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SUMMARY 
 
The existential crisis of the international regime of criminal law is arguably a thing of the 
past. This is confirmed through a growing body of positive law and the existence of various 
international criminal courts, notably the permanent International Criminal Court which has 
been in operation since 2002. Moreover, it is significant that international criminal law 
(“ICL”) is developing towards increased domestic enforcement, in particular as a result of the 
complementarity regime envisioned by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
States have generally been receptive and cooperative towards international criminal norms as 
well as the structures of international criminal justice. As a result international criminal laws 
are increasingly being transformed into national law and enforced by states on the domestic 
level.  
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the abovementioned developments, the 
characteristics of ICL and certain key concepts. In lieu of the upward trajectory of ICL’s 
development, the thesis aims to determine whether ICL exerts an influence which holds 
‘transformative value’. Chapter 3 unpacks this concept by delineating the different meanings 
afforded to transformation and identifying the reticent characteristics of transformative 
change, especially the underlying importance of values during processes of transformation. 
Transformative value is conceptualised broadly as the product and potential of the type of 
change that holds some utility for the civitas maxima (or the community of mankind).  
  
 In Part II, ICL’s transformative value is investigated from a historical and global 
perspective with emphasis on the purposes, values and politics of international criminal 
justice. Chapter 4 focuses on the Nuremberg IMT and the trial of Adolf Eichmann. It is 
submitted that these trials produced a paradigm shift that represents the transformative 
foundation of modern ICL. Chapter 5 investigates the purposes and aspirations of modern 
ICL with reference to its underlying assumptions as well as its objectives, the latter which 
may be found in positive law and the jurisprudence of international criminal courts. The 
research suggests that ICL is disposed towards objectives which are unique in comparison to 
those of domestic criminal law. While it cannot be denied that punishment under ICL is 
predominantly a backward-looking exercise in the tradition of domestic criminal law 
retributivism, ICL is somewhat removed from this paradigm due to its purpose- and value-
driven nature. ICL is also expressive, normative and forward-looking in various respects.  
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Individual criminal liability is however not universally accepted as an appropriate 
response to collective violence. This is partly a result of ICL’s endemic political dependency. 
Chapter 6 addresses the impact of politics on ICL’s transformative value. ICL is closely 
associated with liberal-legalist ideals which essentially promote the interests of individuals. 
Although it constitutes an important element of ICL’s transformative value, this political 
influence exposes ICL to criticism and may exert a disruptive influence on its transformative 
mandate. In this latter respect it is noted that ICL remains somewhat controversial and subject 
to the general limitations of the decentralised and state-dominated international legal system. 
 
In Part III, ICL’s transformative value is investigated using South Africa as a case 
study, with particular reference to its transitional- and post-transitional periods. Chapter 7 
provides a domestic perspective of ICL’s transformative value by investigating the 
interactions of ICL and the South African legal system, particularly the value of the 
transformation of ICL into national law. In this regard the impact of Constitutional provisions 
and national legislation pertaining to ICL are considered, as well as a number of cases related 
to matters of international criminal justice. It is argued that international criminal norms may 
promote human values over state authority and political interests in the domestic context. 
Domestic courts may serve as ‘engine rooms’ for transformative change through more 
effective enforcement of those international criminal norms that have been ‘transformed’ into 
national law through implementation legislation. The permeation of international criminal 
norms into the domestic sphere represents a foray of universal values into an area 
traditionally dominated by sovereign might and holds potential for promoting the interests of 
individuals as well as for the institutionalisation of human rights. Yet, as illustrated by the 
current rift between the ICC and the African Union, international and regional political 
affiliations may influence the ability of a state to meet its obligations towards international 
criminal justice. 
 
In Part IV (Chapter 8), it is submitted that ICL is historically and ontologically aimed 
at change that is both backward-looking (repressive) and forward-looking (normative) as well 
as beneficial in a communitarian sense. ICL’s transformative value derives from the value-
and purpose-driven nature of international criminal norms, the political nature of international 
criminal justice and also from the interaction between international law and domestic legal 
systems. ICL may be viewed as an authoritative expression of the norms and values of the 
international community. As such, ICL and its institutions may be viewed not only as a 
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means of punishing the perpetrators of international crime, but also as part of the spearhead 
towards a desired alternative to the historical and present reality characterised by injustices 
which have gone unabated under the system of traditional Westphalian sovereignty. As 
egregious forms of the aforementioned injustices, macro criminality and impunity undermine 
the protection of internationally recognised individual rights. ICL seeks to remedy this 
through impacting on those individuals that have not yet acceded to the emergent universal 
consciousness of the majority in the international community. It is further argued that ICL’s 
transformative impact is not confined to the “hard” impact of the application of substantive 
ICL in international and domestic courts. The international criminal justice system as a whole 
also produces a normative impact through a purpose-driven association with international 
values and certain political preferences.  
 
This thesis offers a new way of thinking about the value, potential and limitations of 
the ICL regime, as well as the role of politics in international criminal justice.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die eksistensiële krisis van die internasionale strafregbestel is stellig iets van die verlede. Dít 
word bevestig deur die toenemende hoeveelheid positieweregsmateriaal en die bestaan van 
verskeie internasionale strafhowe, in die besonder die permanente Internasionale Strafhof wat 
sedert 2002 in werking is. Daarbenewens is dit beduidend dat internasionale strafreg (hierna 
‘ISR’) na binnelandse toepassing begin verskuif, bepaald as gevolg van die 
komplementariteitsregime wat die Rome Statuut van die Internasionale Strafhof beoog. State 
is oor die algemeen ontvanklik vir, en tegemoetkomend jeens, internasionale strafnorme 
sowel as die strukture van internasionale strafregspleging. Gevolglik word internasionale 
strafwette al hoe meer tot in nasionale wette getransformeer en binnelands deur state 
toegepas.  
 
Hoofstuk 2 bied ’n oorsig van bogenoemde ontwikkelings, die kenmerke van ISR en 
bepaalde kernbegrippe. In die lig van die opwaartse ontwikkelingstrajek van ISR, het dié tesis 
ten doel om te bepaal of die invloed wat ISR uitoefen, oor ‘transformasiewaarde’ beskik. 
Hoofstuk 3 ondersoek hierdie begrip deur die verskillende betekenisse van transformasie 
uiteen te sit en die versweë kenmerke van transformerende verandering, veral die 
onderliggende belang van waardes in die transformasieproses, te bepaal. 
Transformasiewaarde word in die breë verstaan as die produk en potensiaal van die soort 
verandering wat een of ander nut het vir die civitas maxima (of die gemeenskap van die 
mensdom).  
  
 In deel II word die transformasiewaarde van ISR uit ’n historiese en internasionale 
hoek ondersoek, met die klem op die doel, waardes en politiek van internasionale 
strafregspleging. Hoofstuk 4 konsentreer op die Neurenberg- internasionale militêre tribunaal 
en die verhoor van Adolf Eichmann. Daar word aangevoer dat hierdie verhore ’n 
paradigmaverskuiwing teweeggebring het wat die transformerende grondslag van moderne 
ISR gelê het. Hoofstuk 5 verken die doelwitte en aspirasies van moderne ISR aan die hand 
van die onderliggende aannames en oogmerke daarvan. Laasgenoemde is te vinde in die 
positiewe reg en regsleer van internasionale strafhowe. Die navorsing doen aan die hand dat 
die oogmerke van ISR uniek is in vergelyking met dié van binnelandse strafreg. Hoewel straf 
ingevolge ISR onteenseglik ’n hoofsaaklik terugblikkende oefening in die vergeldingstradisie 
van nasionale strafreg is, is ISR tog ietwat verwyderd van hierdie paradigma vanweë die 
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doel- en waardegedrewe aard daarvan. ISR is in baie opsigte ook ekspressief, normatief en 
toekomsgerig.  
 
Individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid word egter nie allerweë as ’n toepaslike 
reaksie op kollektiewe geweld aanvaar nie. Dít is deels ’n gevolg van die endemiese politieke 
afhanklikheid van ISR. Hoofstuk 6 handel derhalwe oor die impak van politiek op die 
transformasiewaarde van ISR. ISR hou ten nouste verband met liberaal-legalistiese ideale wat 
in wese individue se belange bevorder. Hoewel dit ’n belangrike element van die ISR-
transformasiewaarde uitmaak, stel hierdie politieke invloed ISR ook bloot aan kritiek, en kan 
dit ’n ontwrigtende uitwerking op die transformasiemandaat daarvan hê. In dié verband word 
daarop gelet dat ISR ietwat omstrede bly, sowel as onderworpe aan die algemene beperkinge 
van die gedesentraliseerde en staatsoorheerste internasionale regstelsel. 
 
In deel III word die transformasiewaarde van ISR aan die hand van Suid-Afrika as 
gevallestudie ondersoek, met bepaalde verwysing na die oorgangs- en na-oorgangstydperke 
van die land. Hoofstuk 7 bied ’n binnelandse beskouing van die transformasiewaarde van ISR 
deur ondersoek in te stel na die wisselwerking tussen ISR en die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel, 
veral die waarde van die transformasie van ISR tot in die nasionale reg. In hierdie verband 
word daar besin oor die impak van grondwetlike bepalings en nasionale wetgewing met 
betrekking tot ISR, sowel as ’n aantal hofsake in verband met aangeleenthede van 
internasionale strafregspleging. Daar word aangevoer dat internasionale strafnorme in 
binnelandse verband straks mensewaardes bo staatsgesag en politieke belange bevorder. 
Binnelandse howe dien moontlik as ‘enjinkamers’ vir transformerende verandering, deur 
daardie internasionale strafnorme wat deur inwerkingstellingswetgewing tot in die nasionale 
reg ‘getransformeer’ is, doeltreffender toe te pas. Die deurdringing van internasionale 
strafnorme tot in die binnelandse sfeer stel ’n verskeidenheid universele waardes bekend op 
’n gebied wat tradisioneel deur soewereine mag oorheers is, en hou potensiaal in vir die 
bevordering van individuele belange sowel as vir die institusionalisering van menseregte. 
Soos die huidige skeuring tussen die Internasionale Strafhof en die Afrika-unie egter toon, 
kan internasionale en streek- politieke bande ’n invloed hê op ’n staat se vermoë om sy 
verpligtinge teenoor internasionale strafregspleging na te kom. 
 
In deel IV (hoofstuk 8) word aangevoer dat ISR histories en ontologies afgestem is op 
terugblikkende (onderdrukkende) én toekomsgerigte (normatiewe) verandering, sowel as 
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verandering wat een of ander gemeenskapsvoordeel inhou. Die transformasiewaarde van ISR 
spruit uit die waarde- en doelgedrewe aard van internasionale strafnorme, die politieke aard 
van internasionale strafregspleging, sowel as die wisselwerking tussen internasionale reg en 
binnelandse regstelsels. ISR kan as ’n gesaghebbende openbaring van die internasionale 
gemeenskap se norme en waardes beskou word. As sodanig, is ISR en die instellings daarvan 
nie net ’n middel om die plegers van internasionale misdaad te straf nie, maar ook deel van 
die strewe na ’n wenslike alternatief vir die historiese én huidige realiteit, wat gekenmerk 
word deur onregte wat ongebreideld onder die stelsel van tradisionele Wesfaalse 
soewereiniteit voortduur. Makrokriminaliteit en strafloosheid, synde uiterste vorme van 
voormelde onregte, ondermyn die beskerming van internasionaal erkende individuele regte. 
ISR beoog om dít reg te stel deur ’n invloed uit te oefen op daardie individue wat nóg nie die 
ontluikende universele bewustheid van die meerderheid in die internasionale gemeenskap 
openbaar nie. Daar word voorts betoog dat die transformerende impak van ISR nie tot die 
‘harde’ impak van die toepassing van substantiewe ISR in internasionale en binnelandse 
howe beperk is nie. Die stelsel van internasionale strafregspleging in die geheel het ook ’n 
normatiewe impak deur middel van ’n doelgedrewe verbondenheid aan internasionale 
waardes en bepaalde politieke voorkeure.  
 
Hierdie tesis bied ’n nuwe denkwyse oor die waarde, potensiaal en beperkings van die 
ISR-bestel, sowel as die rol van politiek in internasionale strafregspleging.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
“A tree is known by its fruit.”
1
 
 
1.1 Foreword 
 
Since the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereafter 
“Nuremberg IMT”), international law in general has shifted its focus away from interstate 
regulation towards producing direct effects within states.
2
 At the same time, states have 
become increasingly receptive towards the norms and values of international law. The 
prevailing international human rights movement necessitates a domestic legal system and 
foreign policies which are well aligned with international criminal law (hereafter “ICL”) in 
order to show a government committed firstly, to protecting against serious human rights 
violations of its own citizens and secondly to punishing the worst individual transgressors of 
ICL norms on behalf of the international community.
3
 The creation of the International 
                                                          
1
 This proverb refers to the notion that a person may be judged according to his or her actions. With 
reference to this proverb, Snyman argues that the value of a legal regime should be measured according to 
its practical results. In particular, Snyman notes that the lofty aspirations in the South African Bill of 
Rights stand in stark contrast to the country’s “dysfunctional” criminal justice system. See Snyman CR 
Criminal Law (Fifth Edition) (2008) LexisNexis, Durban 23-24.  
2
 Slaughter AM and Burke-White W “The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The European Way 
of Law)” (2006) 47 (2) Harvard Journal of International Law 327-352, 328. The authors contend that 
international law engages directly with domestic institutions in three ways: 1) Through strengthening 
domestic institutions; 2) through acting as a ‘backstop’ when national legal systems are unwilling or 
unable to enforce international law (especially through the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, article 17); and 3) through acting as a catalyst to compel states to act. 
3
 Significant in this regard is the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) under which states have a responsibility 
to protect their citizens from various international crimes, see UNGA Resolution 60(1) (2005) (World 
Summit Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly) para 138; see 
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Criminal Court (hereafter “ICC”) and the complementarity regime contained in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC (hereafter “Rome Statute”) offers arguably the best illustrations of the 
intended intrastate application of international legal norms. These developments allude to a 
novel purpose for international law which goes beyond its traditional regulatory function to 
emphasise instead the international community’s desire to alter the status quo. This desire 
points towards a developing commonality of basic human values. In this regard the 
emergence and rapid expansion of an international regime of criminal law is one of the most 
significant developments in modern international law. Along with other cosmopolitan 
developments which promote the interests of the individual, ICL may be regarded as a 
precursor of an international legal order depending less on traditional, sovereignty-based state 
cooperation, but more on shared international values and enforceable rights under 
international law.
4
 As we move slowly toward the Kantian conception of a ‘world legal 
order’, it becomes imperative to understand those bodies of law which aim to transform, or 
change for the better, the world we live in.
5
 ICL represents such a development and its socio-
legal impact, value and potential are the primary points of focus in this thesis. Does (or will) 
the ‘tree’ of international criminal justice bear fruit? 
 
                                                          
also Drumbl MA “Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity” 
(2004-2005) 99 (2) Northwestern University Law Review 538-611, 546: “The community of international 
human rights activists support the expansion of the international criminal justice paradigm and, according 
to William Schabas, thereby has ‘adjusted its historic predisposition for the rights of the defence and the 
protection of prisoners to a more prosecution-based orientation’”. See also Schabas WA “Sentencing by 
International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach” (1997) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 461-518, 515.  
4
 This resonates with Grotius’s view of international law as natural law binding upon all states by way of 
reason. See Johnson D, Pete S and Du Plessis M Jurisprudence: A South African Perspective (2001) 
Butterworths, Durban 34-35. 
5
 See Wallace RMM and Martin-Ortega O International Law (Sixth Edition) (2009) Sweet and Maxwell, 
London 263: “The establishment of the [ICC] is evidence that the international community recognizes that 
there is a role for a permanent international legal regime” (emphasis added). See also Wise EM “Aut 
Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite” in Bassiouni MC (ed.) International Criminal 
Law (Volume II): Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms (Second Edition) (1999) Transnational 
Publishers, New York 15.  
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Criminal law is increasingly being used as a response to social evil and a means for 
intervention and regulation based on international authority.
6
 The paradigm of recourse to 
criminal law as an instrument of transformation is however not yet fully understood nor 
accepted and has therefore been met with some criticism. This is mostly the result of the sui 
generis nature and purposes of ICL. The aim of this study is to holistically determine the 
transformative value of ICL from a critical perspective and to provide a forward-looking 
analysis of the potential for socio-legal transformation via this body of law.  
 
Furthermore, as a result of the intrastate aspirations of international law and the 
increased commonality of values described above, many states including democratic South 
Africa have incorporated or transformed international criminal norms into their domestic 
law.
7
 This development is equally significant for its capacity to circumvent power in support 
of principle and consequently for the value which it may hold for individuals. The second 
part of the research question addresses this interaction and the value thereof. 
  
1.2 Research question 
 
What is the transformative value of international criminal law in general, and for the 
South African domestic legal system in particular? 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The study comprises investigations in two complementary segments, namely the 
determination of ICL’s transformative value from a general perspective (from above) and the 
transformative value of ICL from a domestic legal perspective (from below) using South 
                                                          
6
 See Stolle P and Singelnstein T “On the Aims and Actual Consequences of International Prosecution” in 
Kaleck W, Ratner M, Singelnstein T and Weiss P (eds.) International Prosecution of Human Rights 
Crimes (2007) Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Heidelberg 49. 
7
 According to section 231-232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, international 
agreements that have been enacted into South African law through national legislation and customary 
international law are binding sources of law in the Republic unless they are inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament. On incorporation and transformation of international law, see 
Chapter 3 para 3.2 infra. 
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Africa as a specially selected case study.
8
 By determining the scope of ICL’s influence, this 
thesis aims to make a tangible contribution to the field by furthering the understanding of the 
purposes and values of ICL as well as various supranational interactions (“transformative 
synergies”) involving ICL.9 The focus of the thesis falls largely on the use of ICL during 
transition and in the wake of mass atrocities; ICL’s interactions with domestic legal systems 
and politics; and the potential of ICL to act as a conduit for socio-legal transformation. 
 
Part I of this thesis serves as a general introduction to (and demarcation of) the 
research. Chapter 2 offers a brief history of ICL and investigates the nature and 
characteristics thereof. It contains a number of critical pointers which are relevant to the 
research question. Chapter 3 considers the cross-disciplinary understandings of 
transformation and clarifies the concept of transformative value. The concept is central to the 
research question and the thesis. An open definition for the concept is proposed at the end of 
Chapter 3, namely change that benefits the civitas maxima.
10
 It is important to note that the 
proposed open definition of transformative value will not be strictly applied herein, but is 
intended as a general guide for addressing the research question.
11
 
 
                                                          
8
 The rationale for the use of South Africa as a case study is set out under Chapter 7 para 7.1 infra. 
9
 On “transformative synergies”, see Chapter 8 para 8.3.4 infra. 
10
 Revived by Christian Wolff in the eighteenth century, the idea of the civitas maxima has its origins in 
Roman jurisprudence. It is inspired by natural law and refers to an abstract entity also known as the 
community of mankind or the international community of individuals. The notion is independent from 
accepting the existence (or future existence) of a world government and instead focuses on “utilitarian 
value derived from common and mutual interests”. See Bassiouni MC Introduction to International 
Criminal Law (2003) Transnational Publishers, New York 18-20; Wise EM “Extradition: The Hypothesis 
of a Civitas Maxima and the Maxim Aut Dedere Aut Judicare” (1991) 62 International Review of Penal 
Law 111-112; for the open definition of ‘transformative value’ see Chapter 3 para 3.5 infra. In this thesis 
the notion of the civitas maxima is used to refer to the international community of individuals. In this 
community the collective interest transcends that of individuals. Accordingly, crimes under international 
law affect not only individuals, but on some level also the whole of mankind. Furthermore, punishment of 
a perpetrator of a crime that affects the international community is not only in the interest of the victims, 
but also in the interest of all individuals in the international community. 
11
 See Chapter 3 para 3.1 infra. 
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Once the concept of transformative value has been introduced and delineated, the 
thesis turns to the identification and evaluation of the transformative value of ICL in general 
(Part II) through the foundations, rationale and objectives of ICL (Chapters 4 and 5); the 
politics of international criminal justice (Chapter 6); and in the domestic (South African) 
context (Part III, Chapter 7). Throughout, the enquiry proceeds against the background of the 
upward trajectory of the ICL regime’s development and other important movements in 
international law: the movement away from ad hoc legalism (international tribunals) to an 
international criminal justice system based on the principle of complementarity; liberal-
legalist ascendency in international criminal justice; political transition (especially 
democratisation); and the international human rights movement.  
 
Part IV (Chapter 8) reflects on the various aspects raised by the thesis and considers 
what conclusions can be drawn from it in its entirety. Chapter 8 contains a number of 
arguments in support of the general conclusion as well as submissions based on the research’s 
findings. 
 
1.4 Sources 
 
The research is essentially conducted from an international law perspective. Since ICL 
emanates from the same sources as international law in general, the sources outlined in article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice are applicable.
12
 These are:  
 International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states  
 International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law  
 The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations  
 Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
 13
 
This notwithstanding, the preference given under article 38(1) to certain sources as primary 
sources over others as subsidiary, is not strictly adhered to since this may conflict with ICL in 
                                                          
12
 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law (Second Edition) (2009) TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague 49-50.  
13
 Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to the Charter of the United Nations) 18 April 
1946, article 38(1). 
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practice.
14
 Therefore decisions of national or international courts are recognised as primary 
sources of law where applicable. The law of the Rome Statute, as “a partial codification [of 
ICL] by treaty”, also constitutes a primary source of law for use in this thesis.15  
 
Furthermore, the investigation of ICL’s transformative value in the South African 
context (Part III) requires the use of legislation and case law from the South African legal 
system. The status of international (criminal) law in the South African legal system is set out 
in detail with reference to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”)  in Chapter 7 para 7.4 infra.  
 
1.5 Assumptions 
 
The following assumptions underlie the research and writing of this thesis: 
 
1. The upward trajectory in the development of ICL (as part of the broader expansion of 
international law) will continue and may result in greater application and enforcement of 
ICL norms.
16
 Furthermore, as the influence and reach of ICL increases so too should its 
transformative value.  
2. The influence and reach of the international criminal justice system is not confined to the 
application of ICL. The system as a whole produces an effect (or a ‘soft impact’) which 
goes beyond trial, judgment and punishment to produce a less tangible, yet valuable 
influence.
17
 The norms and values of international criminal justice, and the domestic law 
                                                          
14
 See Ferdinandusse WN Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts (2006) 
TMC Asser Press, The Hague 5-6. 
15
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 50; see also Chapter 2 para 2.2.3 infra. 
16
 See Wallace and Martin-Ortega (International Law) (supra) 6: “The twentieth century witnessed an 
unparalleled expansion of international law. Evidence points to that expansion continuing in the twenty-
first century”. 
17
 This soft impact is closely related to the underlying importance of values in the transformative process 
as will be discussed at Chapter 3 para 3.4.6 infra. The conceptualisation of this distinction between the 
hard and soft impact of international criminal justice is aided by the well-known distinction between hard 
law and soft law under public international law. Hard law denotes binding law, rules or principles that 
create positive obligations. Soft law refers to non-legally binding international instruments containing 
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obligations of states towards international criminal justice may, for example, influence 
the decisions, behaviour and actions of prosecutors, lawmakers, policymakers, human 
rights NGOs, supranational organisations (such as the United Nations), states and 
individuals in the international community. 
3. This study perceives ICL as a body of law encompassing the prosecution of international 
crime by international and domestic courts. It includes both criminal aspects of 
international law (this includes the core crimes contained in the Rome Statute: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression) and international aspects of 
domestic criminal law (prominent examples of such treaty crimes include drug 
trafficking, money laundering and terrorism).
18
 Jurisdiction over crimes under 
international law is derived from public international law and results in direct criminality, 
while jurisdiction over treaty crimes derives from domestic legislation or from treaties 
and results in indirect criminality under international law.
19
  
4. Socio-legal transformation is the over-arching objective of ICL from which all legal 
cultures and individuals can ultimately benefit. This hypothesis - that ICL has 
transformative value - is the primary point of focus throughout the thesis. 
5. The future of ICL depends largely on the applicability of ICL in domestic criminal justice 
systems with the ICC as an institution of last resort, or backstop, for crimes under the 
                                                          
general obligations and voluntary resolutions (to qualify as soft law it is required that these “guidelines” 
must appear in written form). Soft law lies between law and non-law and has proven to be a useful way of 
securing state consent in multilateral cooperation, but may also have persuasive force (especially in the 
long-run). See Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (2011) (Fourth Edition) Juta, 
Cape Town 33-34. 
18
 Cryer R, Friman H, Robinson D and Wilmhurst E An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (2007) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 3: “Similar terminological distinction…can 
also be found in other languages, such as German (Völkerstrafrecht compared with Internationales 
Strafrecht), French (droit international pènal and droit penal international) and Spanish (derecho 
internacional penal and derecho penal internacional)”. See also Wise EM “Terrorism and the Problem of 
an International Criminal Law” (1987) 19 Connecticut Law Review 801-808; these distinctions are set out 
more fully in Chapter 2 para 2.2.2 infra. Regarding the current status of the crime of aggression under the 
Rome Statute, see Chapter 2 footnote 61 infra. 
19
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 2-3; Werle (Principles of International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 42-43. For a more detailed distinction between crimes under international law and 
international aspects of domestic criminal law, see Chapter 2 para 2.2.2 infra. 
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Rome Statute.
20
 In addition to the obligations of states towards the ICC flowing from the 
Rome Statute and from the feature of complementarity, there have been unilateral efforts 
on the part of a few states to actively pursue the prosecution of international crimes 
through the use of extraterritorial grounds of criminal jurisdiction.
21
 
 
1.6 Limitations and Demarcation 
 
To limit the scope of this thesis, with the aim to stay as near as possible to the research 
question, some subjects or themes which are relevant to the study and which may feature 
regularly throughout the thesis will not be discussed in more detail than is required for 
                                                          
20
 Bergsmo M “On the Long-Term Contributions of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and Lessons for the 
International Criminal Court” Lecture Transcript, Oxford, 29 January 2009, available at 
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1178274301/pp%20090129%20contributions%20tribunals%20(lecture,%20oxf
ord).pdf (accessed 2012/07/20): “The ‘era of multiple international(ised) criminal jurisdictions’ is probably 
coming to an end […] In the ‘new era’, we will have the ICC operating at the international level, 
complementary to national criminal justice. The centre of criminal justice for atrocities will gravitate to the 
national level”. This is also confirmed by UNSC Resolution 1503 (2003) (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) which instructed the ICTY to 
refer all lower- and mid-level accused back to the region for trial by domestic court. This directive gave 
recognition to an increased domestic capacity for trying international crimes. See                                       
ICTY Manual of Developed Practices (2009) 4, available from the ICTY-website at                                                           
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developed_practices/icty_manu
al_on_developed_practices.pdf (accessed 2012/07/20). See also “Report of the Secretary-General to the 
Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, UN Doc. S/1999/957 (8 September 
1999) 10, Recommendation B5 and B6 (the UN Secretary General recommended the UNSC to “encourage 
the development of judicial and investigative mechanisms with national and international components, 
which may be used when the prosecution of those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes” and to “urge Member States to adopt national legislation for the prosecution of individuals 
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”). 
21
 Notable examples are the efforts of Spain to extradite Augusto Pinochet from England, see R v Bow 
Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (1999) 4 All ER 897; R v Bow Street Stipendiary 
Magistrate (Bartle) ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (1999) 1 All ER 577;  R v Bow Street Stipendiary 
Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3 ) (1999) 2 All ER 97; and the Belgian effort to prosecute 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the incumbent foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, by 
way of an international arrest warrant, see Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (The “Arrest 
Warrant” case), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 3. 
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addressing the research question. Chief among these topics are: transitional justice; the debate 
over the choice between, and the merits of, criminal prosecutions and alternative justice 
mechanisms respectively; the legality of amnesties under international law; the impact of 
immunities under customary international law on liability for international crimes; and 
international relations theory. In-depth discussions of the complexities and current debates 
prevalent within these topics will detract from addressing the research question more than it 
would contribute thereto. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
2.1 A Brief History of International Criminal Law 
 
The existential crisis of ICL, in the decades following the acceptance of the Nuremberg 
Charter and the London Agreement, is arguably a thing of the past.
22
 Before the Nuremberg 
IMT and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereafter “Tokyo IMTFE”), ICL 
had originated from diverse sources such as the laws and customs of war resulting in 
unsystematic development over a period of almost 500 years.
23
 Despite the gradual 
development of international crimes such as piracy and slavery up until the Second World 
War, ICL and international law in general, remained greatly underdeveloped.  
 
The catalyst of ICL’s rise to greater prominence during the last 60 years has been the 
terrible effects of worldwide warfare and government sponsored human rights abuses.
24
 The 
                                                          
22
 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (“Nuremberg Charter”), in Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6(3), August 8, 1945, 
58 Stat. 1544 E.A.S. No. 472, 82 UNTS 280. On ICL’s former existential crisis in general, see the 
influential article by Schwarzenberger G “The Problem of International Criminal Law” (1950) 3 Current 
Legal Problems 263-296. 
 
23
 Sunga LS The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and 
Implementation (1997) Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2; see also Bassiouni MC “International 
Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension between States’ Interests and the Pursuit of 
International Justice” in Cassese A (ed.) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 132: “The history of international criminal justice can be said to have its 
first precedent with the 1474 Breisach trial, where 26 judges of the Holy Roman Empire presided over the 
case of Peter von Hagenbach, who was accused of committing ‘crimes against the laws and nature of God’ 
in sacking and pillaging the city of Breisach”.  
24
 See Kemp G Individual Criminal Liability for the Crime of Aggression (2010) Intersentia, Antwerp 9: 
“One way to look at the system of international criminal law is to view it as a reaction of the international 
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development of ICL proceeded incrementally after the First World War, but it was the 
horrors of the Second World War and the Jewish Holocaust that finally awakened humanity’s 
dormant “universal consciousness”.25  This set in motion what would become some of the 
most significant developments in modern international law.
26
 These developments - 
individual criminal responsibility for violations of international law; international human 
rights; and the emergence of supranational crimes – complement each other and demonstrate 
the growing acquiescence of states and the international community to depart from the 
traditional model of Westphalian sovereignty.
27
  
 
Before the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMTFE, international criminals faced either 
extrajudicial action (notably executions) or more often than not, impunity. Britain, for 
example, had favoured summary execution of the top leadership of the Nazi Party based on 
the fact that “their ‘guilt was so black’ that it was beyond the scope of any judicial process”.28 
Furthermore, prosecutorial efforts on the domestic level “were considered to be hopelessly 
political and doomed”.29 To circumvent this, the post-war IMTs used the “vocabulary of 
international law” in an attempt to “lift [criminal] justice out of its politicized national 
                                                          
community to atrocities”. See also Ratner S and Abrahams J Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (1997) Oxford University Press, Oxford 5. 
25
 Bassiouni MC “The Discipline of International Criminal Law” (2002) Paper presented at the World 
Conference on International Criminal Law (28 November – 4 December 2002) 14; see also Broomhall B 
International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law 
(2003) Oxford University Press, Oxford 19 (referring to “the revolution in public consciousness”). 
26
 On the general impact of the Nuremberg IMT on international law, see Dugard (International Law) 
(supra) 322.  
27
 See Hessler K “State Sovereignty as an Obstacle to International Criminal Law” in May L and Hoskins 
Z (eds.) International Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 44-
45.  
28
 See Bassiouni MC International Criminal Law (Volume III): Enforcement (Second Edition) (1999) 
Transnational Publishers, New York 41; see Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) 
(supra) 18 (extra-judicial methods of dealing with perpetrators are now considered an unlawful response to 
international crime). In 1943, Churchill proposed that between 50 and 100 “world outlaws” should be shot 
within 6 hours without reference to any higher authority (see Kadri S The Trial: A History from Socrates to 
OJ Simpson (2006) Harper Perennial, London 228). 
29
 Teitel R Transitional Justice (2000) Oxford University Press, Oxford 31. 
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context”.30 The decision to resort to (international) law and the criminal trial as a means of 
dealing with the perpetrators of mass atrocity represents arguably the defining moment for 
international criminal justice.  Although the post-war IMTs were, at the time, also a practical 
method of dealing with suspected war criminals, the legal legacy and symbolic value of these 
trials, and particularly that of the Nuremberg IMT, may be viewed as their greatest and most 
enduring contribution.
31
 The IMT and IMTFE demonstrated the international community’s 
resolve to turn away from extrajudicial and unlawful treatment of international criminals 
towards hope for a future where accountability under the rule of law may become a reality 
even for the most heinous acts committed behind the veil of statehood and official capacity. 
As a consequence, individual criminal responsibility based on international jurisdiction has 
become one of the principle aims of successor justice.
32
 
 
The proceedings at the Nuremberg IMT and the Tokyo IMTFE have, however, been 
criticised for its shortcomings.
33
 Many viewed the trials as “victors’ justice” or “showcase 
trials” devoid of legitimacy owing to the one-sidedness of the prosecutions (only political and 
military leaders from the Axis countries stood trial) and a lack of equal representation of 
judges on the bench. Both trials were under the exclusive control of the victorious Allied 
forces. Many of the convicted persons received the death sentence which is regarded as 
unacceptable in the modern international criminal justice system. Furthermore the IMTs were 
                                                          
30
 Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 33. As will be discussed in the following paragraph, it cannot 
however be said that these tribunals were absolutely apolitical. 
31
 See Chapter 4 para 4.2.3.3 infra. See also the opening statement of Robert H. Jackson, Representative 
and Chief of Council for the United States of America, during his opening address at the IMT (21 
November 1945): “The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so 
malignant, and so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive 
their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of 
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most 
significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason”. And later: “This inquest represents the practical 
effort of 4 of the most mighty of nations, with the support of 14 more, to utilize international law to meet 
the greatest menace of our times – aggressive war”. Available at http://www.ena.lu/ (accessed 2010/03/29). 
32
 Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 31. 
33
 See Schwarzenberger G “Judgement of Nuremberg” (1947) 21 Tulane Law Review 329-361, 348-349; 
Dugard (International Law) (supra) 321; Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 443. 
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said to have violated the principle of retroactive application of the law and, in relation to 
crimes against the peace, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.  
 
Many of the criticisms above are valid. Even so, history has generally cast the 
Nuremberg IMT in a favourable light and its contribution to modern ICL can be regarded as 
indispensable. These trials were certainly a less than perfect point of departure for the age of 
international criminal justice, but they were a point of departure nonetheless. The Nuremberg 
Principles (“a distillation of the Nuremberg judgement”), along with the United Nations 
Charter, embodied the growing consciousness of people across state boundaries and created 
new legal dynamics between individuals, states and the international community.
34
 
Supranational crimes - crimes against peace and crimes against humanity - were recognised 
and proscribed for the first time. Perhaps most importantly, the “Nuremberg revolution”, as it 
has since become known, advanced the notion that “crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not abstract entities”.35 The principle of individual criminal responsibility 
for international crimes is now firmly established in international law.
36
  
 
                                                          
34
 Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 34; Broomhall (International Justice and the International Criminal 
Court) (supra) 19; see also UNGA Resolution 95(I) (1946) (Affirmation of the Principles of International 
Law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal). 
35
 See Trial of the German Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(Judgment and Sentence) (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 221. 
36
 See Erasmus AE “Revisiting Schwarzenberger Today: The Problem of an International Criminal Law” 
(2003) 16 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 397: “The principle was subsequently adopted by the 
General Assembly and enshrined in the Nuremberg Principles [Principle 1 of the Principles of 
International Law recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal] and replicated in the International Law Commission’s Draft Codes of Offenses/Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind [Article 1 of the Draft Code, 1954 and Article 2 of the Draft Code, 
1996]. It has been enshrined in the statutes and jurisprudence of both ad hoc tribunals [art(s) 7(1) and 23(1) 
of the ICTY Statute and art(s) 6(1) and 22(1) of the ICTR Statute] and the ICC [Article 25 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court]”. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeals Chamber: 
Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, para 186: “The basic assumption must be that in 
international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle 
of personal culpability [...]”. For an overview of the dilemmas inherent to individual criminal 
responsibility as a response to state criminality, see Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 34-36. 
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Furthermore, the Nuremberg IMT and particularly the precedent of individual 
criminal liability for international crime which it established, has been described as a 
historical highlight for proponents of the cosmopolitan theory. Hirsh contends that 
contemporary cosmopolitan theory: 
“[…] understands the period following the Second World War as one in which the rupture 
between ethics and power is gradually being bridged. There is a growth of structural changes 
that bypass the system of independent states both from below and from above, creating 
significant networks of power that are no longer subject to state authority.”
37
 
The increasing “supranational limitation of state power”, initiated at the IMTs and 
subsequently consolidated, can be perceived as the result of a movement from power-based 
actors (states) as the exclusive actors in international law, to norm-driven actors (the 
international community of individuals or the civitas maxima).
38
 Humanity’s “universal 
consciousness” referred to earlier, found overt expression in the human rights movement. 
Through initiatives that protect the basic rights inherent to every human being by virtue of 
their very existence, individuals found for the first time a limited amount of protection and 
recognition under international law.
39
 A multitude of treaties enshrined human rights, but also 
criminalised certain types of conduct on the international level. In combination, these 
instruments were meant to protect individuals and vulnerable groups from, especially, abuse 
of rights where the state or agents of state were involved.
40
  
 
Following the IMT and IMTFE, ICL’s growth would be inhibited due to the political 
deadlock of the Cold War, which continued for almost half a century.
41
 This period, saw a 
dramatic decrease in the number of international armed conflicts and a proliferation of non-
international or internal conflicts and human rights abuses by tyrannical regimes and 
                                                          
37
 Hirsh D Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials (2003) Glasshouse Press, London 20. 
38
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 9. 
39
 See Dugard (International Law) (supra) 1-2: “Since World War II numerous treaties have been signed 
extending the protection of international law to individuals […] Individuals benefit from the protection of 
international law and participate in its processes. They may also be prosecuted for international crimes. 
They cannot, however, be described as full subjects of international law”. 
40
 See for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Genocide Convention (1948) and the Convention Against Torture (1984). 
41
 Bassiouni (International Criminal Law: Enforcement) (supra) 53: “Justice was the Cold War’s casualty”. 
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totalitarian governments.
42
 The death toll from these forms of victimisation far exceeded 
those from international armed conflicts.
43
 International law was ill-equipped to address these 
new threats to international peace and individual human rights since, in the traditionally 
“liberal” international order, states had enjoyed exclusive sovereignty within their territorial 
boundaries and have been left to regulate their own internal affairs.
44
 Traditionally, 
international law regulates external state conduct and, because it is tolerant and 
accommodating of the pluralism in political ideology and political systems among the states 
of the world, it does not attempt to prescribe or impose an overarching version of “the good” 
on states internally.
45
 The nature of threats to international peace however, demanded a more 
flexible international criminal justice system capable of intervening when domestic criminal 
justice systems were unable to protect citizens or to administer justice. Despite these growing 
demands, the international law principle of non-intervention, coupled with the crippling 
effects of political deadlock in the UN Security Council, created an overwhelming obstacle to 
the development of an independent body of ICL during the Cold War period.
46
  
 
In his influential article, “The problem of an international criminal law” (1950), 
Schwarzenberger posed an existential challenge to ICL and elaborated on the problems of 
ICL enforcement and the crucial importance of the state’s role in the domestic application of 
                                                          
42
 Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 3-4, 65. 
43
 See Bassiouni MC “Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious 
Violations of Human Rights” in Bassiouni MC (ed.) Post-Conflict Justice (2002) Transnational Publishers, 
New York 7: “During the course of the twentieth century it is estimated that conflicts of a non-
international character and the abuses by repressive regimes have resulted in estimates of 170 million 
deaths of mostly civilians. This is compared with an estimated 33 million military casualties over the same 
time. Since World War II alone it is estimated that more than 250 conflicts of a purely internal character 
have occurred. These post-World War II situations, which include conflicts of a non-international character 
and the abuses of repressive regimes, have resulted in an estimated 86 million casualties” (footnotes 
omitted).  
44
 Henkin L International Law: Politics and Values (1995) Marthinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 104; 
see also the discussion of ‘classical liberalism’ in Chapter 6 para 6.3.2.1 infra. 
45
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 104. 
46
 Charter of the United Nations, article 2(4) and article 2(7). 
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treaties.
47
 Erasmus observes that, even sixty years after its initial publication, and in a more 
advanced international legal and political landscape, Schwarzenberger’s article remains 
relevant to modern ICL scholars.
48
 Schwarzenberger persuasively argued that ICL did not 
exist by comparing ICL with the character of municipal criminal law. His main objection to 
ICL was the lack of a central authority in the international order with the power to impose 
penal sanctions.
49
 The article in its entirety was (and to a lesser extent still is) a challenge to 
“the meaning and value of ‘international criminal law’”. 50  His observation that both the 
“swords of war and of justice” are “[...] annexed to the Sovereign Power” and his main 
objection based on the absence of a central enforcement agency rings true in modern 
international law despite the establishment of institutions of accountability such as the ad hoc 
tribunals and the permanent ICC.
51
 As will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters, 
these latter institutions are heavily reliant on state cooperation for their effectiveness.
52
 
 
                                                          
47
 Schwarzenberger (The Problem of International Criminal Law) (supra) 266-267: “To the extent to 
which such conventions impose a duty on states to enact municipal criminal legislation or to punish certain 
acts committed by their subjects or within their territorial jurisdiction, such conventions may be said to 
prescribe municipal criminal law. If however States should fail to live up to their treaty obligations, they 
themselves do not commit any ‘international crime’, but are merely responsible for breach of their treaty 
obligation”. 
48
 See Erasmus (Revisiting Schwarzenberger) (supra) 393-414. 
49
 Erasmus (Revisiting Schwarzenberger) (supra) 394; see also Wise (Terrorism and the Problem of 
International Criminal Law) (supra) 829-830. Wise contends that “the existence of international criminal 
law strictu sensu depends on the existence of a relatively cohesive international community” and that 
“[insofar] as the international system does not correspond, in its basic structure, to a genuine ‘community’, 
it does not provide the requisite context for a body of international criminal law materially analogous to 
that which obtains in domestic legal systems”. Nonetheless, Wise adds that ICL could be viewed as “a 
coherent and fruitful field of study”. 
50
 Erasmus (Revisiting Schwarzenberger) (supra) 393. 
51
 Schwarzenberger (The Problem of International Criminal Law) (supra) 294. Damaska notes that “the 
sword of justice tends to be used most against individuals from states that occupy a lowly place in the de 
facto existing hierarchy of states”. See Damaska MR “What is the Point of International                           
Criminal Justice?” (2008) Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1573, available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ fss_papers/1573 (accessed 2012/01/12) 330. 
52
 See Chapter 6 para 6.3.4 and Chapter 7 para 7.6.2 infra. 
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There is some evidence that the tide may be turning against Schwarzenberger’s 
reservations regarding ICL. His argument that universal criminal justice will only become a 
reality once the international community, and not states, wields the “sword of justice” has 
gradually become an objective of, rather than a critique against, ICL.
53
 Modern ICL may be 
viewed as an expression of the will of the international community. This is largely due to 
resurgence of ICL since the 1990’s, which in turn was made possible by a favourable political 
climate in the international order. The increased cooperation in the development of ICL at the 
supranational level is evidenced by the creation of the permanent ICC through a multilateral 
treaty. ICL is no longer viewed, as it was by Schwarzenberger and others, as non-existent. 
Rather, problems related to the enforcement of ICL are seen as imperfections, the “growing 
pains” of an emerging legal system or as defects owing to the anachronistic imbalance 
between power and principle in the international order.   
 
The end of the Cold War signalled the end of the “bi-polar” era in the international 
order in which international law had been overshadowed by the ideological conflict between 
the United States of America and Communist Russia.
54
 Since the fall of communism, the 
international order has been transformed and there has been a broader commitment (largely 
reflected in international law) to the interdependence of states, democracy, economic freedom 
and environmental issues.
55
 With a newfound “unity” the international order could for the 
first time turn its attentions towards intrastate conflict and humanitarian catastrophes. The 
end of the Cold War also saw the re-emergence of cosmopolitanism in international law 
which “seeks to limit state sovereignty, and lays down minimum standards for the treatment 
of human beings by states”.56 Against this background ICL was to be resuscitated. Crucially, 
it is also against this background that modern ICL must be interpreted and understood.  
 
The resurgence of ICL, following the Cold War, commenced through the 
establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals (the “ICTY” and “ICTR”) 
                                                          
53
 Schwarzenberger (The Problem of International Criminal Law) (supra) 296. 
54
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 1. 
55
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 1. 
56
 See Hirsh (Law Against Genocide) (supra) 1, 13-17. 
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during the 1990’s.57 The ad hoc tribunals represented the first institutions founded by the 
‘international community’ to try individuals for international crimes. 58  From the outset, 
these tribunals faced a bevy of practical and legal problems. A lack of resources, bureaucratic 
hurdles and various legal issues combined to bring the tribunal’s work to a grind.59 The 
failures of the ad hoc tribunals confirmed the need for a more permanent system of 
international criminal justice and initiated a process which later culminated in the creation of 
the permanent ICC on 1 July 2002.
60
 The permanent ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, but is complementary to national courts 
with regards to the prosecution of such crimes.
61
 A case involving one or more of these 
crimes is admissible to the court only in instances where the  national courts of that State 
(with jurisdiction over the matter in terms of article 12(2)) are “unwilling or unable 
genuinely” to investigate or prosecute. 62  This is known as the system (or feature) of 
complementarity and will be discussed more fully in various parts of the thesis.
63
 
 
The creation of the ad hoc tribunals and the permanent ICC has gone some way 
towards reversing the general tendency towards impunity for the perpetrators of international 
                                                          
57
 On the resurgence of ICL since the 1990’s, see Tallgren I “The Sensibility and Sense of International 
Criminal Law” (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 561–595, 562 (footnote 4); Werle 
(Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 15-16. 
58
 As opposed to the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMTFE founded by the victorious Allied Forces, the 
ICTY and ICTR were established by the UN Security Council. See (ICTY Manual on Developed 
Practices) (supra) 3. 
59
 Bassiouni (International Criminal Law: Enforcement) (supra) 63. 
60
 Bassiouni (International Criminal Law: Enforcement) (supra) 63. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (UN Doc A/CONF.183/9) was adopted on 19 July 1998 and received the 60 ratifications 
needed to enter into force on 1 July 2002. 
61
 Rome Statute of the ICC, articles 5(1), 5(2) and 17. With regards to aggression, the original text of the 
Rome Statute stipulated that the Court may not prosecute acts of aggression until the crime was defined 
and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction were set out [article 5(2)]. At the Kampala Review 
Conference article 5(2) was recalled from the Statute and a number of amendments accepted. Article 8 bis 
contains a definition of the crime of aggression while article 15 bis and article 15 ter sets out the grounds 
for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The Court may not however, exercise 
jurisdiction before 1 January 2017, where after State Parties may decide to activate such jurisdiction.  
62
 Rome Statute of the ICC, article 17. 
63
 See Chapter 2 para 2.2.8 infra; Chapter 5 para 5.6.3 infra. 
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crimes. Although impunity is no longer the political “bargaining card” that it used to be, 
history shows that perpetrators of international crimes rarely end up in the courtroom.
64
 Since 
the Second World War various alternatives to criminal justice have been used in response to 
situations of mass atrocity. Truth commissions, lustration and conditional amnesties have 
often been invoked in these situations, especially during transitional periods. These 
mechanisms are believed to be useful because of their potential to fulfil a combination of 
needs in transitional or post-conflict societies which outweigh the need for accountability in 
the retributive sense. Short-term peace, reconciliation, truth-finding and redress/reparation for 
victims may be mentioned in this regard. The inadequacy of national prosecutions in dealing 
with mass violence and state criminality may also have had a hand in the rise of alternatives 
to criminal justice.
65
 One can site selectivity, bias and the failure to address the needs of 
victims in national courts as factors that have contributed to the search for alternatives to 
criminal justice.
66
 As a result of these shortcomings, and due to relatively successful resorts 
to alternatives to criminal justice (a notable example is the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission), many dispute the courtroom as the appropriate forum to turn to 
after mass atrocity. Alvarez points out the following in this regard: 
“Awareness of the alternatives to international criminal justice and the rationales offered to 
justify them cast a critical light on the assumptions of some that the ideal forum for mass 
atrocity is an international court, or that there is only a dichotomous choice between criminal 
accountability and total amnesia [...]”
67
 
Criminal prosecutions can be used in conjunction with the alternatives outlined above, or as a 
complementary tool for achieving a broader justice. It is increasingly becoming clear that 
prosecutorial- and alternative justice approaches are not mutually exclusive. The UN seems 
to (at least tacitly) support this notion. On the basis of the popular slogan “no peace without 
justice”, it has supported different modes of justice in many post-conflict societies in the 
                                                          
64
 Bassiouni (supra) in Bassiouni (Post-Conflict Justice) (supra) 4; Alvarez JE “Alternatives to 
International Criminal Justice” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 25. Muammar Gaddafi and Joseph 
Kony may be taken as contemporary examples. The ICC issued arrest warrants for both. Having died at the 
hands of rebels during the civil strife in Libya, Gaddafi never made it to court, while Joseph Kony remains 
at large despite his newfound international notoriety. 
65
 Alvarez (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 26-29. 
66
 Alvarez (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 29. 
67
 Alvarez (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 37. 
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interest of peace.
68
 This stance was evident in South Africa (where the UN showed indirect 
support for the establishment of a truth commission which could grant conditional amnesties) 
and in Sierra Leone (where the UN supported the establishment of both criminal prosecutions 
and a truth commission).  
 
2.2 The Characteristics of International Criminal Law and Some Key Concepts 
 
2.2.1 The Dual- and Sui Generis Character of International Criminal Law 
 
ICL is essentially a combination of international law and criminal law in the domestic law 
tradition that affects (mostly) individuals.
69
 As such, it embodies substantive and procedural 
rules that are directed at repressing and preventing international crimes through punishment. 
Towards this end, it creates direct individual criminal responsibility under international law 
which, especially in partnership with human rights, attempts to affect a shift in international 
law from the traditional state-centred approach towards an international regime for the 
protection of individual rights.  
 
ICL, as implied by its name, has legal characteristics of both criminal law and 
international law.
70
 This creates a measure of legal symbiosis which makes ICL a unique 
                                                          
68
 Scharf MP “The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court” (1999) 32 
Cornell International Law Journal 507. 
69
 See Bantekas I and Nash S International Criminal Law (Third Edition) (2007) Routhlidge/Cavendish, 
London 1; Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 562. According to Allan Norrie “[i]t can be said that 
the ultimate principle at the root of criminal law, and one which includes the principles of logic and 
legality, is the requirement of doing justice to individuals”. This includes perpetrators and victims of 
crime. See Norrie A Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Second Edition) 
(2001) Butterworths, Edinburgh 10. Furthermore, Sir Hartley Shawcross referred to the individual human 
being as “the ultimate unit of all law”. See Shawcross H “Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors at the Close of 
the Case Against the Individual Defendants” (1946) HM Stationary Office, London 63. The only possible 
exception to individual criminal liability is the possibility of state responsibility for international crimes. In 
this regard see para 2.2.7 infra. 
70
 Beyond this, ICL is also strongly affiliated with, and influenced by, human rights law. On the 
relationship between ICL and human rights in general see De Than C and Shorts E International Criminal 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 39 
 
variant of international law, but also highlights underlying tensions which make ICL such a 
complex and ambiguous field: 
“As a body of international law it requires an understanding of the sources and interpretation 
of international law. But it is also criminal law and as such needs substantive provisions that 
are clear and exact rather than the often more imprecise formulations of international law.”
71
 
Predominantly an amalgamation of international law and criminal law, ICL is adversely 
affected at the level of its basic doctrinal foundations.
72
 It exists as a body of law with goals, 
methods and characteristics of both vertical and horizontal legal systems.
73
 This “split 
personality” has proved to be an encumbrance to ICL’s development.74  In this regard it 
should be noted however that, to some degree, domestic criminal law (which is widely 
viewed as more ‘established’ than ICL) also fulfils seemingly conflicting roles.75 Criminal 
law is based on somewhat of an internal paradox. Ideally, criminal laws and criminal justice 
systems should operate in a “normative, formal, predictable and equal” way that sets 
standards of behaviour. Yet, as an “interpreter of common values” it should be flexible 
enough to address any new social problems which may arise or to encapsulate emerging 
values within a community.
76
 
 
Firstly, ICL may be viewed as a branch of public international law.
77
 Traditionally, 
international law is primarily concerned with regulating the relationships between states and 
is a consent-driven system of hierarchical norms derived from the will of states and from 
                                                          
law and Human Rights (2003) Sweet and Maxwell, London; Werle (Principles of International Criminal 
Law) (supra) 45-47; see also Chapter 8 para 8.3.4.1 infra. 
71
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 12. 
72
 Bassiouni MC “An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of International Criminal Law” in 
Dugard J and Van den Wyngaert C (eds.) International Criminal Law and Procedure (1996) Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, Aldershot 90. 
73
 Bassiouni (supra) in Dugard and Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 90. 
74
 Bassiouni (supra) in Dugard and Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 90. 
75
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 562. 
76
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 562; see also Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Pretoria and Another 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC). In this case the South African common law definition of rape 
was expanded to include anal penetration. The Constitutional Court ruled that an extension of the common 
law definition was necessary in order to reflect the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights.  
77
 Cassese A International Criminal Law (2003) Oxford University Press, Oxford 16. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 40 
 
state practice.
78
 In contrast to general international law which is aimed at reconciling and 
facilitating cooperation between the diverse interests of states, ICL is part of a broad 
movement to recognise the rights and interests of individuals under international law.
79
 From 
this perspective ICL is a body of public international law sui generis. Yet it cannot escape 
entirely from the general constraints created by the nature and characteristics of the system of 
international law (as briefly described above) of which it forms part. State cooperation 
remains a key ingredient of a successful international criminal law regime.  
 
Cassese comments that international law’s function is normative rather than 
repressive since it is mostly aimed at facilitating peaceful and effective cooperation between 
states.
80
 In ICL the traditionally repressive function of general criminal law and the 
traditionally normative function of general international law combine so that it is possible to 
speak of ICL as a highly “normative” variety of criminal law. According to Cassese, ICL’s 
unique nature can be ascribed to the fact that it is the only body of international law which 
“simultaneously derives its origin from and continually draws upon both human rights law 
and national criminal law”.81 ICL shares the rudiments of domestic criminal law systems in 
that it criminalises certain acts or behaviour and provides the rules and procedure (the means) 
for punishing individuals who act in contravention of criminal norms. Yet, the underlying 
rationale and normative purposes of ICL makes it more ambitious in its objectives than its 
domestic counterpart.
82
 These dynamics, the simultaneously normative and repressive nature 
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 Orakhelashvili A Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006) Oxford University Press, Oxford 7; 
Wallace and Martin-Ortega (International Law) (supra) 2-5. 
79
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 20. 
80
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 20. 
81
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 18; see also Chapter 8 para 8.3.4.1 infra. ICL and human 
rights share a historical- and purposive connection in that they have both emerged due to the horrors of the 
Second World War and aim to protect basic human rights. 
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 See Chapters 4 and 5 infra. International criminal courts and domestic courts applying ICL have pursued 
objectives which may be regarded as sui generis when compared to the traditional objectives of 
punishment. Furthermore, ICL pursues these objectives not only through punishment, but also through the 
trial itself (see Chapter 4 para 4.4 infra). 
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of ICL and its close partnership with human rights, gives ICL a sui generis character as “a 
special branch of criminal law”.83 
 
It is then somewhat ironic that many of ICL’s general principles have been 
“borrowed” or “transplanted” from domestic criminal law. These general principles apply to 
all international crimes that create individual criminal responsibility.
84
 Thus, ICL is wedged 
in between the general principles of criminal law, such as the presumption of innocence and 
the principle of legality, and the international community’s desire for accountability for 
international criminal acts. The foundational importance of the principle of legality (the 
underlying requirement of fairness, legal certainty and foreseeability) and the positivistic 
nature of criminal law clashes with the instant and near universal moral outrage of the 
international community which is often invoked by international crimes.
85
 One of ICL’s 
greatest challenges is to satisfy the international community’s desire for accountability 
without denigrating the foundational principles of criminal law which lie at its centre. 
 
 The dual- and sui generis nature of ICL, the context in which international crime 
often occurs and the unique nature of the criminal that perpetrates international crime raises 
questions over the extent to which traditional criminal law punishment theory should be 
applied to ICL.
86
 A cursory reading of the case law of the ICTY and ICTR shows that these 
courts almost exclusively apply the justifications of punishment that are commonly applied 
by domestic criminal courts, namely retribution and deterrence.
87
 Overall, punishment under 
ICL retains a strong retributive element, whilst the realisation of utilitarian objectives, such as 
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 Kor G “Sovereignty in the Dock” in Kleffner JK and Kor G (eds.) Complementary Views on 
Complementarity (2006) TMC Asser Press, The Hague 60; see also Haveman R, Kavran O and Nicholls J 
(eds.) Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (2003) Intersentia, Antwerp. 
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 Werle (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 54; see also Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) 
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 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 564; Cassese A International Criminal Law (2003) 20-21. 
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 See Chapter 5 para 5.2.5 infra. 
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 The jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals on the justifications and purposes of punishment is 
discussed in Part II, Chapter 5 para 5.5-5.6 infra. 
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the various forms of deterrence, remains disputed.
88
 Why then persist with ICL as a response 
to mass criminality? In trying to answer this question, Tallgren poses a further question:  
What would be left if ICL is hypothetically deprived of its utilitarian value and rationality?
89
 
ICL’s value could emanate from objectives that are sui generis in relation to traditional 
criminal law punishment objectives or; objectives that are not dependent on punishment as 
the mechanism through which criminal justice is pursued. This possibly attaches an 
expressive, symbolic and pedagogical importance to ICL, where it acts as “the loudspeaker 
echoing the values of the international community”.90      
 
2.2.2 International Crimes 
 
Bassiouni notes that the duality between international law and criminal law, “is not easily 
reconcilable with respect to the very label of the discipline” in different legal systems.91 At 
this point it may be useful to make a legal-theoretical distinction between components of ICL 
belonging to international law and those more appropriately viewed as part of national 
criminal law.
92
 The differentiation between these crimes is exemplified by the distinction 
found in French doctrine between droit international pénal and droit pénal international. The 
former can be translated to mean “criminal international law”, while the latter can be equated 
with the term “international criminal law”. Droit pénal international deals with criminal 
aspects of international law (Van den Wyngaert refers to this as “volkenrechtelijk strafrecht”) 
and, as such, is understood to be part of international law.
93
 The core crimes (currently 
consisting of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression) and crimes 
                                                          
88
 See Chapter 5 paras 5.6 infra; Drumbl MA Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (2007) 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; see also Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 590.  
89
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 591. 
90
 See also Chapter 5 para 5.6.1 – 5.6.2 infra; see also Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 592-593. 
Tallgren believes that ICL comes close to “a religious exercise of hope” for the international community 
(at 593).  
91
 Bassiouni (supra) in Dugard and Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 70 (footnote 
3). 
92
 See also Chapter 1 para 1.5 (assumption 3) supra. 
93
 Van den Wyngaert C Strafrecht en Strafprocesrecht: In Hoofdlijnen (Book I) (Second Edition) (1994) 
Maklu Publishers, Antwerp 64-65; Bassiouni (supra) in Dugard and Van den Wyngaert (International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 70-73. 
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under customary international law, such as slavery and piracy, fall under this body of law. 
Crimes under droit international pénal have numerous other labels including “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” (following the wording 
of the Rome Statute); macro-crimes; supranational crimes; international crimes stricto sensu; 
and international crimes proper.
94
 These crimes are widely believed to be criminalised under 
customary international law. Furthermore, these crimes create individual criminal 
responsibility directly under international law and fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
95
  
 
Droit pénal international deals with international law aspects of domestic criminal 
law (also referred to as transnational criminal law).
96
 This deals with the issue of the 
competing grounds for jurisdiction of national courts to prosecute crimes with an 
international element.
97
 For example, this would apply to extradition proceedings when either 
the victim or the offender is a non-national. Crimes under droit pénal international are also 
referred to as ‘other international crimes’, transnational crimes, treaty-based crimes, or 
distinct crimes. Treaty-based crimes (with the exception of the distinct crime of torture) have 
mostly developed to facilitate state cooperation in repressing crimes which have a 
transnational element. These include piracy, drug trafficking and acts of terrorism.
98
 The 
                                                          
94
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 10.  
95
 Broomhall (International Justice and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 19-20, 25; Kemp 
(Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 10-12; Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 29; 
see also Rome Statute of the ICC, article 25 (which provides for individual criminal liability). 
96
 Van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht en Strafprocesrecht) (supra) 64. Van den Wyngaert refers to international 
aspects of domestic criminal law as “tussenstaats strafrecht”. 
97
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 15. Most commentators on international law list five types 
of jurisdiction: Territoriality (subjective and objective), nationality (sometimes referred to as active 
nationality/personality), protective, passive personality and universal jurisdiction. See Wallace and Martin-
Ortega (International Law) (supra) 120-134; Shaw M International Law (Fifth Edition) (2003) Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 579-620. On the basic principles and different types of jurisdiction, see 
Dugard (International Law) (supra) 146-157. Furthermore, a distinction can be made between prescriptive 
jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. In this regard see Werle (Principles of International Criminal 
Law) (supra) 66 footnote 375; Kemp G (ed.), Walker S, Palmer R, Baqwa D, Gevers C, Leslie B and 
Steynberg A Criminal Law in South Africa (2012) Oxford University Press, Cape Town 554-560; see also 
Chapter 7 para 7.6.1.2 infra. 
98
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 42. 
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protection of the mutual interests of states which are threatened by these types of crime 
requires mutual criminalisation. The criminalisation does not spring from the treaty itself, but 
from the national law enacted by the state to give the treaty domestic effect, thus resulting in 
indirect criminality under international law.
99
  
 
Whether as a ‘crime under international law’ or an ‘other international crime’, the 
crime in question must have an international element (or “a link to the international 
community”) to fall within the scope of ICL.100 Thus, only crimes that threaten international 
interests (such as the “peace, security and well-being of the world”) or transnational interests 
will qualify.
101
  
 
2.2.3 The Sources of International Criminal Law 
 
Most sources of ICL may be found in the general sources of international law, notably 
treaties and customary international law.
102
 Treaties on international crime often contain a 
definition and proscription of the relevant crime, but no prescribed sanction or penalty 
clause.
103
 Such treaties also either obligate states to enact domestic legislation criminalising 
the relevant offense or, in those treaties which enshrine the principle aut dedere aut judicare, 
require by implication legislation to transform international crimes into domestic crimes.
104
 
                                                          
99
 Boister N “Treaty Based Crimes” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 540; Werle (Principles of 
International Criminal Law) (supra) 42. 
100
 Werle (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 55. This is sometimes referred to as the 
“contextual element” of international crime (see Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 
43). 
101
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 43; see Rome Statute of the ICC, Preamble 
(3).  
102
 See article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute for the remaining sources of international law. 
103
 Van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht en Strafprocesrecht) (supra) 65; see also Bassiouni (supra) in Dugard 
and Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 93: “Only one attempt has been made so far 
to add specific sanctions to [an international crime] and that was in the 1971 Montreal Convention on 
Aircraft Hijacking which is not in effect”. 
104
 See, for example, article 4(1) and article 7(1) of UNGA Resolution 39/46 (1987) (Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). In ICJ, Belgium v Senegal 
(Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite) (Judgment) 12 July 2012, the court 
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The statutes of international courts and tribunals have also played an important part in the 
progressive development of ICL. The Rome Statute represents a semblance of a codification 
of ICL (or at the least, a progressive development towards the codification of ICL). The 
Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty which places certain obligations on signatory states with 
regard to the suppression and prosecution of international crimes. As a result, many nations 
have implemented domestic legislation criminalising international crimes based on the Rome 
Statute’s definitions of the core crimes in articles 6-8. Depending on the forum where 
prosecution takes place, the application of the sources outlined above may vary. The 
application of international law in domestic courts, when prosecuting international crime, will 
depend on the constitutional provisions for the applicability of international law or the 
general status of international law in the relevant state.
105
  
 
2.2.4 Normative Hierarchy 
 
There exists a normative hierarchy in international law which may affect the obligations of 
states towards some categories of international crime. International law norms can be either 
ius dispositivum or ius cogens. The former is subject to the will and national interest of states 
and apply “in the absence of any other agreed regime”.106 These are the consent-driven rules 
on which most of international law is based. In contrast ius cogens norms are independent of 
the will of states and are as such “intrinsically superior” and cannot be changed by way of 
agreement between states.
107
 They are the highest norms in the normative hierarchy of 
                                                          
attached the following meaning to article 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture (at para 95): “Extradition 
is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an international obligation 
under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of                       
the State”. The judgment is available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2&case= 
144&code=bs&p3=4 (accessed 2012/08/15). 
105
 Akande D “Sources of International Criminal Law” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 41. 
106
 Fitzmaurice G “Third Report on the Law of Treaties” (1958) (2) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 21-46, 40. Translated from Latin, ius disposivitum means: “Law subject to the dispensation of 
the parties”; Brudner, A “The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A 
Theoretical Framework” (1985) 35 University of Toronto Law Journal 219-254, 249-250. 
107
 See Fitzmaurice (Third Report on the Law of Treaties) (supra) 40; Orakhelashvili (Peremptory Norms) 
(supra) 8. See also the dictum of Judge Tanaka ICJ Reports (1966) 298 in Orakhelashvili (Peremptory 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 46 
 
international law and as a result have reached legal status as peremptory and non-derogable 
norms.
108
 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) refers to a norm 
of ius cogens as:  
“[...] a peremptory norm of general international law […] accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.”
109
 
Many international crimes are acts which constitute a violation of an ius cogens norm. Ius 
cogens norms protect universal and fundamental values and interests of the international 
community. As such, breaches thereof offend not only the individuals and states involved, but 
also “a transcendent common good”.110 A significant consequence of ius cogens is that it 
gives international law elements of a vertical and constitutional legal order.
111
 As such, ius 
cogens is the only concept of international law which defends the national law analogy in the 
international legal system.
112
 However, the existence of ius cogens norms does not alter the 
decentralised and horizontal nature of international law in general.
113
  
 
The concept of ius cogens rules or norms goes hand in hand with what are referred to 
as obligations erga omnes. The latter is defined as an obligation which is regarded as 
fundamental and indispensable by the international community as a whole and from which no 
derogation is allowed under any circumstances. Once a norm has attained legal status as ius 
cogens, an erga omnes obligation arises as a legal implication to that status.
114
 Many offences 
                                                          
Norms) (supra) 53-54: Describing ius cogens as “[…] a kind of imperative law which constitutes the 
contrast to jus dispositivum, capable of being changed by way of agreement between states […]”. 
108
 Bassiouni MC “International Crimes: Ius Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes” (1996) 59 (4) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 63-67. 
109
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331. 
110
 Orakhelashvili (Peremptory Norms) (supra) 46-47, 288-289; see also Brudner (The Domestic 
Enforcement of International Covenants) (supra) 249-250. 
111
 Orakhelashvili (Peremptory Norms) (supra) 9-10. 
112
 Orakhelashvili (Peremptory Norms) (supra) 10-11. 
113
 Orakhelashvili (Peremptory Norms) (supra) 78. 
114
 Bassiouni (Ius Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes) (supra) 63: “Legal obligations which arise from 
the higher status of such crimes include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-applicability of statutes 
of limitations for such crimes, the non-applicability of any immunities up to and including Heads of State, 
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against individuals now place erga omnes obligations on states. Hereby, states have an 
obligation to the international community to protect and enforce fundamental human rights. 
This was exemplified in the Barcelona Traction case in the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) where the court stated that the protection of fundamental rights is of legal interest to all 
states worldwide.
115
 Correspondingly, Article 19(2) of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1996) defines an international crime as: 
“An international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the 
international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by the community as a 
whole.”  
 
The following crimes have emerged as belonging to this category of “imperative law” 
or “compelling law”: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, slavery (and slave 
related practices), apartheid, piracy, torture and aggression.
116
 It is widely accepted that the 
international community as a whole has an interest in the prevention and prosecution of these 
crimes. According to Bassiouni, ius cogens crimes give rise to the following obligations erga 
omnes: “the obligation to prosecute or extradite, the obligation to provide legal assistance, the 
                                                          
the non-applicability of the defence of “obedience to superior orders”[...], the universal application of these 
obligations whether in time of peace or war, their non-derogation under “states of emergency”, and 
universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of such crimes”.  
115
 Belgium v Spain (Barcelona Traction Light and Power House Co Ltd) (1970) ICJ Reports 3, Second 
Phase, 32: “An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligation of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic 
protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes”. See also Bantekas and Nash (International Criminal Law) (supra) 11, 153. 
116
 Bassiouni (Ius Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes) (supra) 68; see also Dugard (International Law) 
(supra) 38-39 (the latter author does not list the prohibition of crimes against humanity as having attained 
peremptory norm status). See also ICJ, Belgium v Senegal (Questions Relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite) (Judgment) 12 July 2012, para 99, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2&case=144&code=bs&p3=4 (accessed 2012/08/15): “In the Court’s 
opinion, the prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and has become a peremptory 
norm (jus cogens). The prohibition is grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio 
juris of states”. 
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obligation to eliminate statutes of limitations, and the obligation to eliminate immunities up 
to and including heads of state”.117 
 
2.2.5 Enforcement 
 
International criminal law encompasses prosecution of international crimes through 
international and domestic authorities as well as the criminal law principles and procedures 
that govern the enforcement process.
118
 The enforcement of ICL echoes the criminal law and 
international law elements which characterise ICL as a body of law. The broadest distinction 
is that drawn between direct and indirect modes as well as mechanisms of enforcement.
119
 
International courts and tribunals, such as the permanent ICC and the ad hoc tribunals, are 
examples of direct means of enforcement. Indirect enforcement refers to situations where ICL 
is enforced by national courts. In this regard the feature of complementarity in the Rome 
Statute is a significant development.
120
 As will become more apparent throughout this thesis, 
cooperation and support from domestic criminal justice systems is crucial in both these 
methods of enforcement. 
 
Regarding the indirect enforcement of ICL, it is necessary to consider briefly the 
scope of the duty to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare) under international law. 
The alternate duty to prosecute or to extradite is provided for in a number of treaties, notably 
in the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide (hereafter 
“Genocide Convention”) and in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter “Convention Against Torture”). 121 
                                                          
117
 Bassiouni (supra) in Bassiouni (Post-Conflict Justice) (supra) 25; see also UNGA Resolution 2391 
(XXIII) (1968) (Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity), articles 1 and 4. 
118
 Cryer et al. (Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 3. 
119
 See Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 80-81; Jessberger F “International v. 
National Prosecution of International Crimes” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 208-211. 
120
 See para 2.2.8 infra. 
121
 See Orentlicher D “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2537-2615, 2562-2567; UNGA Resolution 260 (III) (1951) 
(Convention on the Suppression and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide), article 6; UNGA Resolution 
39/46 (1987) (Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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Furthermore, the preamble of the Rome Statute provides that “it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”.122 Under 
customary international law, the state of commission (that is the state within which the 
international crime was committed) is under an international legal duty to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crime.
123
 However, it is also widely accepted that at present 
there exists no duty on states under customary international law to prosecute perpetrators of 
international crimes committed outside their territorial borders.
124
 An exception exists only in 
respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, over which international law provides 
for mandatory jurisdiction.
125
 Accordingly, any state is obliged under international law to 
prosecute perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions committed during an 
international armed conflict irrespective of whether the perpetrator is a national of the state in 
question or whether the relevant crimes were committed beyond its state borders.  
 
2.2.6 Universal Jurisdiction 
 
Criminal jurisdiction has expanded its reach and developed through state practice and 
international law towards two broad objectives. Firstly, to end impunity for perpetrators of 
international crimes and gross human rights violations and secondly to respond to increasing 
transnational criminal behaviour. Crimes subject to universal jurisdiction are widely viewed 
as conduct mala in se which must be criminalised in order to protect the interests and 
fundamental values of the international community. Some have acknowledged that the use of 
universal jurisdiction by states and “the prosecution of individuals responsible for [serious 
                                                          
Punishment), article 7; see also ICJ, Belgium v Senegal (Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite) (Judgment) 12 July 2012, paras 92-95, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2&case=144&code=bs&p3=4 (accessed 2012/08/15). 
122
 Rome Statute of the ICC, preamble (6). 
123
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 69. 
124
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 71; see also Ferdinandusse (Direct 
Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 192-193. The latter author agrees that there is no 
general obligation to prosecute crimes committed extraterritorially without the existence of a ‘link’ 
between the state and the crime (via the presence of the perpetrator or the nationality of the victim(s).         
125
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 70. 
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crimes] promotes the better realisation of human rights and the prevention of crimes in the 
future, as well as institutionalising the rule of law”.126 
 
It is widely accepted that the international community as a whole has an interest in the 
prevention and prosecution of certain crimes. These crimes are regarded as so egregious by 
the international community that they transcend state sovereignty and are subject to universal 
jurisdiction.
127
 Universal jurisdiction as a form of criminal jurisdiction is based on the 
universality principle which, by nature, embodies a permissive rule of customary 
international law.
128
 Through it, if the conditions are met, a state can negate the principles of 
non-intervention and territorial sovereignty and legitimately exercise its domestic criminal 
jurisdiction under international law.
129
 A number of crimes have consistently been recognised 
as being subject to universal jurisdiction owing to their severity and the universal 
condemnation which such conduct evokes from all nations and peoples of the world. The 
reasoning is that such crimes threaten the most fundamental interests of the international 
community.
130
 It appears certain that genocide, crimes against humanity, piracy, war crimes 
                                                          
126
 Inazumi M Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for 
Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law (2005) Intersentia, Antwerp 2. 
127
 See Eichmann v Attorney-General of Israel (Supreme Court of Israel) Case No. 336/61, 29 May 1962, 
36 ILR 277, 304: “Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international character but 
their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international 
community to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the principle of 
universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent of its enforcement, 
to try the appellant”. 
128
 Jessberger F “Universal Jurisdiction” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 556. The authority to 
prosecute on the basis of the universality principle must be distinguished from the duty to prosecute under 
international law. The duty to prosecute is more constrained under international law than the ability of 
states to extend their prescriptive- and enforcement jurisdiction so as to cover crimes committed 
extraterritorially. See Chapter 7 paras 7.6.1.2 and 7.7.3 infra. 
129
 Jessberger (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 556. 
130
 These interests are broadly speaking:  international peace and security, humanitarian concerns and 
universally held moral values. See Jessberger (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 556. See 
also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble 3 which states that “grave crimes 
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. See Eichmann v Attorney-General of Israel 
(Supreme Court of Israel) Case No. 336/61, 29 May 1962, 36 ILR 277, 291-293. In the Eichmann-case the 
Israeli court claimed universal jurisdiction as one of the bases of jurisdiction. Territoriality and passive 
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and torture are subject to universal jurisdiction at all times.
131
 These crimes are offences 
under customary international law (crimes against humanity and war crimes), multilateral 
treaty or both (genocide and torture).
132
 Traditional ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ universal jurisdiction 
grants jurisdiction to any state “regardless of the situs of the offence and the nationalities of 
the offender and the offended” and “can as such be prosecuted in any state on behalf of the 
international community”.133 It may be said that when a national court exercises universal 
jurisdiction it acts as an agent of the international community.
134
 
 
In practice, and as illustrated by the Arrest Warrant case in the ICJ and the Spanish 
attempt to extradite Augusto Pinochet from the United Kingdom, states that have sought to 
invoke universal jurisdiction have run into legal and practical obstacles.
135
 Nonetheless, in 
light of the above it may be said that universal jurisdiction represents a development that is 
closely aligned with the moral sentiments of the international community and the objective of 
establishing the rule of law internationally.  
  
                                                          
personality were also invoked as bases for jurisdiction. See also Arendt H Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil (Revised and Enlarged Edition) (1963) Penguin Books, New York 261. 
Arendt is critical of the applicability of universal jurisdiction in Eichmann’s case since, in her view, 
Eichmann was chiefly accused of, and for his role in, crimes against the Jewish people. 
131
 See Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 44; see also Shaw M International 
Law (2003) 592-593 (the author is of the opinion that piracy and war crimes are the only crimes clearly 
subject to universal jurisdiction).  
132
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 157-160. 
133
 Randall KC “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law” (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785-841, 
788; Van der Vyver JD “Universal Jurisdiction in International Criminal Law” (1999) 24 South African 
Yearbook of International Law 107-132, 108; see also Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 26-27, 555-
556. Conditional universal jurisdiction (or, universal jurisdiction with presence) may be defined as the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction “when the suspect is already in the state asserting jurisdiction”, see Cryer 
et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 45. Conditional universal jurisdiction is 
discussed more fully in Chapter 7 para 7.6.1.2 infra. 
134
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 154; see also Hall KC “Universal Jurisdiction: Developing and 
Implementing an Effective Global Strategy” in Kaleck et al. (International Prosecution of Human Rights 
Crimes) (supra) 85. 
135
 See Chapter 7 para 7.6.1.2 (footnote 1091) infra. 
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2.2.7 State- and Individual Criminal Liability 
 
For demarcation purposes, this thesis requires a careful theoretical distinction between state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability for international crimes. These regimes are 
clearly distinguishable from each other, but given that states are often implicated in 
international crime, they may overlap in some instances.
136
 In theory both states and 
individuals (as an actual or de facto agent of state or independently thereof) can be held 
accountable for international crimes.
137
 This dual responsibility presents two legal avenues 
for addressing international crime, namely “criminal liability for the individual, falling under 
international criminal law, and state responsibility, regulated by international rules on this 
matter”.138 As with criminal law in general, individual criminal responsibility in international 
law requires the requisite mental element of intent and knowledge for the wrongdoer to be 
                                                          
136
 Bianchi A “State Responsibility and Criminal Liability of Individuals” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) 
(supra) 18-19. Bianchi also notes that “[it] would be misleading [...] to believe that [state responsibility 
and individual responsibility under international law] never intersect or overlap. Their relationship is better 
described in terms of ‘complementarity’ and their interaction may depend on a number of variables, 
including the context in which the issue of responsibility arises” (at 16). See also Werle (Principles of 
International Criminal Law) (supra) 41. 
137
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 19; see also Erasmus (Revisiting Schwarzenberger) 
(supra) 403-404. On the theoretical possibility of state responsibility, see the case brought by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina against Serbia before the ICJ (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2007, 43). The Court found that Serbia was responsible under the Genocide Convention for its 
failure to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica (Bosnia) as well as its subsequent failure to cooperate with the 
ICTY over the prosecution of those responsible for the Srebrenica massacre. However, the court found that 
Serbia was not directly responsible for the commission of the genocide at Srebrenica nor had it incited the 
genocide or conspired towards its commission. Furthermore, the court ruled that “[...] the obligations in 
question in this case, arising from the terms of the [Genocide] Convention, and the responsibilities of 
States that would arise from breach of such obligations, are obligations and responsibilities under 
international law. They are not of a criminal nature” (at para 170). 
138
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 19; see also Rome Statute of the ICC, article 25(4): “No 
provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of states 
under international law”. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 53 
 
held responsible.
139
 In contrast, state responsibility “requires no fault to be established unless 
fault forms part of the primary obligation which is breached”.140 Political considerations and 
the tendency of states to act primarily in their own best interest have thus far undermined 
efforts of establishing a framework of state criminal responsibility in international law.
141
 
Gaeta sights the international community’s ill-suited use of the traditional institutional 
framework of treaty law to cope with state criminality as another reason for the weak position 
of this form of criminal responsibility in international law.
142
 As a result, the concept of state 
crime remains controversial.
143
 Consequently, since the Nuremberg revolution, individual 
criminal liability has become the preferred mode of accountability for international crimes. 
This is part of a broad movement granting increased standing to individuals as subjects of 
international law.
144
 Irrespective of whether the offender was acting as an agent of a state 
(within or outside of the scope of his official capacity), an organisation, or on his or her own 
accord in the perpetration of the relevant crime, this thesis focuses exclusively on the 
criminal liability of individuals under ICL.  
 
2.2.8 The “ICC-Era” of International Criminal Justice 
 
ICL most often addresses extraordinary crimes committed under extraordinary 
circumstances.
145
 Although this is not necessarily the case, the fact that ICL is most often 
invoked as a response to war and mass atrocity is a practical reality which “pervades 
scholarship”. 146  The drafting and subsequent ratification of the Rome Statute however, 
heralded a new era for international criminal justice. Since the establishment of the ICC, the 
international criminal justice system envisions a structure of international criminal law where 
                                                          
139
 Rome Statute of the ICC, article 25 and article 30; see also Bianchi (supra) in Cassese (Oxford 
Companion) (supra) 18. 
140
 Bianchi (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 18.  
141
 Bianchi (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 19. 
142
 Gaeta P “International Criminalization of Prohibited Conduct” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 
63-64. 
143
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 12. 
144
 Bianchi (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 16. 
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domestic jurisdictions are primarily responsible for, and capable of, prosecuting international 
crime. The system of complementarity has emerged as one of the most important features of 
the modern international criminal justice system. It encourages domestic criminalisation so 
that referral to the ICC should only be necessary where domestic courts are unwilling or 
unable to prosecute.
147
 The ICC is designed only as a “backstop” or ‘fall net’ for extreme 
cases which cannot be handled by national courts.
 148
 Through this, complementarity gives 
primacy to indirect modes of ICL enforcement. Furthermore, the feature of complementarity 
serves as an incentive for the domestic incorporation of the core crimes or the transformation 
of core crimes into domestic law.
149
 Complementarity is closely related to the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. In the Rome Statute it manifests as conditional universal jurisdiction 
which will feature more prominently in the discussion under Part III.
150
 Hypothetically 
speaking, a perfectly functioning system of complementarity would leave little need for 
international courts in the international criminal justice system.
151
 Regrettably, this is not a 
reality at present. Many states have either not yet ratified the ICC Statute or, are yet to 
implement legislation transforming the Rome Statute into domestic law.
152
 International and 
domestic prosecutions of international crime have become more frequent since the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, but remain mostly an exception to the norm of 
impunity.  
 
By interpreting the principle with reference to the purposes of the Rome Statute, 
Stigen cites that the complementarity principle has developed to obtain two main purposes, 
namely to ensure the effective prosecution of international crimes and to some extent in order 
                                                          
147
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 Du Plessis M “South Africa’s International Criminal Court Act: Countering Genocide, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity” Institute for Security Studies Paper 172, November 2008, 1, available at 
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to safeguard state sovereignty.
153
 The beneficial consequences of complementarity are 
discussed in greater detail under chapters 5, 7 and 8 infra.  
 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
ICL is in its post-ontological stage. The international criminal justice system has shown 
consistent growth and development since the end of the Cold War and has reached a 
reasonable degree of legal sophistication. The ICTY and ICTR are in the process of 
completing their mandates and will leave behind a valuable body of jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, a large part of ICL has been codified in the Rome Statute.
154
 On the domestic 
level, many states have incorporated or transformed the core crimes of ICL and other 
transnational crimes into domestic law. Domestic prosecutions of perpetrators of international 
crime have been successful in a number of cases. This introductory chapter has shown that, 
even though the enforcement of ICL remains sporadic and selective, the proliferation of ius 
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations and a more realistic approach to universal criminal 
jurisdiction holds some potential for the position of the individual under international law. 
 
Bassiouni comments that the pursuit of justice at both international and domestic level 
“is still a work in progress”.155 One may contend that ICL’s objective of punishing and 
preventing international crime is one part of the greater pursuit of worldwide justice also 
represented by for example, international human rights. The concept of justice is however 
mired in complexity and characterised throughout history up to the present by long-standing 
legal-philosophical debates. The meaning and substance of justice remains a point of 
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contention between different states, legal cultures and academia. Furthermore, in the anarchic 
international order states readily “hide the fact that behind the common ‘us’ lies the self-
interested ‘me’”.156 Accordingly, some academics dispute the status of international law as 
‘law proper’ and dismiss the prospect of global justice in the international legal order 
dominated by powerful sovereigns.
157
 Because of the abovementioned debates and criticisms, 
ICL as a representative of international justice, or of “universal values”, may always be a 
disputed concept. What has become clear, however, is that the model of traditional 
Westphalian sovereignty is not effective in the pursuit of justice for and over individuals and 
that an alternative is both necessary and desired by the international community.
158
  
 
I will not venture into political and legal-philosophical issues in more detail than is 
required to address the research question. Despite jurisprudential debates and the problems of 
hegemony and unilateralism in international law, the following is clear: 
“In this age of globalization, there is increased commonality of norms, procedures, and 
processes in the world’s legal systems, thus reflecting the shared values these represent.”
159
 
ICL is among the most powerful expressions of shared international values. Its development 
since the end of the Cold War provides evidence that ICL is a valuable contributor to the 
increased commonality of norms and values. The shared and fundamental values of 
international peace and security; and individual well-being, create a connection between the 
international community and the aspirations of international criminal justice. Through this, 
ICL is presented with an opportunity to align its objectives to optimally reflect these values. 
Part II focuses on the value (and values) of ICL in a world which will become inevitably 
more interdependent. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE MEANING OF “TRANSFORMATIVE VALUE”  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Law fulfils many roles in society. Historically, the law’s role has been to proscribe or prohibit 
certain conduct in order to regulate human and social interactions as well as to provide a 
means for settling disputes. The judgment in the South African case, S v Bradbury, reflects 
this position by referring to law as a “social science” which “purpose is to regulate the 
conduct between man and man, and man and the State”.160 As a “social science” or social 
system law is highly reflective of morality and the processes of individual and collective 
human reasoning, through which it aims to secure social stability and the distribution of 
mutual benefits in societies. This traditional function of law continues to be of great 
importance to contemporary societies. In modern times however, both international and 
domestic law has increasingly been used for a novel purpose, achieving transformation.
161
 
Justice has developed a transformative dimension in which it speaks to broader social wrongs 
and injustices in a more pro-active manner.
162
 But what serves as the baseline for this 
increased reliance on law to achieve social transformation? Why turn to law as a social 
transformer and not to power and politics?  
 
The historical mandate and rise of international human rights has arguably played a 
substantial role in establishing the modern proclivity towards transformative law. We are 
                                                          
160
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indeed living in the “age of human rights”.163 Human rights values, due to their universal 
appeal, have permeated so deeply into all areas of law and politics that it has permanently 
changed the nature of law “in favour of a robust conception of humanity, dignity, and 
freedom from oppression”.164 As a manifestation of cosmopolitanism, international human 
rights has affected the international legal system in a manner that has caused international law 
to deviate from its traditional function of regulation founded on the principle of non-
interference towards proscribing certain forms of human and state conduct. Human rights law 
as well as states and organisations campaigning for the universal recognition of human rights, 
continue to systematically transform the world in a direction intended to put an end to 
inhumanity, cruelty, poverty, war and other scourges of mankind.  
 
It must be acknowledged however, that transformation has close ties with politics.
165
 
Much of legal transformation is either politically initiated or politically driven. A 
“liberalizing trend” and the phenomenon of democratisation have been a major feature of the 
international political sphere since the mid-20
th
 century.
166
 For example, Huntington 
described the “wave” of democracy that swept the world between 1974 and 1990 in which 
over 30 countries moved from authoritarian to democratic rule.
167
 Since the end of the Cold 
War, the surge to establish liberal democracy around the world has not waned.
168
 Legal 
transformation is a concept which must be viewed from within this broader political context. 
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Generally, ‘transformation’ is nearly synonymous with ‘change’. More specifically, it 
connotes a ‘special’ or ‘qualified’ manner of change. In the common grammatical sense, 
transformative change may be described as complete or comprehensive change as well as 
change in a positive sense or that is ‘for the better’.169 Beyond this “face-value” meaning, 
transformation may have either a broad or a very narrow meaning depending on the context 
of its use. The meaning afforded to transformation differs across various disciplines. The 
term is often used in transitional- or post-conflict societies. In these contexts it refers broadly 
to various inter-related movements such as liberalisation from oppression, social upliftment, 
political and economic reform as well as reconciliation.  
 
As mentioned, the term ‘transformation’ can also be afforded a very particular 
meaning. The well-known meaning attributed to transformation in the context of treaty law 
differs entirely from the meaning attributed to transformation by writers and commentators 
on transitional justice for example.
170
 A further example is how the word transformation is 
used in South Africa where it describes “the process of making institutions and organisations 
more democratic”.171 Apart from the existing level of ‘mystification’ surrounding the concept 
of transformation, this study is further complicated by the fact that ICL has on occasion fallen 
foul to political abuse, rhetoric and unrealistic expectations concerning its transformative 
potential.
172
  
 
The hypothesis, that ICL has transformative value, is the central tenet of this study. 
To clearly define the research question and as a general point of departure, my first task is to 
clarify the meaning of ‘transformative value’ as it will be used hereafter. This section is 
concerned with describing transformation and transformative law (the analytical or 
descriptive approach) and to a limited extent, what it ideally should be (the normative 
approach). The goal is to create workable criteria as well as a defensible definition for 
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characterising that which is considered to be transformative. The criteria put forward below 
are of a reticent and general nature and is neither intended to be a rigorous test nor a 
comprehensive definition.
173
 Still, a general formulation must be provided since it is essential 
for the interpretation of the central research question. The criteria thus serve as both “a 
standard on which judgement or decision can be based” and “a characterizing mark or trait” 
for identifying ICL’s transformative value.174 It is submitted that a flexible method rather 
than a strict definition will reflect not only the substantial transformative benefits and limits 
of ICL, but also its transformative potential. Collaboratively, these aspects produce ICL’s 
transformative value, the identification of which is the purpose of this thesis.  
 
Two fundamental questions will be addressed in this section. Firstly, what is the 
meaning of the term transformation in modern legal language in the different contexts of its 
use which are relevant to the research question?
175
 Secondly, what is indicative of legal 
mechanisms or legal acts with transformative significance?
176
 
 
3.2 The Specific Meaning of Transformation: The Act of Transformation 
 
Before proceeding to the broad meaning of transformation, it is necessary to discuss the 
conventional meaning of transformation that is well known to international lawyers. This 
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meaning is relevant to application of international law and treaty law in national legal 
systems. This ‘conventional’ meaning is also related to the debate between the monistic and 
dualist theories or schools of thought on the relationship of international law and domestic 
law. More particularly, the last-mentioned theories address questions that arise when 
international and domestic law come into conflict. The debate surrounding the application of 
international law in domestic courts is particularly relevant to ICL as it is moving toward a 
vision of indirect enforcement through the incorporation and transformation of the law of the 
Rome Statute and other international criminal norms into domestic legal systems.
177
  
 
Transformation is one of two methods for the domestic implementation of 
international law. The other method is referred to as incorporation. Ferdinandusse offers a 
summary of these two methods: 
“Incorporation takes place when an international rule is integrated in the national legal order, 
so that the judiciary can directly apply that rule. This method of incorporation promotes 
complete implementation of the international rule, as it cannot be modified. Transformation 
denotes the enactment of a national law that mirrors the content of the international rule, thus 
transforming a rule of international law in a national one. This method of transformation gives 
the legislature the opportunity to tailor, or even modify, the international rule to fit the 
peculiarities of the national legal system. Technically speaking, international law is applied 
not at all after transformation. In these cases, national courts apply national law that 
reproduces the content of the original international norm.”
178
 
Whether or not incorporation or transformation is required for international law to be applied 
in domestic courts depends on which of the theories on the relationship between international 
and domestic law (the monist and dualist theories) are supported within the state in question. 
Furthermore, constitutional and legislative provisions may place limitations on the 
applicability of international law within a state. As is the case in South Africa, the domestic 
applicability of international law is often governed by specific constitutional provisions.  
 
There are three distinct theories on the role of international law in domestic legal 
systems. These consist of the monistic theory, the dualist theory and the second monistic 
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theory.
179
 Some domestic legal systems require an act of incorporation or transformation of 
international laws into domestic law before it becomes enforceable law.
180
 This is known as 
dualism or the dualist theory. The dualist school of thought subscribes to the view that 
treaties have no special status in domestic law ipso facto due to the fact that international law 
and municipal law are distinct systems of law.
181
 Without accompanying legislation to 
‘adopt’ the treaty or give effect thereto, the treaty has no force in national courts or domestic 
law.
182
 Accordingly, rights and obligations provided for in treaties only come into effect once 
they become part of a state’s domestic law through legislation that provides for the 
enforcement of such rights and obligations.
183
 Dualists do not believe that there can be a 
conflict between international law and municipal law as they are mutually exclusive legal 
systems.
184
 Incorporated treaty law or international law that has been transformed into 
domestic law has the same status as domestic law and is susceptible to legislative amendment 
or repeal.
185
 Because of this, national courts in states that subscribe to the dualist approach 
treat non-transformed international law as non-binding foreign law. 
 
The two monistic theories are polar opposites of each other. The first monistic theory 
views international law not as ‘law’ but as ‘guidelines’ that are always inferior in status to 
national laws.
186
 In this way national law (as the superior form law) and state power have 
ascendency over international law.
187
 On the other hand, the second monistic theory views 
both systems as “a single conception of law” so that international laws apply directly in 
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municipal courts if the treaty was properly concluded and has entered into force.
188
 Cassese 
explains the superiority of international law in the second monistic theory as follows: 
“[...] sources of international law belong to a legal system that is hierarchically superior to 
municipal systems, not radically different from them. As a result, international rules can be 
applied as such by domestic courts without any need for transformation.”
189
   
The secondary monistic theory thus gives international law ascendancy over municipal 
law.
190
 In practise, domestic legal systems attempt to harmonise these conflicting views by 
taking an approach that is neither absolutely monistic nor dualistic.
191
   
 
The incorporation or transformation (as a method of implementation of international 
law) can be seen as an “act of transformation” in a literal sense.192 This denotes an act 
through which the international norm becomes domestically ‘active’ and may create social 
impact. Beyond legislative acts of transformation or incorporation lie the possible broader 
socio-legal repercussions or effects of the integrated law, which may be transformative 
according to the hypothesis of this thesis. The specific meaning of transformation and the 
transformative effects of acts of transformation as described above will be illustrated in 
Chapter 7 by looking at the status of international law in South Africa and the potential 
influence of ICL which has been transformed into South African municipal law. 
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3.3 Alternative Meanings of Transformation 
 
The term transformation is often encountered in the context of societal transitions. It is most 
often, but not exclusively, used in the field of transitional justice which falls within the 
broader field of transitional studies. Here transformation refers broadly to a process of 
change. The related concepts of transformation and transition both speak to unjust or 
oppressive political and legal systems, to broader social inequalities and to the goals of 
liberalisation and democratisation.
193
 In this context, the concept of transformation has no 
fixed meaning.
194
  
 
In an effort to identity transformation in its alternative meaning and to clarify the 
relationship between transition and transformation, I consider firstly a number of 
terminological distinctions. What are the correct cross-disciplinary meanings of the terms 
transition and transformation on the one hand, and transitional justice and transformative 
justice on the other? And how does one distinguish between these?  
 
3.3.1 ‘Transition’ and ‘Transformation’  
 
The distinction between transition and transformation is more elusive than it appears at first. 
These terms are often used interchangeably in the same context.
195
 This approach is not 
necessarily incorrect, but as Daly explains, certain critical differences must be considered:
196
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 Roederer CJ “Transitional/Transformative Jurisprudence: Law in a Changing Society” in Roederer CJ 
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“Transition suggests movement from one thing to another – from oppression to liberation, 
from oligarchy to democracy, from lawlessness to due process, from injustice to justice. 
Transformation, however, suggests that the thing that is moving from one place to another is 
itself changing as it proceeds through the transition; it can be thought of as radical change. A 
nation in transition is the same nation with a new government; a nation in the midst of a 
transformation is reinventing itself. Because transformation entails a recreation of the culture, 
it fulfils the promises of reconciliation and deterrence that transition alone cannot achieve.”
197
 
According to transitional justice authority Ruti Teitel, a transition is a “change in a 
liberalizing direction”.198 Transitions occur when there is a liberalising movement away from 
colonial, oppressive regimes or dictatorships towards a more just regime or society. The 
South African transition for example can be viewed as part of the so-called “Third Wave” of 
transitions to democracy.
199
 Such a change of government or large-scale political movement 
is usually accompanied by an attempt to remedy the various injustices which are still present 
in societies even after a new government has taken over.  
 
Daly’s definitions above suggest that it is likely for a society in transition to be 
simultaneously in the process of transformation, but that transitions and transformations do 
not accompany each other as a rule. It appears that transformation can take place 
independently of a transitional situation, or may even continue in the wake of a transition by 
becoming a permanent feature of the national legal system. South Africa’s post-apartheid 
society may be the best example of such a situation. In South Africa, the transition is 
completed and transformation is on-going.
200
 A transition then has a fixed timeframe as 
opposed to transformation which is a long term process. 
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 While socio-ecomonic and institutional transformation remains a high priority in South Africa, the 
democratic transition is completed to such an extent that some now refer to South Africa as a state that has 
moved from democracy to a “rogue democracy” (see Jordaan E “Fall from Grace: South Africa and the 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 66 
 
3.3.2 Transitional Justice 
 
Transitional justice is the study of the various institutional and legal responses during a 
transition to democracy.
201
 The field of transitional justice has been defined as “the study of 
the choices made and the quality of justice rendered when states are replacing authoritarian 
regimes by democratic state institutions”.202 Transitional justice as part of a democratisation 
or liberation process resides in both the political and legal realm. It lies at “the intersection 
between jurisprudence, comparative politics, and political theory”.203 As a result of this, the 
legal and the political concepts of transformation tend to become distorted during transitions.  
 
Transitional jurisprudence has emerged as the study of the complex interaction 
between politics and law in transitions. Teitel argues that legal responses “follow a distinctive 
paradigm” during transitional periods which is “guided by rule-of-law principles tailored to 
the goal of political transformation” (emphasis added).204 This paradigm (or “transitional 
jurisprudence”) is described by Teitel as follows: 
“Because transitions’ defining feature is their normative shift, legal practices bridge a 
persistent struggle between two points: adherence to established convention and radical 
transformation. Ultimately, a dialectically induced position emerges. In contexts of political 
upheaval, transitional jurisprudence comprises a partial and nonideal conception of justice: 
provisional and limited forms of constitutions, sanctions, reparations, purges and histories. 
Across categories of law, a distinctive legal form mediates the move between regimes. Law’s 
role here is transitional, and not foundational, constructive of critical changes in individual 
status, rights, and responsibilities – and, more broadly, of shifts in power relations. As law’s 
function is to advance the construction of political change, transitional legal manifestations 
                                                          
Changing International Order” (2010) 30 Politics 82-92) and by the recent discussion of a ‘second 
transition’ during the ANC’s policy conference in June 2012. 
201
 Bilsky L Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial (2004) University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor 9: “Transitional justice theory addresses trials and other processes that take place during the 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy”. 
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 Siegel R “Transitional Justice: A Decade of Debate and Experience” (1998) 20 Human Rights 
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are more vividly affected by political values in regimes in transition than they are in states 
where the rule of law is firmly established. Thus, the jurisprudence of these periods does not 
follow such core principles of legality as regularity, generality, and prospectivity – the very 
essence of the rule of law in ordinary times. While the rule of law in established democracies 
is forward-looking and continuous in its directionality, law in transitional periods is 
backward-looking and forward-looking, retrospective and prospective, continuous and 
discontinuous.”
205
 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added) 
 
Finding a balance between political and legal reactions to prior and current injustice 
during transition is difficult. According to Teitel: 
“The central dilemma intrinsic to transition is how to move from illiberal rule and to what 
extent this shift is guided by conventional notions of the rule of law and individual 
responsibility associated with established democracy. A core tension emerges here in the use 
of law to advance transformation, as opposed to its role in adherence to conventional 
legality.”
206
 
As a result, most transitional justice responses become a trade-off between the need for peace 
and the desire for justice. Teitel provides an eloquent description of the predicament of law 
during transitions: 
“Law is caught between the past and the future, between backward-looking and forward-
looking, between retrospective and prospective, between the individual and the collective”.
207
  
Depending on the nature of the oppression or conflict, there may be a need for the successors 
to perform any or all of the following duties: attaining justice for the victims (retributive, 
reparatory and truth finding); holding perpetrators accountable; and facilitating short term 
peace, reconciliation and legal and socio-economic equality.
208
 Many of these duties have 
roots in international law. Political responses such as democratic elections, as well as legal 
responses that are often grounded in international laws, are used in combination to attain 
these goals and to shape the liberalising movement.  
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 Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 215. 
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3.3.2.1 Criminal Law in Transitions 
 
Historically, criminal trials are one of the most prominent features in the field of transitional 
justice.
209
 Recourse to criminal law during transitions gained popularity following the end of 
the Cold War. The use of criminal law during transitions is dependent on a multitude of 
factors. These factors include amongst others the nature of the transition, the nature and 
degree of prior human rights abuses, socio-economic conditions and the participation of the 
international community. As there is no longer “a dichotomous choice between criminal 
accountability and total amnesia”, there is also no longer a choice between a backward-
looking and forward-looking approach to transitions.
210 Teitel argues that “[the] role of 
criminal justice in transitional times [...] transcends that of conventional punishment.”211 
Furthermore, Teitel argues: 
“Criminal justice in some form, transitional practices suggest, is a ritual of liberalizing states, 
as it is through these practices that norms are publicly instantiated. Through known, fixed 
processes, a line is drawn, liberating a past, that allows the society to move forward. Though 
punishment is conventionally considered largely retributive, in transition, its purposes are 
corrective, going beyond the individual perpetrator to the broader society.”
212
 
Teitel accordingly recognises the potential of criminal law to provide stability, but also to act 
as a forward-looking instrument of social change during transitions.
213
 Thus it may be argued 
that the function of criminal justice during transition differs to some extent from the function 
of criminal law in stable domestic societies. Since criminal justice in domestic societies is 
fundamentally directed at upholding the rule of law, this discrepancy creates tension between 
the transformative use of criminal law and the rudiments of the rule of law principle. 
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3.3.2.2 Transformation and the Rule of Law during Transition 
 
Transitions exhibit a tension between the rule of law and the transformative use of law.
214
 
According to Teitel, in transitions “[the] juxtaposition is always between the rule of law as 
settled norms versus the rule of law as transformative.”215  The rule of law traditionally 
demands consistent application of the law to promote stability, foreseeability and 
predictability. Unlike transformative law, the rule of law is not aimed at facilitating change 
nor is it influenced by or based on morals. The rule of law is an abstract legal principle that 
has little to do with what is morally right or wrong, in fact adherence to the rule of law has 
often meant enforcement of unjust laws. This was observed in Nazi Germany and during 
apartheid in South Africa for example.  
 
The conflict between the rule of law and transformation is especially palpable when it 
comes to predecessor criminal trials. In this context the domestic rule of law which is 
traditionally based on predictability and foreseeability clashes with the international rule of 
law representative of the desire of the international community to hold those persons whose 
acts have violated the rules of international law accountable. For instance under these 
circumstances, should the predecessors be tried under the law of the old regime or that of the 
new regime or should prosecution be instituted under international laws? Adherence to the 
criminal laws of the old regime perpetuates injustice which runs contrary to the international 
rule of law, while applying new (international) criminal laws retroactively runs contrary to 
the domestic rule of law principle. Even if it is accepted that impunity for perpetrators of 
certain categories of past injustice is absolutely prohibited, accountability in the retributive 
sense may require retrospective punishment which runs contrary to the principle of legality 
and the rule of law principle. 
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The problem above can be approached from a legal positivist or natural law 
perspective.
216
 Positivists argue that politics is the appropriate means of responding to past 
injustices and to advance transformation.
217
 Positivism stresses adherence to prior settled 
laws in order to achieve transformation. In contrast, the natural law position highlights moral 
rights over settled law. According to Teitel: 
“…the natural law position highlights the transformative role of law in the shift to a more 
liberal regime. Under this view, putative law under tyrannical rule lacked morality and hence 
did not constitute a valid legal regime”.
218
  
Dugard has made a similar argument in relation to the reliance on amnesties during the South 
African transition.
 
He contends that the laws of the Apartheid regime must be denounced 
because they did not comply with the inner morality of the law and that, as a result, the 
amnesty process was circumspect.
219
 He suggests that: 
“[Justice], universal justice which transcends the requirements of political expediency, is an 
essential component of reconciliation [...] In South Africa, it is doubtful whether a just 
reconciliation can ever be achieved without the retrospective invalidation of the laws of 
apartheid.”
220
 
Furthermore “[this] theory of transformative law promotes the normative view that the role of 
law is to transform the prevailing meaning of legality”.221 From the natural law perspective 
there is a link between morality and transformative law and recognition of the potentially 
transformative role of criminal law to denounce prior injustice and to invalidate abusive laws 
of the former regime.  
 
                                                          
216
 See Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 12-15 where Teitel outlines the jurisprudential debate between 
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3.3.3 Transformative (Criminal) Justice
222
 
 
Transformative justice is the collection of institutional- and legal responses which produce 
transformation. As opposed to transitional justice, transformative justice has a stronger moral 
undercurrent and is less infused with the political. However, as will be subsequently 
discussed, an absolute de-politicisation of transformative justice may not be possible.
223
  
 
Transformative justice in the criminal law context demands a systematic approach to 
punishment which speaks to the broader social problems behind a specific crime.
224
 
Transformative justice has strong ties to restorative justice and envisions a reconciliatory 
approach to criminal justice involving the offender, the victim and the affected community.
225
 
According to Daly, the “two principal goals of transformative justice are the related aims of 
reconciliation and deterrence”. 226  Beyond these goals however, transformative justice 
“requires metamorphosis at all levels of society” which involves “changing the culture that 
pursued or tolerated the prior injustice”.227  This process entails infusing new norms and 
                                                          
222
 Transformative justice can be distinguished from transformational justice which refers to “the notions 
of justice that drive and also legitimise the process of transition and transformation”; see Esterhuyse (Truth 
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values into a society which, although it has already undergone a transition, may not yet have 
accepted those values (often of a universal character) closely associated with the transition.
228
 
 
Transformative justice operates through a number of institutions and modalities. 
Criminal trials, various types of truth commissions, blanket- or conditional amnesty and 
lustration may serve as vehicles for transformative justice.
229
 Prosecutions are often used in 
conjunction with alternatives to criminal justice.
230
 In some situations however, criminal 
accountability has been rendered impossible by realpolitik or by the desire for national peace 
and reconciliation.
231
 The rise of alternatives to criminal justice has shown that a purely 
prosecutorial approach to mass atrocity (the “Nuremberg approach”) is likely to be an 
impractical means of simultaneously dealing with the past and moving forward.
232
 It must be 
noted that the proliferation of alternatives to criminal justice has by no means rendered 
criminal prosecutions redundant to the transformational process. Prosecution remains relevant 
to transformative justice for a number of reasons. Firstly, impunity for perpetrators of mass 
atrocity and international crime offends the international community’s basic notion of justice 
and runs contrary to humanity’s instinctive demand for retribution in response to crime. 
According to Alvarez: 
“The justifications for international criminal liability for perpetrators of the international 
crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have remained essentially 
unchanged in the half century since World War II’s Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. Despite the 
vast literature on those famous prosecutions, including extensive critiques levelled at what 
they accomplished, there is a remarkable degree of consensus among international lawyers in 
favor of international criminal accountability for mass murderers, rapists, and torturers.”
233
 
Secondly, denying justice and ignoring past violations through failure to bring offenders to 
court whenever possible (especially for egregious international crimes) decreases the chances 
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of a successful transformative process.
234
 There may also be a strong desire among the 
victims of past injustices to see their former tormentors brought to book. Thirdly, the 
international community and human rights culture continues to express strong support for 
accountability for international crimes. The creation and continued support for the permanent 
ICC serves as an illustration of the desire that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes must come to an end.
235
 
 
3.4 The Character of Transformative Change 
 
Change is the central feature of transformation. Below I provide a brief outline of the nature 
and characteristics constitutive of the type of change that is transformative.  
 
3.4.1 The (Limited) Relevance of Transformative Constitutionalism 
 
In South Africa, the term ‘transformation’ usually denotes the process of making institutions 
and organisations more democratic.
236
 Furthermore, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa is a legal instrument attributed with transformative qualities. An area of study which 
may be helpful for the identification of transformative change is “transformative 
constitutionalism”. In his seminal article “Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism”, Klare described transformative constitutionalism as follows: 
“[...] a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political 
developments) to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative 
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 Daly (Transformative Justice) (supra) 100-101 (footnote 65). According to Daly, the “ICC Statute 
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constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large scale social change through non-
violent political processes grounded in law.”
237
  
The notion of transformative constitutionalism features prominently in South African human 
rights and constitutional law discourse and is a widely discussed topic among South African 
lawyers and academics.
238
 Writing on the subject, many lawyers and academics have 
elaborated on the possible meaning of transformation. Therefore, the premise for turning to 
transformative constitutionalism in this thesis is to identify a number of shared qualities or 
characteristics in those bodies of law or legal instruments which are part of public law, and 
which have been credited for producing the type of change that is transformative.  
 
The relevance of transformative constitutionalism for this thesis is twofold. Firstly, in 
this chapter, I turn to transformative constitutionalism to outline the meaning of 
‘transformative value’ and more specifically to identify and describe ‘transformative change’. 
Secondly, transformative constitutionalism’s relevance lies in the potential impact of the 
‘transformative’ South African Constitution on the interaction between South Africa’s 
domestic legal system and international criminal justice.
239
 Especially relevant in this regard 
is section 232 of the Constitution which potentially provides a basis for the prosecution of 
customary international crimes directly under common law.
240
 Beyond these aspects, 
transformative constitutionalism’s relevance to this thesis is limited. Transformative 
constitutionalism proceeds essentially from a perspective which is specific to South African 
history, politics and law. This thesis focuses primarily on the international criminal justice 
system (international aspects of domestic criminal law and criminal aspects of international 
law) as well as the international- and domestic application thereof. Within this broader 
primary focus, the potential impact of the transformative Constitution on the application of 
ICL in South Africa must be considered and not the type of transformation more generally 
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Langa P “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351; Liebenberg S 
Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) Juta, Cape Town. 
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associated with transformative constitutionalism, namely transformation through 
constitutionally entrenched socio-economic rights.  
     
3.4.2 Transformative Change as Qualified ‘Social Change’ 
 
It has been noted above that transformation is nearly synonymous with change.  Reitz 
observes that “much law is intended to enforce the status quo, but transformative law is 
intended to change society”.241 According to Esterhuyse, ‘change’ in the broad meaning of 
the word (he refers to the “umbrella function” of the term) isn’t necessarily change for the 
better but could represent change in any unspecified manner.
242
 Esterhuyse contends that 
“transformation means a new institution, a new culture and a new direction”.243 Therefore, 
law that aims to be transformative cannot simply confirm or entrench societal consensus.
244
 
Rather, law can be regarded as transformative when it “[...] has the power to change society 
because a substantial segment of society has not yet adopted the values of the law.”245 The 
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distinction between law that confirms public consensus and law that shapes public consensus 
to create new social norms is not always easily made. Moreover, transformative change must 
be distinguished from ordinary legal development, meaning the normal manner through 
which law adapts or evolves to meet shifting social needs.
246
 How then can we distinguish 
ordinary legal evolution from legal transformation? 
 
The legal evolution referred to above is often gradual and instinctive, resembling what 
Klare refers to as “reform”.247 According to Klare, reform is not vast enough to encapsulate 
transformation. Yet, transformation falls short of a social revolution in the traditional 
sense.
248
 The following observation by Teitel illustrates the difficulty in trying to establish a 
threshold for transformative change during a transition: 
“Not all transformations exhibit the same degree of ‘normative shift’. Indeed, one might 
conceptualize transition along a transformative continuum in their relation to the predecessor 
regime and value system varying in degree from ‘radical’ to ‘conservative’ change.”
249
 
Although transformation most often occurs in transitions and post-conflict situations, 
transitional justice mechanisms are not transformative per se. It is not change itself but the 
qualities of change and the effect of the change that provides the transformative element. As 
in Klare and Teitel’s respective views above, the manner of change is more than conservative 
reformation, yet does not necessarily have to amount to a radical political (and legal) 
revolution.
250
 It is the substantial innovation, improvement or normative shift brought about 
by the change irrespective of the specific circumstances in which it takes place that 
determines whether or not it is transformative.
251
 Thus, the type of change is the determining 
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factor for identifying transformative value. It is the substance and quality of the change that 
provides the transformative element. 
 
3.4.3 ‘Back to the Future’: Transformative Change as Forward- and Backward Looking 
 
Transformation cannot be a dichotomous choice between backward-looking and forward-
looking action. Pieterse, with significant references to both Teitel’s work on transitional 
jurisprudence and Klare’s seminal article, describes transformative constitutionalism as 
“historically self-conscious whilst simultaneously embodying an as yet unrealised future 
ideal”. 252  He notes that transformative constitutionalism is concurrently forward- and 
backward-looking, “maintaining legal continuity and simultaneously [facilitating] change”.253 
These forward- and backward-looking goals of transformation are illustrated well in the 
preamble to the South African Constitution:  
“We the people of South Africa, recognize the injustices of our past” [and] “adopt this 
Constitution so as to – Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.”
254
 
Addressing a society’s past during a transition impacts upon its future and its prospects for a 
successful transformation.  
 
 In keeping with the familiar saying “there can be no peace without justice”, there can 
be no moving forward, no progressive change, before past wrongs and current injustices have 
been righted. Nor can there be justice without adherence to established principles of justice 
such as legal certainty and the rule of law. The first prize in any transition is to cultivate a 
peaceful and stable environment wherein past legal abuses can be addressed and remedied 
and where a platform can be created to protect against future abuses. To a certain extent, 
                                                          
appropriate to say that the caterpillar has transformed into a butterfly, since the change is of such a nature 
that it is viewed (at least under the idiom of the caterpillar and the butterfly) to be a positive development. 
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transformative change is determined by, and contingent upon, the nature of prior injustices.
255
 
This determines the threshold for transformative change. Whether through criminal trials or 
through alternatives to criminal justice, confronting the past is essential to any 
transformation. The legacy of past injustices must be eradicated and combined with a 
commitment to ensure that the wrongs of the past are never repeated.
256
 Borrowing from the 
title of the 1980’s American science fiction films, transformative change must serve to take a 
society back to the future. To an extent, the future is shaped both by the past and the ex post 
facto legal reaction thereto. To achieve transformation in this way is a daunting task, one 
requiring a balancing act between diverse and often conflicting legal duties and political 
interests. This is the crux of any transformation, how to optimally balance and mediate 
between the numerous and often divergent backward- and forward-looking objectives of 
peace, reconciliation, truth-telling, retribution, restoration and deterrence, all while remaining 
within the bounds of legality and the rule of law.  
 
3.4.4 The Utility Criterion  
 
One approach to the concept of transformative change may be to regard it as the type of 
change with the property of being useful. Bearing this in mind, a good point of departure is 
perhaps the work of the utilitarian positivists. Writers such as Bentham, Austen and Mill 
rejected the idea of turning to natural law and natural rights to establish what the law is.
257
 
They worked towards a critical evaluation of law based on the criterion of utility. A thorough 
legal-philosophical analysis of utilitarian positivism falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
What I am mostly interested in is the definition of utility or usefulness under utilitarian 
positivism. Bentham postulated utility as “[...] the property or tendency of a thing to prevent 
some evil or to procure some good [and] to augment the happiness of the community”.258 
Accordingly, “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right 
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257
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and wrong”.259 Furthermore, a legal mechanism with utility is one with potential to maximise 
the good (or “happiness”) and minimises iniquity on a grand scale.260 This can be observed in 
the work of Mill where he refers to happiness as “a good to the aggregate of all persons”.261 
Because of the emphasis on that which is in the interest of the common good, utilitarianism 
places a high value on equality, fairness and impartiality. Since every person in the utilitarian 
vision is entitled to share equally in the state of maximised happiness, an impartial judgment 
can be made as to what that would entail.
262
 
 
In the criminal law context, utilitarianism manifests through the utilitarian theories of 
punishment, which views punishment as a means of obtaining social benefits. The premise 
for socially beneficial punishment is the transgression of a legal rule. Punishment to deter 
future crimes either of a specific individual or within the general public is a notable example. 
Utilitarian punishment theory is discussed more fully under Chapter 5 para 5.2.3.2 infra. 
 
Based on the above, useful change may be taken to mean change which actively 
promotes the collective good (at times also through the prevention of common evils).  
 
3.4.5 Legalism and the Individual as the Ultimate Object of Transformation 
 
Sir Hartley Shawcross once referred to the individual human being as “the ultimate unit of all 
law”.263 At the time of this statement the only exception was international law which was 
almost exclusively state-centred as a matter of custom and as a result of its historical 
development. Since the mass atrocities in the first half of the 20
th
 century however, 
international law is increasingly being called upon to protect the individual, as Tomuschat 
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remarked: “[the] fate of the individual has become a matter of international concern”.264 
Especially significant in this regard is the rise of international human rights and ICL, which 
are both bodies of law fundamentally concerned with the individual. 
 
Furthermore, legal protection for individuals is achieved through what is referred to as 
legalism. Shklar defines the legalist outlook as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct 
to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights 
determined by rules”. 265  Legalism involves an abstraction which depersonalises the 
individual only for the purpose of equality before the law and confers upon individuals a 
certain legal status so all may receive equal benefits and treatment before the law. 
Theoretically, the impersonal manner in which law is applied creates an objectivity which 
benefits all not only a select few. For example, the international human rights movement aims 
to protect individuals through basic rights to which all humans are entitled purely through the 
fact of their existence. 
 
It is submitted that to some extent utilitarianism, legalism and transformative law 
theory overlap on the ideal of mutual benefit. Similar to utilitarian and legalist reliance on 
equality and impartiality in the interest of individuals above, Reitz lists objective equality and 
‘logical consistency’ (impartiality may also have been used) in the application of law as 
ideals closely related to transformative law. Reitz observes that: 
“It is difficult to imagine that law meant to transform society could be applied in a way that 
results in different law for different people [...] law cannot be expected to change society 
unless it can be applied [...] with a logical consistency that is unaffected by who the parties are 
except to the extent that their relevant characteristics are specified in the law itself.”
266
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Writing on transformative constitutionalism, Langa too observes that the ultimate objective of 
the South African transformative project is a truly equal society.
267
 It seems safe to conclude, 
as Reitz did, that an important part of the transformative law concept is substantive and 
formal equality of individual rights through impersonal and objective application of the 
law.
268
 Although transformative processes may address specific social problems (and 
therefore only those individuals affected by such social problems) or pursue specific 
subsidiary goals, such processes are ultimately part of the broader ideal of improving the 
lives of individuals and, to this end, the impartial distribution of benefits among individuals. 
Therefore, law that aims to be transformative on the international level must similarly, strive 
towards an effect which is broadly to the benefit of the civitas maxima. 
 
3.4.6 Values and Transformative Expression 
 
“Part of the process of transformation [...] entails inculcating new values in the society.”269 In 
order to be transformative, the impact of the law’s application must be such that it has the 
effect of communicating new values en masse, partly to reject the values of the prior injustice 
and partly in pursuit of the new ideal or the desired alternative. In relation to the South 
African transition to democracy, De Lange comments: 
“Transformation is seen as a holistic project to change the attitudes, consciousness and 
material conditions of our people, and in a meaningful way to reflect the values that we 
struggled for and are now embodied in our constitution and in the human rights culture we 
strive for.”
270
 (emphasis added) 
The critical importance of the communication of values in a transformative project has been 
noted by Shapiro (reviewing Bilsky’s work in relation to the impact of ‘political’ trials, such 
as the Eichmann trial, on Israeli identity and collective consciousness): 
“It is the impact on consciousness that provides the transformative element, rather than 
substantive change in the legal universe. It is transformative because it touches the heart of 
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things. Core values of the society and its political system are on trial. The results may, in 
effect, provide legitimacy to the existing order. They may also suggest the limits of the legal 
system in effectuating fundamental change.”
271
 
The realism (or perhaps slight pessimism) in the latter part of Shapiro’s observation, that law 
may be limited in its ability to create fundamental change, is significant. Shapiro seems to 
suggest that the formalism which accompanies the application of laws and the procedural 
restraints of the trial mechanism creates certain limitations on the law’s ability to reflect and 
entrench values. To an extent Shapiro makes a valid point. Criminal trials are in many ways 
formally and practically bound (to depart from Shapiro’s restrictive choice of the word 
‘limits’) by criminal law tradition, legal principles and by its procedures, but, as I will 
illustrate later in the thesis, other characteristics of (international) criminal justice are 
conducive to the communication of values en masse. See in this regard Chapter 5 para 5.6 
and Chapter 8 infra. 
 
If one subscribes to the view that transformation involves reflecting the mores of a 
society or the civitas maxima in the international context, one takes the view that 
transformation is to some extent impelled and compelled by human values or beliefs.
272
 
Commonly, societies in transition attempt to embrace values closely associated with liberal 
democratic beliefs, chiefly human rights and the rule of law principle. The legal norms that 
encapsulate transformative values are normally universal in character and therefore based on 
a broad moral resonance.
273
 
 
As part of transformation, values can be expressed broadly in two ways. Firstly, social 
values can be expressed by legally entrenching them as legal norms or secondly, by 
criminalising acts which transgress social values. This necessitates a strong belief in legalism 
(as discussed above) as a means of protecting social values. According to Diane Marie 
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Amann the “[law] operates as a means for articulation and nourishment of social values”.274 It 
does so through the repeated pronouncement of legal norms backed by the authority of 
political and moral legitimacy granted to it by a society. This function of law is often referred 
to as its expressive function
 
and, since criminalisation is a means of expressing values, the 
expressive function of law “is of particular importance to criminal justice”.275 According to 
Kahan “the condemning retort of punishment signals society’s commitment to the values that 
the wrongdoer’s act denies”.276 As it is widely accepted that domestic criminal laws reflect 
the values of a closed society, punishment under ICL may be viewed as an expression of the 
values and norms of an abstract society, namely the international community or civitas 
maxima. Especially those international criminal norms which have attained ius cogens status 
may be viewed as norms that exist in the interests of mankind. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The previous section highlighted a number of characteristics indicative of ‘transformative 
change’. In summary, transformative value may be formulated as follows:  
Transformative value is the product of change which is useful to the civitas 
maxima. 
Furthermore, it is possible to refer to the ‘transformative value’ of a body of law as the 
potential of that body of law to promote, contribute to, or supply the type of change that is 
transformative. As illustrated by the flowchart below (figure 1), transformation may occur 
through legal and/or political means. The study is primarily focused on legal transformation. 
In recognition of the fact that legal and political processes of transformation arise 
concurrently and cannot readily be separated due to the complexity of legal and political 
interaction during transformation, parts of this thesis are devoted to the politics of 
international criminal justice and the assessment of the influence of politics on ICL’s 
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transformative value. The remainder of this thesis will focus on transformation which may (or 
may have) occur(ed) through: 
1. The use of ICL in well-known historical and political trials, namely the Nuremberg IMT 
and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (Chapter 4);   
2. The use of ICL as a component of transitional justice or in post-conflict situations where 
ICL pursues retributive and utilitarian objectives (Chapter 5). This includes ICL as 
enforced by international criminal tribunals; 
3. The consequences of the fact that ICL is to some extent politically motivated and 
supported (Chapter 6). Although political transformation is less acute in the international 
order than in the domestic, my approach is to focus on the political reasons for state 
support, abuse or abandonment of international criminal justice. This chapter includes 
investigation of the positive and negative influences of politicisation on the 
transformative value of ICL and criticism of the use of ICL to achieve political goals; and 
4.  Incorporation, transformation and other domestic interactions of ICL with particular 
focus on the South African state and legal system (Chapter 7). 
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*Figure 1: The influence of politics on ICL’s transformative value. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TRANSFORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Traditionally, the main areas of transformative jurisprudence have been in the field of public 
law, namely constitutional law, public international law, criminal justice and the rule of law 
principle.
277
 Teitel argues that criminal law is one of three legal disciplines most reflective of 
the transformative potential of law during transitions.
278
 Transformative legal processes are 
often seen during transitions and after conflicts. Since the establishment of the ICTY most 
post-conflict societal transformations and political transitions have involved transitional 
criminal justice processes at least to some extent. The historical roots of this phenomenon lay 
however at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg IMT 
established ICL’s potential as a response to mass atrocity and as an alternative to extrajudicial 
means of dealing with war criminals. 
 
Some years later, international criminal justice resurfaced through the well-known 
and controversial prosecution of Adolf Eichmann in Israel. In many ways the Eichmann trial 
relied upon the historical and legal precedent set by the Nuremberg IMT. The factual 
background of the trial is, like that of the Nuremberg IMT, related to events of the Second 
World War. Yet, the Eichmann trial left a legacy unique from that of the Nuremberg IMT. In 
contrast to the Nuremberg IMT, the prosecution of Eichmann took place in a domestic legal 
forum. Unlike the Nuremberg IMT, the Eichmann trial was not a case of victors’ justice, but 
victims’ justice. These unique aspects to Eichmann’s prosecution have made its legacy for 
international criminal justice stand apart from the legacy of Nuremberg. Furthermore, the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann illustrated the value of prosecutions of international crimes in the 
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domestic setting. The role of the Eichmann trial in forging a narrative of history, national 
identity and victimisation is of particular interest.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the legacies of the two abovementioned trials. 
It is submitted that these trials can be viewed not only as the foremost catalysts for modern 
ICL, but also as events which established ICL’s transformative ability on various levels. In 
other words, these trials represent the transformative foundations of modern ICL. These 
transformative foundations present a logical point of departure in addressing the research 
question. This chapter is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of these trials. It focuses 
specifically on their transformative dimensions and serves as an introduction to Chapters 5 
and 6. Some of the transformative aspects of these trials will therefore be dealt with in greater 
detail in the following chapter.
279
 
 
Beyond the benefit of a historical perspective that an investigation of these trials 
entail, an examination of the Nuremberg IMT and the Eichmann trial has the added 
advantage that these trials  mirror the general methodological approach adopted in this thesis. 
That is, they offer an international and domestic perspective respectively on the 
transformative value of ICL.  
 
4.2 International Perspective: The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 
4.2.1 Background 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the victorious Allies faced a unique practical and 
moral conundrum. How could the defeated and captured enemy best be dealt with? In lieu of 
the failed national trials policy of World War I, it was decided that leading figures of the 
German and Japanese regimes would stand trial in two international military tribunals 
(“IMTs”). Of the two post-war IMTs, the Nuremberg IMT has left the more enduring and 
valuable legacy. The reasons being firstly, that the Nuremberg IMT acted as the forerunner to 
the Tokyo IMTFE. The Tokyo IMTFE was largely modelled on the Nuremberg Tribunal, its 
                                                          
279
 See Chapter 5 para 5.6 infra. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 89 
 
substantive jurisdiction and many other aspects of the London Charter.
280
 Secondly, the 
Nuremberg IMT placed more emphasis on fairness than the Tokyo IMTFE. As will be 
discussed later on in this chapter, this enhanced the Nuremberg IMT’s transformative 
value.
281
 Consequently, the discussion of ICL’s transformative foundations in international 
perspective is confined to the Nuremberg IMT.  
 
The Nuremberg IMT has been the subject of equal amounts of both praise and 
criticism; pessimism and optimism; admiration and condemnation; and passionate debate. 
Some herald it as the trial of the century, a milestone for international justice and a tribute of 
power to reason.
282
 Others see it as having been an experiment, a one-sided political act and a 
disguised show trial.
283
 Regardless of the diverse viewpoints on the accomplishments and 
failures of the Nuremberg IMT, the ramifications of the trial for international criminal justice 
have been enormous.
284
 Not only did the trial fast-track the development and acceptance of 
ICL as an independent and valuable system of law, but it also had an enduring impact on the 
objectives, values and character of modern ICL.
285
 Furthermore, in Chapter 2 it was noted 
that the legal produce of the Nuremberg IMT, the Nuremberg Principles, along with the 
United Nations Charter, embodied the emergent mores of individuals irrespective of their 
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nationality and created new legal dynamics between individuals, states and the international 
community.
286
  
 
4.2.2 The Moral-Ethical and Legal Legacy of Nuremberg 
 
Bassiouni distinguishes between the more intangible moral-ethical legacy and the tangible 
legal legacy of the Nuremberg IMT.
287
 The moral-ethical legacy finds expression in the 
“intellectual ferment” since Nuremberg which, according to Bassiouni: 
“[...] has strengthened individual and collective values in a large number of societies, some 
more than others, which in turn has contributed to heightening social consciousness, and 
which in turn has impacted on the development of law and legal institutions.”
288
 
The moral-ethical legacy of Nuremberg is “to a large extent [...] reflected in the various 
human rights instruments which have developed since World War II”.289  
 
The legal legacy of Nuremberg is an outgrowth, or a partial concretisation, of the 
moral-ethical legacy of Nuremberg. Moral, ethical and legal factors lie on the same 
continuum so that “moral-ethical considerations shape social consciousness and social 
consciousness impacts on the development of law and legal institutions”. 290 Bassiouni 
contends that the legal legacy of Nuremberg is threefold: 
“[1]Legal instruments that are readily and directly attributable to Nuremberg; [2] legal 
instruments that reflect the moral-ethical values and intellectual ferment deriving from the 
Nuremberg legacy; and [3] the legal consequences of the behavioral transformation and social 
consciousness witnessed among post-Nuremberg generations.”
291
   
Thus the Nuremberg inheritance consists of bolstered values and the basic foundations of the 
institutions, procedure and substantive law applied in modern international criminal justice. 
But is this legacy transformative in nature? 
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4.2.3 The Nuremberg Legacy as Transformative 
 
The moral-ethical and legal legacy of the Nuremberg IMT is a sound point of departure for 
the investigation into the transformative value of ICL. The enduring impact of the Nuremberg 
IMT is threefold. Firstly, substantive criminal law innovations were established or set in 
motion at the Nuremberg IMT. Secondly, the Nuremberg IMT represented a radical break 
from the past for which it is still historically acknowledged. And finally, the Nuremberg 
IMT’s impact on international social consciousness created a lasting and symbolic message 
of international unity and the transcendental potential of law and justice.
292
  
 
4.2.3.1 Substantive Criminal Law 
 
The most palpable aspect of the legal legacy of Nuremberg is the application, development 
and later codification of customary international law. Nuremberg left a lasting and valuable 
jurisprudential legacy consisting of the Nuremberg Charter, the indictment and the judgment. 
The substantive crimes prosecuted at Nuremberg consisted of crimes against the peace, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
293
  
 
The Nuremberg Principles, that is the principles of international law contained in the 
Nuremberg Charter and the judgment of the tribunal, were subsequently affirmed by the 
General Assembly by way of resolution 95(I) of 11 December 1946.
294
 According to Cassese: 
“[...] this approval and support meant that the world community had robustly set in motion the 
process for turning the principles at issue into general principles of customary law binding on 
member States of the whole international community”
295
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The Nuremberg Principles have been reproduced in the Statutes of all the major international 
criminal courts and in various human rights treaties.
296
 Furthermore the principles have been 
acknowledged in domestic prosecutions of international crimes.
297
 Today, the Nuremberg 
Principles have achieved customary international law status.
298
  
 
The prosecution of individuals under international law represented the defining 
moment in the history of international criminal justice. For the first time, government and 
military leaders could not hide behind the veil of state responsibility or membership to an 
organisation. The Nuremberg IMT had “the power to try and punish persons who […] 
[committed crimes] whether as individuals or as members of [criminal] organisations”.299 The 
“Nuremberg revolution”, as it has since become known, advanced the notion that “crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities” and that “individual 
human rights ought to be protected also at the level of international law”.300 The principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for international crimes is now firmly established in 
international law.
301
  
 
4.2.3.2 Fairness 
 
In contrast to the Tokyo IMTFE, the Nuremberg IMT placed a high value on fairness. 
According to Bassiouni: 
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“It must also be noted that the Nuremberg trial offered more guarantees of procedural fairness 
to the defendants. Conversely, the Tokyo trial was shamefully unfair and riddled procedurally 
with every type of error, bias, prejudice and unfairness that one can imagine. Both objectively, 
and in contrast to its Tokyo counterpart, Nuremberg stands out from a procedural perspective 
as a relatively fair trial; under the circumstances and in light of history a leading example of 
procedural fairness that victorious powers could extend to the principles of their defeated 
enemies.”
 302
 
Article 16 of the Nuremberg Charter contained procedures to be followed to ensure a fair trial 
for the defendants. Article 16(e) for example, gave defendants the right to present evidence 
and to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. This represented a radical break from the past 
and was in and of itself a transformative development if one considers the crimes, the context 
in which they were committed and the era in which the Nuremberg IMT was established. 
Bassiouni comments that “[the] enduring legacy of Nuremberg is due principally to its 
attempts to insure procedural fairness to the defendants”. 303  Fichtelberg considers the 
emphasis placed on fairness as “the central condition for legitimacy” as the Nuremberg 
IMT’s greatest contribution, albeit one that has gone largely undervalued.304 Although the 
proceedings at the Nuremberg IMT may not stand up to the standards of fairness of recent 
and current international criminal tribunals, it was by and large intended to be fair and 
transparent.  
 
In retrospect, Bassiouni wrote of the “relative fairness” of the Nuremberg IMT.305 
Despite problems relating to the principle of legality and the denial of previously accepted 
defence of obedience to orders, the proceedings at Nuremberg were undoubtedly fair in 
relation to the alternative presented by historical precedent and other proposals put forward 
by the Allies for dealing with the Nazi leadership.
306
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4.2.3.3 Symbolic Effect 
 
Jonathan Turley believes that the Nuremberg IMT created a lasting legacy of transformative 
justice: 
“Nuremberg showed that the goal of the world war was to bring justice and not simply 
domination. It was in the final moment that the trial distinguished World War II from all prior 
wars. It was through the trial that the world turned away from retributive justice and embraced 
transformative justice.”
307
 
At the IMT the prosecution deliberately attached a moral element to an issue affecting 
international affairs.
308
 The choice of legally regulated retribution over the precedent of 
vengeance was an important symbolic act, the reverberations of which can be seen in many 
subsequent legal responses to mass atrocity.  
 
The decision of the victorious Allies to follow legal process and to afford fair trial 
rights to the defendants at Nuremberg forever changed the landscape of global politics. 
Following this “hidden revolution” at the Nuremberg IMT, the legitimacy of international 
criminal tribunals - derived from the fairness of the proceedings of such courts and their role 
as the “voice” of the international community – provided a way to authoritatively advance 
interests and communicate values, whether moral, legal or political.
309
 The moment in which 
it seemed that international criminal justice had become viable and independent was also the 
moment that it became open to criticism due to the influence of politics on justice, as was 
encapsulated in the “victor’s justice” critique. Here was a marriage, for better or worse, 
between international criminal justice and politics. 
 
Shklar describes the Nuremberg IMT, in terms of the broader distinction between law 
and politics, as a political trial. She comments that the remarkable nature of the Nuremberg 
IMT was not only a consequence of the trial being a first of its kind, but also because: 
“It was a great drama in which the most fundamental moral and political values were the real 
personae. Emotionally and philosophically it confronted every thoughtful individual with the 
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necessity of making some clear decisions about his beliefs. For persons of liberal convictions 
and a strong commitment to legalistic politics it was a genuine moral crisis.”
310
 
With regard to the purported “revolutionary” influence of the trial, Shklar was pessimistic: 
“There is a great deal of reason to suppose that the [Nuremberg IMT] did in fact reinforce the 
dormant legal consciousness of [Germany’s professional and bureaucratic classes], which is 
more than can be said on behalf of its grandiose claims to revolutionize international 
law…”
311
  
The latter part of this statement referring to the “grandiose” claims of the Nuremberg IMT, 
although it would have seemed true to Shklar and many others at the time, is today essentially 
discredited. Shklar considered the Nuremberg IMT as something that took place “in a social 
vacuum” or in a non-existing international order without international criminal laws.312 This 
may have been true at the time. At present it is possible to speak of an international order, an 
international community and a system of international criminal law with more confidence. 
Furthermore, it is possible to point to the institutions and legal instruments that embody their 
existence, such as the ICC and the Rome Statute. How much of the change that occurred 
between the conclusion of the trial at Nuremberg and the present day was made possible by 
the precedent and legacy of the Nuremberg IMT? One would be hard-pressed to deny the 
Nuremberg IMT of any contribution in this regard.  
 
The Nuremberg IMT has had a lasting impact on the values and collective 
consciousness of humanity. Bassiouni comments that although it is difficult or perhaps 
impossible to measure, the Nuremberg IMT transformed the collective values and behaviour 
of subsequent generations:  
                                                          
310
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“The social consciousness generated by Nuremberg (and Tokyo) has penetrated contemporary 
social values and social consciousness of the generations that were not present at the time of 
Nuremberg (and Tokyo).” 
313
 
The Nuremberg IMT as well as the Tokyo IMTFE to a lesser extent, is an expression and 
historical reminder of humanity’s post-Second World War values. It stands as a testament to 
an emergent universal social consciousness and of the heinous acts that awakened this 
collective consciousness. Despite the imperfect nature of the trial at Nuremberg, the 
international criminal justice movement initiated by it has since been regarded by many as a 
custodian of universal values and a demonstration of a growing sense of global 
interconnectedness.  
 
Finally, the Nuremberg IMT may be viewed as the foundational act of a new form of 
international law, namely cosmopolitan (criminal) law.
314
 As a response to Nazi atrocities, 
the Nuremberg IMT advanced a notion of humanity under which human beings are regarded 
as equals and as bearers of fundamental rights under a new international authority.
315
 This 
was achieved through the Nuremberg IMT’s precedent of individual criminal liability which 
lies “at the heart of cosmopolitan criminal law”.316 Shortly after the Nuremberg IMT, this 
new individual criminal liability under international law fell into sync with the post-Second 
World War human rights revolution which had been set off by the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
317
 Subsequent to the Cold War deadlock of international law, 
the ad hoc tribunals re-initiated the cosmopolitan movement which emerged from the 
Nuremberg IMT. Today, ICL is viewed by many as a manifestation of an emerging 
cosmopolitanism and a custodian of international human rights.
318
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4.2.4 Criticisms of the Nuremberg IMT 
 
From a legal point of view the proceedings at the IMT has been criticised due to a number of 
real and perceived shortcomings.
319
 The trial was certainly a less than perfect point of 
departure for the age of human rights and international criminal justice. Many viewed the 
trials as “victors’ justice” or “showcase trials”, devoid of legitimacy owing to the one-
sidedness of the prosecutions (only political and military leaders from the Axis countries 
stood trial) and a lack of equal representation of judges on the bench. The trial was in all 
respects exclusively controlled by the victorious Allies. Furthermore, many of the convicted 
persons received the death sentence, which is no longer legal under international law.
320
   
 
The proceedings at the Nuremberg IMT were in many ways in violation of the 
principle of legality. The prosecution of crimes against the peace and crimes against 
humanity at the Nuremberg IMT’s constituted violations of the principle of retroactive 
application of the law and the principle nullum crimen sine lege.
321
 No specific conventions 
or other international legal instruments suggested the existence of such crimes prior to the 
charges brought at Nuremberg.
322
 Another problem relating to the principle of legality and to 
the ex post facto application of criminal law at Nuremberg was the denial of the traditionally 
accepted defence of obedience to superior orders.
323
  Furthermore, no appeal or review of the 
judgment was available to any of the defendants.
324
 
 
 
 
                                                          
319
 See Schwarzenberger (Judgement of Nuremberg) (supra) 329, 348-349; Dugard (International Law) 
(supra) 321; Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 443. 
320
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) (1945), article 27. 
321
 Bassiouni (Nuremberg: Forty Years After) (supra) 61-62. 
322
 Bassiouni (Nuremberg: Forty Years After) (supra) 61-62.  
323
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) (1945), article 8: “The fact that the 
defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires”. 
Superior orders was not recognised as a defence at the ad hoc tribunals, but is recognised as a defence 
against charges of war crimes in the ICC Statute (see Rome Statute of the ICC, article 33). 
324
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) (1945), article 26. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 98 
 
4.3 Domestic Perspective: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann 
 
4.3.1 Background 
 
A ground-breaking case regarding the domestic prosecution of international crime is the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann in the District Court of Jerusalem, and on appeal in the Israeli Supreme 
Court.
325
 The Eichmann case stands apart due to the fact that it involved the application of 
substantive international criminal law despite the lull in ICL’s historical development during 
the Cold War period.  
 
Eichmann, a former Gestapo officer under Hitler’s Nazi regime, had been abducted 
from Argentina to stand trial in Jerusalem mainly on charges of crimes against the Jewish 
people (counts 1-5), but also for crimes against humanity (counts 6-7 and 9-12), war crimes 
(count 8), and membership in a criminal enemy organisation (counts 13-15). These charges 
stem from his instrumental role in the Nazi government’s policy of genocide against Jewish 
peoples in Europe, euphemistically referred to by the Nazi’s as ‘the final solution to the 
Jewish problem in Europe’. As the head of sub-department IV-B4 of the Reich Main Security 
Office, “Eichmann organized and coordinated the deportations of the Jews to the 
concentration camps”.326 Eichmann was convicted and sentenced to death for his crimes. The 
sentence and conviction was upheld in a subsequent appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court.  
 
From an international- and a procedural law point of view, the case was a 
controversial one. Eichmann’s prosecution was initiated by the State of Israel not only in 
order to bring him to justice, but also for the political objective of turning the trial into a 
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didactic tool. The means used by the prosecution to realise this secondary purpose of the trial 
were often detrimental to Eichmann’s prospects for a fair and impartial trial and will be dealt 
with in para 4.3.5 infra. Another issue that arose from the trial was the legality under 
international law of Eichmann’s presence through abduction. No state may exercise police 
powers within the territory of another state without permission to do so.
327
 Eichmann’s 
abduction by Israeli security agents was therefore an act which constituted a clear violation of 
Argentina’s territorial sovereignty under international law.328 As a consequence, Argentina 
had a legitimate claim under international law for the return of Eichmann from Israel. 
Ultimately, Argentinian protestations went unheeded. The UNSC warned against future 
abductions and called for reparations from the Israeli government.
329
 These reparations were 
never made and Eichmann remained in Israel where he was scheduled to be put on trial. 
 
The charges of ‘crimes against the Jewish people’ and crimes against humanity were 
brought against Eichmann in terms of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act of 
1950. This act in its entirety can be viewed as a species of ICL, particularly the offence of 
crimes against the Jewish people. It is national criminal law of an international character, as 
crimes against the Jews were committed on foreign soil (in fact, the crimes could not have 
been committed on domestic soil since the state of Israel had not yet come into existence 
during the period in which the crimes were committed) and by a non-national of Israel. The 
charges of crimes against humanity related to Eichmann’s role in the persecution of Jews 
(count 6) and plundering of Jewish property (count 7) and the deportation of non-Jewish 
civilian populations (counts 9-12). The Israeli court ruled that it was competent to hear all the 
charges against Eichmann on the basis of both extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction.  
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The relevance of the Eichmann trial for this study lies in the larger impact of the 
domestic prosecution of crimes against humanity and other crimes of an international 
character, through the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on the 
principle of universality. Of particular interest is the impact of the aforementioned on the 
victims of the Holocaust and on the state of Israel. A further note of relevance lies in the 
trial’s overall legacy and international impact. The relationship between the retributive-
expressive function of the Eichmann trial and the didactic, consciousness-transforming 
effects thereof, may prove illuminating in the search for ICL’s transformative foundation and 
the transformative effects of the prosecution of international crime in general.
330
 
 
4.3.2 ‘Victims’ Justice’: History, Memory and Identity 
 
During the Eichmann trial, the state of Israel and the prosecution were not solely concerned 
with the prosecution of an individual for his crimes in the traditional sense. Lipstadt observes 
that bringing Eichmann to justice was the main objective of the trial, but that the trial 
“transformed Jewish life and society as much as it passed judgment on a murderer”. 331 
Eichmann’s guilt however, had been a virtual certainty from the start. Undeniably, the trial 
has become closely associated with extrajudicial objectives and political goals. In retrospect 
the trial represents a “transformative moment for the State of Israel”.332 The trial centred not 
only on the prosecution of an individual, but also on Israeli identity and the suffering of 
victims of the Holocaust.
333
 It has since been described as an instance of “retributory 
theatre”.334 The proceedings and accompanying events were characterised by exaggerations 
of the role of the accused. For example, the Israeli prime minister at the time, David Ben-
Gurion, referred to Eichmann as “the greatest war criminal of all time”. 335  In contrast, 
Hannah Arendt noted the ordinariness and the bureaucratic nature of Adolf Eichmann.  This 
led her to formulate the now famous notion of “the banality of evil”.  
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In reality, although Eichmann was in all likelihood a key player during the Holocaust, 
he was not one of the primary or even main architects thereof.
336
 By creating the impression 
that he was however, the Israeli authorities succeeded in providing the trial with an element 
that would give it the desired transformative effect. The trial’s historical significance and 
dramatic elements can be ascribed not to Eichmann as the personification of evil, but to the 
heinous nature of the crimes of the Holocaust and the identity of the victims on behalf of 
which the prosecution took place. The heinous nature of the crimes was not exaggerated 
however, if indeed it is at all possible to exaggerate the evil of genocide.    
 
In contrast to the so-called “victors’ justice” dispensed by the post war IMTs, the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann can be regarded as a case of “victims’ justice”. In his opening statement 
before the court, prosecutor Gideon Hausner famously stated that he was acting as the 
mouthpiece of six million accusers. Eichmann stood as an accused before a Jewish court, in 
the newly founded Jewish state of Israel, on trial for crimes committed against six million 
Jewish victims in Europe.  
 
In contrast to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials where the victors sat in judgment, the 
emphasis of the Eichmann trial was placed on the victims and not the perpetrator(s). The 
newly formed state of Israel, as representative of the victimised Jewish people, provided for 
the first time a forum where justice could be dispensed on behalf of victims.
337
 The Israelis 
contended that the Jewish story needed to be told through the victims, something which the 
Nuremberg trial failed to do. At Nuremberg, the emphasis fell on documentary evidence. At 
the Eichmann trial however, over 100 victims of Nazi atrocities testified for the Israeli state 
and provided “the pulsing heart of the trial”.338 These testimonies were the primary focus of 
Eichmann’s trial and were intended to imprint the victims’ stories and history of the 
Holocaust into Israeli (and the universal) collective consciousness. Crimes against the Jewish 
people were the central charges of the prosecution. It signalled that the trial was not merely a 
continuation of the Nuremberg precedent which placed emphasis on international crime, 
excluding international crime which specifically targeted Jewish peoples.
339
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If documentary evidence created the historical record and served as the didactic tool 
at Nuremberg, victim testimony did the equivalent at the Eichmann trial. The focus of the 
trial on the victims and testimony merges the trial with Israeli history, memory and identity. 
Additionally, it may hold an enduring universal significance: 
“…the Eichmann trial must enact not simply memory, but memory as change. It must 
dramatize upon its legal stage before the audience nothing less than a conceptual revolution in 
the victim. And this, in fact, is what the trial does. In this sense, the Eichmann trial is, I would 
submit, a revolutionary trial. It is this revolutionary transformation of the victim that makes 
the victim's story happen for the first time and happen as a legal act of authorship of history. 
This historically unprecedented revolution in the victim which was operated in and by the 
Eichmann trial is, I would suggest, the trial's major contribution not only to Jews, but to 
history, to law, to culture - to humanity at large. I will further argue that as a singular legal 
event, the Eichmann trial calls for a rethinking - and sets in motion a transvaluation - of the 
structures and the values of conventional criminal law.”
340
 (footnotes omitted) 
Lipstadt contends that the Eichmann trial changed the world’s perception of victims of 
genocide.
341
 In the courtroom they were no longer only victims, but also witnesses for the 
prosecution. For the first time since the Holocaust the victims could themselves play an 
active part in the pursuit of justice. Testifying became an act of empowerment and 
vindication. On the stand, in excess of one hundred victims became symbols of triumph over 
tragedy. The victims and the prosecution provided the theatre, a shocking real life drama, 
whilst the trial provided the audience.
342
 
 
 The trial with its many victims’ testimonies and extensive media coverage had the 
effect of raising global awareness of the Holocaust and lead to research, teaching and a 
heightened general interest on the subject.
343
 Even the term “Holocaust”, although in use 
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before the trial, “was cemented into the lexicon of the non-Hebrew-speaking population when 
the court translators used it throughout the trial”.344  
 
4.3.3 Domestic Prosecution of International Crime and Universal Jurisdiction 
 
The Eichmann case is also historically relevant for its use of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute serious international crimes.
345
 The jurisdictional background to the 
case was sui generis in various respects. The case represented the first prosecution of an 
individual for crimes against humanity in a domestic court without a jurisdictional link to the 
perpetrator via nationality or the territory where the crimes were committed.   
 
Furthermore, the state of Israel only came into existence in 1948 following the 
expiration of the British mandate over Palestine. The Israeli court’s assertion of jurisdiction 
over crimes committed against the Jews in Europe was therefore regarded as controversial. 
The court ruled that there were two grounds for asserting jurisdiction over the case. Firstly, 
the court considered the connection between Jewish people (including European Jews) and 
the Jewish state of Israel as a satisfactory ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Secondly, 
the court asserted universal jurisdiction over Eichmann’s crimes since, in the court’s view 
and following the Nuremberg precedent, they were crimes which could be prosecuted by any 
state as crimes under the Law of Nations. According to the Israeli Supreme Court: 
“Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international character but their 
harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the 
international community to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, 
pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of 
international law and an agent of its enforcement, to try the appellant.”
346
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Through the articulation of the rationale underlying universal jurisdiction in the District Court 
of Jerusalem and in the Israeli Supreme Court, the Eichmann trial made a lasting contribution 
to international criminal justice.
347
  
 
4.3.4 The Eichmann Trial as a Political and Transformative Trial 
 
In her book, Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial, Bilsky discusses the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann as one of four political trials that have helped shape the collective memory 
and identity of Israel.
348
 Shklar defined a political trial as: 
“[...] a trial in which the prosecuting party, usually the regime in power aided by a cooperative 
judiciary, tries to eliminate its political enemies. It pursues a very specific policy – the 
destruction, or at least the disgrace and disrepute, of a political opponent”.
349
 
Bilsky departs from this “classical model” and defines a political trial in less abhorrent terms 
as “a trial in which the political authorities [seek] to advance a political agenda through 
criminal prosecution”.350 Political trials are distinguishable from show trials because there is 
an element of risk to the authorities (the prosecution and state in a criminal trial) which is not 
present during a show trial.
351
 The risk emanates from the fact that liberal criminal trials place 
a high value on fairness and impartiality and give a voice to both sides of the dispute. 
Through this the prosecuting authority runs the risks of the minority party’s counterclaim 
upending their political objectives.  
 
Bilsky’s book addresses the ability of political trials, including the Eichmann trial, to 
“serve as a consciousness transforming vehicle”.352 According to Bilsky, the strength of a 
transformative trial lies in its ability to transform a multi-layered political debate into a binary 
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conflict represented in a criminal trial by the prosecution and the defendant.
353
 The Eichmann 
represented a clash between two values of the state of Israel, namely Judaism and 
democracy.
354
 Bilsky concludes that: 
“…[the Eichmann] trial played an enormous role in transforming Israeli collective memory 
and identity. The transformative power of the trial consisted not only in determining the guilt 
of a Nazi perpetrator by a Jewish court, nor even in representing the story of the Jewish 
Holocaust for the first time on a public stage through survivor testimonies. Rather, its 
transformative importance lay in the public forum it created for translating the memory of the 
past into a concept of the state’s Jewish and democratic identity.”
355
 
On the one hand, the Eichmann trial served as a mediator of sorts between the Jewish and the 
Democratic (personified by Hausner and Arendt respectively), between competing narratives, 
and between other binary conflicts.
356
 On the other, it was the platform which brought these 
conflicts to the fore and addressed them in a civilised matter.
357
 
 
4.3.5 Criticism of the Eichmann Trial 
 
The manner in which the Eichmann trial was conducted has elicited much criticism. Firstly, it 
was argued that the trial was not solely that of Adolf Eichmann, but that of Nazi Germany 
and the Nazi Party for the destruction of European Jewry during the Holocaust and of anti-
Semitism in general throughout history.
358
 To an extent this may have been due to the 
physical impossibility of putting Nazi- and anti-Semitist beliefs on trial as a whole. 
Furthermore, there were no Nazi leaders left to bring to trial.
359
 The prosecution deliberately 
designed the trial as a great historical event instead of an ordinary criminal trial focused on 
the guilt of a single defendant.
360
 Much of the evidence presented at the trial had no relation 
to the charges brought against Eichmann but was of an exhibitionist nature. Hundreds of 
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Holocaust survivors were called as witnesses not only to prove Eichmann’s guilt but to 
provide a detailed account of the horrors of the Final Solution, which was arguably the 
primary motivation of the trial. Witness testimonies emphasised the plight of the victims as 
well as the courage of those who resisted and formed part of a deliberate effort to speak to the 
State of Israel and the international community. Throughout the trial and in rendering their 
judgment the judges seemed to go along with the trials overall design to impress upon 
history.
361
 
 
The trial was however, fundamentally staged as a criminal trial. Inevitably, any 
deviation from what is traditionally the central purpose of a criminal trial, namely to establish 
individual guilt, invites criticism. In her famous critical assessment of the trial, Hannah 
Arendt expressed the belief that “[the] purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; 
even the noblest of ulterior purposes […]”. 362 Arendt was critical of the prosecution’s 
attempts to further extrajudicial, political goals through a criminal trial. Arendt also noted the 
serious disproportionality of arms between the prosecution and the defence. Defence 
witnesses could not testify in court because Hausner had indicated that they would be put on 
trial for crimes against the Jewish people.
363
 Arendt wrote that: 
“It quickly turned out that Israel was the only country in the world where defence witnesses 
could not be heard, and where certain witnesses for the prosecution, those who had given 
affidavits in previous trials, could not be cross-examined by the defence.”
364
  
 
Secondly, the Israeli court’s reliance on extraterritorial jurisdiction and universal 
jurisdiction is another aspect of the trial that has been subjected to criticism. Eichmann’s 
lawyer argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and violated the territoriality principle. He 
argued that the crimes in question were committed before Israel achieved statehood and “on 
foreign soil […] against people who had no connection to Israel” (although it must be 
conceded that many of the surviving victims of the Holocaust were residing in Israel by the 
                                                          
361
 Loya (Justice in Jerusalem) (supra) 55. In contrast, Arendt’s observation was that the judges did not act 
theatrically at any stage of the proceedings and showed “refreshing” impatience with the prosecutor’s 
efforts to drag out the trial, see Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) (supra) 4. 
362
 Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) (supra) 253.  
363
 Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) (supra) 220. 
364
 Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) (supra) 221. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 107 
 
time that the trial started).
365
 Others suggested that an international tribunal may have been a 
more appropriate forum for Eichmann’s trial since an international forum would have been 
less biased towards the accused, or at least would have been perceived as such.  
 
4.3.6 A Final Word on Eichmann 
 
To this day, it is disputed whether the message of the Eichmann trial is of universal 
significance.
366
 Many aspects of the trial indicate that its object was to impress upon Jewish 
people the message of “never again”, rather than serving as a universal message of 
remembrance and warning. The dominant charges against Eichmann related to crimes against 
the Jewish people. All the state witnesses were Jewish Holocaust victims. These aspects of 
the trial may detract from its universal significance, but does not entirely do away with the 
universal significance of punishing those crimes which are said to offend the universal 
consciousness of mankind. The crimes committed by the Eichmann and his associates surely 
belong to the latter category of crimes, irrespective of the identity of the victims. Importantly, 
despite criticisms from those observing the trial from a mostly non-legal perspective (such as 
Hannah Arendt), Ambos contends that Eichmann was afforded a fair trial by the State of 
Israel.
367
 This gives the legacy of the Eichmann trial ‘staying power’ in that it cannot easily 
be dismissed or delegitimised as a show trial. What is more, the Eichmann trial’s legacy of 
the transformative potential of the domestic prosecution of international crime might yet 
discover a new lease of life in the imagined era where domestic courts are the primary fora 
for the prosecution of international crime. 
 
 
                                                          
365
 Lipstadt (The Eichmann Trial) (supra) 58. 
366
 Ben-Naftali (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 656. 
367
 Ambos (supra) in Ambos et al. (Eichmann in Jerusalem: 50 Years After) (supra) 124-125. The author 
notes that Eichmann was duly informed of his right to silence and to legal representation of his choice. 
Furthermore, Eichmann was convicted on the basis of “individual responsibility proper” and not merely on 
the basis of his membership to various organisations which had been declared to be criminal by the 
Nuremberg IMT (see footnote 326 supra). Considering however some of the criticisms against the trial 
which have been noted in this chapter, it may be more appropriate to view the trial as “relatively fair” 
(borrowing Bassiouni’s observation in relation to the fairness of the proceedings at the Nuremberg IMT, 
see para 4.2.3.2 supra). 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks   
 
A common feature of the Nuremberg IMT and the Eichmann trial emerges from this chapter. 
Both these trials were far from perfect. The victor’s justice critique remains relevant to 
anyone who seeks an objective appreciation of international criminal justice.  The numerous 
criticisms against these trials do not however, override their historical value for modern ICL. 
The radical and experimental nature of these trials may be the very aspect which has made 
them historically significant. Many of the transgressions against established legal principles 
at the Nuremberg IMT and Eichmann trial became valuable transformative precedents. The 
Nuremberg IMT’s denial of the ‘act of state’ and ‘obedience to orders’ defences, for example, 
was a violation of the principle of legality at the time. However, it was crucial in order to 
produce the Nuremberg revolution that brought individuals within the reach of international 
law. At the Eichmann trial the disproportionate use of victims as state witnesses may have 
been prejudicial to Eichmann, but helped to create awareness of the importance of giving the 
victims of international crime a voice in court. These legacies live on in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.      
 
To echo Bassiouni’s conclusion on the legacy of the Nuremberg IMT, we must 
distinguish in retrospect between the accomplishments, criticisms and expectations 
engendered by these historical trials.
368
 No matter what historical perspective one takes on 
these trials, they represent powerful reference points for the transformative potential of 
international criminal courts and ICL. At these trials history was on the stand. Could it be 
that, to some extent, the larger and more legally inaccessible problem of humanity’s 
propensity towards extreme evil was also at issue? At the very least the new social 
consciousness awakened through these trials, and from the horrors of the preceding events to 
which they owe their existence, the international community has inherited the motto of 
“never again”.369  
   
According to Luban, “the curious feature about ICL is that in it the emphasis shifts 
from punishment to trials”. 370  The enduring legacy of the Nuremberg IMT, and post-
                                                          
368
 Bassiouni (Nuremberg: Forty Years After) (supra) 64. 
369
 Bassiouni (Nuremberg: Forty Years After) (supra) 65. 
370
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
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Nuremberg trials such as the Eichmann trial, seems to confirm Luban’s statement. Both trials 
had dramatic, theatrical and symbolic aspects. In the Eichmann trial the theatrical aspects of 
the trial seem to have been purposely manufactured and were consequently more pronounced 
than at the Nuremberg IMT. At Nuremberg it was the pioneering act of bringing international 
criminals to trial that provided the symbolic impact. The symbolism and dramatic effect of 
these trials give them an expressive value above and beyond ordinary criminal trials. The 
expressive effect is also more lasting. It becomes an enduring legacy that is closely aligned 
with the values and collective consciousness of the international community.  
 
Modern international criminal courts represent a continuation of the legacies of the 
Nuremberg IMT and the Eichmann trial, but as a result of the criticisms elicited over the 
proceedings at Nuremberg and in Jerusalem, have moved towards greater emphasis on 
fairness, impartiality and procedural rights in the determination of individual criminal 
responsibility. The ICTY for example, has prosecuted perpetrators from both sides of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Croats and Serbs/“losers” and “victors”) in order “to 
overcome the legacy of victor’s justice established at Nuremberg and Tokyo”. 371  The 
emphasis on fairness at Nuremberg has strengthened considerably through the ad hoc and 
mixed tribunals to the ICC. In the second sentencing judgment of Dražen Erdemović, this 
was highlighted by the ICTY Trial Chamber: 
“The International Tribunal must demonstrate that those who have the honesty to confess are 
treated fairly as part of a process underpinned by principles of justice, fair trial and protection 
of the fundamental rights of the individual.”
372
 
Reliance on due process in international tribunals ensures that justice is seen to be done.
373
 
This is especially important for international criminal justice because prominent international 
criminal trials such as the Nuremberg IMT and the ad hoc tribunals may reach global 
audiences. During their operative years and beyond, these trials are dissected and placed 
under the microscope by the media and legal scholars. Some trials will remain as historical 
                                                          
371
 Peskin V International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans (2008) Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 93. The ICTR has been much less successful in this regard having prosecuted mostly 
perpetrators from the Hutu side of the conflict. 
372
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: [Second] Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T 
bis, 5 March 1998, para 21. 
373
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 175. 
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beacons or “intergenerational signposts”.374  In this regard, the function and value of the 
international criminal trial is precipitated by fairness and impartiality.
375
 The symbolism that 
attaches to international criminal trials and the global audience that interprets their legacy, 
endow them with an enhanced expressive value. 
 
The shift in emphasis away from punishment at Nuremberg and in the Eichmann case 
offers a rationalisation for the fact that modern ICL imposes ordinary sentences on 
extraordinary criminals. This shift in emphasis suggests that there is some value innate to 
international criminal trials which results not from the subsequent act of punishment, but 
from the symbolic and expressive significance of the trial and the process of determining 
individual criminal responsibility. The shift in emphasis from punishment to the trial 
supposes objectives that are “extrinsic to purely legal values”.376 It has become common 
cause that ICL, particularly in post-conflict situations, pursues other objectives alongside the 
traditional objectives associated with domestic criminal law.  Beyond traditional objectives of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, international criminal tribunals have 
been mandated to achieve reconciliation, to uncover the truth and to create a historical record 
of events.
377
 In addition, academics have alluded to other functions of ICL, such as the 
symbolic or didactic value of punishment and trial under ICL.
378
 I refer to these other 
objectives as the sui generis objectives of ICL. The values of these sui generis objectives are 
addressed in Chapter 5. These sui generis objectives are often pursued through the symbolism 
of the trial itself or through larger messages conveyed by it. 
 
Fichtelberg notes that another significant consequence of the IMT was a new fusion 
of criminal justice with the “political discourse of strategy and power”. 379  Henceforth 
international criminal justice would, like the rest of international law, only be viable if it was 
accompanied by the political will and cooperation of states. Then again, international 
                                                          
374
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 175. 
375
 Smeulers A “Punishing the Enemies of All Mankind: Review Essay of Drumbl MA Atrocity, 
Punishment and International Law” (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 971–993, 987. 
376
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
377
 See Chapter 5 paras 5.5 and 5.6 infra. 
378
 See Chapter 5 paras 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 infra. 
379
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criminal trials can be seen as a victory (albeit a small one) for the realm of law (idealism) 
over the realm of politics (political realism), the latter being less disposed towards the 
objective to combat impunity for the perpetrators of mass political violence.
380
 To some 
degree, and at least partially as a result of the intentions of the international community, each 
international criminal tribunal asserts the growing transcendent and global character of law in 
a world previously characterised by impunity (especially in relation to state criminality) and 
Westphalian dominance of state politics over law in the international setting.   
 
The vision of international criminal justice as truly universal justice driven by the 
shared values of the international community clashes with the vision of international criminal 
justice as a tool for global governance. As opposed to the first mentioned vision of 
international criminal justice, the latter would be inevitably and inexorably infused with the 
political. It is the latter, ‘realist’ vision of international criminal justice that has come to be 
most widely accepted. This begs the question, can the realisation of some or all ICL’s 
objectives be considered transformative even if they are politically driven (some might prefer 
to say “politically tainted”) and not truly universal? And, if we accept that ICL has inherited a 
transformative legacy, what does the modern adaptation of this legacy look like? I will turn to 
these questions in the remainder of Part II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
380
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Transformation as described in Chapter 3, is a forward- and backward looking, goal driven 
process of change.
381
 In this chapter the investigation into the transformative value of ICL 
turns to the following question, what are the essential purposes and aspirations of ICL and 
how is ICL poised to reach them? Stolle and Singelnstein observe that this is arguably the 
most fundamental question in relation to the existence of international criminal justice, but 
remains unresolved: 
“On the theoretical or conceptual level, the questions posed for criminal law include what 
goals to pursue and whether they are achievable. Although these are fundamental to criminal 
law neither scholarly literature nor case law has conclusively resolved these questions for 
nascent international criminal law.”
382
 
It is submitted that the reason d’être for the international body of criminal law as well as 
ICL’s ability to reach its penological objectives has a direct influence on its transformative 
value. Therefore, the questions put forward above may be addressed by firstly examining the 
historical and theoretical reasons for the existence of ICL; secondly, by investigating the 
penological purposes of ICL as found in positive law and the jurisprudence of international 
criminal courts and finally, by investigation of those utilitarian objectives which are unique to 
the field of ICL. 
 
As an introduction, I begin this chapter by discussing the fundamentals of criminal 
law punishment theory, most of which also forms the foundations of ICL.
383
 This is followed 
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382
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383
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by an explanatory section on the difference between the goals of punishment of domestic 
criminal law and that of ICL as well as the reasons for these differences. Awareness of these 
differences is essential for the understanding of the transformative value and potential of ICL.  
 
In this thesis I engage punishment theory from a specific angle. That is, punishment 
both as a human or social institution (Chapter 5) and a political act (Chapter 6) with 
underlying purposes.
384
 In this view punishment theory is not exclusively aimed at ex post 
facto justification of sentences, but actively engaged in an ante facto pursuit to project values. 
The understanding of international criminal justice as a value- and purpose-driven legal 
mechanism is gained firstly by studying the rationale for the use of ICL as a response to 
radical evil and mass atrocity. To this end, the underlying assumptions of ICL as well as the 
justification for punishment under ICL are considered (Chapter 5). The second aspect crucial 
to the understanding of ICL as value- and purpose-driven, is the influence of politics on ICL 
(Chapter 6).  
 
Furthermore, I take the view that punishment, although it is the primary effect-
producing act of criminal law, does not represent the sole means through which ICL impacts 
upon individuals and communities. The more imperceptible expressive and didactic functions 
such as the ability to authoritatively communicate values as well as the symbolic effect 
produced through the enforcement of international criminal norms must be taken into account 
to appreciate ICL’s overall transformative value. Furthermore, the ‘soft impact’ of ICL which 
goes beyond acts of punishment must also be taken into account in the determination of 
ICL’s transformative value.385  
 
                                                          
sanctions. See ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-
23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para 836 (and footnote 1430): “The Trial and Appeals 
Chambers of the International Tribunal generally consider what is variously and often interchangeably 
referred to, for example, as sentencing "objectives", "purposes", "principles", "functions" or "policy" in the 
assessment of the term of actual imprisonment for convicted persons”. 
384
  Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “Punishment”, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries 
/punishment/ (accessed 2012/07/20).   
385
 See also Chapter 8 para 8.5.1 infra. 
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5.2 Punishment Theory and Penological Justifications in International- and Domestic 
Criminal Law 
 
5.2.1 Punishment Theory: The Justifications and Objectives of Criminal Law 
Punishment 
 
The basic principles of punishment apply equally to domestic and international criminal law. 
Punishment is a legitimate act of vengeance regulated and inflicted by an authoritative body 
other than the victim(s).
386
 As such, an act of punishment is an officially sanctioned 
deprivation of the “life, liberty or property of the offender”, inflicted on the offender because 
it is deserved (retribution) and because such punishment is believed to be socially beneficial 
(utilitarian theories).
387
 Furthermore, punishment is closely associated with social values and 
acts as a “moral educator”.388 It may be viewed as the symbolic embodiment of shared 
notions regarding what is just or unjust, or deserving or undeserving, of punishment. 
 
Because punishment involves a deprivation of the rights of the offender, it is a firmly 
established principle that legitimate purposes should underlie criminal punishment.
389
 All 
modes of criminal law (domestic, international or hybridised) gain their legitimacy from 
these punishment theories.
390
 The punishment theories of criminal law are legal theories 
                                                          
386
 Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law (Third Edition) (2005) Juta, Cape Town 68. In domestic law the 
state is the central authority charged with inflicting punishment on persons who commit crimes within its 
territory. In international law there is no central authority to enforce punishment for breaches of 
international criminal laws. In modern ICL, international crime is punished through international- or mixed 
courts and tribunals on the authority of the UNSC or a multilateral treaty such as the Rome Statute. 
Alternatively, prosecution and punishment takes place through domestic courts that are willing and capable 
of trying perpetrators of international crimes.   
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 Burchell (Principles of Criminal Law) (supra) 68; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
“Punishment”, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/ (accessed 2010/06/08).   
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 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 174. 
389
 Snyman (Criminal Law) (supra) 10; Stigen (International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions) 
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Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 17 and Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International 
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which provide the rationale and justification for acts of punishment. Punishment in turn 
breathes life into the objectives of criminal justice.
 391
 Punishment theory may also be viewed 
in the abstract as an articulation of the reasons for the existence of criminal law.
392
 
Punishment theories are not mutually exclusive and are almost always used in varying 
combinations to determine the sentence of a single perpetrator.
393
 It may be said however that 
a de facto hierarchy of punishment objectives exists, in which retribution is the most 
prominent justification for punishment while deterrence is arguably the most prominent 
utilitarian justification for punishment. 
 
It is important to distinguish the act of punishment or the sentence imposed from the 
theoretical justifications for punishment found in the wide range of recognised punishment 
theories. The sentence imposed is not purely a reflection of penological objectives. Other 
considerations such as the gravity of the crime, the public interest and the personal 
circumstances of the perpetrator, may be taken into account as aggravating or mitigating 
factors. In Kunarac, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY noted that: 
“What appear to be justifications for imprisoning convicted persons, or theories of 
punishment, actually are treated as or resemble sentencing factors, in the sense that these 
considerations are consistently said to affect, usually in an unspecified manner, the length of 
imprisonment.”
394
 
                                                          
Punishment) (supra) 1-2: “Punishment [...] whether authorized by international or national law requires 
justification; otherwise, it is simply cruelty”. 
391
 Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) 1: “[…] punishment is the 
distinctive feature of criminal law, and sentencing the vehicle through which it pursues its objectives, both 
practical and moral”.  
392
 Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) 1-2. 
393
 The overlapping use of different punishment theories may create tensions since these theories are not 
always compatible with each other. However, the overlapping use of theories may also produce positive 
synergies. Punishment to exact retribution may for example be hard to reconcile with punishment which is 
intended to rehabilitate the accused. On the other hand, retributive punishment may serve to ensure that the 
offender receives his or her just deserts. Moreover, it may have expressive-didactic effects which reach 
beyond the offender, producing a social message which in turn may have a general deterrent effect. See 
Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 149. 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-23-T and 
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Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 116 
 
Referring to this dictum and the sentencing practice of the ad hoc tribunals, Henham notes a 
general “failure to distinguish or overtly articulate the crucial difference between the general 
justifications for sentencing and their specific relevance as guides to principled sentencing in 
particular cases [...]”.395 I am predominantly interested in the general purposes of punishment, 
not the effect of such purposes on the sentence of accused persons. Punishment theory and 
sentencing are topics that go hand in hand. Nevertheless, they remain distinct topics. 
 
5.2.2 The Principle of Legality 
 
Even though criminal punishment should be justified or serve some purpose, the harm to the 
wrongdoer can never outweigh the broader social benefit of the punishing sanction. To 
prevent arbitrary or unfair deprivation of rights, the principle of legality endeavours to ensure 
that criminal law is applied in compliance with notions of justice, fairness and individual 
freedom.
396
 The principle of legality, also referred to as the nullum crimen sine lege principle 
(literally translated from Latin to mean “no crime without a law”), states that an act which is 
not illegal may not be punished. The principle of legality is comprised of a number of 
rules:
397
   
a) The ius acceptum principle holds that a person may not be punished for an act which is 
not legally recognised as a criminal act. 
b) The prohibition of retrospective application of criminal law or the rule against ex post 
facto laws (ius praevium).  
c) The rule that the definitions of crimes should be precise and settled (ius certum).  
d) The rule that criminal law statutes should be strictly construed (ius strictum). 
e) The abovementioned principles are to be applied mutatis mutandis to the sentencing 
phase of criminal proceedings. This notion is embodied in the principle nulla poena sine 
lege.
398
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396
 See Burchell (Principles of Criminal Law) (supra) 94; see also Snyman (Criminal Law) (supra) 36-38. 
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The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law (2009) Cambridge University 
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Historically, international criminal justice has been mired in controversy over 
observance of the principle of legality. The Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMTFE trials were 
criticised by many as contrary to the principle of legality, specifically the ius acceptum and 
ius praevium principles.
399
 For example, in his (largely ignored) dissenting opinion at the 
Tokyo IMTFE, Judge Radhabinod Pal of India asserted that “new crimes cannot be created 
under international law and enforced without precedent”.400  
 
In contrast with the post-world war military tribunals, the principle of legality has 
become a core principle of modern international and internationalised criminal courts.
401
 
International crimes are now more firmly established and clearly defined under both 
customary international law and treaty law. It is also widely accepted that the principles 
nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege have attained customary international law 
status.
402
 Furthermore, retroactive application of criminal law and retroactive punishment 
represent clear violations of international human rights.
403
 The principle of legality may 
create restrictions to the exercise of international criminal justice by domestic or international 
courts and cannot be ignored by any international or internationalised criminal 
jurisprudence.
404
  
 
5.2.3 Absolute and Utilitarian Theories 
 
Broadly speaking, all punishment theories can be classified as either absolute (backward-
looking punishment inflicted on the offender because it is deserved) or utilitarian (forward-
looking punishment with some broader social utility). All punishment theories are 
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accompanied by various theoretical and practical criticisms, the most important of which will 
be discussed in brief below.   
 
5.2.3.1 Absolute Theory 
 
The retributive or absolute theories of punishment represent the oldest and most widely 
accepted justification for punishment. Retribution is historically derived from the lex talionis, 
the notion of justice as proportional revenge (an eye for an eye) which is based on theological 
writings.
405
 The modern day versions of these theories are rather more nuanced, but are still 
based on the basic idea that persons who infringe another’s rights should themselves have 
their rights infringed upon.
406
 It is a prerequisite that the punishment should fit the crime.
407
 
Thus, the concept of retribution is deeply synonymous with vengeance, albeit regulated by 
the state or some other authority.
408
 Retribution therefore denotes a qualified form of revenge 
or vengeance. 
 
Retributivist theories of punishment fall roughly into two categories. Kantian 
retributivism seeks to justify punishment by way of the criminal’s implicit acceptance of a 
hypothetical social contract whereby, “whatever undeserved evil you inflict on another within 
                                                          
405
 “The Law of Retribution” (or lex talionis) contains three interrelated claims: a) Punishment is justified 
only if it is deserved, b) it is deserved if and only if a person being punished has voluntarily done a wrong 
(and, specifically, the wrong being punished) and c) the severity of deserved punishment is that which is 
proportional to the severity of the wrongdoing. See Falls MM “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for 
Persons” in Duff A (ed.) Punishment (1993) Dartmouth, Aldershot 27. The law exacting equality of 
punishment and crime (lex talionis) is embodied in the phrase “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”. The 
law is stated three times in the Bible (Exodus 21:24, Leviticus 24:20 and Deuteronomy 19:21). In the past 
lex talionis has often permitted barbaric punishment. See Schabas (Sentencing by International Tribunals) 
(supra) 501. 
406
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words, that the punishment be made to fit the crime”. 
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the people that you inflict on yourself”.409 Although the quality and quantity of punishment is 
regulated by the court in this theory, punishment is essentially self-imposed since the 
offender has “willed a punishable action”.410 Hegelian retributivism, on the other hand, seeks 
to justify punishment as an act which annuls the crime.
411
   
 
A prominent retributive theory, the theory of just desert, suggests that a perpetrator 
should be punished in order to restore the moral order in society which was disturbed by the 
criminal act.
412
 Burchell, with particular focus on the theory of just deserts, contends that 
retribution may be the only “true theory of punishment” as it alone justifies punishment as a 
post facto response to crime and focuses on punishment that is proportionate to the crime.
413
 
The notion of just deserts implies that punishment has both moral value and social benefit in 
that it restores moral and social order through proportional revenge.  
 
In the context of international criminal justice, proponents of retributive theory 
contend that regulated vengeance protects public order by reducing the need for vigilantism. 
In post-conflict scenarios, retribution is credited for dissipating hate and the accompanying 
need for revenge amongst antagonistic groups, thereby linking retribution with 
reconciliation.
414
 Retribution in the context of international criminal justice is also purported 
to express the condemnation and outrage of the international community over international 
crimes.
415
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413
 Burchell (Principles of Criminal Law) (supra) 81. 
414
 Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 158. According to Shklar, the Nuremberg IMT’s immediate function of 
preventing uncontrolled private vengeance by those directly injured shows “its enormous social value as an 
expression of legalistic politics on an occasion when it was most needed”. 
415
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 24 March 2000, 
para 185; ICTY, Prosecutor v (Monir) Nikolić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-02-
60/1-S, 2 December 2003, paras 86-87. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 120 
 
5.2.3.2 Utilitarian Theory 
 
The utilitarian or relative theories of punishment portray punishment as an act which may 
produce social benefits. The utilitarian theory of punishment is related to the political 
philosophy of utilitarianism which developed in the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries.
416
 Bentham in 
particular expounded a theory of criminal sanctions based on utility.
417
 In contrast to the 
retributive theory, which does not primarily pursue any purpose beyond the act of punishment 
itself, utilitarian theory sees punishment as a means for achieving a secondary purpose.
418
 
Accordingly, “the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number of persons may require 
the infliction of the greatest misery on a few”.419 Punishment as a means to a secondary goal 
may however result in punishment which exceeds the harm produced by the perpetrator’s 
criminal deed.  
 
The goal of utilitarian punishment theory is to maximise the social benefit of 
punishment while minimising the social harm of criminal conduct. The aim of punishment is 
generally to provide a disincentive to criminal activity and to transform the values of 
offenders (or potential offenders) into those shared by the larger community. Utilitarian 
theories of punishment include deterrence (general and specific deterrence), incapacitation 
(an enhanced form of specific deterrence) and rehabilitation.   
 
To achieve these goals, utilitarian theories are forward-looking in nature and focused 
on both the objective behind the punishing act and its consequences by weighing up the costs 
and benefits thereof.
420
 Bentham formulated the basic notion of criminal behaviour as a 
phenomenon which is loosely based on rational choice. He wrote: 
                                                          
416
 See also Chapter 3 para 3.3.4 supra. 
417
 See Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 20. 
418
 Snyman (Criminal Law) (supra) 10-11. 
419
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 569. 
420
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 569; Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 115. 
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“[…] the profit of the crime is the force which urges man to delinquency: the pain of the 
punishment is the force employed to restrain him from it. If the first of these forces be the 
greater, the crime will be committed; if the second, the crime will not be committed.”
421
  
In the simplified economic theory of punishment, crime can be analysed as a choice between 
profit (crime) and loss (punishment). In theory, crime can be prevented by providing a 
potential loss to the offender which is greater than the potential gain that would be received 
through committing the criminal act.
422
  
 
This economic perspective on the deterrence of criminal activity relates closely to the 
equalitarian goal of punishment. From the equalitarian perspective, criminal law is intended 
to restore the balance in society: 
“Criminal law is concerned with maintaining the equal distribution of a specific set of benefits 
among the members of the community: in particular, the benefits of autonomy of action within 
a sphere which should be beyond interference by others.”
423
 (emphasis added) 
This echoes the ideals of social equality and protection for individuals from other individuals 
and state power. As a result of its undertaking to maximise social benefits, utilitarianism is 
therefore predominantly concerned with the maintenance of social equality.
424
  
  
The most prominent utilitarian theory of punishment is the deterrence (or prevention) 
theory. Deterrence theorists view punishment as “a policy aimed at creating efficient 
behavioural incentives” through “credible and authoritative communication of a threat of 
sanction”.425 This theory takes two forms, specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence 
aims to deter an offender from committing similar crimes. General deterrence theory holds 
that the act of punishing one offender will have a deterrent effect on a larger group of 
                                                          
421
 Bentham J An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) in Eide E, Rubin PH and 
Shepherd JM Economics of Crime (2006) Now Publishers, Hanover (USA) 3. 
422
 See Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) 40-41. The author expresses 
doubt as to the applicability of the rational actor model of deterrence in the context of international crime. 
423
 Sadurski W “Theory of Punishment, Social Justice and Liberal Neutrality” in Duff (Punishment) 
(supra) 7. 
424
 See also Chapter 3 para 3.4.5 supra. 
425
 Kahan (The Secret Ambition of Deterrence) (supra) 415; Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment) (supra) 39; Snyman (Criminal Law) (supra) 15-17. 
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potential offenders. The problem with this particular utilitarian approach is that a 
perpetrator’s conduct may be met with disproportional punishment in order to advance the 
greater good. The offender then becomes the “sacrificial lamb” of the community. This 
creates the risk of disproportionate punishment which is unfair towards the offender and runs 
contrary to the principles of fairness and legality. This is especially relevant in the event that 
mitigating factors are ignored. 
 
The notion of punishment as a deterrent is however somewhat speculative overall due 
to an absence of conclusive empirical evidence.
426
 In theory successful deterrence should 
produce peace and reconciliation. This effect is equally difficult to measure.
427
 The call for 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of deterrence works on the assumption that there is a 
way to provide empirical proof that international courts deter crime. There is doubt over the 
accuracy of this assumption. Firstly, it may well be impossible to prove the state of mind of 
the potential offender. Secondly, if deterrence is effective, it may not be possible to measure 
that which is not there or which has not materialised since it has been effectively prevented. 
 
The speculative nature of deterrence theory, especially general deterrence, is even 
more pronounced in the context of international crimes and criminals than it is for domestic 
criminal justice systems. The effectiveness of international criminal law and international 
trials as a deterrent of future crimes is placed in serious doubt by a number of realities in 
international criminal justice. Firstly, the historical reality of international criminal justice is 
that accountability is the exception and impunity the norm. The larger the scale and extent of 
the criminal acts, the more unlikely perpetrators will face criminal prosecutions. Secondly, as 
                                                          
426
 See Ku J and Nzelibe J “Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian 
Atrocities?” (2006) Hofstra University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 06-22, 13.  
427
 See Clark JN “Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities” (2011) 
9 (3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 521-545, 539: “[...] the actual effects of criminal trials and 
the extent to which they do in fact aid social peace and stability remain empirically under-explored. 
Arguably, one reason for this is that the task of actually measuring impact presents significant challenges. 
Peace, for example - not in the negative sense of an absence of conflict but in the thicker, more positive 
sense of reconciliation - is an intangible concept that cannot be easily measured or quantified” (footnote 
omitted). 
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described by Drumbl, the theoretical foundation of deterrence theory is (even) less applicable 
to international crimes: 
“[...] deterrence’s assumption of a certain degree of perpetrator rationality, which is grounded 
in liberalism’s treatment of the ordinary common criminal, seems particularly ill fitting for 
those who perpetrate atrocity. This assumption already is hotly debated within the context of 
isolated common crime. However, its viability already is even more problematic in the context 
of the chaos of massive violence, incendiary propaganda, and upended social order that 
contours atrocity.”
428
 
 
The characteristic mix of “evils” and “banalities” that spawn international crimes and 
the extreme contexts in which these crimes occur, namely collective violence, mass atrocity, 
administrative massacres and gross violations of human rights, place the deterrent value of 
ICL in further doubt.
429
 It is disputed whether people can always be treated as “rational 
calculators, who carefully weigh up the costs and benefits of their actions” before committing 
criminal acts.
430
 For this reason international criminal courts have on occasion elected not to 
give “undue prominence” to deterrence in sentencing. 431  However, as will be illustrated 
further below, deterrence remains one of the fundamental purposes of ICL overall and has 
been cited by international criminal tribunals as on objective of punishment and in positive 
law documents.
432
 
 
 
 
                                                          
428
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 171. 
429
 Hannah Arendt famously coined the phrase “the banality of evil” in her report on the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann. See Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) (supra). 
430
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 20. 
431
 ICTY, Prosecutor v (Momir) Nikolić (Trial Chamber) Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, 2 December 2003, para 
90; ICTY, Prosecutor v Babić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-03-72-S, 29 June 2004, 
para 45.  
432
 See Chapter 5 para 5.5 infra; See for example ICTR, Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda (Trial Chamber I: 
Judgment and Sentence) Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 4 Sept. 1998, para 28; ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović 
(Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996, paras 64-65; see also 
Rome Statute of the ICC, preamble (5). 
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5.2.4 Overlap between Domestic and International Criminal Law Objectives 
 
One should bear in mind that ICL at its core, retains the basic features of criminal law. ICL is 
fundamentally criminal law extrapolated to a unique international legal setting. It is pure 
criminal law in the sense that it prohibits, criminalises and sanctions punishment for pre-
defined conduct. As a result of this extrapolation, the punishment objectives and social 
function of ICL and those in domestic law are shared on many levels. The standard 
justifications for punishment found in domestic criminal law apply to ICL, but is subjected to 
its unique nature and the abnormal setting in which it most often finds application.
433
 These 
standard justifications of punishment (retribution, general and special deterrence, 
incapacitation and rehabilitation) give rise to unique justificatory problems in the context of 
ICL.
434
  
 
Despite differences that originate from ICL’s unique status and character, its purpose 
is fundamentally aligned with that of national criminal law. That is, punishment as retribution 
with broader expressive significance.
435
 Punishment is a way of communicating legal norms 
to societies as well as individuals, whether a distinct social group or the international 
community. These norms are based on shared social values. Furthermore, Garland suggests 
that: 
“[...] penality communicates meaning not just about the crime and punishment, but also about 
power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations, and a host of 
other tangential matters.”
436
  
Individually and collectively, the rationalisation of sentencing through the theories and 
justifications of punishment generate this ‘broader expressive significance’.437  
                                                          
433
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
434
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
435
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 17: “[…] much of the implementation 
of international criminal law is intended to be at the domestic level, therefore it is questionable whether the 
objectives of punishment ought to differ significantly between international and municipal criminal law”. 
Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra).  
436
 Garland D Punishment in Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (1990) University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 232.  
437
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 19 – 26. 
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Punishment theories are not mutually exclusive and are invoked in varying 
combinations depending on the gravity of the crime, the circumstances of the case, the 
characteristics and values of the applicable criminal justice system and the political affiliation 
of the punishment authority.
438
 The retributive theories in particular are relevant irrespective 
of whether international or domestic crimes are being punished. However, many have come 
to view a purely retributive approach as too primitive and outmoded. The emergence of 
utilitarian justifications for punishment has prodded both international and domestic courts 
into a position where they are wary of relying solely on retributive theories.
439
 
 
In addition to the punishment purposes outlined above, ICL recognises other purposes 
which are mostly alien to domestic criminal law punishment theory.
440
 Reconciliation, 
expressivism or symbolism, truth-finding, creating a historical record and giving voice to the 
victims of mass atrocity are all goals that have been associated with ICL. It is significant to 
note, as David Luban does, that these goals are at times pursued through trials and not 
punishment.
441
 I return to these, the sui generis and trial objectives of ICL, at para 5.6 infra.  
 
5.2.5 Some Unique Considerations in Penal Justifications for International Crime 
 
The majority of academic writing on punishment theory has been written from the 
perspective of domestic criminal law systems. Much of ICL’s criminology and penology has 
                                                          
438
 For example, retributive punishment may have a general deterrent effect through sending a message to 
the public that those who infringe the law run the risk of criminal sanction. See Drumbl (Atrocity, 
Punishment and International Law) (supra) 149. 
439
 See Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “Punishment”, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/punishment/ (accessed 2010/06/08): “[...] justification requires some accommodation to 
consequentialist [forward-looking] as well as to deontological [backward-looking] considerations. A strait-
laced purely retributive theory of punishment is as unsatisfactory as a purely consequentialist theory with 
its counter-intuitive conclusions (especially as regards punishing the innocent). The practice of 
punishment, to put the point another way, rests on a plurality of values, not on some one value to the 
exclusion of all others”. 
440
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
441
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
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been supplanted from that of national criminal law systems in liberal states.
442
 The 
development of a distinct criminology and penology for ICL has not been forthcoming as yet. 
In part, this is one of many consequences of the fallacious application of the domestic law 
analogy to international criminal justice.
443
 Despite the similarities between domestic and 
international criminal punishment objectives there are a number of fundamental differences 
which necessitates distinct and unique consideration of the penal justifications in 
international criminal justice:
444
 
 
1. Most literature on the application of punishment theory approaches the subject from the 
domestic perspective of the state-individual-dichotomy. Much of the literature written 
from the domestic perspective concerns the state’s authority to punish (the limits on the 
legislative authority regarding criminalisation) and the legal limits to the exercise of that 
authority by the state (the courts and the police).  The state-individual-dichotomy is less 
applicable to ICL as the institutions of international law are dissimilar to those found in 
national legal systems. There are no central legislative and enforcement bodies in the 
international legal order. The institutions in the international order (the UNSC, General 
Assembly and international courts) cannot be accurately compared by way of analogy to 
national institutions.  
 
2. ICL is most often invoked in cases of mass atrocity and mass criminality which lie 
beyond the ambit of what domestic laws and courts are able to deal with.
445
 Much of ICL 
                                                          
442
 Burchell defines criminology as “the study of criminals and the incidence of different types of crimes, 
in order to explain the phenomenon of crime”. The author defines penology as “[the branch of criminology 
that] seeks to devise methods and techniques for dealing with criminals so as to address the causes of their 
criminal behaviour and to rehabilitate the offender so that he or she will not again commit a crime”. See 
Burchell (Principles of Criminal Law) (supra) 18.  
443
 Tallgren defines the general domestic analogy as “the assumption that the principles regarded as valid 
in inter-individual relations apply in inter-state relations as well”. See Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) 
(supra) 566. 
444
 For a general discussion of the flaws in the analogy between national and international criminal justice 
as they relate to punishment objectives, see Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) 
(supra). 
445
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 17; see also Sloane (The Expressive 
Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) 3. The author remarks that crimes such as genocide, crimes 
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addresses the repercussions of collective violence.
446
 During mass atrocity or collective 
violence a diverse set of crimes are often committed by organised groups for the purpose 
of obtaining “social control”. 447  Domestic criminal law systems are often simply 
incapable of addressing such systemic types of crime. Prosecution in domestic courts may 
be impractical because the crimes are too widespread and overwhelmingly numerous. 
This is often seen in times of internal armed conflict when international humanitarian law 
becomes applicable, or in failed states where there is no longer a central government in 
control of a state territory. Furthermore, the crimes themselves are often alien concepts to 
domestic criminal law systems.  
 
Exactly how groups of people living in harmony can suddenly turn against each other 
in violence remains a vexing question.
448
 Somewhat paradoxically, ICL allocates 
individual liability for crimes committed in such a collective or group context.
449
 
Understanding collective violence requires “an altogether different paradigm from the one 
adopted for individual violence”.450  Accordingly, “[where] ordinary criminal law is a 
product of continuity, pure ICL is a product of discontinuity”.451  
 
ICL also deals with a very different breed of criminal than its domestic counterpart.
452
  
Conversely, the punishment for these extraordinary criminals remains very ordinary. As 
Drumbl explains, “[the] enemy of humankind is punished no differently than a car thief, 
                                                          
against humanity, war crimes and torture typically occur in “a normative universe that differs dramatically 
from the relatively stable, well-ordered society that most national criminal justice systems take as their 
baseline”. 
446
 Ceretti A “Collective Violence and International Crime” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 5-6; 
Swart B “Modes of International Criminal Liability” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 89: 
“International crimes are largely collective phenomena. They usually require the cooperation of many 
actors, who are more often than not, members of collectivities.”  
447
 Ceretti (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 6.  
448
 Ceretti (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 8. 
449
 Swart (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 89. 
450
 Ceretti (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 5. 
451
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra). 
452
 See also para 5.2.5 (5) infra. 
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armed robber, or felony murderer […]”.453 The predominant punishment for international 
crime is imprisonment.  
 
The exceptional nature of the perpetrators of international crime, the uniqueness of 
their crimes as well as the extraordinary context in which the crimes occur requires a 
unique reflection on the goals of punishment for international crimes. Firstly, 
international crime appears to have a more enduring negative effect on communities than 
domestic crimes. This may require addressing the legacy of the past or broader social evil 
which produced mass violence. Penological purposes will therefore have to be directed at 
least partially at objectives which go beyond the specific perpetrators to achieve 
punishment that will benefit affected communities.  
 
3. The goals of ICL include and exceed the goals of domestic criminal justice in quantity. 
As a result, there is an “overabundance” of goals in international criminal justice in spite 
of a lack of financial and institutional support.
454
 Despite the almost automatic persistence 
with the traditional goals of retribution and deterrence, no solid hierarchy of priorities has 
emerged to provide international criminal courts with guidance as to what their 
contribution could or should be.
455
 As a result, international criminal courts may find 
themselves overburdened by unrealistic expectations.  To complicate matters, some of the 
goals of international criminal justice create tension or disharmony within the 
discipline.
456
 The best and arguably the most complex example of this, is the conflicting 
goals of peace (reconciliation) and criminal accountability in post-conflict situations.
457
 
Prosecuting the ‘big fish’ such as heads of state and senior military officials could disturb 
a fragile peace or ceasefire and plunge a divided post-conflict or transitional society into 
further civil unrest. Also, creating an accurate and comprehensive historical record in 
post-conflict situations may be at odds with the practical limitations of international 
                                                          
453
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 5. 
454
 Damaska (What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?) (supra) 331; Damaska, M “Problematic 
Features of International Criminal Procedure” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 178. 
455
 Damaska (What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?) (supra) 339-340. 
456
 Damaska (What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?) (supra) 331-335; Damaska (supra) in 
Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 178. 
457
 Damaska (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 178 
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courts.
458
 Historically, only a handful of ‘top level’ perpetrators have stood trial, while 
mid- and low level perpetrators either benefit from immunity or are dealt with through 
alternative justice mechanisms, not all of which contribute towards creating a historical 
record. 
 
It may be argued that the overabundance of objectives, the lack of priorities of 
punishment and the problem of conflicting objectives in international courts are to a large 
extent created by the lack of a clearly defined and universally accepted reason d’être of 
ICL. However, it may be contended that national criminal justice systems experience 
many of the same problems in relation to punishment.
459
 Achieving an optimal balance of 
objectives is essential for both national and international courts. This may however be 
harder to achieve in international criminal courts as there is typically a greater diversity of 
needs and interests to serve through punishment.  
 
4. Traditionally, criminal law reflects the values of relatively homogenous societies. ICL is 
intended to serve an “international community” with conflicting interests and values. 
Despite the harmonising effects of globalisation, international law and human rights, the 
international community remains comprised of a fusion of sovereigns and societies with 
possibly conflicting values. Domestic criminal law serves communities of at least the 
same nationality and often the same ethnic, cultural and religious affiliation with a greater 
degree of conformity on moral and social ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’. This also lends more 
conformity to the goals and values of criminal justice. Law is a normative expression of 
(some of) the values of a society.
460
 The purpose for which the legal norm was created 
reflects directly or indirectly on the underlying values of a society.
461
 In the international 
context however, it is mostly accepted that ICL champions the values of the international 
community or the civitas maxima. This being said, many would dispute international law 
as truly representative in such a universal way.
462
 The idea of ICL as a normative 
expression of the values of the international community creates a number of difficulties. 
                                                          
458
 Damaska (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 178. 
459
 Damaska (What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?) (supra) 340. 
460
 Dror Y “Values and the Law” 17 (4) The Antioch Review (1957) 440-454, 441-442. 
461
 Dror (Values and the Law) (supra) 441-442. 
462
 See Chapter 6 paras 6.2.1-6.2.2 infra. 
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Firstly, since the civitas maxima is an abstract concept, it is not always easy to identify 
those values which can be considered truly universal and representative of the 
international community. Many of these values are continually evolving and, although 
widely preached as universal, are given differing degrees of normative protection in law. 
For example, it would be easier to argue that the crimes contained in the Rome Statute are 
crimes against the international community than it would be to argue the same for other 
international crimes such as drug trafficking or corruption. Secondly, since all states have 
differing pre-existing criminal justice systems that embody the normative expression of 
the values of their societies, a uniform international criminal justice system creates 
potential for a clash of social values in the criminal justice sphere. The clash between the 
ICTR and the Rwandan domestic criminal justice system over the use of the death penalty 
may be cited as an example of the clash between the differing values of the international 
order and those of a state.
463
 
 
5. The perpetrators of international crime may be roughly categorised according to their 
level of participation. Consequently, criminal responsibility differs widely among the 
mass of perpetrators and cannot be punished uniformly. Top level perpetrators are the 
masterminds, architects or “conflict entrepreneurs” of mass atrocities. 464  These 
perpetrators often occupy the highest positions of governmental and military leadership. 
Mid-level perpetrators are typically those leading figures or leaders who are themselves 
subject to some higher authority or chain of command. Low level perpetrators are the foot 
soldiers or ordinary citizens who commit the majority of the actual criminal acts. To these 
groups may be added a fourth group, the bystanders and beneficiaries of mass atrocity 
who although not criminally liable (thus not ‘perpetrators’ in the strict sense), bear some 
moral responsibility through their inaction or apathy.
465
 The level of moral 
blameworthiness descends from top level perpetrators to onlookers making allotment of 
criminal responsibility and delineation of sentencing policy between different classes of 
perpetrators exceedingly difficult.
466
 National and international trials that prosecute 
                                                          
463
 See para 5.5.2.2 infra. 
464
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 25. 
465
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 25; Fletcher and Weinstein (Violence 
and Social Repair) (supra) 580.  
466
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 25. 
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individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out acts of mass violence leave the 
bystander group largely untouched.
467
 Prosecution has mostly been aimed at top level 
perpetrators or “big fish” if possible and on mid- and low level perpetrators where 
practical. Two reasons have been put forward for this state of affairs. Firstly, the widely 
held view that top level perpetrators are the most deserving of punishment and secondly, 
the prosecution of all mid- and low level perpetrators is often a matter of impossibility.
468
 
 
6. In international criminal justice there is a tendency, initiated by the prosecution at the 
Nuremberg IMT to place great weight and symbolic value on the trial itself.
469
 Many 
scholars have described international criminal trials as symbolic events impacting on the 
collective memory, noting the pedagogical value that these trials may have.
470
 Often the 
defendants become symbols of great evil and their punishment on the world stage 
reasserts the rule of law. In domestic legal systems symbolic trials such as these occur 
from time to time, but not as frequently as in the sphere of international criminal justice. 
In domestic criminal courts the emphasis is placed almost exclusively on the act of 
punishment. The gravitas which may attach to international criminal trials allows for the 
pursuit of goals which are mostly sui generis to international criminal justice and which 
are not necessarily dependent on the act of punishment. The value of the trial itself 
intensifies, especially where a high profile person or core crimes are involved.
471
 
 
In light of the above, the assertion that the justifications for punishment under ICL are to be 
approached from a different angle appears to be warranted. Even though some goals, such as 
                                                          
467
 See however, Chapter 8 para 8.4.1 infra where ICL’s ability to impact on the bystander group in the 
wake of mass atrocity is addressed in more detail; see also Fletcher LE and Weinstein HM “Violence and 
Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation” (2002) 24 Human Rights 
Quarterly 573–639, 579. 
468
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 25. 
469
 See Chapter 4 para 4.2.3.3 supra. 
470
 See Douglas L “The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom” (2006) 14 (4) 
European Review 514; Douglas L The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the 
Holocaust (2001) Yale University Press, New Haven; Osiel M Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the 
Law (1997) Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick; Drumbl, MA Atrocity, Punishment and International 
Law (2007) 173-176. 
471
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
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retribution and deterrence, are common to both domestic and international criminal law, 
domestic criminal law punishment theory can only apply to ICL to a limited extent.
472
 ICL is 
a response to a unique form of criminality with an international element. It is submitted that 
the problems associated with applying the domestic criminal law analogy to ICL should have 
a significant influence on the rationale for punishment of international crime.
473
 ICL attempts 
to reach beyond the conventional objectives of domestic criminal law.
474
 As will be discussed 
below, creating a historical record, truth-finding, increased accountability for gross human 
rights violations, rights and interests of victims and objectives related to reconciliation and 
international peace and security are among the sui generis objectives of international criminal 
justice and international criminal trials.
475
  
 
5.3 The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Criminal Law 
 
The historical and theoretical foundations of ICL may provide insight into the social benefits 
that are expected to materialise from the prosecution of international crimes and the change 
that ICL is expected to make to the status quo. These foundations constitute the raison d'être 
of ICL. They are based on certain assumptions regarding the use of criminal law to combat 
the phenomena which give rise to international crimes, namely state criminality, mass 
violence, armed conflict and other egregious acts of social evil. They also provide insight into 
the values that ICL protects and promotes. 
                                                          
472
 As an example, one may take the objective of rehabilitation through punishment. The rehabilitation and 
social reintegration of a perpetrator of large scale human rights abuses would be highly unrealistic 
considering the nature and extent of the crime. According to Sloane “it is far from clear that terms of 
incarceration imposed by international tribunals can [...] rehabilitate serious war criminals and 
genocidaires” (See Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) 34). These 
situations cannot be equated to domestic rehabilitation, e.g. reintroducing a convicted murderer into 
society after the expiration of his or her sentence. See also Ratner S “The Schizophrenias of International 
Criminal Law (2001) 33 Texas International Law Journal 237-256, 251: “[...] the mechanical transfer of 
domestic criminal law principles to the international context [...] is fraught with danger”. 
473
 See Chapter 8 para 8.5.1 infra. 
474
 Examples include creating a historical record of the events, ending the culture of impunity or ensuring 
accountability for gross human rights violations, and objectives relating to international peace and security. 
See Damaska (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 177. 
475
 See para 5.6 infra. 
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What are the purposes for which ICL exists? Most international criminal lawyers will 
not hesitate to assert that since “there can be no peace without justice”, ICL was created to 
end the culture of impunity for perpetrators of serious violations of human rights and 
criminality involving the state or state officials and that, simultaneously, ICL represents a 
means to deter future international crimes. Some would add that many international criminal 
laws (international aspects of domestic criminal law) are a practical response to the 
globalisation of crime. These answers are all demonstrably correct. However, the thesis 
argues that there may be more to ICL than what lies on the surface and in the preambles of 
treaties. It is submitted that ICL has reached a point in its development where it favours more 
ambitious and nuanced objectives.
476
 
 
Since the creation of the ICTY, international criminal trials have accompanied many 
of the major social transitions around the world. The reliance on criminal proceedings in 
these situations has occurred in spite of a lack of empirical studies to provide data on the 
ability of international criminal justice to reach utilitarian punishment objectives. Retributive 
justice or the goal of criminal accountability provides the primary impulse for the prosecution 
of international crime, while it is mostly assumed that prosecution will provide some added 
utilitarian benefit. However, a number of ICL scholars have paused to ask the ‘why?’ 
question in a broader sense.
477
 In the article “The Sensibility and Sense of International 
Criminal Law”, Tallgren asked why international criminal justice is justified as a response to 
large-scale crimes.
478
 The author poses the following question with regard to ICL’s role: 
“[...] does the ‘international criminal justice system’ need to protect the same interests as the 
national system in general? Are there any specific interest, the protection of which belongs 
among the exclusive tasks of the international community?”
479
 
Prosecutions of the perpetrators of core crimes, violations of ius cogens norms or gross 
human rights violations have often been described as prosecutions in the interests of the 
international community, since the crimes involved are so egregious as to be universally 
                                                          
476
 Both arguments are set out more fully in paras 5.6 – 5.7 and Chapter 8 infra. 
477
 See Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra); Osiel M “Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass 
Atrocity” (2000) 22 (1) Human Rights Quarterly 118-147; Damaska (What is the Point of International 
Criminal Justice?) (supra). 
478
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 565. 
479
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 586. 
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offensive. Universal jurisdiction over these crimes, albeit a disputed notion, is based largely 
on the same rationale. However, the reliance on prosecutions in the name of universal 
interests and values has to some extent become a matter of rhetoric. References to notions 
such the global rule of law, universal justice, ending the culture of impunity and human rights 
surface recurrently and dogmatically in the statutes, resolutions and judgments that relate to 
international criminal justice. Yet it remains difficult to explain exactly how the prosecution 
of an international criminal benefits everyone everywhere. For example, how exactly does the 
prosecution of an African warlord in The Hague benefit an Indian citizen who has never 
heard of the ICC? This question is difficult to answer because, as previously noted, 
prosecution on behalf of the international community is an abstract notion.
480
 There is some 
evidence that substantiates the desirability of such prosecution, for example the increased 
multilateral- and inter-state cooperation on these matters. But is it useful? Strictly speaking, 
the desire for the prosecution of international crime is not truly and absolutely universal. The 
prosecution of international crimes seems to be more useful and desirable to some states or 
politically aligned factions in the international order than to others.
481
 Yet, ICL’s moral 
resonance in the international community is undeniable. In this regard, the following 
questions are relevant for determining the transformative value of ICL. Firstly, why is 
criminal law sometimes preferred as a response to radical evil and serious human rights 
abuses? Secondly, who or what is the authority or driving force behind this recourse to 
criminal law? 
 
5.3.1 Why Address Radical Evil Through Criminal Law and Punishment? 
 
Differently formulated, the ‘why-question’ may be put as follows - what benefits are thought 
(or hoped) to be attained through the punishment of international crimes? The investigation 
now turns directly to the assumptions and motivations behind punishment for international 
crimes. Only once this has been established can the second question above be considered.  
 
 
                                                          
480
 See para 5.2.5 (4) supra. 
481
 Notably, liberal states seem supportive of the ideal of an international criminal justice system. In this 
regard, see Bass GJ Stay the Hand of Vengeance (2000) Princeton University Press, Princeton; see also 
Chapter 6 para 6.3.2.2 infra. 
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5.3.1.1 The Basic Theoretical Rationale: State Criminality and Legalism 
Certain general assumptions underlie international criminal justice as a response to the 
problem of international crime. According to Lee, international crimes exist because: 
“[...] some acts of harm, because of their relation to the abuse of state authority or other 
violations of the state’s legitimacy conditions, are such that, for their suppression and 
accountability, we need to appeal to an alternative framework other than the one of states 
exercising their legitimate authority within their territories or over their citizens.”
482
 
International criminal justice has developed partly out of the inability of states to deal with 
massive human rights violations internally. This inability occurs either because domestic 
legal systems are inept (unable) to deal with overwhelming nature and extent of the crimes or 
because the state itself is implicated in the commission of those crimes (and therefore 
unwilling to prosecute these crimes).
483
 ICL may be viewed as an expression of the collective 
will of states and the international community to establish an “alternative framework” for 
criminal liability that is not restricted by the veil of sovereignty and state immunity. 
Therefore, the first assumption of the existence of ICL is that the problems of state complicity 
in mass violence and state inability to deal with mass violence can be addressed by an 
alternative supranational framework of criminal law. 
 
How effective the aforementioned “alternative framework” has been, is an open 
question. Effecting penal sanctions for human rights violations in this alternative framework 
remains problematic. Firstly, even though much progress has been made towards ending the 
culture of impunity for perpetrators of international crime, widespread enforcement of ICL 
rules and effective cooperation in the prosecution of suspected perpetrators of international 
crime remains elusive. Despite the proliferation of human rights treaties and suppression 
conventions, state cooperation remains the most crucial element in ensuring that international 
crimes are effectively prosecuted. Secondly, as discussed above, many of the punishment 
theories applied in domestic criminal justice systems, and which have been subsumed into the 
abovementioned alternative framework, become less relevant when scrutinised in the unique 
and complex domain of the international criminal.
484
 By no means does this indicate that ICL 
                                                          
482
 Lee (supra) in May and Hoskins (International Criminal Law and Philosophy) (supra) 21. 
483
 See Rome Statute of the ICC, article 17(1)(b). 
484
 See para 5.2.5 supra. 
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is of no use to the international community.
 
It merely indicates that our understanding of the 
ontological aspects of ICL is not as clear as it is for domestic criminal justice. In this regard, 
once more, greater acknowledgement is required for the fact that the domestic law analogy 
applies to ICL only to a limited extent.
485
 
 
A second supposition underlying the international criminal law regime is the belief 
that mass atrocity and macro criminality can be addressed and remedied through holding 
individuals accountable under substantive criminal law similar to the way domestic crime is 
addressed by criminal laws and procedure. Thus, ICL is based on a strong faith in, on the one 
hand, the value of individual responsibility (even in the face of the complex matrix of 
responsibility inherent to collective violence) and, on the other, the power of legalism to 
shape and change human behaviour over time. It is hoped that ICL can address what Arendt 
and Kant have referred to as “radical evil” by treating extreme crimes as breaches of 
universal norms subject to criminal sanction.
486
 International criminal tribunals focus on the 
determination of individual guilt with the hope that this will end the cycle of violence through 
preventing the imposition of collective guilt and the broad demonization of perpetrator 
groups.
487
 
 
Arguably, the supposition of international crime as a breach of universal norms and 
the fact that such breaches are recognised under the established notions of ius cogens and 
obligations erga omnes creates a connection between the discipline of international criminal 
justice and natural law theory. Yet, ICL is confined to established criminal law principles of 
legality which requires, amongst other things, a high level of legal certainty and 
foreseeability. Thus ICL finds itself in a paradoxical state. ICL has emerged as a positivistic 
legal discipline restrained in its exercise by the rules of the principle of legality. Yet, it may 
be argued that to some extent ICL is founded on natural law ideals as yet unrealised in law. 
                                                          
485
 See Sloane RD “The Expressive Value of International Punishment: the Limits of the National Law 
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law” (2006) Columbia Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers (Paper 06100), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/06100/ (accessed 
20110/08/30). 
486
 Drumbl MA “Atrocity, Punishment and International Law” (2007) Washington and Lee Public Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series No. 2007-14, 3. 
487
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 10. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137 
 
Indeed, since the Nuremberg IMT, ICL has been operating at the junction between positive 
law and morality. The Nuremberg IMT consciously endeavoured to hold accountable the 
individuals responsible for radical evil by prosecuting these acts as international crimes, 
breaches of universal norms and crimes against the international community. This was the 
beginning of the attempt to criminalise radical evil under international law in a manner akin 
to the criminalisation of domestic criminal acts. As a result – and almost inevitably - the 
moral undertone of the prosecutorial effort at Nuremberg came into conflict with positive 
legal rules such as the prohibition on retroactive punishment. Although this is much less of a 
problem in modern ICL, an underlying tension between natural law ideals and positive law 
realities is still endemic to international criminal justice. 
 
The third assumption of international criminal justice is that the existence (whether ad 
hoc or permanent) of international criminal courts and increased reliance on extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction by states will deter or prevent international crime or that such 
prosecution may produce other utilitarian benefits.
488
 I return to this assumption specifically 
in greater detail below (see para 5.6 infra). 
 
5.3.1.2 Protected Interests: Core Crimes and Other International Crimes 
 
ICL has developed to this point essentially to protect certain interests and values. It is 
possible to distinguish between the interests protected by the criminalisation of acts which 
today constitute the core crimes of ICL (or crimes under international law) and the 
criminalisation of acts which constitute less egregious international crimes (other 
international crimes).
489
     
 
All states and the international community as a whole have an interest in the 
prevention and prosecution of serious international crimes.
490
 With reference to the Eichmann 
                                                          
488
 See Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 569. 
489
 See Chapter 2 para 2.2.2 supra. 
490
 The Rome Statute refers to the crimes under its jurisdiction as “the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole” which includes the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and aggression (article 5). These crimes are collectively known as the core crimes of 
international criminal law. Serious international crimes, as I have used it here, is not confined to the core 
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case, Kemp identifies the three most important interests protected by the core crimes of 
international law, namely “humanitarian concerns”, “universal moral values”, and 
“foundations and security of the international community”.491 The crimes in article 5 of the 
Rome Statute and the distinct crime of torture, which are widely regarded as having obtained 
ius cogens status under customary international law, are examples of international crimes that 
protect and project the abovementioned interests.
492
  
 
Other less egregious crimes of international law and transnational crimes protect a 
multitude of interests. These crimes have developed to facilitate effective cooperation 
between states in fighting crimes with a transnational element or to speak to a particular 
scourge in the international community, for example, terrorism. The interests protected by 
less egregious international crimes are closely related to the interests of individual states, 
namely effective crime control and cooperation in criminal matters. Yet, in the larger scheme 
of things, efforts in international cooperation in criminal matters between individual states 
may be viewed as part of a larger project of the international community of states to ensure 
respect for human rights, accountability and the global rule of law.
493
   
 
 
                                                          
crimes and includes international crimes such as torture and apartheid which are arguably crimes of 
international concern although not included as distinct crimes in the Rome Statute.  
491
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 128; see also Eichmann v Attorney-General of Israel 
(Supreme Court of Israel) Case No. 336/61, 29 May 1962, 36 ILR 277, 291-293: “[Core crimes] constitute 
acts which damage vital international interests; they impair the foundations and security of the 
international community; they violate the universal moral values and humanitarian principles that lie 
hidden in the criminal law systems adopted by civilised nations […] Those crimes entail individual 
criminal responsibility because they challenge the foundations of [the] international society and affront the 
conscience of civilised nations … [They] involve the perpetration of an international crime which all the 
nations of the world are interested in preventing”. See also Werle (Principles of International Criminal 
Law) (supra) 31-32. 
492
 It may however be argued that the distinct crime of torture is unrelated to the interest of international 
peace and security. 
493
 These utopian efforts are not universally supported. Outside of the circle of western liberal-minded 
states, the project of international (criminal) law has many detractors and critics. These criticisms are 
addressed under Chapter 6 infra. 
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5.3.1.3 Moral Objectives 
 
Tallgren observes that serious international crime invites “intuitive-moralistic answers” in 
favour of punishment.
494
 Accordingly, it is felt that the perpetrators of conduct mala in se and 
the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” deserve 
punishment all the more than domestic criminals.
495
 The moral justifiability of punishment 
for international criminals is not questioned but instinctive (the moral justifiability of the 
methods the determination of who should be punished and how is however an entirely 
different matter). Punishment for international crime is rarely a matter of asking “why”. 
Rather, the kneejerk of public sentiment proclaims that the perpetrators of these crimes 
should undoubtedly be punished. Indeed, some have come to view certain acts as so morally 
offensive that they are incapable of being responded to through even the harshest form of 
sanction.     
 
Osiel notes the powerful retributive impulses that emerge in times of mass atrocity, 
stating by way of introduction to his article that if ever there was an ‘easy case’ warranting 
prosecution, mass atrocity is it.
496
 He follows this up by immediately acknowledging that 
several doubts exist which may lead one “to conclude that criminal law is singularly 
unsuitable as a societal response to such wrongs”.497 Even if one views the doubts on the 
                                                          
494
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 564; Akhavan P “The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment” (1996) 90 (3) American Journal of International 
Law 501-510, 501-502: “The unconscionable atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have 
become the twin pillars of moral outrage upon which the beginnings of a long-awaited international 
criminal jurisdiction can be discerned” (emphasis added). 
495
 Rome Statute of the ICC, article 5(1). 
496
 Osiel (Why Prosecute?) (supra) 118. 
497
 Osiel (Why Prosecute?) (supra) 119-120. In this article, the author forwards “nine major reasons for 
doubting the wisdom of criminal prosecutions” as a response to mass atrocity: 
1. Due to their unique nature, it may not be possible to conceptualise massive offenses in legal terms. 
2. Novel legal doctrines conflict with established liberal/western legal principles.   
3. The difficulty of identifying culpable parties. 
4. The acts committed during mass atrocity may be so heinous and evil in nature that they are incapable 
of being met with punishment. 
5. Other acts may be too banal in nature to warrant punishment. 
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suitability of criminal law as a response to mass atrocity as insurmountable factual obstacles, 
the individual and collective moral desire for retribution over acts such as those perpetrated 
during the Rwandan genocide would not diminish. Human nature, especially in cases 
involving large-scale victimisation, is not inclined towards unqualified forgiveness. 
Depending on the nature and extent of the conflict as well as the particularities of the society 
in question, reconciliation requires at least some form of public symbolic revenge or 
humiliation in exchange for the harm suffered. Taking the moral outrage over mass atrocity 
and human nature into consideration, controlled retribution to this effect by way of criminal 
trial is preferable to the possible alternatives, namely personal revenge and vigilantism. 
 
From a moral point of view, if we accept the proposition that ICL enforces the moral 
outlook of the masses, the logical place to look for the reasons behind the punishment of 
international crime is the retributive theory of punishment. As Shklar observes, the 
Nuremberg IMT fulfilled an immediate and essential function “which is both the most 
ancient and the most compelling purpose of all criminal justice”.498  That is, to “replace 
private, uncontrolled vengeance with a measured process of fixing guilt in each case, and 
taking the power to punish out of the hands of those directly injured”.499 The retributive 
theory of punishment is more easily justified from a moral point of view than the utilitarian 
punishment theories.
500
 Perhaps as a result of this, the retributive justification for punishment 
forms the foundation of punishment whether that punishment is dispensed by a domestic- or 
international criminal court.  
 
                                                          
6. Alternative justice mechanisms may be superior to criminal trials as a response to mass atrocity. 
7. Political prudence may require that prosecution be kept away from the political agenda by the new 
government. Such “gag rules” may create a “choking” effect on the new democracy.  
8. Culpable parties may halt or undermine prosecutorial effort through wielding their political power 
thereby creating a political compromise which is damaging to judicial integrity. 
9. An objective and impartial criminal trial may evoke empathy for the perpetrators by normalising or 
rationalising behaviour which is deliberately considered by liberal societies to be ‘incomprehensible’.  
498
 Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 158. 
499
 Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 158. 
500
 See para 5.2.3.1 supra. 
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The retributive element of punishment has been framed in expressive terms in 
international criminal tribunals.
501
 Retributive expression is purported to communicate a 
message beyond the courtroom which clearly defines moral rights and wrongs. Closely 
associated with the expressive function of punishment, the objectives of denunciation and 
moral education are intended to denounce the wrong, to reaffirm the social norm which had 
been infringed and to educate the perpetrator and society as to the type of conduct which is 
unacceptable.
502
 
 
Yet, it appears that retribution as the basic foundation of punishment falls short of 
what is expected from modern international criminal justice. Retribution has its limits.
503
 
Justice also requires more than retribution.
504
 Fairness, due process, and the basic human 
rights of the accused must also be taken into account. From a moral perspective, retribution 
as revenge (albeit regulated revenge) comes into conflict with modern human rights discourse 
and the emerging ethos of restorative justice. Furthermore, it is important to consider the 
interests of transitional and post-conflict communities. Truth-finding, prevention of future 
atrocities and reconciliation are immediate and essential needs of these societies in which 
criminal justice plays but a part. Robert H. Jackson argued against a purely retributive 
approach in the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of international crime: 
“The satisfaction of instincts of revenge and retribution for the sake of retribution are 
obviously the least sound basis of punishment. If punishment is to lead to progress, it must be 
carried out in a manner which world opinion will regard as progressive and as consistent with 
the fundamental morality of the Allied case.”
505
 
                                                          
501
 See the discussion on the objectives of punishment as per the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg IMT and 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals at para 5.5 infra. 
502
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 23. 
503
 Clark JN “The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (2009) 7 (3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 463-487. 
504
 Clark (Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 522-523. 
505
 Jackson RH “Memorandum of Proposals for the Prosecution and Punishment of Certain War Criminals 
and Other Offenders” (30 April 1945) 11, available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ 
whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?pagenumber=12&documentid=17-
6&documentdate=1945-04-30&studycollectionid=nuremberg&groupid= (accessed 2011/10/11). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 142 
 
The moral worth of punishment under ICL cannot be based solely on the traditional 
retributive function of inflicting regulated and proportional revenge on the perpetrator. 
Retributive punishment is only acceptable when it is meted out subsequent to a fair and 
transparent trial, conducted under conditions where the defendant had been afforded the full 
measure of protection to which he or she is entitled to under the standards of international 
human rights. Furthermore, in the context of mass atrocity some have called for greater 
sensitivity to context and to pluralist notions of justice in the application of international 
criminal justice.
506
 These calls are certainly justified. However, it is unthinkable to advance 
the notion that the objective of retribution should be dispensed with altogether. Doing so will 
almost certainly raise the ire of lawyers, human rights activists, victims, post-conflict 
societies and perhaps the entire international community. Rather, it is argued that 
international criminal justice has internal and external limitations to its applicability, with the 
result that it should be invoked in a more pragmatic and contextually sensitive manner to 
form part of a broader strategy of justice.
507
 
 
5.3.2 Punishment under International Law: Authority, Values and Legitimacy 
 
Punishment under ICL represents an exercise of authority. But who or what represents the 
punishing authority in international criminal justice analogous to the state in domestic 
criminal law systems? Punishment through international criminal justice seems to be related 
to the interests and objectives of two movements, or groups. Firstly, the collective interest of 
the international community (as discussed above) and the international human rights 
movement with which it is closely associated. Secondly, hegemonic and political forces in 
the international system that seek to (ab)use criminal punishment as a legitimising tool. Thus, 
there seems to be a moral authority and a political authority driving the international criminal 
justice movement. These are discussed in paras 5.3.2.1 – 5.3.2.3 infra.508 
 
 
 
                                                          
506
 See, for example, Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra). 
507
 See Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra); see Clark (Peace, Justice and the 
International Criminal Court) (supra) 545. 
508
 See also in Chapter 6 para 6.2 infra. 
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5.3.2.1 Punishment as an Expression of the Values of the International Community 
 
Punishment is a social phenomenon. It is based on the values of a community and intended to 
protect those values. The rationale for international criminal justice in this view is to protect 
and uphold the values of the international community and to express their outrage over 
certain acts or situations.
509
 According to Gaeta, the core crimes: 
“[have their] roots in the gradual emergence of a set of ‘supra-national’ values, proper to the 
international community as a whole, that must be safeguarded against those states that – 
through their individual organs or their whole apparatus – disregard them.”
510
 
Prosecution of international crimes often requires encroachment on the sovereign right of 
states to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction within their territory. Such encroachment is 
however, widely viewed as justifiable in light of the universally offensive nature of the crime 
and the international community’s desire to hold the perpetrators of such offenses 
accountable as hostis humani generis.  
 
International criminal justice attempts to transcend the victim-offender dynamic, in 
some instances also the victim-offender-community dynamic. Apart from the individual 
victims of mass atrocity and the affected society, it is now widely accepted that some 
international crimes are wrongful acts against the international community as a whole due to 
the extraordinarily deplorable nature of the crime involved. This is confirmed by those crimes 
which have attained the status of ius cogens norms under international law. It is because of 
this universal condemnation that perpetrators of certain crimes, for example genocidaires, 
pirates and terrorists, are dubbed hostis humani generis (“the enemy of all humankind”). 
Mass atrocity and gross human rights violations invite a moral backlash from the 
international community. The response to such heinous criminal acts is more intuitive than it 
would be to domestic criminal acts. The international community is naturally more offended 
and morally repulsed by widespread, recurring and state sponsored human rights abuses than 
by human rights abuses that occur daily in any state in the guise of ‘ordinary crimes’. For 
example, a single act of murder may be universally condemnable, but in the absence of a 
                                                          
509
 This may be referred to as ‘expressive retribution’. See ICTY, Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Appeals 
Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 24 March 2000, para 185. 
510
 Gaeta (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion (supra) 66. 
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sensational or dramatic aspect it is highly unlikely to engender the same kind of moral 
outrage from the international community as is often seen with acts of murder committed 
with genocidal intent or as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian 
population. Many international crimes warrant a higher level of condemnation because they 
represent violations of ius cogens norms. This is a spontaneous form of universal 
condemnation, not comparable to public denunciation of domestic crimes. 
 
Although the civitas maxima is widely regarded as a benefactor from punishment for 
international crime, the way in which the international community interprets and benefits 
from punishment for international crimes is not yet fully understood. ICL is often confronted 
with problems that arise out of the notion of the international community as an abstract moral 
authority, which expresses its human values partly through international criminal laws. Much 
of the time, ICL must speak to a multifaceted audience comprised of the international 
community and its more directly affected subsets, the society and victims affected by 
international crime with unique needs.
511
 There is no doubt that ICL may benefit from a firm 
understanding of the social intricacies of collective violence and the “contextual reality” in 
which punishment of international crimes takes place.
512
 Greater understanding of these 
matters will enhance the ability of international criminal justice to project the international 
community’s desire for lasting respect for ICL and human rights, in the process nourishing 
post-conflict environments which ensure social healing and address more specific needs of 
affected societies. 
 
Despite this, it appears that political and legal responses to international crimes and 
mass atrocity have not matched the moral outrage generated within the international 
community. As will be discussed subsequently, politics often plays a disruptive role in this 
                                                          
511
 The values of a state or community can differ significantly from values purported to be those of the 
international community. This was illustrated by the tension between the ICTR and the Rwandan justice 
system over the use of the death penalty and generally through the on-going peace versus justice debate 
which is a prominent feature of many social transitions.On the tensions between the Rwandan state and the 
ICTR over the use of the death penalty, see Chapter 5 para 5.5.2.2 infra. 
512
 Henham (Philosophical Foundations) (supra) 78 (footnote 68): “…context requires that international 
punishment must engage with the social world that gives it meaning and provide the means for reconciling 
and weighing different contexts […] in ways which have moral resonance”.  
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regard.
513
 ICL’s historical development offers another possible explanation for the disparity 
between the international community’s moral outrage and the low frequency of prosecution 
of international crime. ICL’s extraordinary nature and the fact that it is of a relatively recent 
vintage has had an impact on what it aims to achieve. Overall, the emphasis has fallen on 
realistic prosecutions rather than over-zealousness and over-reaching.
514
 This is 
understandable. A gradual and manageable evolution should ultimately increase ICL’s 
legitimacy and objectivity. The short term effects of such slow development has been, and 
will continue be, criticised by some. 
 
5.3.2.2 Punishment as Legitimisation of Hegemonic Power
515
 
 
In theory, international law is a neutral and independent system of justice. It is a system 
founded on principles of equality and impartiality. These fundamental principles have 
resulted in an almost automatic acceptance of the legitimacy of international law and 
international institutions. These characteristics of international law make it attractive to 
powerful states that may seek to (ab)use it as a disguised instrument for pacification, 
stabilisation and of authoritatively projecting norms and values onto the international 
order.
516
  Especially the institutions of international criminal justice are not immune to this 
type of hegemonic exploitation. According to Henham: 
“A significant paradigm for conceptualizing the activities of international criminal tribunals is 
to regard them as structural mechanisms concerned with the legitimation of hegemonic power, 
authority and control. As such they provide modalities which permit members of the 
international community to dispense a morally relative form of justice through legitimized 
repression.”
517
 
And further: 
                                                          
513
 See Chapter 6 (in general) and Chapter 8 para 8.3.5 infra. 
514
 This approach was followed at the IMT were it was decided to limit proceedings to 22 defendants in 
order to minimise the risk of a botched trial. See Overy (supra) in Sands (Nuremberg to the Hague) (supra) 
1-14. 
515
 See also Chapter 6 para 6.3.3 infra. 
516
 Krisch N “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order” (2005) 16 (3) European Journal of International Law 369-408, 377. 
517
 Henham (Philosophical Foundations) (supra) 67.  
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“[...] in the context of the ad hoc tribunals, retribution in international criminal justice has 
been more readily equated with the concept of victor’s justice; vindication and western 
exculpation; the symbolic manifestation of hegemony.”
518
 (footnotes omitted) 
 
There are a number of political reasons for the recourse to criminal law in response to 
mass violence. These reasons derive from the ascendency of Western ideas in international 
justice and, accompanying this Western centeredness, the ascendancy of liberal-legalist 
criminal law ideals in international criminal justice.
519
 For liberal states, the protection of 
human rights has become an important matter, both internally and as a matter of foreign 
policy.
520
 ICL, as part of the larger movement to protect and punish human rights abuses, is 
partly a manifestation of liberal morality. Liberalism and legalism are ideologies strongly 
associated with western political beliefs and demand that individuals stand trial for human 
rights abuses.
521
  
 
It can be argued that states support or cooperate with international criminal justice on 
behalf of their citizens as part of the international community. From another vantage point, 
one which may be in greater conformity with the political nature of the international system, 
it may be argued that state support and cooperation towards international criminal justice is 
an overt act in the political interest of the state. This latter view also explains why certain 
states do not cooperate with international criminal justice mechanisms, or do so in an 
inconsistent manner. From this perspective, punishment through international criminal law 
and its institutions may be viewed as mechanisms to legitimise the interests of hegemonic 
forces in the international system.
522
   
 
5.3.2.3 Legitimacy and the Problem of Selective Prosecution 
 
The objective of ICL is to ensure maximum accountability for perpetrators of international 
crime and gross human rights violations. Unfortunately, this objective squires off against the 
                                                          
518
 Henham (Philosophical Foundations) (supra) 68. 
519
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 123. 
520
 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 16-21. 
521
 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 16-21. 
522
 See Chapter 6 para 6.3.3 infra. 
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contemporary trend wherein impunity is the norm and accountability the exception. The 
reasons for the current state of affairs are partly ascribable to the enduring prevalence of 
sovereignty and the dominance of politics over international law in international relations. 
Successful prosecutions of perpetrators of international crime have been few and far between. 
For example, less than 4% of the estimated 100 000 Nazi perpetrators were eventually 
brought to trial.
523
 Prosecutorial discretion has favoured prosecutions of only the “big fish” or 
those cases where the prospect of achieving a conviction was high. Furthermore, some 
international criminal courts have been limited in their prosecutorial discretion by an 
“artificial and politically convenient time frame”.524 This use of the prosecutorial discretion, 
although arguably a pragmatic exercise, has resulted in criticism of ICL as a hegemonic, 
selective and inconsistent form of justice. It also clearly demonstrates the many inadequacies 
in the current system, particularly inadequacies of enforcement. 
 
Selectivity in prosecutions represents a serious obstacle to some of the fundamental 
objectives of international criminal trials, namely retribution, deterrence and ending the 
culture of impunity for international crimes.
525
 Selectivity in international criminal justice can 
be attributed to two factors, namely internal selectivity and randomness. Amann describes 
internal selectivity as “the inevitable choice by actors within a tribunal of certain defendants, 
certain witnesses, and certain incidents to the exclusion of others that also merit 
consideration”.526 Randomness refers to the limited and haphazard production of international 
criminal justice based on an incidental convergence of political and external circumstances.
527
 
Drumbl contends, for example, that the ICC has a political incentive to investigate cases only 
                                                          
523
 See Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 300; Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 117 (footnote 
106). 
524
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 151. 
525
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 30. 
526
 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 116. 
527
 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 116. The author notes that the conflicts that gave birth to the ad hoc 
tribunals were just two out of a number of similar conflicts which may have warranted the creation of 
similar tribunals. On selectivity in the prosecution of international crime, see Stolle and Singelnstein 
(supra) in Kaleck et al. (International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes) (supra) 46-48. These authors 
argue that the prosecution of Serbian leadership at the ICTY was an “attempt legally to justify the later 
NATO intervention” (at 47).  
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in those countries that are politically powerless, thereby ensuring that the Court involves 
itself only in countries that cannot jeopardise its funding and political standing.
528
  
 
Skewed and selective prosecutions are the realities of a developing international 
criminal justice system with limited powers of enforcement. Such limited power of 
enforcement is endemic to the international legal system which is dependent on cooperation 
and based on consensus. Keeping this in mind, selectivity and randomness can at least be 
partially explained. It cannot however be viewed as morally or legally justified. The 
establishment of an effective framework for the relationship between domestic and 
international criminal systems represents the best hope for international criminal justice to 
achieve the consistency and impartiality which is required of criminal law. This framework 
has only recently been given renewed emphasis under the Rome Statute’s scheme of 
complementarity, and will need many years to become solidified if at all possible.  
 
 One way of approaching the problem of skewed prosecutions and limited 
enforcement is to focus on more clearly defined targets, set within the framework of ICL’s 
fundamental objectives. Who should be punished and for what conduct remain relevant 
questions. It would be unwise to ignore the influence of alternatives to criminal justice at this 
juncture. Stretching ICL objectives toward over-optimistic ideals could be detrimental to its 
still fragile existence and may hamper its prospects of achieving acceptance among hereto 
unsupportive states. Alternatives to criminal justice and restorative justice mechanisms such 
as South Africa’s TRC and the gacaca courts in Rwanda have proved to be imperfect, but 
also useful and pragmatic responses to transitional and post-conflict periods. For now at least, 
the voice of reason calls for pragmatism and realism on the frontlines of international 
criminal justice.        
 
 
 
 
                                                          
528
 Drumbl, MA Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007) 152; see also Damaska (What is the 
Point of International Criminal Justice?) (supra) 330: “[…] the sword of justice tends to be used most 
against individuals from states that occupy a lowly place in the de facto existing hierarchy of states”.  
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5.4 The Modality of ICL Objectives: Trial and Sentencing Objectives in 
International Criminal Justice 
 
At least one negative aspect of the sudden proliferation of international criminal courts in the 
post-Cold War era is that international- and internationalised criminal courts were required to 
conduct trials and hand down sentences without being able to rely on a jurisprudence of 
punishment theory tailored specifically to international crimes and perpetrators of mass 
atrocities. ICL’s inactivity during the Cold War period resulted in little practical development 
of the justifications for punishment for international crime. Indeed, until relatively recently 
and in light of more pressing matters in the field of international criminal justice, academic 
consideration of the penological purposes of international criminal law may not have been 
viewed as an issue requiring urgent consideration. 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, and the creation of the ad hoc and hybrid criminal 
tribunals, there has been a regular output of jurisprudence by international criminal courts. 
Many writers have noted the lacuna in the application of punishment theory and sentencing 
jurisprudence at these tribunals and in the field of ICL in general.
529
 Empirical studies on the 
effectiveness of international tribunals have been called for, but remain mostly lacking or 
unenlightening. As a result it remains hard to discern whether or not a nexus exists between 
the lofty aspirations of ICL, what it has achieved and that which it may be expected to 
achieve in future.  In the tribunals themselves, the focus seems to have been more on the 
development of substantive international criminal law than on penology.  
 
In the most notable works on sentencing practices of international criminal courts, 
much criticism has befallen the sentencing practice of the ICTY and ICTR.
530
 Much of the 
criticism sights a lack of coherence, lack of methodology and randomness in sentencing at 
                                                          
529
 Henham R Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials (2005) Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot 1; Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra). 
530
 See Henham (Philosophical Foundations) (supra) 69: “Regrettably, the ad hoc tribunals have 
consistently failed to define […] sentencing aims, or explored their meaning in the international trial 
context”. 
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these tribunals.
531
 Overall, the relationship between penological justifications, divergent 
factors influencing sentencing (for example the gravity of international crime and mitigating 
factors specific to the accused), the relative weight to be attached to these factors and the 
sentence imposed has not been well articulated.   
 
Traditionally, penological justifications and sentencing objectives have been treated 
as synonymous concepts.
532
 Punishment is simultaneously justified and rationalised through 
the purpose it is intended to serve. An imposed sentence is usually based upon more than one 
justification for punishment. The justification of punishment in turn typically consists partly 
of aspirations or purposes beyond punishment itself. International criminal justice mostly 
borrows its penological justifications from domestic penological justifications through the 
partly fallacious application of the domestic criminal law analogy to ICL.
533
  
 
Yet, the objectives of international criminal justice cannot be confined to those which 
are pursued through sentencing. This notion defeats some of the criticisms regarding the 
inconsistency of sentencing practice in relation to penological justifications in international 
criminal justice mentioned above. The international criminal trial, as a symbolic and public 
event, and the allocation of guilt through the conviction have their own functions within the 
larger objective and rationale for international criminal justice. Luban observes that “the 
                                                          
531
 See Ewald U “‘Predictably Irrational’: International Sentencing and its Discourse Against the Backdrop 
of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices” (2010) 10 International Criminal Law 
Review 365–402; Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra); Van Zyl Smit D 
“Punishment by International Criminal Tribunals: Ideal Example for National Criminal Justice, or Parody 
of a Penal Process?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology in 
Denver, USA (2003)  available at http://www.asc41.com/www/2003/ cmsindx.htm (accessed 2010/03/02); 
Henham R “Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court” (2003) 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 81-114, 82; see also Henham (Philosophical Foundations) (supra) 69: “The 
evidence of confusion and obfuscation on the part of the ad hoc tribunals relating to the possible scope and 
meaning to be accorded to penal justifications is incontrovertible”. 
532
 See footnote 383 supra. 
533
 Tallgren defines the general domestic analogy as “the assumption that the principles regarded as valid 
in inter-individual relations apply in inter-state relations as well”. See Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) 
(supra) 566. 
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curious feature about ICL is that in it the emphasis shifts from punishment to trials”.534 This 
shift in emphasis from punishment to the trial itself leads to the conclusion that some ICL’s 
objectives are “extrinsic to purely legal values”.535 For example, a report by former UN 
Secretary Kofi Annan stated that the objectives of international criminal tribunals include 
accountability for perpetrators of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
prevention of future violations, seeking justice for victims, creating a historical account, 
national reconciliation, re-establishment of the rule of law, putting an end to violence and the 
restoration of peace in conflict situations.
536
  
 
Furthermore, it must be mentioned that states often pursue international criminal 
justice as a means to fight transnational crime and for applying their criminal jurisdiction 
extraterritorially under certain circumstances. As a result, the objectives of international 
criminal tribunals applying ICL strictu sensu and the objectives of domestically enforced ICL 
(specifically that part of domestic law which constitutes ‘international aspects of domestic 
criminal law’) may not be absolutely aligned. 
 
5.5 Sentencing Objectives of the IMTs, ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
 
Since the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals there has been much debate and criticism over 
punishment and penology in international criminal courts. In the post-Cold War era, 
sentencing law in international courts has become more sophisticated than in its predecessors, 
the Nuremberg IMT, Tokyo IMTFE and the Eichmann trial.
537
 The prevailing notion at these 
trials, namely that no punishment can truly fit egregious crimes such as genocide, has 
                                                          
534
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
535
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
536
 Report by the Secretary General to the United Nations Security Council on Strengthening the Rule of 
Law in Post-Conflict Situations, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (23 Augustus 2004) 13 (para 38). See also Galbraith 
J “The Pace of International Criminal Justice” (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 79-143, 
84 (footnote 19). In light of the role of the United Nations in the establishment and functioning of 
international criminal tribunals, Galbraith considers these objectives as the most authoritative statement on 
the objectives of international criminal tribunals. 
537
 Sloane R “Sentencing” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 509-510. 
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gradually diminished.
538
 An investigation into the combination of punishment theories and 
justifications used by international courts in sentencing may help to clarify ICL’s overarching 
objectives. Identifying these objectives will aid the investigation of the ‘transformative value’ 
of ICL. Furthermore, the ability of international courts to achieve these objectives may 
constitute an important element of ICL’s transformative value.  
 
Positive law documents provide little guidance as to the purpose of punishment in 
ICL. The supreme positive law objectives of international criminal justice are accountability, 
deterrence, prevention of future atrocities, prevention of state abuse through achieving greater 
individual accountability for egregious crimes and ultimately creating universal respect for 
human rights. Penological justifications can at best be inferred from the statutes of the major 
international criminal tribunals. Relative to positive law documents, sentencing jurisprudence 
from international courts has provided the clearest guidance as to the goals of ICL 
punishment. Although retribution (also in the guise of expressive retribution) and deterrence 
generally remain the central purposes of punishment, there has been a gradual movement 
away from the initial retributive objectives of punishment at the Nuremberg IMT toward 
recognition of punishment in favour of achieving some broader social utility. According to 
Sloane, “sentencing judgments refer frequently to the broader, architectural goals of ICL, e.g. 
restoring international peace and security, ending impunity, and promoting ethnic and 
national reconciliation”.539  
 
5.5.1 Early Punishment Institutions: The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
 
The Nuremburg and Tokyo trials represented the first legal proceedings which brought 
perpetrators of mass human rights violations within the ambit of criminal justice.
540
 At these 
trials the purposes of punishment proceeded from what was essentially a retributive 
                                                          
538
 Sloane (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 509-510. This was reiterated by Arendt in her 
correspondence with Karl Jaspers: “It may well be essential to hang Goering but it is totally inadequate. 
That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems”. See 
Arendt, H/Jaspers, K Correspondence 1926-1969 (Cited in Osiel (Why Prosecute?) (supra) 128) 54. 
539
 Sloane (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 509-510. 
540
 Golash D “Retribution for International Crimes”, available at http://www.chinalawsociety.com/ 
admin/ewebeditor/UploadFile/20099814129362.doc (accessed 2009/11/17). 
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impulse.
541
 The widespread imposition of the death penalty at these tribunals provides 
perhaps the strongest evidence for this.
542
 Both the IMT and IMTFE Charters authorised 
“death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just”.543 
 
Many regard the sentences, and indeed these trials as a whole, as an expression of 
“victors’ justice”. It is hard to deny that trials were an expression of the vengeance and values 
of the peoples of the victorious nations at that time just as much, if not more, than it was 
intended to deter future atrocities and to be a symbol of justice and the rule of law.
544
 
However, to some extent the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMTFE were also expressions of 
the international community’s moral outrage. At Nuremberg this expressive or symbolic 
component of the trial and subsequent punishment was acknowledged by the prosecution. 
Robert H. Jackson cast the defendants as living symbols of an evil that will persist in the 
world long after they, the defendants, were gone: 
“What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent influences that will lurk 
in the world long after their bodies have turned to dust. We will show them to be living 
symbols of racial hatred, of terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power. 
They are symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism, of intrigue and war-making which 
have embroiled Europeans generation after generation, crushing its manhood, destroying its 
homes, and impoverishing its life.”
545
 
Thus, the main impetus for the prosecutions at the Nuremberg and Tokyo was retribution in 
the traditional sense as well as the projection of a symbolic message of the victorious states’ 
belief in the rule of law principle.
546
 Beyond these objectives, it would appear that the IMTs 
                                                          
541
 Schabas (Sentencing by International Tribunals) (supra) 500; Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment) (supra) 32-33. 
542
 Schabas (Sentencing by International Tribunals) (supra) 500. 
543
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“Nuremberg Charter”) (1945) 82 UNTS 
279, article 27; Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 26 April 1946, TIAS No. 
1589, article 16. 
544
 Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 18-19. 
545
 Opening Statement of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the United States, 
21 November 1945 in Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 121. 
546
 See the opening statement of Robert H. Jackson, Representative and Chief of Council for the United 
States of America, in his opening address at the IMT (21 November 1945) at footnote 31 supra. 
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spent little time and effort on developing new rationales for punishment of international 
crime or to adapting punishment objectives to the international context.  
 
5.5.2 The Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
Pioneering developments in the international legal order in the years since the Nuremberg 
IMT and Tokyo IMTFE have exerted a discernible influence on the penal justifications used 
by the ad hoc tribunals. Most notable was the influence of international human rights law 
which barely existed prior to the Second World War. By the time that statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals were drafted, and under the influence of international human rights law, the death 
penalty was no longer regarded as legal under international law and rehabilitation had 
become a more prominent punishment objective.
547
 As a consequence the ICTY and ICTR 
each invoked a lob sided array of justifications for punishment. Generally, retribution and 
deterrence are mentioned as the main purposes of punishment.
548
 Incapacitation (or individual 
deterrence) and rehabilitation are occasionally mentioned. Reconciliation has been given 
some, mostly rhetorical, attention.
549
 
 
5.5.2.1 The ICTY 
 
UNSC Resolution 827, which established the ICTY states: 
“the establishment of an international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for 
[...] violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such 
violations are halted and effectively redressed” (emphasis added).
550
   
                                                          
547
 Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) 33; see also Soering v United 
Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights) Case No. 1/1989/161/217, 7 July 1989. In the latter case it 
was ruled that the United Kingdom was prohibited from extraditing Soering to the USA since this would 
lead to him being subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment while on death row. 
548
 See Mettraux G International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (2005) Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 345-346; ICTY, Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-96-21-A, 20 
February 2001, para 806. 
549
 See Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 150. 
550
 UNSC Resolution 827 (1993) (Establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal).  
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Resolution 827 implies deterrence and retribution respectively as the fundamental objectives 
of the ICTY.
551
 Neither Resolution 827 nor the ICTY Statute however makes any specific 
mention to retribution and deterrence as punishment objectives. 
 
Furthermore, resolution 827 declares that “the prosecution of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law [...] would contribute to the restoration 
and maintenance of peace”. This falls firmly within the UNSC’s mandate to maintain 
international peace and security through the use of measures not involving the use of force 
under article 41 of the UN Charter. When viewed as an objective of criminal law, in terms of 
the traditional objectives of punishment, it may however be contended that such ambitious 
objectives represent a speculative effort on the part of the UNSC. This was most glaringly 
illustrated by the Srebrenica massacre which took place well after the establishment of the 
ICTY which as noted above, had been mandated to restore and maintain peace.  
 
Although Resolution 827 makes no specific mention of reconciliation, the ICTY has 
often made a positive link between its work and national reconciliation in the former 
Yugoslavia as well as between such reconciliation and the maintenance of international peace 
and security.
552
 According to the tribunal, guilty pleas in particular have a reconciliatory 
impact firstly “by helping to establish the truth, without which a society cannot move 
forwards” and secondly “by providing victims with a substantial degree of closure, as a result 
of the defendant acknowledging responsibility for his actions”.553 There seems to be a lack of 
empirical evidence to prove the supposed positive link between the functions attributed to 
guilty pleas (including accountability via the acknowledgement of responsibility) and 
reconciliation.
554
 Clark casts some doubt on the ICTY’s acceptance that guilty pleas create a 
reconciliatory effect through establishing the truth.
555
 Clark’s criticism revolves around two 
key aspects: 
                                                          
551
 See Schabas (Sentencing by International Tribunals) (supra) 498. See also Mettraux (International 
Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals) (supra) 346 (footnote 15). 
552
 Clark JN “Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation” (2009) 20 (2) European 
Journal of International Law 415-436, 421. 
553
 Clark (Plea Bargaining) (supra) 434. 
554
 Clark (Plea Bargaining) (supra) 421. 
555
 Clark (Plea Bargaining) (supra) 415-436. 
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“First, truth is a contested concept, and therefore has no inherent positive value; and, secondly, 
the ICTY practice of charge bargaining means that the ‘truth’ that is established is often only 
an incomplete truth.”
556
 
A survey of 1045 participants from Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the Centre for 
Human Rights in December 2010 showed that the majority of the participants did not believe 
that the ICTY contributed to national reconciliation.
557
 Also, since the ICTY operates from 
The Hague, there has been an ever-present concern that the Tribunal is too far removed from 
the former Yugoslavia to have a reconciliatory impact.     
 
In Erdemović, the Trial Chamber referred specifically to the establishment of the 
tribunal pursuant to UNSC resolution 827 and highlighted the ICTY’s “purposes and 
functions” as follows: 
“The International Tribunal’s objectives as seen by the Security Council—i.e. general 
prevention (or deterrence), reprobation, retribution (or “just deserts”), as well as collective 
reconciliation—fit into the Security Council’s broader aim of maintaining peace and security 
in the former Yugoslavia.”
558
 
However, in Kunarac et al. the ICTY Trial Chamber deemed it “inappropriate to have 
recourse to [UNSC resolution 827] for guidance on what the general sentencing factors of the 
International Tribunal should be”. 559 According to the Trial Chamber the resolution was 
never intended to serve as a sentencing guide, but should be viewed as an effort on the part of 
the UNSC to justify the establishment of the tribunal.
560
 
 
                                                          
556
 Clark (Plea Bargaining) (supra) 424. 
557
 “Trials have not helped reconciliation – Survey shows” Balkan Insight, available at http://www.bim.ba/ 
en/264/10/32161/ (accessed 2011/04/24). 
558
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T, 29 
November 1996, para 58. UNSC Resolution 827 makes no specific reference to the objective of 
reconciliation. The tribunal seems to have opted for a broad interpretation of the words “restoration and 
maintenance of peace” so as to include reconciliation as one of its objectives.  
559
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-23-T and 
IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para 824. 
560
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-23-T and 
IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para 824. 
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The first sentencing judgment of the Trial Chamber in Erdemović constitutes the first 
extensive consideration of sentencing principles by the ICTY. Retribution and deterrence 
were considered as the most important purposes of punishment: 
“In the light of this review of international and national precedents relating to crimes against 
humanity (or crimes of the same nature), the Trial Chamber deems most important the 
concepts of deterrence and retribution. It further notes that in the context of gross violations of 
human rights which are committed in peace time, but are similar in their gravity to the crimes 
within the International Tribunal’s jurisdiction, reprobation (or stigmatisation) is one of the 
appropriate purposes of punishment. One of the purposes of punishment for a crime against 
humanity lies precisely in stigmatising criminal conduct which has infringed a value 
fundamental not merely to a given society, but to humanity as a whole. This concept moreover 
served as a basis for this Chamber’s deliberations in relation to the procedures pursuant to 
Rule 61 of the Rules, while noting that in none of these cases was there a conviction followed 
by a sentence. 
On the basis of the above, the International Tribunal sees public reprobation and 
stigmatisation by the international community, which would thereby express its indignation 
over heinous crimes and denounce the perpetrators, as one of the essential functions of a 
prison sentence for a crime against humanity. In addition, thwarting impunity even to a limited 
extent would contribute to appeasement and give the chance to the people who were sorely 
afflicted to mourn those among them who had been unjustly killed. 
Intimately related to the reprobative function is general prevention, which played a salient role 
in the judgements of the post-World War Two international military tribunals, as pointed out 
above. The Trial Chamber also adopts retribution, or “just deserts”, as legitimate grounds for 
pronouncing a sentence for crimes against humanity, the punishment having to be proportional 
to the gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.”
561
 (footnotes omitted) 
The tribunal was sceptical about the applicability of rehabilitation as a purpose of 
punishment, clearly treating it as subsidiary to retribution, deterrence and stigmatisation.
562
 
Taking into considering the “particularities” of the crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction, the 
                                                          
561
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T, 29 
November 1996, paras 64-65. See also Prosecutor v Todorović (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) 
Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, 31 July 2001 paras 28-29 (the Trial Chamber concluded that retribution and 
deterrence provided “the main principles in sentencing for international crimes”). 
562
 Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 21. 
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court regarded the rehabilitative function of punishment as subordinate to retribution and 
deterrence.
563
 Similar scepticism towards rehabilitation was expressed in Kunarac et al. and 
by the Appeals Chamber in Mucić et al.564 In the second sentencing judgment of Erdemović, 
the potential rehabilitation of the offender was taken into account as a mitigating factor. 
According to the Trial Chamber the offender’s “circumstances and character indicate that he 
is reformable and should be given a second chance to start his life afresh upon release, whilst 
still young enough to do so”.565  
 
In Babić, the ICTY Trial Chamber took the view that the objective of special 
deterrence was not relevant as a sentencing principle.
566
 The Trial Chamber also cautioned 
that punishment of an individual for the benefit of general deterrence would be unfair.
567
 
Referring in casu also to the sentencing appeal judgment in Tadić, the Trial Chamber in 
Babić therefore did not place “undue prominence” to the objective of deterrence.568  
 
In the second sentencing judgment of Dražen Erdemović, the ICTY highlighted truth 
and reconciliation as purposes of the tribunal, and elaborated on the relationship between 
truth and reconciliation:  
“The International Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute and punish 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, through its judicial functions, 
                                                          
563
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T, 29 
November 1996, para 66. 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-23-T and 
IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para 844; ICTY, Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) 
Case No. IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, para 806. 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: [Second] Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T 
bis, 5 March 1998, para 16. 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Babić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-03-72-S, 29 June 2004, 
para 45. 
567
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Babić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-03-72-S, 29 June 2004, 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Babić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-03-72-S, 29 June 2004, 
para 45; see also ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeals Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-A 
and IT-94-1-A bis, 26 January 2000, para 48; also reiterated in ICTY, Prosecutor v (Dragan) Nikolić 
(Appeals Chamber: Sentencing Appeal) Case No. IT-94-2-A, 4 February 2005, para 46.   
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to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and 
establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. Discovering the 
truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation: 
for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing 
process.”
569
 
The correlation between truth and reconciliation, particularly the role of guilty pleas pursuant 
to plea bargains in this relationship, has been disputed.
570
  
 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Aleksovski elaborated on the retributive purpose 
of punishment and its relation to the international community: 
“[Retribution] is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing 
the outrage of the international community at these times […] Accordingly, a sentence of the 
International Tribunal should make plain the condemnation of the international community of 
the behaviour in question and show that the international community was not ready to tolerate 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.”
571
 
This dictum endorses the objective of expressive retribution and the view that retributive 
impulses are at least partially based upon the collective will of the civitas maxima. In this 
view, punishment is an expression of the international community’s abhorrence of the 
conduct in question because it offends and indirectly harms the interests of everyone in the 
international community. As was acknowledged in Kupreškić, the reinforcement of 
international criminal norms is a subsidiary objective closely related to the expressive intent 
of retributive punishment: 
“[…] another relevant sentencing purpose is to show the people of not only former 
Yugoslavia, but of the world in general, that there is no impunity for these types of crimes. 
This should be done in order to strengthen the resolve of all involved not to allow crimes 
against international humanitarian law to be committed as well as to create trust and respect 
                                                          
569
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for the developing system of international criminal justice. The Trial Chamber also supports 
the purpose of rehabilitation for persons convicted […].”
572
 
In the dictum above, the subsidiary and almost cursory acknowledgement given to 
rehabilitation as a justification for punishment (see emphasis above) is particularly illustrative 
of the overall approach of the ICTY towards punishment objective in general and in 
particular towards objectives other than retribution and deterrence. On the whole retribution 
and deterrence have been most frequently invoked as penal justifications by the ad hoc 
tribunals. Also in Kupreškić, the ICTY reiterated that “in general, retribution and deterrence 
are the main purposes to be considered when imposing sentences before the International 
Tribunal”.573 The same view was expressed in Todorović and Krnojelac.574 
 
5.5.2.2 The ICTR 
 
Shortly after the creation of the ICTY, the UNSC created the ICTR through Resolution 
955.
575
  Based largely on the same rationale as for the establishment of the ICTY, the ICTR 
was established with the belief or hope that the creation of an international criminal tribunal 
will ensure that violations are “halted and effectively redressed”.576 Similarly it aimed to 
contribute to “the restoration and maintenance of peace”.577 Resolution 955 is differentiated 
from Resolution 827 by the specific reference to reconciliation, stating that “the prosecution 
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law [...] would 
contribute to the process of national reconciliation”.578 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al. (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 
2000, para 848. 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al. (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 
2000, para 848. 
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 ICTY, Prosecutor v Todorović (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-95-99/1-S, 31 July 
2001, paras 28-29; ICTY, Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Trial Chamber II: Judgment) Case No. IT-97-25-T, 15 
March 2002, para 508. 
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 UNSC Resolution 955 (1994) (Establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
Adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal). 
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In accordance with articles 12(2) and 15(3) of the ICTR Statute, the ICTR shares both 
its Appeals Chamber and prosecutor with the ICTY. Furthermore, the ICTR and the ICTY are 
based on similar or unified legal approaches.
579
 Consequently, the approach of the ICTR to 
sentencing objectives is very similar to that of the ICTY discussed above.     
 
In Kambanda, which was the ICTR’s first sentencing judgment, the tribunal followed 
the ICTY’s lead and endorsed retribution and deterrence as the main purposes behind 
punishment stating that: 
“[it] is clear that the penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal must 
be directed, on the one hand, at retribution of the said accused, who must see their crimes 
punished, and over and above that, on the other hand, at deterrence, namely dissuading for 
good those who will attempt in future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the 
international community was not ready to tolerate the serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights.”
580
 
These words are repeated verbatim in Rutaganda.
581
  
 
In Ruggia, the ICTR Trial Chamber reiterates the objectives in Resolution 955 and the 
role of the tribunal within the duties of the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
582
 
Thereafter, the tribunal notes in an extraordinarily concise and open-ended fashion, that 
“[the] jurisprudence of the ICTR with regard to penalties has addressed the principal aims of 
sentencing, namely retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and justice”.583  On occasion the 
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 ICTR, Prosecutor v Kambanda (Trial Chamber I: Judgment and Sentence) Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 4 
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ICTR has especially highlighted the objective of general deterrence “to dissuade for ever 
others who may be tempted to commit atrocities”.584   
 
From the outset there have been tensions between the ICTR and the Rwandan 
domestic legal system. The Rwandan government was initially an active supporter of the 
establishment of an international criminal tribunal.
585
 Later however, Rwanda (at the time a 
non-permanent member of the UNSC) voted against Resolution 955 and expressed 
dissatisfaction over the ICTR Statute on various grounds.
586
 Some of the reasons for the 
Rwandan government’s dissenting vote seemed to indicate scepticism over the possible 
reconciliatory effects of certain provisions in the ICTR Statute: 
“[...] the International Tribunal as designed in the resolution, establishes a disparity in 
sentences since it rules out capital punishment, which is nevertheless provided for in the 
Rwandese penal code. Since it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing with suspects 
who devised, planned and organized the genocide, these may escape capital punishment 
whereas those who simply carried out their plans would be subjected to the harshness of this 
sentence. That situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda [...] above all 
we requested the establishment of this Tribunal to teach the Rwandese people a lesson, to fight 
against the impunity to which it had become accustomed since 1959 and to promote national 
reconciliation. It therefore seems clear that the seat of the International Tribunal should be set 
in Rwanda; it will have to deal with Rwandese suspects, responsible for crimes committed in 
Rwanda against the Rwandese. Only in this way can the desired effects be achieved.”
587
 
As Akhavan pointed out, many of the concerns of the Rwandan government proved to have 
been unwarranted.
588
 Yet, the fact that tensions arose between the ICTR and Rwanda raises 
doubts over the transformative value of invoking ICL in a post-conflict society. This tension 
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is a result of disparity which may exist between the values of the international community 
and those of a state and highlights the need for a robust approach to post-conflict justice.
589
 
 
5.5.3 The ICC 
 
It seems as if the lack of clarity concerning penal justification in the ad hoc tribunals, and 
indeed throughout the emergence of ICL, has persisted into the new era of ICL. As the most 
prominent positive law document of ICL, one may be disappointed when turning to the Rome 
Statute for guidance on ICL’s objectives. The preamble of the Rome Statute reiterates the 
ICC’s purpose of establishing peace by “recognizing that […] grave crimes threaten the 
peace, security and well-being of the world”. 590  The preamble mentions two specific 
objectives of international criminal justice, “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” 
and “to contribute to the prevention of serious international crimes”. 591  Furthermore, 
according to Stigen, the Rome Statute “appears to build on the assumption that a society 
which has experienced massive human rights violations cannot reconcile unless the guilty are 
held accountable”.592 
 
ICL is a branch of law which represents the international community’s desire for 
legally entrenched peace.
593
 This is confirmed by the references to “peace, security and well-
being of the world” in the preamble of the Rome Statute. This logically leads one to suppose 
that a primary objective of ICL is preventative in nature. It pushes deterrence to the forefront 
as a primary goal of ICL in theory. Unlike retribution, deterrence is not a retrospective or 
posterior justification for criminal sanctions, but a forward-looking objective of punishment. 
It can be seen as a positive act aimed at realising a greater social benefit. In a statement made 
following his election as the ICC’s first chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said that he 
would regard an absence of trials at the ICC as a consequence of effective institutional 
                                                          
589
 See also Chapter 8 para 8.3.4.4 infra. 
590
 Rome Statute of the ICC, Preamble (3). 
591
 Rome Statute of the ICC, Preamble (5). 
592
 Stigen (International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions) (supra) 12. 
593
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 31-31; see also Stigen (International Criminal 
Court and National Jurisdictions) (supra) 12-13.      
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 164 
 
protection at the national level as a major success.
594
 Thus, deterrence also seems to be a 
prominent objective on agenda of the Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter “OTP”). Another 
objective of the ICC, greater cooperation and effectiveness at the national level, would be the 
first step towards the deterrent vision of international criminal justice. 
 
Beyond these almost tacit objectives the Rome Statute is “virtually silent” on what 
considerations should be borne in mind when punishing offenders of international criminal 
law.
595
 Article 76 of the Rome Statute enjoins the court to only impose an “appropriate 
sentence”. Surely, the justifications of punishment of the core crimes were not very high up 
on the agenda of many of the state parties involved in the negotiation and drafting of the 
Rome Statute. Rather than focusing the debate on appropriate and well-articulated 
punishment policy and purposes, the delegates where pre-occupied with other urgencies and 
high profile matters which featured more prominently in the negotiation and  drafting of the 
Rome Statute, such as the heated debates over the Court’s jurisdiction and whether the death 
penalty should be included in the Statute or not.
596
 
 
In the ICC’s first sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber confined itself to the 
sentencing purposes set out in the preamble of the Rome Statute, namely that perpetrators of 
crimes under the Rome Statute must not go unpunished and that impunity of such crimes 
must be ended and their recurrence prevented.
597
 Although the ICC has only recently handed 
down its first sentencing judgment, the OTP has claimed that the mere investigation into 
prohibited conduct can in itself act as a warning to potential offender of similar crimes.
598
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10 July 2012, para 16.  
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According to this claim the threat of criminal prosecution acts in a preventative and deterrent 
manner. The prosecution of Thomas Lubanga for the use of child soldiers in an armed 
conflict has, according to the ICC website, resulted in armed forces around the world 
adjusting their operational standards to the Rome Statute.
599
 Similarly the UN, which has 
shown great support for the work of the Court, has claimed that the ICC has successfully 
fought impunity and forced governments to alter their behaviour.
600
 
 
5.6 The sui generis objectives of ICL 
 
In this section I refer to those (mostly) utilitarian objectives that are unique to ICL and may 
be regarded as sui generis objectives. By sui generis, I do not necessarily mean that these 
objectives are absolutely beyond the ambit of domestic criminal law. In fact, it is anticipated 
that domestic courts will be able to advance similar objectives in the complementarity-
centred future of international criminal justice. These objectives are unique in the sense that, 
although they may be invoked by criminal courts applying ordinary criminal law, their 
significance is enhanced by the nature of ICL and context in which it is frequently applied. 
Many of these objectives have been recognised as subsidiary goals of punishment in 
international criminal tribunals.
601
 Other sui generis objectives have received recognition 
through the work of ICL scholars. 
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5.6.1 The Expressive Function 
 
A subsidiary goal that emerges from the jurisprudence of ICL is located within expressivist 
theory.
602
 It has been noted that “[the] expressive function of law is of particular importance 
to criminal justice”.603 The ideal of punishment as an expression of social values or, as an 
action carrying meaning, was recognised as early as the Nuremberg IMT.
604
 At Nuremberg 
the defendants became symbols of a great and universal evil and their criminal liability and 
punishment under law the expression of the international community’s desire for 
accountability under the rule of law.
605
  
 
Expressivism strikes a balance between the moral considerations of retributivism and 
the social benefit of deterrent theories.
606
 Yet, expressive function of punishment transcends 
the traditional justifications for punishment. It aims to strengthen the public’s faith in the rule 
of law and is closely associated with the goals of creating an accurate historical record, 
establishing the truth, denunciation and public education.  
 
The expressive theory emphasises the social meaning of punishment.
607
 That is not 
the meaning intended by courts and lawmakers, but the actual meaning of punishment as it 
reaches the mind of the public or society.
608
 In this way punishment under law is society’s 
way of expressing its condemnation over certain acts or sets of behaviour, and to bolster the 
public confidence in the rule of law. The criminal sanction reflects and projects the values of 
society by indicating “what it esteems” and “what it abhors”. 609  From this perspective, 
punishment “signals society’s commitment to the values that the wrongdoer’s act denies” and 
                                                          
602
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 11-12. 
603
 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 120. 
604
 See Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 118, 121. On the expressive function of law in general, see 
Sunstein (The Expressive Function of Law) (supra) 2021-2025. 
605
 See Chapter 4 para 4.2.3.3 supra. 
606
 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 119-120. 
607
 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 118-119; Kahan (The Secret Ambition of Deterrence) (supra) 419-
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actively reinforces the norm that has been contravened.
610
 One may also refer to this function 
of criminal law as ‘norm projection’ or ‘norm stabilisation’. 
 
Expressivism is not strictly speaking an independent justification for punishment.
611
 
Rather, it is a “function and essential characteristic of punishment as a social institution”.612 
Expressivist theories, though having hereto received little attention, may be very significant 
to the field of ICL.
613
 Drumbl, for one, contends:  
“There is good reason to believe that punishment inflicted by an international tribunal 
operating prominently on the global agenda at the cusp of history has enhanced expressive 
value in asserting the importance of law, the stigmatization of the offender who transgresses 
that law, and the authenticity of the historical narrative that ensues.”
614
 
Drumbl also acknowledges a positive link between the expressive function of international 
trials, norm stabilisation (or reinforcing moral consensus) and public education (or the 
didactic function).
615
  
 
In his work on the expressive capacity of international sentencing, Sloane argues for 
the recognition of the expressive function of international criminal tribunals. In his view, one 
of the reasons that expressivism is valuable as a consideration in the justification of 
punishment under ICL is because it “focuses … on the long term normative values served by 
any system of criminal law”. 616  Sloane believes that, because of political and resource 
constraints, the most realistic contribution of punishment under ICL lies in the legitimate, 
persuasive and authoritative institutional expression of justice.
617
 Similarly, Luban takes the 
view that “the most promising justification for international tribunals is their role in norm 
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projection under which trials are expressive acts broadcasting the news that mass atrocities 
are, in fact, heinous crimes and not merely politics by other means”.618 
 
While expressivism and retribution are distinct penological justifications, they are 
interlinked to some extent. This has been acknowledged by international criminal tribunals 
and by writers on the subject.
619
 As Drumbl explains: 
“[...] a public that sees a wrongdoer punished in a manner that accords with perceptions of that 
individual’s just deserts can augment the value of the legal system in the eyes of that same 
public”.
620
  
This notion of expressive retribution has been invoked by the ICTY in Aleksovski and also 
indirectly in Kordić and Čerkez. 621  Expressive retribution may also be referred to as 
stigmatisation.
622
 In Erdemović the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that “[one] of the purposes of 
punishment for a crime against humanity lies precisely in stigmatising criminal conduct 
which has infringed a value fundamental not merely to a given society, but to humanity as a 
whole”.623 Thus expressive retribution as invoked by the ad hoc tribunals may be viewed as 
punishment specifically on behalf of the international community.  
 
Much of expressive theory also relates to the norm-generating function (and 
messaging value) of the trial and conviction of perpetrators.
624
 In expressive theory, 
punishment holds independent social value by communicating values of the international 
community to immediately affected societies. Punishment may reinforce, but also generate, 
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social norms.
625
 Furthermore, punishment may send a signal to society that the trial and 
conviction, the formal legal process, is a reality.
626
  
 
A compelling question in this regard is whether this messaging value, the ability to 
create authoritative narratives, is diminished if the court is unable to convict and render a 
judgment. An unusually high number of defendants at international criminal tribunals die 
before their cases can be completed. This was the case in, for example, the Milošević trial. 
Milošević’s death four years into the trial resulted in the denial of “the single greatest test of 
the tribunal's and ICL's ability to forge an efficacious and transformative narrative”.627 A 
terminated trial does not necessarily equate to an exercise in futility. According to Waters: 
“[...] a final judgment is not the only part of a trial that has any value; other effects manifest 
themselves throughout the trial process. Certainly, the residuum of a terminated trial has uses - 
the accumulated transcripts, exhibits, briefs, orders, and interim decisions constitute an 
archive with a meticulously documented provenance that any historian would value. It seems 
undeniable that other acts and images in a trial - confession in open court, a shocking film - 
can come to have an iconic or emotive value greater, in their way, than formal 
authority.”
628
(footnotes omitted) 
This view corresponds with the findings on the value of the Nuremberg IMT and the 
Eichmann trial under Chapter 4, in which it was noted that as a result of their historical 
significance, some trials may have an enhanced expressive and symbolic value.
629
  
 
Without denigrating the aforementioned value, it must however be acknowledged that 
conviction and punishment remains central to the social function of criminal law in general. 
The notion of expressive condemnation through punishment in international criminal justice 
faces a fundamental predicament relating to the predominant method of punishment imposed 
by international criminal courts. How do you express condemnation for heinous and universal 
crimes through ‘ordinary’ modes of punishment such as incarceration? Perhaps this question 
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poses a more fundamental dilemma to the retributive justification for punishment. However, 
it remains relevant to expressivism through the shared connection between the 
aforementioned punishment objectives. On the one hand, ordinary punishment for 
extraordinary crime seems to defy logic. On the other, taking cognisance of the broader 
expressive function of punishment defends the historical and theoretical rationale for criminal 
law as a response to mass atrocity.
630
  
 
5.6.2 The Didactic Criminal Trial: Creating an Historical Record
631
 and the Shaping of 
Collective Memory 
 
Criminal trials are concerned with individual conduct. Proceedings are conducted in such a 
manner as to place the court in a position to determine the guilt or innocence of each 
individual according to their acts or their unlawful failure to act in certain instances. As 
Hanna Arendt critically observed in her work on the trial of Adolf Eichmann:   
“The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior 
purposes - "the making of a record of the Hitler regime which would withstand the test of 
history," as Robert G. Storey, executive trial counsel at Nuremberg, formulated the supposed 
higher aims of the Nuremberg Trials - can only detract from the law's main business: to weigh 
the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due 
punishment.”
632
 
Former Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte issued a similar warning in her opening statement to 
the court in the trial of Slobodan Milošević by emphasising that “the accused is brought 
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before you to answer for his own actions and for his personal involvement in the crimes 
alleged against him”.633 
 
Lawrence Douglas, in his work on international criminal trials as didactic tools, 
believes Arendt’s criticism to be significant, yet overstated: 
“No one would deny that the core responsibility of a criminal trial is to resolve the question of 
guilt in a procedurally fair manner. To insist, however, as Arendt does, that the sole purpose of 
a trial is to render justice, and nothing else, defends a crabbed and unnecessarily restrictive 
vision of the trial form. The question is not whether the trial can serve the interests of history 
and memory, but how it can do so responsibly.”
634
 
Douglas argues that due to the unique context in which these trials arise, the didactic function 
of criminal trials for perpetrators of mass atrocity does not play a subsidiary role to the 
allotment of criminal responsibility, but instead “lies at the very heart of the proceedings”.635 
Douglas cites, for example, the Nuremberg IMT and the trials of Eichmann and Milošević as 
“perpetrator trials” that have openly pursued didactic purposes. He describes the didactic 
effects of these trials as follows: 
“Staged as exercises in collective pedagogy, these trials claimed to provide detailed and 
accurate representations of the larger sweep of historical forces that issued in acts of mass 
atrocity. In addition, these trials aimed to teach history lessons – they were orchestrated to 
locate in the historical record clear morals that could serve to shape the terms of collective 
memory. Finally, these trials aimed more concretely to honor the memory of victims and 
survivors, by providing a solemn public space in which anguished remembrance could take 
the form of legally probative testimony.”
636
 
History and memory are brought into the trial firstly, and most importantly, through the 
historical and political context in which the trial occurs.
637
 Secondly, through “filters” 
                                                          
633
 ICTY, Prosecutor v (Slobodan) Milošević (Trial Transcript) Case No. IT-02-54, 12 February 2002 at 3-
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 Douglas L “The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom” (2006) 14 (4) 
European Review 514. See also Douglas L The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the 
Trials of the Holocaust (2005) Yale University Press, New Haven. 
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embedded in the criminal trial, such as the rules of evidence, that produce a historical account 
of the crimes and the larger context in which they were committed. These “filters” include 
verbal accounts from victims and witnesses, the unique substantive crimes with which the 
accused are charged and the application of unique principles of criminal accountability.
638
 
These formal and structural features in criminal trial proceedings “filter the movement of 
history and memory into the courtroom, albeit [...] subtly”.639 
 
Douglas also points out the fact that the trial itself has no control over the historical 
impact and imprint it will leave on collective memory as this is unpredictable and dependent 
on various factors outside of the court’s control. 640  Despite Del Ponte’s avoidance of 
invoking symbolism at the ICTY, the media have considered some trials to have produced a 
symbolic impact.
641
 The conviction of Krstić for example was regarded as having a symbolic 
impact because it was the first conviction of the crime of genocide in Europe since the 
Nuremberg IMT and because the Srebrenica massacre stood as “an emblem of ethnic 
cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia”.642  
 
As a further example, the Eichmann trial is said to have created a lasting legacy 
through its impact on the Israeli collective consciousness.
643
  Also, in 1985, the Argentine 
government under President Alfonsin became the second government after that of post-
Second World War Germany to prosecute its own former military leaders for atrocities.
644
 
The prosecutions in the aftermath of Argentina’s Dirty War, the so-called “trial of the juntas”, 
were calculated specifically to infuse the collective conscience of the concerned parties with 
                                                          
638
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639
 Douglas (The Didactic Trial) (supra) 516. 
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 Douglas (The Didactic Trial) (supra) 520-521. 
641
 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 123 (footnote 136). 
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 Amann (Group Mentality) (supra) 123 (footnote 136); ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstić (Trial Chamber: 
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the notion that no one is above the rule of law.
645
 Furthermore, the trials were designed to 
advance the principles of liberal morality amongst the public.
646
   
 
In his book Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law, Osiel acknowledges that 
collective memory is a woolly concept.
647
 According to him the concept refers to: 
“[...] the stories a society tells about momentous events in its history, the events that most 
profoundly affects the lives of its members and most arouse their passions for long periods. 
This category of events prominently includes wars, revolutions, economic depressions, large-
scale strikes and riots, and genocides – as well as legal proceedings often arising from such 
upheavals. These events are also distinguished by the tendency for recollection of them to 
‘hover over’ subsequent events, providing compelling analogies with later controversies of the 
most diverse variety. When a society’s members interpret such an event in common fashion, 
they derive common lessons from it for the future.”
648
 (footnotes omitted)    
The significance of collective memory lies in its susceptibility to exploitation as a political 
weapon.
649
 This is especially dangerous in a deeply divided society where failure to address 
past injustices may breed the kind of collective memory that facilitates a common 
interpretation (as in the quoted text above) of past events serving to deepen social antagonism 
and possibly to renew the cycle of violence. It is preferable for collective memory to be 
shaped without such undesirable effects. In this regard, criminal trials may play a valuable 
role by serving as a vehicle to transform the consciousness of society.
650
 A public trial may 
help to transform the memory of the past into a new social ethos based not on backward-
looking notions of vengeance and antagonism, but on forward-looking notions of justice and 
                                                          
645
 Osiel (Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory) (supra) 29. Under pressure from the military to avoid further 
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reconciliation.
651
 In this way a criminal trial may be a mechanism that takes society ‘back to 
the future’. A criminal trial becomes simultaneously a judgment on the past and a means of 
projecting binding social norms into the future.
652
 The transformative potential, the potential 
for social utility, lies in the substance of the judgment but also in the manner in which it is 
interpreted by society at large. The argument is that criminal law embodies a certain shared 
morality which through criminal trials creates social solidarity.
653
 
 
For what reasons should criminal trials be considered as the preferred social ritual in 
response to mass atrocity or administrative massacres? Durkheim’s criminology, according to 
Osiel, postulates that “[criminal] judgement serves its social purpose by vigorously 
expressing the uniform sentiment of righteous indignation aroused among all conscientious 
citizens by the defendant’s acts”.654 Osiel concludes however that Durkheim’s criminology 
“offers only the most uncertain help in understanding criminal law’s potential contribution to 
social solidarity in times of deep political division and social trauma”.655 Osiel advances three 
reasons to substantiate this conclusion. Firstly, he notes that Durkheim’s theory sees criminal 
trials only as an authoritative mechanism to interpret collective social sentiments without 
giving reasons for punishment as required by the legal systems of liberal societies.
656
 
Secondly, Durkheim’s account does not give recognition to the fact that dissenting opinion 
and disagreements may occur and have an enduring impact within society after mass 
atrocity.
657
 Lastly, Durkheim focused solely on the public’s desire for retribution and not on 
the preservation of public order, thereby underestimating the complexity of mass atrocity.
658
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It must be noted therefore that the didactic value of international criminal trials is “not 
preordained”. 659  Prosecution of international crime may not always create the same impact 
as for instance, that which many claim was made by the Nuremberg IMT and the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann. Ultimately, a criminal trial must speak first and foremost to the 
immediately affected parties of the conflict or mass atrocity, in the victims, offenders and 
local populace. The challenge to international criminal tribunals of the future, especially the 
ICC and domestic courts applying ICL, will be to make proceedings intelligible to the parties 
most immediately affected. The liberal-legalist modality of international trials, although 
ostensibly fair, runs the risk of alienating its domestic audience and presents another 
argument for a more pluralistic and horizontal approach to mass atrocity.
660
 
 
5.6.3 Purposes of the Complementarity Principle 
 
Unlike domestic courts, the ICC cannot rely on independent agencies or something akin to a 
national police force to enforce its laws or its judgments. The ICC relies on cooperation from 
and with the existing enforcement agencies of member states. The Court derives authority 
from the Rome Statute, signed and ratified by its member states, and established in order to 
prosecute “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”.661 
The Rome Statute does not only project the shared norms of its member states, but also has 
the ability both to shape state conduct and to coordinate state conduct in a mutually beneficial 
manner.
662
 One of the ICC’s most potent tools in this regard is the regime of complementarity 
provided for under article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
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 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 175-176 (citing that the pedagogical 
effect of the Tokyo IMTFE cannot be compared to that of the Nuremberg IMT).  
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The purpose of complementarity is ostensibly aligned with those mentioned in the 
Statute, namely “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” and “to contribute to the 
prevention of serious international crimes”.663 On the surface of things, one may contend that 
the primary purpose of complementarity is to ensure greater accountability for perpetrators of 
crimes under the Rome Statute by ‘integrating’ the domestic legal systems of ICC state 
parties into the broader purpose of the Rome Statute. This also required providing the ICC 
with ‘back-up’ jurisdiction over such perpetrators. Under the complementarity regime, the 
ICC’s jurisdiction is triggered when state parties are unwilling or unable to discharge their 
prosecutorial obligations pursuant to the Rome Statute. 
 
The feature of complementarity in the Rome Statute also appears to function as a 
mechanism with tacit purposes specifically calculated to make the ICC a ‘realistic’ 
institution. By interpreting the principle in conjunction with the purposes of the Rome 
Statute, Stigen cites that the complementarity principle has developed to pursue two main 
purposes: 
a. To ensure the effective prosecution of international crimes. The principle should ensure 
effective national investigations and prosecutions “partly by stimulating and partly by 
applying pressure” on them.664 In turn, the ICC benefits from a more appropriate selection 
of cases to adjudicate and greater effectiveness when states are “unable or unwilling” to 
prosecute. Since the creation of the ICC, states are faced with the prospect of being 
labelled as “unwilling or unable” by the Court.665 This unfavourable prospect, and the 
heightened political and media attention on international crime, make it more likely that 
states will initiate national prosecutions.
666
 
b. To safeguard state sovereignty. The complementarity principle mediates between the 
traditional view of state sovereignty and the diminished version of sovereignty which has 
gained momentum in the 20
th
 century. The complementarity principle redefined the 
notion of sovereignty firstly to ensure a viable ICC and secondly, in recognition of the 
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fact that sovereignty is still the organising principle in international law, not to do away 
with or impinge too radically on the traditional view of sovereignty.
667
 
 
Similarly, Kleffner asserts that the feature of complementarity affects national 
criminal justice systems in a number of ways.
668
 Amongst other things, complementarity 
impacts on national criminal justice systems by serving as an incentive for implementation 
legislation.
669
 The incentive lies in the ‘win-win’ situation created by the feature of 
complementarity. States are incentivised to adopt legislation which “[safeguards] their 
primary right to investigate and prosecute those crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC”, 
thus protecting their sovereignty.
670
 On the other hand, the ICC and the international criminal 
justice system may benefit through more widespread and effective enforcement of the law of 
the Rome Statute.
671
 As will be illustrated below using South Africa as a case study, the 
complementarity innovation in the Rome Statute is one of the most pertinent mechanisms 
through which ICL transforms domestic legal systems.
672
  
 
The Rome Statute does not however impose an obligation on states to prosecute or 
extradite perpetrators of those customary international law crimes contained therein.
673
 
Akhavan refers to this deficiency as the Rome Statute’s “missing half” which he describes as 
“the absence of an express and enforceable obligation on states to repress international crimes 
before national courts”.674 Thus, while the Rome Statute’s complementarity scheme assigns 
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the responsibility for enforcement primarily on national criminal jurisdictions, it does not at 
the same time create any obligation on national criminal jurisdictions to repress international 
crime.  Also, it is unclear whether the Rome Statute creates an obligation on state parties to 
implement substantive international criminal law into their domestic criminal justice systems. 
Such an obligation does not appear plainly in the text of the Rome Statute. Some believe that 
such an obligation can be derived from the Statute as a whole since no rule exist which 
prohibits the inference of the existence of an implicit obligation from the text.
675
  
 
Regardless of the existence of the obligations outlined above, the enactment of 
domestic legislation to give effect to the Rome Statute is common amongst State Parties. The 
incentive which complementarity provides and the normative influence it exerts, has resulted 
in a positive development for international criminal justice: 
“If one considers the almost uniform response of States to the complementary nature of the 
ICC by seeking to ensure that conduct criminalized under the Rome Statute is equally 
punishable under their domestic law, complementarity – reinforced by the threat of the ICC 
exercising jurisdiction in case they do not – proves more effective than those express and clear 
obligations to implement under relevant international humanitarian and criminal law treaties – 
obligations which have long been met with a lack of compliance.”
676
 
Complementarity has emerged as the only principle that can mediate between the emerging 
ideal of accountability under international law and the traditional dominance of the 
Westphalian model characterised by impunity and realism.
677
 As such, the principle of 
complementarity creates breathing room for international criminal justice in the otherwise 
suffocating international order based mostly on sovereign independence and the unilateral 
interests of states.  
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5.6.4 The International Rule of Law: Accountability and Ending the Culture of 
Impunity for Serious International Crimes 
 
The “culture of impunity” thesis postulates that future international crime can be deterred and 
gradually eroded through putting an end to the historical fact that perpetrators who commit or 
instigate acts of mass atrocity usually escape criminal liability.
678
 The “culture of impunity” 
thesis thus requires effective enforcement of ICL. One must acknowledge the fact that 
enforcement, even though having come a long way since Nuremberg, is far from effective 
enough in modern ICL to confidently endorse this theory. Few conflicts have been addressed 
through the establishment of international criminal tribunals or through domestic 
prosecutions. Moreover, in those instances where this has occurred, such prosecutions 
targeted only a small percentage of mostly mid- and low-level perpetrators. These facts 
significantly corrode the value of the “culture of impunity” thesis. The thesis is bolstered 
however by factors unrelated to problems of enforcement in ICL. One such factor is the 
possible contribution of the thesis to the (international) rule of law. It goes without saying 
that criminal sanctions and accountability are essential for strengthening the rule of law. This 
is not only true on the domestic level - it is a fact that is becoming more apparent as the 
international legal system continues to develop.  
 
The objective of accountability for perpetrators of international crimes goes hand in 
hand with the realisation of an international legal order premised on the universal rule of 
law.
679
 Norm stabilisation, a lesser renowned objective of ICL, aims to strengthen and uphold 
the rule of law in just this way. It is in stark contrast to the rule of law for perpetrators of 
international crime to escape being held accountable for their actions. As a qualified form of 
impunity, selective prosecution poses another threat to the rule of law.
680
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However, the historical development of ICL shows a degree of friction between the 
requirements of the rule of law and the objective of ending the culture of impunity.
681
 ICL 
has the arduous task of stamping out the culture of impunity and to reinforce the international 
rule of law, all while remaining within the bounds of legality and fairness which are 
principles central to the rule of law.
682
 The rule of law requires uniformity and consistency in 
the functioning of any system of law. Accordingly, laws and decisions of courts must not be 
arbitrary. Legal obstacles related to established principles of fairness and the rule of law have 
plagued international- and mixed tribunals in post-conflict zones on numerous occasions 
during the last century. These problems have mostly been the result of the effort to meet the 
inimitable nature of the offense through normal trial proceedings. As a result, an ironic 
situation emerged where ICL aspired to bolster the global rule of law, while at other times it 
seemed inclined to thwart that very same principle.
683
 
 
ICL often operates in extraordinary settings in which it strives towards equally 
extraordinary objectives. As a developing body of law inhibited by numerous factors, the 
challenge to ICL is to achieve a point of acceptance and efficiency in the international 
community of states which will match the desire of the international community of human 
beings for accountability for international crimes. It appears that many of the 
abovementioned problems are being stamped out as ICL continues to develop and becomes a 
more permanent feature of the international legal and political orders. Compared to the 
Nuremberg IMT, the ad hoc international tribunals have managed to make big strides toward 
stabilising international legal norms first applied at the Nuremberg IMT. This momentum is 
being carried forward by the ICC.  
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5.6.5 Transitional Justice and the Needs of Post-Conflict Societies 
 
Accountability is one of the core desires of victims and the international community in the 
aftermath of mass atrocity and gross human rights violations. However, criminal prosecutions 
are rarely a top priority during transitions or in the wake of mass atrocity. On many occasions 
criminal prosecution has had to play a secondary role to the demands of peace and 
reconciliation. Where prosecutions have taken place, accountability has not been exclusively 
based on the need for retribution. Consequentialist objectives related to the needs of post-
conflict societies have received some recognition in international criminal tribunals. Below, I 
investigate the ability of international criminal trials to establish the truth, to advance social 
reconciliation and advance the interests of victims in transitional or post-conflict societies. 
 
5.6.5.1 Truth-Finding
684
 
 
5.6.5.1.1 TRCs versus Criminal Trials? A Brief Overview 
 
A truth commissions is a non-judicial (although they may sometimes have judicial features) 
and non-penal response to mass atrocity and gross violations of human rights that seeks to 
address the past in an effort to establish the truth for its own sake and for the sake of creating 
an historical account of past events.
685
 Truth commissions emphasise the ideals of restorative 
justice and social restoration. As such, the public and often highly emotional proceedings 
before truth commissions are framed in a way which facilitates the exposure of the truth, 
apology, forgiveness and compensation.  In contrast, criminal trials place emphasis on 
formalities and rights such as pleading, due process, rules of evidence, judgment and 
conviction or acquittal which are based on legal tradition and principles. 
 
                                                          
684
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International criminal lawyers cite a number of problems with the use of TRCs in 
response to international crimes. Firstly, substituting criminal prosecutions for TRCs, with 
their non-penal character, undermines the rule of law in the successor regime.
686
 Secondly, 
truth-telling through TRCs does not measure up to the quality of truth that emerges and is put 
on record through criminal trials.
687
 During criminal trials evidence is first subjected to 
forensic scrutiny before being placed on record, where it is claimed that the truth will stand 
the test of time and prevent recurring repression.
688
 Lastly, there is also the question of 
whether or not amnesties granted by TRCs are compatible with the obligation on states to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes.
689
  
   
Although primarily concerned with retribution, deterrence and the other traditional 
and sui generis purposes, modern international criminal tribunals have acknowledged that 
criminal trials have a role in establishing the truth and that truth-finding is an important 
element in healing a divided society. In Erdemović for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
stated that:    
“The International Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute and punish 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, through its judicial functions, 
to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and 
establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. Discovering the 
truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation: 
for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing 
process.”
690
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According to Duff et al. “the truth at which the [criminal] trial purports to aim has an 
intrinsic, not merely an instrumental, importance among the aims of a criminal justice 
systems”.691 Also, according to Schabas, “[much] of the struggle for international justice, and 
the battle against impunity, is a search for truth”.692 It has been suggested that an enduring 
contribution of the Nuremberg IMT’s was its authoritative “affirmation of the facts of Nazi 
atrocities”.693 This ability of the criminal trial to act as a forum or conduit of truth has been 
widely proclaimed since Nuremberg.
694
 Carlos Nino attests to the superiority of trials over 
truth commissions in establishing the truth: 
“[T]he public presentation of the truth is much more dramatic when done through a trial, with 
the accused contributing to the development of the story. Furthermore, the quality of the 
narration in an adversarial trial can not be fully replicated by other means. Even when an 
amnesty or pardons are issued at the end of the trial, they do not counteract the initial effect of 
such emphatic public disclosure.”
695
 
It has been said that the criminal trial can create a version of events which will be accepted as 
the authoritative truth, which is subsequently assimilated into history and preserved. Owing 
to the high evidentiary standard in criminal trials, the whole truth may not emerge. The truth 
that emerges however, the so-called “legal truth” or “forensic truth”, may be viewed as very 
trustworthy since, in a properly constituted criminal trial, the verdict has been “justified by 
adequate and legitimate evidence”.696  
 
                                                          
691
 Duff A, Farmer L, Marshall S and Tadros V The Trial on Trial (Volume III) (2007) Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 62. 
692
 Schabas (Sentencing by International Tribunals) (supra) 499. 
693
 Schabas (Sentencing by International Tribunals) (supra) 500. 
694
 See Orentlicher (Settling Accounts) (supra) 2546 (footnote 32); Fletcher LE and Weinstein HM 
“Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation” (2002) 24 Human 
Rights Quarterly 573–639, 587. 
695
 See Osiel (Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory) (supra) 15 (footnotes 10-11). 
696
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 173-176; Smeulers (Punishing the 
Enemies of All Mankind) (supra) 986. Regarding forensic truth, see Du Bois-Pedain A Transitional 
Amnesty in South Africa (2007) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 204-205. The author defines 
forensic truth as “a selective reconstruction of an event according to very specific rules” of a court process; 
see also Duff et al. (The Trial on Trial) (supra) 91. 
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In contrast to the above however, many have disputed the truth-finding capabilities of 
criminal trials and question whether their design enables the whole truth to emerge. In any 
event, many domestic criminal justice systems may be overwhelmed by the project of 
dispensing justice (and by implication also the subsidiary objective of truth-finding) in the 
wake of mass atrocity or serious violations of human rights. Proponents of the truth-finding 
abilities of the criminal trial must therefore acknowledge the emergence of alternative justice 
mechanisms, notably truth commissions, as a means to exposing the truth. As opposed to 
criminal trials, where the truth is said to emerge through a process which entails the 
identification, exclusion and weighing of evidence, applicants before truth commissions are 
provided with an incentive to expose the truth voluntarily. According to Du Bois-Pedain: 
“[...] unlike in the courtroom, where defendants are free to exercise their right to silence and 
thereby refuse to respond to the call [to account] directly, the amnesty process requires active 
and responsive account giving by applicants. In this respect, the amnesty process is therefore 
arguably superior to criminal trials – better placed than criminal trials to achieve the 
communicative objective of engaging with offenders in a dialogue about their conduct.”
697
 
It is argued that in this way truth commissions may help to establish the “real truth” as 
opposed to the “trial truth” that emerges from the criminal justice process.698  
 
Truth on its own does not however constitute justice. As a response to mass atrocity, 
the success of truth commissions is reliant upon the context of its use. A truth and 
reconciliation process does not produce automatic effects.
699
 Perhaps truth commissions are 
sensitive to context to an even greater extent than the more universally appealing criminal 
trial. Depending on the context, the moral outcry and the accompanying demand for 
retribution induced by mass atrocity may outweigh the desire for truth, forgiveness and 
reconciliation. The South African TRC for example, benefitted from a combination of factors 
                                                          
697
 Du Bois-Pedain (Transitional Amnesty in South Africa) (supra) 258. 
698
 Judge Röling (judge of the Tokyo IMTFE) is accredited for the distinction between “real truth” and 
“trial truth” (see Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 27). Trial truth may be 
afforded a meaning similar to “legal truth” or “forensic truth” (see footnote 696 supra) while “real truth” 
has also been referred to as “historical truth”, see Du Bois-Pedain (Transitional Amnesty in South Africa) 
(supra) 214. The latter author shows clear support for conditional amnesties over criminal trials when it 
comes to the establishment of the historical truth. 
699
 Cockayne (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 550. 
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that made the TRC not only the most practical transitional mechanism, but also the most 
morally acceptable one in light of South Africa’s cultural and religious particularities.700 This 
will not be equally true of every society in transition. Therefore, truth commissions should 
not be viewed as the preferred transitional or post-conflict mechanisms without due regards 
being given to contextual sensitivity, the needs of the effected society and the international 
community’s demand for justice. 
 
5.6.5.1.2 The Influence of Plea Bargaining 
 
Another popular mechanism with a purported truth finding benefit is the plea bargain.
701
 Plea 
bargains (or ‘plea agreements’) of various sorts were used by prosecutors at the ad hoc 
tribunals and the East Timor Special Panels.
 
At the ICTY, the trial and appeals chambers 
generally accepted the plea agreements that came before them.
702
 In Plavšić, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber accepted that “full disclosure of serious crimes are very important when 
establishing the truth in relation to such crimes” and that such truth “together with acceptance 
of responsibility for the committed wrongs, will promote reconciliation”. 703  Despite the 
aforementioned practice of the ICTY however, general opinion over whether plea bargains 
assist or detracts from the process of truth-telling seems to be more divided. 
  
                                                          
700
 See Graybill L “To Punish or Pardon: A Comparison of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (2001) (July-September) Human Rights 
Review 3-18. 
701
 Plea bargains have also been praised for other benefits, including lightening the prosecutorial workload 
(this is especially beneficial to international tribunals established in the wake of mass atrocity and 
collective violence); evidence gathering for use against other perpetrators; reconciliatory benefits; and that 
justice is to some extent seen to be done (this is because the perpetrator enters a negotiated guilty plea and 
still receives a sentence). See Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 164. 
702
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 165. 
703
 In terms of her plea agreement, Plavšić pleaded guilty in exchange for the dismissal of some of the 
charges in the original indictment. Plavšić was convicted of persecutions on political, racial and religious 
grounds (crimes against humanity) and received a sentence of 11 years imprisonment. See ICTY, 
Prosecutor v Plavšić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-00-39 and 40/1-S, 27 February 
2003, para 80.  
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As mentioned, plea bargains come in different variations. Firstly, there is the plea 
bargain in which the trial is circumvented. Here the perpetrator confesses, enters a guilty plea 
and receives his or her commuted sentence. This type of plea bargain incentivises the 
perpetrator to tell the truth by presenting an opportunity to act in his or her best interests. 
Thus, plea bargains of this type work on the same basic principle as truth commissions, 
namely to create a forum for exposing the truth as well as an incentive to utilise it, only 
without the power to grant amnesty. The downside to this form of plea-bargaining is that the 
victims are denied the chance to appear in court and to tell their side of the story. Thus, it 
may be said that the truth is not made public to the same extent as through a criminal trial. As 
illustrated by the Eichmann trial, victim testimonies may have an important symbolic effect 
on the victims as a group or may have cathartic value for individual victims.
704
  
 
Secondly, a plea agreement may amount to a quasi-contract between the prosecutor 
and the defendant under which parties to the dispute may for example, agree on underlying 
facts with the advantage that those facts will not have to be proved in a subsequent trial. The 
agreement may establish a range of possible sentences which are presented to the court for 
approval along with the perpetrators plea of guilty. Furthermore, under a plea agreement the 
prosecutor may agree to drop certain charges against the accused through what is known as 
charge bargaining, in exchange for information.
705
 The greatest criticism against charge-
bargaining is that it negates the retributive and expressive functions of the criminal trial in 
exchange for partial truth. Du Bois-Pedain notes that “[plea-bargaining] strategy at a criminal 
trial is essentially about figuring out how much of the truth to admit in order to ensure an 
optimal outcome”.706 Therefore punishment is premised on what the perpetrator knows (the 
information that the accused has to offer) and not on meeting, through proportional sanction, 
the seriousness of the crimes that the perpetrator has committed and on exposing the whole 
truth.
707
  
 
                                                          
704
 See Chapter 4 para 4.3.2 supra; Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 164; see 
also Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 28 (casting some doubt on the 
cathartic effects of international criminal trials). 
705
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 164. 
706
 Du Bois-Pedain (Transitional Amnesty in South Africa) (supra) 210. 
707
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 164. 
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5.6.5.2 Reconciliation 
 
The objective of reconciliation is closely related to that of truth-finding.
708
 The designation of 
South Africa’s foremost transitional mechanism, the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, plainly suggested the regular acceptance of a symbiotic relationship between 
these two objectives.  
 
It has been suggested that criminal trials foster reconciliation by establishing truth 
through authoritative narratives.
709
 Documentary evidence and verbal testimony create 
narratives while the official and formalistic proceedings (the trial), judgment and punishment 
(if applicable) provide an authoritative edge to the version of events that has emerged in due 
course. The authoritative narrative theory suggests that fair and formal criminal judgments 
displace contradictory views and opinions within a divided society and promotes 
reconciliation through creating a shared understanding of the truth.
710
 Authoritative narratives 
can emerge from the trial of a single defendant as was the purportedly the case in the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann, or from an entire body of jurisprudence such as that of the ICTY and ICTR. 
 
 Reconciliation is comprised of two aspects, external reconciliation between 
antagonistic states and internal reconciliation between individuals and societies within a state. 
Alongside the worldwide increase in civil wars and internal atrocities since the Second World 
War, the questions of how best to achieve lasting internal reconciliation in transitional and 
post-conflict societies has become pertinent. Of particular interest in the narrative of 
transitional justice has been the dilemma over how to balance the intuitive need for 
retribution and the more practical need for reconciliation and peace in the wake of mass 
atrocity and gross human rights violations. Retribution and reconciliation are, to varying 
degrees which may depend on historical, political and cultural factors within a post-conflict 
society, both considered as desirable commodities in any post-conflict society. Yet, because 
of their opposing natures, and because the demands of peace often outweigh the demands of 
                                                          
708
 See ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: [Second] Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-
22-T bis, 5 March 1998, para 21; Clark (Plea Bargaining) (supra) 424. 
709
 On the “Authoritative Narrative Theory”, see Waters (A Kind of Judgment) (supra) 279. 
710
 Waters (A Kind of Judgment) (supra) 285-288 (the author seems to use the term “transformative 
narratives” to refer to reconciliation through authoritative narratives). 
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justice, post-conflict societies have often opted for a balance in which reconciliatory 
mechanisms exceed retributive ones or where retribution is not seriously pursued. In the latter 
case, it is often argued that criminal trials are impractical and that the social need for peace is 
more important than the need for accountability in the short term. At other times the lack of 
retributive justice mechanisms could be attributed to the fact that criminal prosecutions had 
been ‘negotiated away’ by the outgoing oppressive government.711  
 
The objective of reconciliation has become more closely associated with alternatives 
to criminal justice, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”). 
Reconciliation is most often required in the wake of mass atrocity or administrative 
massacres that have created a deeply-divided society, a deficit of justice or inter-social 
animosity. This antagonism may be based on actual injustice, the collective memory of past 
injustices and the struggle for power among different racial, ethnic or tribal groups. It is now 
widely accepted that reconciliation is imperative for the restoration and long-term 
maintenance of peace within a transitional or post-conflict state. The maintenance of 
international peace and security is also a central function of international law. This is 
confirmed through the most important international legal texts and positive law documents of 
the institutions of international law. Whether or not, and how much, retributive justice is 
required to successfully achieve or contribute to reconciliation and peace is much less certain.   
 
In the transitional justice context there is much debate over whether or not retributive 
justice is linked to reconciliation in a post-conflict society. Since the establishment of the ad 
hoc tribunals, the trend to create international tribunals in the wake of mass atrocity has 
nonetheless strengthened. Diplomats and human rights activists create a connection between 
prosecutions (particularly for international crimes) and social reconstruction.
712
 There is some 
support for a positive relationship between retribution and reconciliation. Moghalu, for 
example, argues that: 
“[When] justice is done, and seen to be done, it provides a catharsis for those physically or 
psychologically scarred by violations of international humanitarian law. Deepseated 
                                                          
711
 The South African transition serves as a prominent example in this regard. See Chapter 7 paras 7.5.1 
and 7.5.2 infra. 
712
 Fletcher and Weinstein (Violence and Social Repair) (supra) 578. 
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resentments – key obstacles to reconciliation – are removed and people on different sides of 
the divide can feel that a clean slate has been provided for.”
713
 
The former deputy prosecutor at the ICTY, Graham Blewitt, maintained that “[the] ICTY was 
established, in part, as a measure for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
through its ability to contribute to reconciliation in the territorial States torn by violence and 
disunity”. 714  UNSC Resolution 955, which established the ICTR, refers specifically to 
reconciliation as an objective of the tribunal.
715
 One of the reasons for the Rwandan 
government’s initial support of the ICTR was that they believed that: 
“[…] it is impossible to build a state of law and arrive at true national reconciliation if we do 
not eradicate the culture of impunity which has characterized our society since 1959. The 
Rwandese who were taught that it was acceptable to kill as long as the victim was from a 
different ethnic group or from an opposition party, cannot arrive at national reconciliation 
unless they learn new values. The national reconciliation of the Rwandese can be achieved 
only if equitable justice is established and if the survivors are assured that what has happened 
will never happen again.”
716
 
The Rwandan government subsequently withdrew its support for the establishment of the 
ICTR because it was unsatisfied with many of the provisions in the ICTR Statute and due to 
the fact that the tribunal’s jurisdiction was not within the control of the Rwandan state.717 It is 
submitted that initial view of the Rwandese government referred to above highlights (perhaps 
                                                          
713
 Moghalu KC “Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on the Role of Judicial 
Prosecutions” in Thakur R and Malcontent P (eds.) From Sovereign Impunity to International 
Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (2004) United Nations University Press, New 
York 216. 
714
 Blewitt G “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” in Lattimer M 
and Sands P (eds.) Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (2006) Hart Publishing, Portland 151. See also 
ICTY, Prosecutor v Plavšić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-00-39 and 40/1-S, 27 
February 2003, paras 80-81 (the ICTY Trial Chamber expressed the view that the accused’s guilty plea 
may have a positive impact on reconciliation). 
715
 UNSC Resolution 955 (supra): “[...] the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law [...] would contribute to the process of national reconciliation”. 
716
 UN Doc S/PV 3453 (1994) 14. 
717
 UN Doc S/PV 3453 (1994) 14-16; Akhavan (The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) (supra) 
505. 
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ironically) the contribution which criminal trials may make to reconciliation and towards 
social change more generally through value-expression. 
 
Murphy is of the belief that “international criminal trials can contribute to political 
reconciliation [in transitional societies] by fostering the social [and moral] conditions 
required for law’s efficacy”.718 These conditions, which the author extracts from the work of 
Lon Fuller, involve “ongoing cooperative interaction between citizens and officials, 
systematic congruence between law and informal social practices, legal decency and good 
judgement, and faith in law”. 719  Murphy notes an absence of these social and moral 
conditions in transitional societies and is optimistic about the contribution of international 
criminal trials to their re-establishment.
720
 Her argument is that international criminal trials 
play an educative role in the transitional context by creating a stark contrast with the unjust 
practices and procedures of the past that encourages faith in the law among law-making and 
law enforcement officials and citizens.
721
 Murphy seems to argue that fairness, in the form of 
internationally recognised fair trial principles which offers perpetrators basic protection from 
inhumane treatment during pre-trial detention, contributes to reconciliation.
722
  
 
Yet, it has been contended that there are certain limitations to the exercise of 
assigning accountability to individual perpetrators of mass atrocity or gross human rights 
violations. As Fletcher and Weinstein have noted: 
“Trials do not address the complicity of those who stood by or cheered a vicious leader or who 
elected a war criminal to represent them. Currently, there are no mechanisms to respond to the 
ways in which bystanders are implicated in the establishment and maintenance of societal 
structures that facilitate the onset and implementation of mass violence.”
723
 
                                                          
718
 Murphy C “Political Reconciliation and International Criminal Trials” in May and Hoskins 
(International Criminal Law and Philosophy) (supra) 225. 
719
 Murphy (supra) in May and Hoskins (International Criminal Law and Philosophy) (supra) 226-227. 
720
 Murphy (supra) in May and Hoskins (International Criminal Law and Philosophy) (supra) 232-241. 
721
 Murphy (supra) in May and Hoskins (International Criminal Law and Philosophy) (supra) 236-238. 
722
 Murphy (supra) in May and Hoskins (International Criminal Law and Philosophy) (supra) 239-240. 
723
 Fletcher and Weinstein (Violence and Social Repair) (supra) 580. On the limits of ICL as a response to 
mass atrocity in general, see Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra). 
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International criminal tribunals have been hampered in their reconciliatory ambitions by 
numerous factors such as resource constraints, concerns over legitimacy and the location of 
tribunals outside the post-conflict state. Drumbl contends that international legal institutions 
have mostly failed to foster real reconciliation through punishment.
724
 Furthermore, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence to establish whether claims to the reconciliatory effect of criminal 
trials are justifiable.
725
 There appears to be much doubt as to the ability of criminal trials to 
contribute to reconciliation.
726
  
 
Detractors of the notion that criminal trials have the ability to encourage 
reconciliation cite the success of truth commission relative to criminal trials in establishing 
the truth, securing a peaceful transition and fostering national reconciliation. Especially the 
South African TRC has often been heralded as a pragmatic and relatively successful 
transitional justice mechanism. I agree that criminal trials are not traditionally appropriate 
forums for establishing the interactive process of apology and forgiveness required for 
reconciliation.
727
 Even though trials may facilitate reconciliation in this manner to a certain 
extent, the over-riding objective is to establish guilt or innocence of the alleged perpetrators. 
The accused may only be asked whether or not he or she regrets his or her actions. Although 
the accused may take the opportunity to apologise or to express regret (assuming that this 
aids reconciliation), he or she will never be asked to do so. Plea bargains represent an 
exception in this regard in that the accused may be incentivised towards making an apology 
or expression of regret in order to secure a more lenient sentence. To further dampen the 
prospect of the criminal trial contributing to reconciliation, the victim plays a minimal part in 
the trial process.
728
 
 
It must be recognised however that most commentators on the matter do not approach 
the topic of post-conflict reconciliation from a position that expresses doubt over the potential 
                                                          
724
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 150. 
725
 Clark (Plea Bargaining) (supra) 421. 
726
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 28. 
727
 See Osiel (Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory) (supra) 128: “Only when apology succeeds in eliciting 
forgiveness does reconciliation occur”. 
728
 There is however a movement in international criminal justice, spearheaded by the ICC, towards greater 
participation for victims of international crime. This is discussed at para 5.6.3.5 infra. 
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for criminal trials to support reconciliation. They approach the matter from a perspective that 
highlights the advantages that alternatives to criminal justice hold for reconciliation, 
specifically relative to the advantages of criminal justice for reconciliation in particular. 
Therefore, alternatives to criminal justice in this view can only be regarded as superior to the 
extent that one regards criminal justice and alternative mechanisms of justice as mutually 
exclusive or if one regards reconciliation to be the primary consideration or objective in the 
relevant post-conflict society. It cannot be denied that the international community desires 
accountability over certain crimes and an end to the culture of impunity. Moreover 
international criminal justice is partly an expression of this desire.
729
 Despite often passionate 
rhetoric, alternatives to criminal justice have been preferred mostly on the basis that they are 
the most practical response to past injustice, not the best or most useful response for purposes 
of reconciliation. There seems to be an increasing consensus that where possible, these 
responses may optimise reconciliation if invoked in cooperation with each other.
730
 The 
establishment of mechanisms both for accountability and for the promotion of truth and 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone and East Timor may be viewed as proof that retributive and 
reconciliatory mechanisms do not necessarily have to be regarded as mutually exclusive 
alternatives.
731
  
 
                                                          
729
 See Bassiouni (supra) in Bassiouni (Post-Conflict Justice) (supra) 25. 
730
 Fletcher and Weinstein (Violence and Social Repair) (supra) 573–639 (the authors argue that criminal 
trials are one of the necessary components in the process of social repair following mass atrocity). 
731
 For a brief overview of the structure and mandate of courts and TRCs, see Coté L “Special Court for 
Sierra Leone” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 515-517 (on the Special Court for Sierra Leone); 
546 (on the Sierra Leone TRC); 307-308 (on the East Timor Special Panels); and 547 (on the Timor-Leste 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation). Coté provides the following in summation to the 
overview provided: “Despite a longer timeframe than expected to complete its mandate and difficulties to 
finance its operations only by voluntary contributions, the SCSL has been considered by many as a 
success. Its hybrid nature with the participation of Sierra Leonean personnel and its location in the country 
directly affected by the crime committed are both enhancing prospects for the Court’s operations to be 
known, understood, and seen as legitimate by the victims in Sierra Leone. That alone would constitute 
quite an achievement for any international justice effort”.  
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No matter which side of the peace versus justice debate one subscribes to, the 
objective of reconciliation is closely associated with establishing the truth.
732
 The ICTY 
highlighted this in the second sentencing judgment of Dražen Erdemović:  
“The International Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute and punish 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, through its judicial functions, 
to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and 
establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. Discovering the 
truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation: 
for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing 
process”
733
 
Exposing and documenting the truth about past crimes and atrocities has been advocated as 
an objective of transitional societies form Argentina to South Africa. But, can true 
reconciliation be achieved solely by publicly exposing the truth? The South African TRC 
appears to provide an affirmative answer to this question. Yet, it may be contended that the 
South African transition was a sui generis phenomenon, a negotiated miracle that proved 
relatively successful because of the presence of a number of factors and characteristics which 
were unique to the South African transitional situation.
734
 These factors were not only unique, 
but also exceptional. Hence the frequent use of the phrase “the miracle of the new South 
Africa” in reference to the post-Apartheid period. Also, the truth on its own does not amount 
to justice. Would a TRC similar to South Africa’s have worked in Rwanda or in the former 
Yugoslavia? Even if this is accepted as a possibility, how much retributive justice would have 
been required in partnership with the truth to create the ideal environment for reconciliation? 
This last question is an especially difficult one to answer. I will return to these questions 
under Chapter 7.
735
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 Fletcher and Weinstein (Violence and Social Repair) (supra) 586. 
733
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Erdemović (Trial Chamber: [Second] Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-96-22-T 
bis, 5 March 1998, para 21. 
734
 See Chapter 7 para 7.5.1 infra. 
735
 See Chapter 7 paras 7.5 and 7.7.4 infra. 
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5.6.5.3 Victims and Affected Groups 
 
The context in which international crimes occur together with the fact that the victims of 
crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity are often targeted only for the fact of 
their existence as a member of an identifiable group or subset of a civilian population, has 
elevated concerns over the needs of victims and victim participation in post-conflict criminal 
trials. Since the end of the Second World War, the rights of victims have been recognised on 
the international level through various UN ‘soft law’ instruments.736 This growing concern 
over the interest of victims has developed to a point where some contend that “no 
accountability mechanism can be described as valid and just unless it gains a reasonable level 
of approval and acceptance from […] victims”.737 It is believed that punishment combined 
with greater victim participation in criminal trials provide a sense of closure and may 
facilitate reconciliation.
738
  
 
Traditionally, the chief concern of international criminal courts has been to ensure 
accountability for serious international crimes. Other than exacting retribution for the 
wrongful acts committed against victims, the interests of victims have been a subsidiary 
concern of international criminal courts.  Victim participation is mostly an alien concept to 
domestic criminal justice systems. This is especially true in criminal justice systems that 
follow the adversarial model. In the adversarial model the victim’s participation in the case is 
mostly limited to acting as a witness. Additionally, the interests of victims may be taken into 
account as one of many factors influencing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This has 
perhaps contributed to the fact that victim participation in international criminal proceedings 
had been very limited up until the creation of the ICC.   
 
                                                          
736
 See UNGA Resolution 40/34 (1985) (Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power); UNGA Resolution 60/146 (2005) (Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
737
 Garkawe S “The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Suitable Model to Enhance 
the Role and Rights of Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights?” (2003) 27 (2) Melbourne 
University Law Review 334-380, 335. 
738
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Victims have been granted limited rights of participation in the Statutes and 
proceedings of the ad hoc tribunals. Punishment as a means of attaining justice on behalf of 
the direct and indirect victims of international crimes as well as “recognition of the harm and 
suffering caused to the victims” was acknowledged by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Nikolić.739 
However, in the ICTY and the ICTR victims could not participate in their personal capacity 
or promote their personal interests, they could only be heard as witnesses in the court. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor holds an exclusive discretion on whether to prosecute and on 
whether to act in the interests of victims or not.  
 
The ICC is the first international court with the power to grant reparations to 
individual or collective victims of criminal conduct. The participatory rights of victims have 
found a measure of prominence partly in the Rome Statute, but mostly in the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”). These rights include legal representation for victims, 
participation during the trial, reparations, witness protection and protection related to the 
giving of evidence in court.
740
 Victims are given “a voice” at crucial stages of the 
proceedings in the ICC and may present their “views and concerns” during the trial if their 
“personal interests” are affected.741 Furthermore, article 79 of the Rome Statute establishes a 
trust fund for the benefit of victims and their families.  
 
The manner in which the rights and interests of victims of mass atrocity have been 
pushed to the forefront of international criminal trials has been sighted by many as a positive 
development in international criminal justice and one which is well aligned with the 
international human rights movement for which ICL is also a torchbearer.
742
 Although victim 
                                                          
739
 ICTY, Prosecutor v (Monir) Nikolić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, 2 
December 2003, paras 82 and 86.  
740
 See Rome Statute of the ICC, articles 19(3), 53, 64, 68(3) and 75; Doak J Victims’ Rights, Human 
Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties (2008) Hart Publishing, Portland 136-
137; see also Baumgarten E “Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International 
Criminal Court” (2008) 90 (870) International Review of the Red Cross 409-440, 410 (referring to the 
ICC’s scheme of victim participation as “relatively broad”). 
741
 Rome Statute of the ICC, article 68(3). 
742
 See for example, Human Rights Watch Commentary on the Preparatory Commission of the 
International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure                       
(July 1999) available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRWComment2ndPrepComJuly99.pdf 
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participation and compensation schemes are praiseworthy and ambitious developments in 
international criminal justice, it does bring with it certain problems. Firstly, the participation 
of a large number of victims in the criminal process slows proceedings down considerably 
and might seriously undermine effort to ensure expeditious trials at the ICC. Secondly, the 
ICC may be viewed primarily as an institution of accountability or for ending the culture of 
impunity, with broader normative purposes and a limited amount of funding. This means that 
most of the ICC’s institutional emphasis and funding must be directed at efforts for bringing 
perpetrators to justice in an adversarial trial rather than the compensation of victims. The 
adversarial confrontation leaves little room for parties outside the “battle” between the 
prosecution and the defence.
743
 The wording of article 68(3) makes it clear that the interests 
of the victim must not outweigh and are subsidiary to the rights of the accused on trial. The 
ICC’s primary focus on prosecutions is also reflected in the huge gap between its estimated 
annual budget for prosecution (100 million Euros go to the OTP) and the annual budget for 
the compensation of victims (1 million Euros go to the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims).744 
Reparations to victims whether in the form of restitution, compensation or rehabilitation, is 
also dependant on (or limited by) the convicted persons’ available resources as well as on the 
harm caused by the crimes for which they were convicted.
745
 
 
The ICC is making the most concerted effort at recognising the interests of victims in 
the history of international criminal justice. This is surely a positive and laudable 
development. However, such recognition ultimately falls far outside the ICC’s primary 
mandate, namely to end the culture of impunity and contribute to prevention of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. Recognition of the 
victims’ interests and their participation during proceedings must be pursued in a manner that 
                                                          
(accessed 2012/08/08) para 106 (at 45-46): “[...] reparations from perpetrator to victim can play a critical 
role in the healing process of victims, of societies as a whole and of the perpetrators themselves, and as 
such can be a factor in preventing future violations”. 
743
 De Hemptinne J “Victim Participation in International Proceedings” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) 
(supra) 563. 
744
 “Convict a dictator and the money will flow” International Justice Tribune, 22 November                      
2011, available at http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/convict-a-dictator-and-money-will-flow 
(accessed 2011/11/23). 
745
 (Convict a dictator and the money will flow) (supra); see also Rome Statute of the ICC, article 75. 
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does not undermine the main objectives of the ICC. The challenge to the ICC is to try to 
maintain a balance between its primary mandate and the interests of victims, failure to do so 
runs the risk of the ambitious victim participation scheme becoming an encumbrance upon 
the effective functioning of the court.
746
   
 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The general retributive trend established at the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMTFE has 
permeated into the culture and mechanisms of modern international criminal justice.
747
 The 
justification for punishment in modern international criminal courts has been largely 
retributive and backward-looking.
748
 For the most part, this is how it should be. Punishment 
is essentially regulated retribution. That is not to say however that the punishments dispensed 
by international criminal law institutions should merely condemn the criminal and crimes 
involved. It is also important to consider the larger underlying purpose of the international 
criminal justice system and the broader future utility that may be achieved through 
championing those objectives unique to international criminal justice.
 
Nor are judges 
precluded from exercising their discretion within the limits of the law to give recognition to 
the fact that ICL is ultimately intended to pursue broader social purposes. Although 
retribution is still undoubtedly the main impetus for international criminal punishment, 
retribution as revenge is less relevant than before, especially in the international legal setting. 
Henham contends that the predominant retributive approach to international sentencing does 
not achieve the moral resonance required to strengthen the legitimacy of international 
punishment.
749
 Also, in Mucić et al. the ICTY Trial Chamber acknowledged that “retributive 
punishment by itself does not bring justice”.750  The significance of the movement from 
punishment with a closer resemblance to lex talionis at the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo 
                                                          
746
 Baumgarten (Aspects of Victim Participation) (supra) 439-440. 
747
 Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 19. 
748
 Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 20. Henham contends that “the overriding sentiment of 
punishment in the international arena consists of revenge and retribution tempered by poorly articulated 
allusions to deterrence (and occasionally rehabilitation and reconciliation)”. 
749
 Henham (Philosophical Foundations) (supra) 66. 
750
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, 
para 1231. 
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IMTFE to a modern variant of expressive retributivism in contemporary international 
criminal tribunals must be acknowledged. Modern ICL has moved away from instinctive and 
‘emotional’ responses to mass atrocity toward a more objective determination based on 
principles of fairness and the fair trial rights of the defendant (often expressed as the notion of 
“equality of arms”). In Tadić, for example, the ICTY acknowledged rehabilitation as a 
worthy punishment objective and hinted that punishment should not only fit the crime, but 
also the offender.
751
 Retribution as revenge, albeit regulated and proportional revenge, 
counteracts the guiding virtues of the international community and the universal principles of 
justice for which international criminal courts are supposedly acting as beacons.
752
 The 
retributive aspect of international punishment is less justified as a form of revenge than a 
reassertion of the fundamental values of humanity of which international crimes are 
representative.
753
 
 
Retribution, and also the most widely accepted utilitarian objective in deterrence, will 
always be the logical point of departure for any criminal trial. Yet their ascendency leaves 
more than enough room to acknowledge the potential social function and the lesser known 
value that criminal punishment under international law may hold. Acknowledging these sui 
generis functions of international criminal justice will likely require future jurisprudence that 
‘chips away’ at the ‘permanent’ purposes of punishment through greater recognition of ICL’s 
fundamental forward-looking values and purposes. It is submitted that this would augment 
the transformative potential of international criminal justice.
754
 As a sui generis form of 
criminal justice, ICL requires a sui generis theory and framework that enables trial and 
punishment for purposes ‘outside’ the traditional penological justifications of criminal law.   
 
Furthermore, punishment theories common to domestic criminal law cannot be 
supplanted mutatis mutandis to ICL due to its unique nature.
755
 A failure to fully differentiate, 
                                                          
751
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Chamber: Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-S, 14 July 1997, 
para 61; see also Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 19. 
752
 Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 17 (footnote 20). 
753
 Henham (Punishment and Process) (supra) 17. 
754
 See also Chapter 8 para 8.5.1 infra. 
755
 See Sloane (The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment) (supra) (general criticism on the use 
of the national law approach to punishment under ICL).  
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acknowledge and understand the unique foundations and objectives of ICL risks undermining 
its potential. Because ICL is driven by forward-looking values and purposes, it intends to 
realise objectives which move beyond the purposes of criminal law punishment in the 
domestic setting and the objectives of the traditional theories of punishment. This is a 
consequence of ICL’s unique supranational setting and area of application namely mass 
atrocity, collective violence and social transitions.
 756
  
 
The limited extent to which domestic criminal law analogy and traditional punishment 
theory applies to ICL, explains and perhaps justifies the numerous novel or sui generis 
punishment objectives of ICL outlined above.  Considering the fact that ICL is already 
regarded as a sui generis system of supranational criminal law, there is no apparent danger in 
broadening the conceptualisation of its purpose to include these sui generis objectives.
757
 
This is however not ideally reflected in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. 
Although there has been some recognition of objectives which are unique to the purposes for 
which ICL exists, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals have mostly varied in their 
approach to punishment purposes by being either conspicuously silent on the matter of 
theoretical justifications for punishment or dealing with the matter in a brief and formal 
manner by way of a few sentences which acknowledge mostly retribution and deterrence as 
the goals of punishment. Furthermore, the ad hoc tribunals have been rather inconsistent in 
applying justifications for punishment on international criminal acts and perpetrators. It 
appears that no specialised jurisprudence on the matter has been developed up to this point. 
The Rome Statute has not remedied this defect.  
 
Punishment for international crimes is essentially a trade-off between effectively 
discharging international criminal justice’s ambitious mandate and problems associated with 
over-reaching in its utilitarian punishment objectives, such as unfairness towards the accused 
if he or she should receive a sanction which is disproportionate to his or her crime.
758
 Finding 
the right balance is crucial since the success or failure of ICL hinges firstly upon certainty 
                                                          
756
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 17. 
757
 On ICL as a sui generis system of supranational criminal law, see Haveman et al. (Supranational 
Criminal Law) (supra). 
758
 See Damaska (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 177-179 (on potential problems which 
may arise due to the overly-ambitious agenda of international courts). 
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with regards to its essential objectives and secondly on it reaching those objectives.
759
 ICL is 
already seriously inhibited on institutional and enforcement levels and cannot reach its 
objectives if they are overly-demanding. On the other hand, assuring accountability for 
perpetrators and preventing serious violations of human rights are now widely recognised 
ideals of the international community. Failure to achieve these ideals cannot be justified or 
tolerated much longer.  
 
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that international criminal tribunals operate at a slow 
pace and a high cost.
760
 The ICC’s first judgment was delivered ten years after the court came 
into operation at a cost of roughly €100 million per annum.761 The budgets of the ad hoc and 
hybrid tribunals are similarly disproportionate to the number of judgments that have been 
delivered by these courts.
762
 Although understandable in light of the unique practical 
difficulties and contextual complexities faced by international courts, these considerations 
have “raised serious doubt about the value of these tribunals”.763  
 
Why then do the supporters of ICL sometimes overlook the inefficiencies of ICL in 
relation to domestic criminal law proceedings? Firstly, the differences between the objectives 
of domestic criminal law and those of ICL provide a measure of rationalisation for the slow 
pace of ICTs, especially the sui generis goals mentioned above. The recognition of the 
greater prevalence of goals which are long-term and forward-looking, offers a 
conceptualisation of ICL that makes short term retribution less imperative and delays in the 
conveyance of criminal justice (within limits of course) more acceptable. This is especially 
true if such delays are the result of efforts aimed at ensuring a fair and transparent trial, the 
                                                          
759
 See Damaska (supra) in Cassese (The Oxford Companion) (supra) 178: “The prolixity of goals is far 
from harmless: the resulting disparities between aspiration and achievement may damage the reputation of 
any system of justice – let alone an immature one, whose legitimacy is not yet firmly established”. 
760
 See Goldbraith J “The Pace of International Criminal Justice” (2009) 31 (1) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 79-155, 79. 
761
 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Trial Chamber I: Judgment) Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 
March 2012; see also http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=budgetbackground (accessed 2012/03/26). 
762
 See Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 131. 
763
 See Goldbraith (The Pace of International Criminal Justice) (supra) 82 and 142. 
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latter which constitutes an important aspect of the expressive and symbolic value of 
international criminal tribunals. 
 
Secondly, states support the project of international criminal justice for reasons that 
are unrelated to the efficiency of ICL. International law is mainly aimed at creating consensus 
and achieving cooperation among states. International criminal justice as an expressive 
device of the international community is a fictitious notion that is becoming more realistic as 
ICL evolves, especially with the appearance of the permanent ICC. The ICC holds the 
potential, unparalleled in history, for wielding its influence from a global stage. The ICC’s 
potential influence is however heavily dependent on political support for the Court and 
cooperation in terms of enforcement of the law of the Rome Statute. When presented with the 
opportunity of joining a cause articulated by the international community through 
international law, it is governments who make the choice to be involved or to associate as 
well as whether or not to keep their legal commitments towards courts and treaties. Domestic 
and international politics plays a crucial role in this regard. The following chapter 
investigates the relationship of politics and international criminal justice. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
“If you claim that law is a type of politics, that it serves political ends, are you not suggesting 
that law is merely the instrument of the ruling class, to be used by it as it sees fit to promote its 
own interests?”
764
 
 
The analysis of the objectives of ICL in the previous chapter addressed the historical and 
legal rationale for the existence of international criminal justice. The analysis also hints at 
what ICL can potentially achieve. To a certain extent, the objectives of ICL as highlighted in 
the previous chapter hints at the potential of ICL to benefit individuals, post-conflict societies 
and states. Yet, they are for the most part theoretical objectives. They can never be achieved 
without active support and cooperation from states. Tallgren noted that “the promise of the 
benefits of real law [...] confronts the unpredictable ‘reality’ of international politics” in 
international criminal justice.
765
 For this reason, it is necessary to consider the influence of 
political power on ICL and its transformative potential.
766
 
 
Some authors have endeavoured to illustrate that states support international criminal 
justice only when it is in their self-interest to do so or because there is an alignment of 
interests and political beliefs.
767
 This notion, namely the politicisation of law, is reflected in 
                                                          
764
 Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 143. 
765
 Tallgren (Sensibility and Sense) (supra) 564. See also Hirsh (Law Against Genocide) (supra) 17: “[…] 
history […] has repeatedly demonstrated that power politics overrides paper law”. 
766
 At times such consideration will require references to the work of international relations theory and 
political science, but only to the extent that such references are necessary for addressing the research 
question.  
767
 See Peskin (International Justice) (supra); Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) (the author 
points out that mostly liberal states support international war crimes tribunals). 
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the opening quotation to this chapter above. The question posed by Shklar serves also to 
introduce the realist perspective on law, under which law is viewed as an instrument of 
power. The notion of “law as power” and the relationship between justice and power has 
notable significance to students of international law and international criminal justice. The 
interactions of international (criminal) law and politics which I investigate in this chapter are 
part of a complex field of study to which many have contributed.
768
 My aim in this chapter is 
to consider some of these contributions in order to determine the influence of power and 
politics on ICL’s transformative value. 
 
Because international law reflects the politics and values of the international order and 
serves purposes to this end, it may be contended that ICL responds to and is shaped by the 
political and economic forces that dominate the system.
769
 The “internationalization of 
criminal justice” can be viewed as “a fusion of ideology and structure”. 770 The political and 
ideological motives and purposes behind ICL has (and will have) a profound impact on its 
transformative value since as a species of international law it is still largely based on the 
political acquiescence of states to concede their sovereign powers to an area of international 
regulation. In this thesis I approach the transformative value of ICL from a broad perspective 
to include interactions of ICL and politics that have a positive or negative impact on the 
transformative potential of ICL. 
 
The investigation below proceeds from the notion of ICL as a device for the 
expression of the often conflicting values of states and the civitas maxima. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
768
 See Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra); Peskin (International Justice) (supra); Megret F “The 
Politics of International Criminal Justice” (2002) 13 (5) European Journal of International Law 1261-1284 
(for a general overview of various published works dealing with the politics of international criminal 
justice.) 
769
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 1. 
770
 Findlay M and Henham R Transforming International Criminal Justice: Retributive and Restorative 
Justice in the Trial Process (2005) Willan Publishing, Cullompton at xv. 
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6.2 The Values of International Criminal Justice 
 
Earlier in the thesis, the notion of punishment as an act with expressive significance has been 
introduced.
771
 Broadly speaking, the limitations on the international criminal justice system is 
an expression of state values, while ICL’s repressive and normative functions are expression 
of human values and a consequence of ICL’s brotherhood with human rights. International 
criminal norms project these values onto the international order and also onto states 
internally. Whether applied as hard law, or through the impact of “soft power”, ICL may 
influence the behaviour of states and other actors.
772
 
 
6.2.1 State Values 
 
Since states are the primary subjects in the international legal system, the most important 
values of the international legal order have traditionally been those of states. Foremost among 
these is the notion of state sovereignty. It can be said that all other state values such as 
equality, autonomy and independence are derived from sovereignty. These represent the 
traditional values of the international legal order.  
 
 ICL as an expression of state values manifests most clearly through the constraints 
placed before it by the international order. The lack of a central enforcement authority and the 
critical importance of state cooperation emphasise the consent driven nature of the 
international legal order. Public international law generally aspires to facilitate voluntary state 
cooperation. This is reflected in ICL’s sources, which are created either through multilateral 
treaty or through state practice backed by opinio juris.  
 
State values often pose an obstacle to international criminal justice. This is evidenced 
by the relevance of sovereignty-based rules of international law such as exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over territory and head of state immunity.  
 
                                                          
771
 See Chapter 5 para 5.6.1 supra. 
772
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 7 (Peskin notes that even though international criminal tribunals 
have no enforcement power they do employ strategies that affect the behaviour of states and other actors 
that interact with these the tribunals behind the scenes). See Chapter 1 para 1.5 (assumption2) supra. 
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6.2.2 Human Values (or, Values of the Civitas Maxima) 
 
The rise of ICL embodies an encroachment on classical state sovereignty. As such, ICL is 
part of the body of cosmopolitan law which has developed since the end of the Second World 
War and has been described as: 
“[…] a new form of law [that emerged] out of international law, a form of law that has a logic 
that transcends international law and is in some respects in contradiction to it. It seeks to limit 
state sovereignty, and lays down minimum standards for the treatment of human beings by 
states.”
773
  
ICL, as a reflection of the social and moral norms of the international community, represents 
the foray of human values into what has traditionally been viewed as the exclusive 
prerogative of the state. International law is increasingly seeking to create an internal effect in 
states. The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are increasingly losing ground to 
the vertical application of international rules to alter government conduct. Highly significant 
in this regard is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), an emerging norm of international 
security and human rights that views sovereignty as a responsibility and not an absolute 
right.
774
 Accordingly “[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.775 International 
law is moving beyond its traditional role of regulating interstate conduct to regulating the 
conduct of states towards their citizens.
776
 To this end international law is increasingly 
“invasive, but also potentially transformative” and has as a result become increasingly 
intimidating to those states that still demand a high or absolute level of domestic 
autonomy.
777
 
 
                                                          
773
 Hirsh (Law Against Genocide) (supra) 1. According to Hirsh “cosmopolitan law exists as an empirical 
fact, in institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as well as in 
treaties, conventions and charters that give ammunition and courage to those struggling against state 
tyranny”. 
774
 UNGA Res 60(1) (2005) paras 138-139. 
775
 UNGA Res 60(1) (2005) para 138. 
776
 Slaughter AM and Burke-White W “The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The European 
Way of Law)” (2006) 47(2) Harvard Journal of International Law 331.  
777
 Slaughter and Burke-White (The Future of International Law is Domestic) (supra) 331. 
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The rules of international criminal law are primarily intended to protect the values of 
the international community or human values.
778
 Although individuals still have a very 
limited form of international legal personality which is mostly filtered through the state, 
human beings are no longer indirect beneficiaries of international law in an absolute sense. 
The emergence of the human rights movement in the wake of the Second World War is a 
reflection of the rise of human values.
779
 Individuals have gained a measure of formal 
international legal protection against state abuse. It may be said that the values of the 
international community are encapsulated in the most important international human rights 
instruments such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, 
and the ICESCR.
780
 Other treaties such as the Genocide Convention and the Convention 
Against Torture bolster these values indirectly by criminalising conduct which infringes upon 
them.
781
  
 
The close affiliation of ICL with human values is a result of two characteristics. 
Firstly, as a species of criminal law, ICL has developed to serve as a statement of types of 
conduct that the international community has deemed worthy of carrying the label of 
international crime. Criminal law is particularly expressive of social values and what a 
society deems to be offensive towards its shared values. In the international context, states 
and the international community are the primary driving forces of transformation. In 
accordance with one of the central themes of this thesis, international criminal justice is one 
of the mechanisms through which they may promote, export and entrench their values.  
 
                                                          
778
 See for example, ICTR, Prosecutor v Elizaphan and Ntakirutimana (Trial Chamber I: Judgment and 
Sentence) Cases No. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T, 21 February 2003, para 881: “Both accused have 
been found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity. These crimes are of an utmost gravity; they 
are shocking to the conscience of mankind, in view of the fundamental human values deliberately negated 
by their perpetrators and the sufferings inflicted. These crimes threaten not only the foundations of the 
society in which they are perpetrated but also those of the international community as a whole”. 
779
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 173. 
780
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 23. 
781
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 23. 
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Secondly, ICL is closely associated with human rights.
782
 Protection of human rights 
represents liberal morality.
783
 The interaction or “partnership” between ICL and human rights 
highlights the values that the prosecution of international crime is intended to protect.
784
 
These values are closely associated with basic human rights such as the right to life and the 
right to human dignity as well as rights that protect minorities and vulnerable groups and 
rights that are intended to protect against state sponsored abuse.  
 
6.3 The Politics of International Criminal Justice 
 
The concept of transformation is inextricably linked to politics.
785
 Therefore, to understand 
ICL’s transformative value one must not only look to at the qualities of ICL that make it 
amenable to promoting transformation, but also to the political values that drive 
transformation through the use of ICL.  
 
6.3.1 (International) Law and Politics: Justice and Power in the International Order 
 
The disciplines of law and politics are among the world’s great agents of change, 
consequently the term ‘transformation’ is often encountered in both these fields. Of the two, 
politics is the more powerful but also the more radical vehicle for social transformation. In 
the context of political violence and social upheaval, the demands of politics and those of 
international criminal justice often clash. History shows that change through radical politics 
comes with an unacceptable amount of damage to individual rights and the rule of law. Under 
a regime of radical politics, law becomes either politically tainted, as was the case in Nazi 
Germany and apartheid South Africa, or the state is plunged into lawlessness where the rule 
of law is marginalised and domestic courts become unwilling or unable to cope.  
 
                                                          
782
 See Chapter 2 para 2.2.1 supra and Chapter 8 para 8.3.4.1 infra. 
783
 Osiel (Why Prosecute?) (supra) 141. 
784
 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 18. 
785
 This is especially evident in the context of transitional justice where law is invoked to achieve change 
in a liberal and democratic direction, see Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra). 
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According to Luban “[p]olitics is broad, partial and forward-looking”.786 The nature 
of politics makes it an unstable vehicle for change when compared to the consistency and 
certainty of legal processes. On the other hand, law and legal process can provide change that 
is stable (although some would argue that this change is not always radical enough and 
allows for an inacceptable continuation of injustices). The perceived legitimacy and moral 
authority of international law has popularised the recourse to ICL during transformative 
periods. There seems to be a general perception that recourse to international law during such 
periods can provide greater stability and neutrality than tainted or overwhelmed domestic 
legal systems. Yet, deeper analysis reveals that state support of, and cooperation with, 
international criminal justice is a field of study that is both highly complex and essential to a 
proper understanding of modern ICL.
787
  
 
In legal theory there is a body of opinion that law must be apolitical.
788
 Law and 
politics can be formally and academically separated, but according to Henkin: 
“[...] the distinction between law and politics is only a part truth. In a larger, deeper sense, law 
is politics. Law is made by political actors, through political procedures, for political ends. 
The law that emerges is the resultant of political forces; the influences of law on state 
behaviour are also determined by state behaviour.”
789
 
Since there exists no central agency of power in the international order, international law is 
almost wholly dependent for its survival on its ability to entice political support.
790
 The 
discipline of international relations theory is informative in this regard since it attempts to 
explain and predict state behaviour. Two of the most common approaches to international 
relations theory are realism (or political realism) and liberalism.
791
 
 
                                                          
786
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
787
 See for example, Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra); Bass (Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance) (supra); Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 
788
 Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 111. 
789
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 4. 
790
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 370. 
791
 Slaughter AM “International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 European Journal of 
International Law 506. 
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Realists argue that law is a mere by-product of the political processes that bring about 
social change.
792
 According to realists, the law is always man-made and created through 
politics. Realism in international relations advances the notion that international law and 
idealism are irrelevant to the national interests of the monolithic state and to international 
politics.
793
 Realist scholars of international relations, along with Marxist and critical legal 
scholars have attempted to show that “international law itself is instrumental to, and shaped 
by, power”.794 Adherents of classic political realism in international relations theory hold that 
state interests are paramount to ideology in an anarchic, consent-driven world order 
composed of self-interested states. International law with its “dangerous moralism” is viewed 
as a luxury and either met with scepticism or disregarded by realists.
795
  
 
 A prominent assertion of the realist view of international criminal law finds 
expression in the criticism against international criminal courts as a means of dispensing 
victors’ justice. This critique has been raised by amongst others Wilhelm II after the First 
World War, Hermann Göring at the Nuremberg IMT in the wake of the Second World War 
and by indicted Serb military leaders at the ICTY following the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia.
796
 Realism also finds expression in the African critique of the ICC as a neo-
liberal institution.
797
 
 
International law must not be indisputably dismissed as an instrument of power and 
politics as realists would suggest. According to Krisch “[i]nternational law appears as either 
the nemesis of power or as its handmaiden”.798 There is some evidence that contradicts the 
realist perspective and shows the influence of liberalism and idealism in the international 
order.
799
 Firstly, international courts focus on persons who, although they may be perceived 
                                                          
792
 Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra) 3. 
793
 Slaughter (International Law in a World of Liberal States) (supra) 507. 
794
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 370. 
795
 Slaughter (International Law in a World of Liberal States) (supra) 503; Bass (Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance) (supra) 9. 
796
 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 8-9. 
797
 See Chapter 7 para 7.6.2.2 and 7.7.1.1 infra. 
798
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 371. 
799
 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 12-16. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 210 
 
as political enemies, are put on trial because they have committed criminal acts, and not in 
order to purge them.
800
 These trials are not merely show trials. It is not the defendants 
themselves who are stigmatised but the acts that they have committed. These acts in turn are 
deemed to be universally offensive through various modes of positive law such as 
international treaties, the statutes of international courts and in some states through domestic 
legislation. In modern international courts defendants may receive an acquittal if the case 
against them is not supported by evidential proof, if the trial is unfair towards the accused or 
botched somehow by the prosecution. From Nuremberg to the ad hoc tribunals there have 
been numerous acquittals to prove that the prospect of acquittal is not merely a theoretical 
possibility.  
 
The emphasis on the criminal liability of the accused and on upholding the rule of law 
through punishment also appears in the Rome Statute. The preamble to the Rome Statute 
confirms the commitment of state parties to punish “perpetrators” of “the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community”. The Rome Statute also includes various 
provisions which guarantee certain due process rights and that criminal law principles of 
fairness are to be applied in the trial of any accused. Yet realists may argue that for all its 
legal principle the Rome Statute is a ‘fig leaf’ masking the interests of those who back the 
ICC for political reasons. 
 
Secondly, although states remain the dominant powers in the international order, 
idealism is pushed to the fore of international relations by the international community and 
non-state actors. Especially since the 1960’s, non-governmental organisations have been 
successful in applying pressure and persuading states in the direction of cooperation with 
international criminal justice efforts.
801
 The human rights movement has also filtered its 
idealism through to the international order. Many international crimes, such as the distinct 
crime of torture and the crime of apartheid, exist as an attempt to ensure respect for basic 
human rights. Human rights idealism is also filtered into international criminal justice 
through more indirect means. Consider for example the requirement in article 21(3) of the 
Rome Statute that the law applied by the ICC “must be consistent with internationally 
recognised human rights”. Also, article 36(3)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute provides that:  
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“Every candidate for election to the Court shall … Have established competence in relevant 
areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, 
and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial 
work of the Court.” (emphasis added) 
Human rights groups are generally supportive of international criminal law and international 
criminal courts since the prosecution of international crimes such as torture and crimes 
against humanity are invariably linked to the transgression of human rights norms and aims to 
deter future human rights abuses. 
 
Whether through the influence of politics, idealism or through its traditional consent-
driven nature, international law may function in a way that is restrictive of power. The 
foundations of international law, such as equality of states and sovereignty, provide a 
counterweight to abuses of power. As a result, international law is “disinclined to grant 
formal recognition to structures of superiority”.802 According to Krisch, international law is 
always in a precarious position where it mediates between the “demands of the powerful and 
the ideals of justice held by international society at any given moment”.803 Accordingly, 
international law has a dual nature that appeals to both realists and idealists. It is “both an 
instrument of power and an obstacle to its exercise”.804 Powerful states may endeavour to 
abuse the legitimacy of international law by using it as a smokescreen to hide unilateral 
interests. At other times international law presents states with “the hurdles of equality and 
stability”, in which case states are inclined to withdraw their support for international 
regulation.
805
 This is illustrated by the United States of America’s (“USA”) ambiguous 
support of the ICC. Although the USA was supportive of the work of the ICC in Sudan and 
Libya via its permanent seat on the UNSC, the USA is not a party to the Rome Statute 
because it perceives the court as a threat to its military interests and national security, 
especially post-September 11, 2001. 
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6.3.2 The Influence of Western Liberal Legalism 
 
International criminal justice is clearly saturated with the values and legal principles of liberal 
legalism. In this section the goal is to define liberal legalism through the relationship between 
liberalism and legalism and their respective characteristics. It is submitted that the influence 
of liberal legalism is an important component of ICL’s transformative value.806 
 
6.3.2.1 Defining Liberal Legalism 
 
The word “liberal” is infamously ambiguous in its meanings.807  As a political theory or 
philosophy, liberalism is founded upon respect for individual freedom and individual 
autonomy.
808
 In theory, the main objective of the liberal state is to ensure liberty - the 
economic and personal freedom of individuals.
809
 The liberal state is today the most 
prominent form of political society.
810
 Liberal political philosophy owes much to the work of 
Hobbes and Locke. Their influence has created the foundation of the liberal view that 
“individuals possess certain natural rights that it is incumbent upon the state to protect, even 
in situations where violating these rights may turn out to be beneficial to the community”.811 
Liberalism’s attempt to maximise individual liberty against state power is closely associated 
with the human rights movement.
812
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 Teson FR “The Kantian Theory of International Law” (1992) 92 (1) Columbia Law Review 53-102, 54 
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808
 Teson (Kantian theory) (supra) 54 (footnote 4). 
809
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states). 
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 Fichtelberg A “Liberal Values in International Criminal Law: A Critique of Erdemović” (2008) 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 3-19, 9. 
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 Clarke K “Rethinking Africa Through its Exclusions: The Politics of Naming Criminal Responsibility” 
(2010) 83 (3) Anthropological Quarterly 625-651, 627; Fagan A “Human Rights” Internet Encyclopaedia 
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ideas defended by the likes of Locke and Kant have come to be associated with the general Enlightenment 
project initiated during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries, the effects of which were to extend across the globe and 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 213 
 
Liberalism may also be expressed as a theory of international relations. Liberal 
thinkers of the Enlightenment period are recognised for their contribution to the essence of 
modern liberal theory of governance and international co-operation.  Modern liberalism’s 
ideals are a reflection of especially Kant’s work on democracy, peace, common humanity and 
co-operation among states in an increasingly integrated world.
813
 The Kantian theory of 
international law has a (neo-) liberal basis and therefore also holds a foundational belief in 
the primary importance of the individual:   
“Liberal theory [of international law] commits itself […] to normative individualism, to the 
premise that the primary normative unit is the individual, not the state. The end of states and 
governments is to benefit, serve, and protect their components, human beings; and the end of 
international law must also be to benefit, serve, and protect human beings, and not its 
components, states and governments.”
814
 (footnotes omitted) 
In contrast to the state-centred focus of realism, liberalism assumes that individuals are the 
primary actors in the international system.
815
  
 
Simpson distinguishes between two prevalent “strands” of liberalism or “two of the 
ways in which liberalism has supplied international law with a theory of political community 
among states”, namely classical liberalism (or “Charter liberalism”) and neo-liberalism (or 
“liberal anti-pluralism”).816 As the earlier of the two varieties of liberalism in international 
law, classical liberalism equates states to individuals and treats them as equal and 
independent actors.
817
 In line with traditional Westphalian sovereignty, the state is therefore 
the centre or primary subject of this form of liberalism. Classical liberalism is based on 
tolerance, non-interference and non-prescription in the domestic politics of a state. Many of 
these ideals are established principles of the international legal order and formally 
                                                          
over ensuing centuries. Ideals such as natural rights, moral autonomy, human dignity and equality provided 
a normative bedrock for attempts at re-constituting political systems, for overthrowing formerly despotic 
regimes and seeking to replace them with forms of political authority capable of protecting and promoting 
these new emancipatory ideals”. 
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814
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815
 Slaughter (International Law in a World of Liberal States) (supra) 508. 
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encapsulated in the UN Charter, hence Simpsons’ reference to “Charter liberalism”. A 
primary example of this is the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states in 
article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
818
 Diversity of political beliefs among states is accepted, 
making this form of liberalism inclusive and pluralistic in nature. As a result of this 
pluralism, classical liberalism ascribes to “agnosticism about moral truth”.819 
 
 Neo-liberalism developed later than classical liberalism and “views liberalism as a 
comprehensive doctrine or a social good worth promoting”.820 Neo-liberalism is less tolerant 
of illiberal regimes and treats them in an exclusionary manner.
821
 The internal characteristics 
of states determine their standing in the international order. Traditional sovereign equality 
becomes a qualified right: 
“Respect for states is merely derivative of respect for persons. In this way, the notion of state 
sovereignty is redefined: the sovereignty of the state is dependent upon the state's domestic 
legitimacy; and therefore the principles of international justice must be congruent with the 
principles of internal justice.”
822
 (footnotes omitted) 
Neo-liberalism does not embrace pluralism. Individual rights, human rights and the norm or 
emerging right of democracy lie at the heart of this form of liberalism.  
 
Neo-liberalism has become increasingly more prevalent in the international legal 
order. This form of liberalism is encapsulated especially well in the works of John Rawls, 
Thomas Franck and Anne Marie Slaughter.
823
 Slaughter defines liberalism as a theory of 
international relations that “permits, indeed mandates, a distinction among different types of 
States based on their domestic political structure and ideology”. 824  Thus neo-liberalism 
begins by separating the liberal from the illiberal. In the criminal law context, liberalism is 
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reflected by an emphasis on individual rights, due process and principles of equality that 
protect individuals and counteract state abuse of power. States that do not respect the 
aforementioned liberal tenets and other liberal preferences such as democratic government 
may be labelled as illiberal. The neo-liberal distinction “between liberal democracies and 
other kinds of States, or more generally between liberal and non-liberal states, cannot be 
accommodated within the framework of classical international law” where states are equal 
sovereigns.
825
 
 
The neo-liberalist influence on the international order exposes international law to the 
hegemonic critique.
826
 However, classical liberalism must not be assumed to be preferable 
because it is “anti-hegemonic” or “less hegemonic”. Classical liberalism represents the 
“universal face” of liberalism, but it is still a political force that influences the prerogatives of 
the international order and the functioning of international law. Both strands of liberalism 
represent a form of imposed moralism. In neo-liberalism this imposition of moralism only 
manifests in a more pronounced and prominent form. 
 
Across its various meanings, liberalism demonstrates a confidence in legalism. Shklar 
defines the legalist outlook as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of 
rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules”.827 
Elsewhere Shklar refers to legalism as a “social ethos [...] which gives rise to the political 
climate in which judicial and other legal institutions flourish [...]”. 828  Legalism is often 
expressed as a political ideology or “political preference”.829  Others have suggested that 
legalism is “the ideological proposition that moral conduct is a matter of following rules”.830 
It is the belief that all human conduct, even individual conduct during collective violence, is 
within reach of legal rules. Peskin describes the manifestation of legalism in international 
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criminal justice as “the idea that there should be [international criminal] trials governed by 
principles of fairness and due process”.831  
 
Legalism is by nature a conservative and rule-bound exercise, committed to 
preserving the past in an effort to maintain social expectations.
832
 Accordingly, the principle 
of legality (including the rule against the retrospective application of law) is a primary value 
of legalism.
833
 For this reason legalism often acts as a constraint to the transformative agenda 
of liberalism (especially neo-liberalism) that seeks to introduce new legal norms in societies 
that have not yet embraced them. Yet, to some extent legalism is an important aspect of the 
liberal transformative agenda. When liberal rules are willingly or unwillingly imported by 
transitional or post-conflict societies, the belief that these “new” rules are preferable and 
binding is based on both the perceived legitimacy of international law and faith in legalism. 
Legalism, if embraced by a society in this manner, is no conservative exercise similar to the 
legalist commitment to rule-following in stable domestic legal orders. In such a setting, 
legalism may not maintain social expectations but establish new ones. In the aforementioned 
context there is less ‘past’ to preserve, only new expectations to be created through the values 
and norms of the ‘liberal’ international legal order. A prominent example is punishing 
perpetrators of acts which may have been legal under the previous political order. In this way 
legalism provides legitimacy to such liberal transformative projects and is itself an important 
part of the transformative process. Thus, as part of transformation with an international 
element, legalism contradicts itself in favour of that which is believed to be in the interest of 
the greater good. 
 
International criminal justice may be regarded as a convergence of liberalism and 
legalism. At the heart of liberalism lies the belief in legalism as a means of political and legal 
transformation, while at the heart of both liberalism and legalism lies respect for 
individualism that is expressed through legal rules.
834
 Liberalism and legalism share a belief 
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in the value of the criminalisation of certain acts and the individualisation of guilt. Although 
distinct concepts, liberalism and legalism are so closely associated in the international (legal) 
order that they are often grouped together and referred to as ‘liberal legalism’. In this thesis 
liberal legalism refers broadly to rules that create rights and obligations which are aligned 
with liberal political beliefs that attempts to protect individuals and the interests of liberal 
states. Liberal legalism is a legal and political ideology especially closely associated with a 
belief in human rights and democratisation. 
 
6.3.2.2 The Ascendency of Liberal Legalism (and Political Realism) in International 
Criminal Law 
 
The liberal-legalist adversarial criminal trial is fast becoming “the idiom of international 
criminal law”.835 For example, the ICTY and ICTR have been held up by some as “new 
beacons for international legal liberalism”.836 Liberal criminal law principles and processes 
have become the template for endeavours of international justice.
837
 According to 
Fichtelberg: 
“Given that conventional (domestic) law can usually rely upon a constitution, or at a 
minimum, a set of communally shared values, to fill in the background of legal rules, it is 
initially unclear how a legal theory that is based on a domestic paradigm can apply to 
international criminal law with its overlapping legal and political traditions, and the diverse 
cultures over which international law must hold dominion. However, international law in 
general, and international criminal law in particular, displays a number of characteristics that 
are indicative of an underlying liberal political philosophy. In addition, the mandate of the 
ICTY essentially defines it as a liberal institution, embodying a number of procedural rules 
that would only be found in a liberal context. International criminal law represents in many 
ways, the ideals of a liberal society. Central concepts of humanitarian law and international 
criminal law - most importantly the recognition that individuals, even those accused of crimes, 
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have a set of basic, procedural rights - indicate the strong influence of liberal traditions upon 
this legal regime.”
838
 
The fact that international criminal tribunals are constrained by procedural and due process 
rights of the accused and by human rights in general, argues for a liberal conception of 
international criminal law.
839
 Relying on Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously, Fichtelberg 
notes that ICL generally favours a ‘principled’ approach over a ‘policy’ approach. 840 
Accordingly, he argues that rights and legal principles protecting the individual accused 
should be regarded as superior to the broader purposes (policy) of ICL.  
 
This is not always the approach of judges at international criminal tribunals. In 
Erdemović, the ICTY Appeal Chamber ruled that the accused could not rely on the defence of 
duress since this would undermine the purpose for which the tribunal was created, namely to 
protect weak and vulnerable peoples.
841
  Fichtelberg criticised the Erdemović judgment for 
deviating from the liberal values of ICL. He called the ruling an “inappropriate decision”, one 
which “undermined the moral and theoretical core of international humanitarian law” and 
“feeds the fires of those who equate the criminal tribunals with the exercise of victor’s 
justice”.842  
 
Fichtelberg’s argument above is a solid one. Fichtelberg makes a convincing 
argument based on the influence of liberal political philosophy on ICL. It is submitted 
however that he failed to account for the influence of liberalism on international relations and 
the latter’s impact on ICL. The politicisation of ICL through neo-liberalism has infused it 
with liberal ideals and values which move ICL beyond the liberal-legalist belief in adherence 
to principle. These liberal purposes are a major driving force behind ICL, without which it 
would be hard for international criminal tribunals to garner the political support necessary to 
function effectively. International criminal courts are established for specific purposes and 
supported politically by those states who consider such purposes to be important. This 
importance may be based on the states internal beliefs or on self-interest. Although it cannot 
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be said that judges consider themselves bound to behind-the-scenes politics or political 
purposes, they are generally bound by those purposes mentioned in the statute of the court in 
which they serve and the constituting treaty or resolution establishing that court. International 
criminal tribunals are established among other things for utilitarian purposes such as 
reconciliation and deterrence that views punishment of the accused as a means to an end. The 
Erdemović decision may represent a confirmation of the fact that judges consider themselves 
legally bound to promote broader liberal purposes of international courts thereby at times 
subordinating the strict legalist approach. Legal scholars such as Fichtelberg will question the 
fairness of such an approach on the basis that it violates the traditional liberal state-individual 
dichotomy. Others will ask whether the traditional state-individual dichotomy should be 
applied strictly in international criminal courts and might suggest that exceptions can be 
made for international criminal justice because of the unique context in which it functions as 
well as the unique purposes for which it has been created. 
 
But why is liberalism so dominant in international criminal justice? For international 
law generally, the overriding relevance of liberal political philosophy and liberal international 
relations theory lies in acceptance of the fact that “international law and international politics 
cohabit the same conceptual space”, namely the international system or international order.843 
One of the basic assumptions of ICL, that international crimes and collective violence can be 
addressed through criminal law that assigns individual criminal responsibility (and individual 
guilt), draws on Western liberalist thought and the belief in legalism which dominates the 
international system.
844
 It has been suggested that this development might be viewed as a 
reflection of the internal values and principles of liberal states on the foreign policy level, 
which in turn brings domestic idealism into international affairs.
845
 Bass argues that “liberal 
ideals make liberal states take up the cause of international justice”. 846  Thus, the acts 
criminalised under ICL and the doctrines of responsibility which determine the amount of 
individual guilt attributable to acts or omissions may be viewed as manifestations of 
dominant forces in the international moral and political order and the belief of those dominant 
forces in liberal idealism and legalism. 
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Furthermore, a belief in legalism underlies liberalism.
847
 In colloquial terms, legalism 
is ‘part of the bargain’ of liberalism. Both concepts are politically motivated (or political 
preferences) and each finds its own way of expression in international (criminal) law. 
According to Gary Bass: 
“[…] the serious pursuit of international justice rests on principled legalist beliefs held by only 
a few liberal governments. Liberal governments sometimes pursue war crimes trials; illiberal 
ones never have.”
848
 
And: 
“There are two strong pieces of evidence to support the liberal view of international relations. 
First, every international war crimes tribunal that I am aware of…has rested on the support of 
liberal states. Second, conversely, when illiberal states have fought each other, they have 
never established a bona fide war crimes tribunal.”
849
 
ICL is only invoked following a regime change or political transition if it is expected to 
accelerate liberalisation, not impede it. This partially explains the existence of international 
criminal tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but not in South Africa for example. 
Thus, depending on the context, the political belief in liberalisation may trump the ideal of 
criminal accountability. 
 
It has been contended that criminal trials generally, condemn illiberal values and 
espouse liberal values such as respect for basic human rights.
850
 A considerable body of 
academic work has emerged declaring that ICL is driven and legitimised by liberal states with 
a shared belief in legalism.
851
 Although these works focus mostly on the ad hoc international 
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criminal tribunals, they also consider international relations theory and attempt, in part, to 
decode the complex relationship between international (criminal) law and power in the 
international system.  
 
The realist perspective leads to the conclusion that states support ICL only for self-
interested motives and in order to legitimise state-centred goals.
852
 On the other hand, liberal 
theorists and idealists look on international law as a means of constraining power within a 
framework of rules.
853
 As such they afford international law greater recognition and respect 
and also a measure of credit. If, as in the idealist view, international courts may act 
independently and in a transformative manner, a number of questions become pertinent: 
“[W]hy would states have created institutions that they cannot control and which might even 
turn against them? Is this a vindication of the liberal theory either in its purposive (liberal 
states willingly dish out bits of their sovereignty for the higher collective good) or providential 
(liberal states dish out bits of their sovereignty for liberally constructed interests, but in doing 
so end up creating a globally optimal result) variants? Or is the argument substantially 
complicated by factors that are not clearly amenable to liberalism’s categories”
854
 
Megret observes that on the whole, modern international criminal justice seems to subsist as a 
mix of liberal legalism representative of idealism and liberal legalism representative of realist 
interest and power.
855
  
 
It may not be easy to distinguish between what serves the interests of states and what 
serves the common good in the proposition above. As a very broad starting point, it may be 
said that projects of international criminal justice such as the ad hoc tribunals, which are 
initiated or established through state support also serve some political self-interests. The 
amount and manner of state cooperation may also be used to gauge the level of political 
interests involved. Once international criminal law institutions have been established 
however, they may take on a life of their own. This is because legalism as described above is 
also “the operative outlook of the legal profession, both bench and bar”.856 Although the 
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politics of international criminal justice may create considerable restrictions on the work of 
ICTs, lawyers and judges have the occupational habit of performing their legal duty 
irrespective of possible political consequences. This brand of liberal legalism endeavours to 
constrain politics within legal boundaries.
857
 This may be one reason for the idealism that 
sometimes surfaces in international criminal justice.  
 
The establishment of the ICC as an institution to help fight impunity, represents a 
triumph for liberalism and legalism on the international scene. The ICC Statute serves as 
proof of liberalist legalist dominance in international criminal justice through the liberalist 
ideals that can be found in the Rome Statute. For instance, the Rome Statute adopts the 
principle of non-retroactivity and excludes jurisdiction over persons under the age of 18.
858
   
   
6.3.3 The Real and Perceived Dangers of Hegemonic Dominance 
 
Hegemonic policies towards international law “oscillate between two poles: 
instrumentalization and withdrawal”.859  Instrumentalisation is viewed as the more odious 
form of hegemonic behaviour and denotes the active pursuit by states of the development and 
use of international law as a means to stabilise dominance, to improve a dominant position or 
as a means of regulation and pacification.
860
 In his dissenting opinion at the IMTFE, Justice 
Radhabinod Pal raised concern over the skewed nature of the proceedings and criticised 
international law as “a project for stabilizing and securing existing power distributions within 
international society”.861 Thus it appears that Justice Pal was accusing the victorious Allies of 
instrumentalisation of ICL. Justice Pal further declared that he “would hold that each and 
every one of the accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the 
                                                          
857
 Martin Loughlin observed that legal-liberalism attempts to “confine politics to the straight-jacket of 
law”. See Tomkins A “In Defence of the Political Constitution” (2002) 22 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 157-175, 162.  
858
 See Rome Statute of the ICC, articles 24 and 26. 
859
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 381. 
860
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 371 and 382. This was possibly the 
motivation for the USA’s early enthusiasm towards the ICC, which dwindled spectacularly after the 
attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. 
861
 Quoted in Gevers C and Du Plessis M “Another Stormy Year for the International Criminal Court and 
its Work in Africa” (2010) 35 South African Yearbook of International Law 163-180, 180. 
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indictment” and denounced the tribunal as a manifestation of victors’ justice. 862  The 
following comment from Hirsh seems to describe the hegemonic instrumentalisation of 
international law by states: 
“…a strong state, particularly a hegemonic state, may be in a position to wield an 
overwhelming control over the content and functioning of international law. In that case, it has 
an interest in bolstering an international legal framework that it can influence both directly, 
through pressure, and indirectly, through using it to project its own world view and values.”
863
 
Since the Nuremberg IMT and Tokyo IMTFE, renounced by many as “victors’ justice”, there 
has been concern that liberal legalism is facilitating the creation of a hegemonic legal culture 
in international law. This raises the possibility that the expressive function of ICL 
(punishment as representative of authoritative moral values) is a liberal-legalist tool in the 
struggle for political dominance in the international legal order.
864
  
 
A second hegemonic strategy is that of withdrawal. Withdrawal is mostly encountered 
as a policy of non-compliance with international law.
865
 This amounts to what may be viewed 
as a ‘hegemonic omission’ or a hegemonic ‘failure to act’ by dominant states. Dominant 
states may easily choose to violate international law, evade their international legal 
obligations or undermine international legal efforts. A good example of the latter is the 
USA’s efforts to undermine the ICC through entering into bilateral immunity agreements that 
limits the impact of the law of the Rome Statute on US citizens. It may also manifest as a 
policy of non-cooperation or of insufficient cooperation. Such a non-cooperative attitude 
                                                          
862
 See Cryer R “PAL, Radhabinod” in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 449-450. 
863
 Hirsh (Law Against Genocide) (supra )18; see also Arnold J “Protection of Human Rights by Means of 
Criminal Law” in Kaleck et al. (International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes) (supra) 7. The author 
provides the following postulate relating to the hegemonic abuse of criminal law (which seems to refer to 
the USA’s response to the September 11, 2001): “Over the past several decades, the classic, liberal, rule-
of-law concept of criminal law has transformed into a tool for regulating globalization, risk, and 
information societies. This type of criminal law parades legislatively in the guise of security law, 
intervention law, and, most recently, in the development of a special criminal law solely applicable to the 
‘enemy’ (Feindstrafrecht)”. 
864
 See Kahan (The Secret Ambition of Deterrence) (supra) 421-424: “Punishment, the expressive theory 
tells us, conveys an authoritative schedule of moral values”. 
865
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 385. 
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towards international criminal justice mechanisms occur when an international criminal 
tribunal might undermine other state interests or priorities. An example is the approach of 
western states towards the ICTY. Peskin notes that the West was careful not to press for the 
prosecution of Milošević since indictment by the ICTY could have been harmful to their 
diplomatic interests by excluding Milošević’s participation in peace talks.866 In this case US 
diplomatic interests and the interests of peace temporarily trumped the interests of 
international justice.   
 
States that promote the values of liberal legalism have been criticised for using their 
ascendancy to subvert minority legal culture, further solidifying their dominance. Such 
hegemonic dominance in international law has contributed to ambivalence in decisions 
regarding the use of force and humanitarian intervention from the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council with close ties to liberal legal values. These policies have resulted in a 
lack of criminal accountability for international crimes in some conflicts and selective 
prosecutions depending on the political motivation and self-interest of the permanent member 
states.
867
 Although formally cast as neutral and independent, ICL and the institutions 
associated with it are not immune to the influence of neo-liberalist anti-pluralism. In some 
circles there is the perception that these courts are politically tainted and constitutive of a new 
form of imperialism through which dominant states control weaker ones and impose their 
values.
868
 In Africa there is growing concern over the ICC’s prosecutorial strategy, selectivity 
                                                          
866
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 39. 
867
 “Assembly President Warns on Doctrine to Intervene on War Crimes, Atrocities”                            
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31562&Cr=right+to+protect&Cr1 (accessed 
2009/09/14): “Mr. D’Escoto used the case of Iraq as an example of the lack of accountability for ‘those 
who might abuse the right that [R2P] would give nation-States to resort to the use of force against other 
states.’ He also questioned whether the adoption of [R2P] in the practice of collective security would 
undermine respect for international law, saying that the principle is ‘applied selectively, in cases where 
public opinion in [the permanent members of the UNSC] supports intervention, as in Darfur, and not 
where it is opposed, as in Gaza’”. 
868
 For example, consider the following statement by Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda: 
“Rwanda cannot be party to ICC for one simple reason … with ICC all the injustices of the past including 
colonialism, imperialism, keep coming back in different forms. They control you. As long as you are poor, 
weak there is always some rope to hang you. ICC is made for Africans and poor countries”. See Kezio-
Musoke D “Kagame tells why he is against ICC charging Bashir” Daily Nation, 3 August 2008, available 
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of prosecutions and the use (or abuse) of the ICC as a political tool for regime change.
869
 
Criminal trials, especially those that occur during societal transitions, are vulnerable to 
political exploitation. The greatest risk in such a scenario is injustice to the defendants and 
distortion of the historical record.
870
 This is particularly dangerous in a deeply divided society 
where politically compromised criminal trials might serve only to further imbed the social 
antagonism which may lead to mass atrocity.  
 
Various criticisms have been voiced in opposition to the ascendancy of liberal 
legalism and different schools of thought have raised some verifiable concerns over the abuse 
of liberal legal ideology in the international legal system. Leftist critics of liberal legalism site 
that its “reliance on law [to transform society] imbricates the left with the state in ways that 
thwart truly transformative change and cedes authority to the state to define and produce ‘the 
normal’”.871 Marxist legal theory is critical of liberal criminal justice in general.872 Firstly, 
Marxists argue that the liberal-legalist ideal of equality is nothing more than “an ideological 
fig leaf” masking real inequality and advancing the interests of the rich and powerful elites. 
Secondly, criminal law is a reflection of the interests of the dominant classes. Lastly, criminal 
justice primarily punishes crimes of poor or minority groups. The Marxist critique points to 
the fact that international law is instrumental to, and shaped, by power and politics.
873
 This 
echoes concerns that, as the dominant force in international law, liberal legalism drives 
                                                          
at http://allafrica.com/stories/200808120157.html (accessed 2009/05/15); see also Chapter 7 para 7.6.2.2 
infra. 
869
 All the cases currently before the court arise from conflicts on the African continent. It must be 
acknowledged however, that three of these cases (Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
Central African Republic) have been referred to the ICC by the concerned states themselves (see also 
Chapter 7 para 7.6.2.2 infra). Furthermore, upon submission of this thesis the ICC was conducting a 
preliminary inquiry into the situation in Mali on the basis of a self-referral.  
870
 Osiel (Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory) (supra) 294. 
871
 Hearst A “Review of Brown W and Halley J (eds.) Left Legalism/Left Critique” (2003) 13 (7) Law and 
Politics Book Review available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/brown-wendy.htm 
(accessed on 2009/06/08). 
872
 Beckett K “Criminal Law and Criminal Justice in Action: The Marxist Critique” available at 
http://www.soc.washington.edu/users/kbeckett/The%20Marxist%20Critique.pdf  (accessed 2012/08/29). 
873
 Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 370. 
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hegemonic legal culture by subverting minority legal culture through using its ascendancy to 
solidify its own dominance.  
 
More criticism against the ascendancy of liberal legalism in international criminal 
justice is presented by cultural relativists. Cultural relativists contend that criminal justice 
differs from one state or region to the next. They argue that the ideals of international 
criminal justice and universal human rights are in reality the liberal legal ideals of dominant 
and mostly western states, imposed under the guise of universal ideals or international justice. 
The cultural relativist stresses contextual sensitivity and puts the emphasis back on the state 
as opposed to the individual.
874
 This is in sharp contrast to liberal legalism’s emphasis on 
universal rights for all individuals. 
 
The realist school of thought believes that international law in general should not 
actively promote any form of social transformation or subscribe to any form of idealism. In 
their view international law should only play a role in those instances where states find 
cooperation to be in their own best interest.
875
 They preach a multidisciplinary approach to 
ICL with more emphasis on political solutions and alternatives to criminal justice. 
 
6.3.4 The Importance of State Cooperation 
 
The rise of liberal international relations theory, prominent under the victorious Allies of the 
Second World War, has provided much room for international cooperation and institution 
building including cooperation in the realm of international law. However, the notion of an 
autonomous international criminal justice system is a fallacy. Treaties on international crime 
are negotiated while customary international crimes are the product of the will of states. 
International criminal courts are politically negotiated and -supported (or not). While the 
prosecutors of these courts may be formally independent, they won’t be in a position to make 
much progress without receiving or somehow enticing state support and cooperation. 
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Bass contends that liberal states are the primary supporters of international criminal 
tribunals.
876
 His contention is that liberal states are inclined to support international war 
crimes tribunals because of their belief in the universal value of legalism or as he puts it: 
“Liberal states are legalist: they put war criminals on trial in rough accordance with their 
domestic norms”. 877  Bass does however concede that the support of these “few liberal 
governments” sympathetic of war crimes tribunals will falter if the tribunal places the success 
of more important political matters such as peace negotiations at risk.
878
 
 
In his book International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the 
Struggle for State Cooperation, Peskin is critical of Bass’ theory above on the ground that he 
“leaves largely unexamined the complex interests and actions of illiberal states towards the 
tribunal”.879 According to Peskin: 
“[...] the pursuit of international justice does not belong to Western liberal states only. A 
state’s role in an armed conflict – whether it was, is, or may become a victim or perpetrator – 
may be a better predictor of its level of support for a tribunal than whether the state is liberal 
or illiberal.”
880
 
Theoretically, international criminal tribunals are based on the principles of autonomy and 
neutrality. In contrast to their predecessors, modern international criminal tribunals are 
intended to function independently and to be truly international in character. Peskin illustrates 
that international criminal tribunals have in reality been forced to developed strategies to 
induce state cooperation without which the “independent” work of the tribunals would be 
significantly hampered.
 
He distinguishes broadly between political activity on the issue of 
cooperation that occurs between tribunals, states and the international community and 
political activity that occurs within states.
881
 These external and internal “virtual trials” 
ultimately determine the level of cooperation which an international criminal tribunal will 
receive from states.
882
 The level of state cooperation which international criminal tribunals 
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 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 19. 
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 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 20. 
878
 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 8. 
879
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 20. 
880
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 21. 
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 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 6, 9-14. 
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 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 9. 
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are able to ensure has a direct influence on the “nature and outcome” of the trial.883 Peskin’s 
research relates mostly to the ad hoc tribunals, where he notes “trials of cooperation” take 
place behind the scenes and that: 
“[t]hrough these trials of cooperation, the tribunals’ original mandate to focus solely on 
determining individual guilt […] broadens, in effect, into determining the state guilt for the 
obstruction of the legal process.”
884
 
Through state guilt, international tribunals use a strategy of “shaming” to encourage state 
cooperation. Shaming activates international pressure against a state, thereby increasing the 
political cost of non-cooperation in violation of legal obligations.
885
 
 
Peskin’s work was based mainly on the importance of state cooperation at the ICTY 
and the ICTR. In contrast to the latter tribunals, the ICC is based on a multilateral treaty. The 
treaty-based origin of the ICC makes the court more representative among states and “gives it 
significant moral and political leverage in the inevitable “trials of cooperation” that the ICC 
will conduct with states.
886
 Peskin does however conclude that the ICC potentially faces even 
greater obstacles with regard to state cooperation than the ad hoc tribunals because it lacks 
support from powerful and populous states, notably that of the USA.
887
 
 
What emerges ultimately from both Bass and Peskin’s work is the reality that 
international criminal justice may be subordinated to the interests of states. However, the 
                                                          
883
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 9. 
884
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 10. Also (at 170): “A ‘trial of cooperation’ refers to the battles 
fought between a tribunal and a targeted state over the terms and timing of that state’s cooperation with 
tribunal investigations and prosecutions”. 
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 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 238; see also Johnson (Peace Without Justice) (supra) 185. The 
author describes another method used by the ICTY to promote its self-sufficiency, namely the use of 
sealed indictments: “The ICTY chided specific states and the international community in general for its 
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cooperation”. 
886
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 251. 
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 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 251-252; see also Clark (Peace, Justice and the International 
Criminal Court) (supra) 527-529.  
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feature of complementarity in the Rome Statute appears to alleviate the problem of state 
cooperation to some extent.
888
 By interpreting the principle in conjunction with the purposes 
of the Rome Statute, Stigen cites that complementarity should ensure effective national 
investigations and prosecutions “partly by stimulating and partly by applying pressure” on 
states.
889
 In turn the ICC benefits from a more appropriate selection of cases to adjudicate and 
greater effectiveness when states are “unable or unwilling” to prosecute. Since the creation of 
the ICC, uncooperative states face with the prospect of being labelled as “unwilling or 
unable” in accordance with the Rome Statute.890 This unfavourable prospect together with the 
heightened political and media attention on international crime make it more likely that states 
will initiate national prosecutions on their own accord.
891
 
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter began by investigating the values reflected in modern ICL. It was noted that the 
values which ICL promotes mirrors its dual character, or its repressive and normative 
characteristics respectively, to reflect the values of both individuals and states.
892
 
Furthermore, there appears to be elements of idealism in the predominantly realist 
international criminal justice system. Since the Nuremberg IMT, and under the “project” of 
cosmopolitan law, certain values are regarded as being universal in character.
893
 These values 
have found expression in the norms of the human rights movement and international criminal 
justice. International consensus regarding these values can be seen through increased 
international legal cooperation, the establishment of various international legal institutions 
and a rapidly expanding body of substantive, procedural and institutional international law.  
 
                                                          
888
 In addition to provisions on complementarity, the Rome Statute contains detailed provisions regarding 
state cooperation with the ICC. See Chapter 7 para 7.6.1.4 infra. 
889
 Stigen (International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions) (supra) 18. 
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 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 1. 
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 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 1. 
892
 See also Chapter 2 para 2.2.1 supra. 
893
 See Hirsh (Law Against Genocide) (supra) 20-22. Hirsh contends that cosmopolitan law can only 
achieve an independent existence as law once the principles and institutions of cosmopolitan law “attains 
sufficient authority, independence and power to threaten some of the interests that brought them into 
being” (at 21).  
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Despite evidence of idealism and cosmopolitanism in ICL, state cooperation remains 
crucial to the enforcement of international criminal justice. International criminal courts have 
no policing and enforcement powers of their own and are heavily reliant on the financial 
support they receive from states. Achieving the level of cooperation which makes the 
enforcement of ICL not only possible but also effective, comes at a price. Liberal states, 
which are the primary supporters of ICL according to Bass, take their pound of flesh through 
hegemonic or self-interested action towards international criminal justice when their interests 
are threatened. Furthermore, although ICL may be viewed as part of the substantive and 
formal law that encapsulates the values of the international community, it is largely modelled 
on liberalist-idealist and predominantly Western legal culture and legal fundamentals which 
can be referred to as western liberal legalism.  
 
Traditionally, liberal legalism has embraced the concept of transformative law.
894
 This 
latter consideration and the matter of liberal-legalist ascendancy in international criminal 
justice, holds important implications for the transformative value of ICL. As with ICL, liberal 
legalism has a strong attachment to human rights law and is concerned with effecting change 
in society. It seeks to transform society and empower individuals by embracing legal 
rights.
895
 ICL through the lens of western liberal-legalist modality, human rights and other 
western ideals such as democracy are in close partnership with each other and are part of the 
cosmopolitan movement in international law away from Westphalian sovereignty. As a result 
of this symbiosis, the spread of human rights and democracy carries forward the ideals of 
western liberal legalism and transformation. Hirsh formulated the thesis that: 
“…the great powers, for purposes of legitimation, have allowed cosmopolitan law to emerge 
and have allowed it a certain institutional existence; they have always attempted to keep 
control of it and prevent it from attaining an independent existence; they will not always 
succeed in thus controlling it because that to which they are forced to agree for purposes of 
legitimation is precisely that which makes it possible for cosmopolitan law and its institutions 
to gain a life of their own.”
896
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It appears that, through liberal legalism, sovereign powers have (perhaps inadvertently) 
created a realist-idealist brand of ICL and have merged in international criminal justice the 
self-interests of states with the common good (or the interests of humanity).  
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PART III 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE INFLUENCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
IN DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of Part III is to determine the transformative value of ICL from a domestic 
perspective. Firstly, I aim to investigate the practical ramifications of ICL obligations using 
South African law and society as a case study for the examination of the interaction between 
the norms and values of ICL and domestic legal systems. Secondly, with reference to relevant 
provisions in the Constitution, case law, the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act (the “ICC Act”) and forthcoming legislation related to 
international criminal law, this chapter investigates South Africa’s ability to dynamically 
reflect developments in modern international criminal justice. The abovementioned aims 
require an investigation of South Africa’s ability and willingness to prosecute international 
crimes, its aptitude for aligning itself with ICL’s complementarity regime and the country’s 
stance on universal jurisdiction with an eye to the future of prosecution of international 
crimes through domestic courts. The value of the South African legal system being so 
enabled is considered throughout.
897
 In this latter respect Part III partly draws on the findings 
in Part II regarding the transformative value of ICL in general. 
 
The following additional reasons are advanced for the assessment of the 
transformative influence of ICL in South Africa under Part III: 
 The post-apartheid ‘constitutionalisation’ of international law under sections 231-233 
of the Constitution. As a result of this constitutional entrenchment, international 
(criminal) law forms part of the ‘supreme law’ of South Africa to the extent that it is 
compatible with the Constitution and acts of parliament.
898
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 South Africa’s unique international law history, with special reference to South 
Africa’s transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy and the impact of this 
transition on international criminal justice in South Africa.  
 The widely held view that “international problems have domestic roots” and that 
international criminal justice must evolve toward enforcement through national law 
systems in the future.
899
 In this regard the research attempts to identify the shared 
characteristics of ICL’s interaction with domestic legal- and criminal justice systems 
and general challenges associated with this interaction through investigation of one 
jurisdiction. Towards this end, the importance of contextual relativity must be duly 
noted. Every state’s reception of international law is different.900 The impact of ICL 
norms will be greater in a state taking juridical cognisance of international law 
generally than in states that view international law as subsidiary to domestic law or as 
non-binding. Therefore, the case study in question comes with a warning which is 
similar to the warning attached to the comparative law approach, to generalise with 
caution and with due recognition of the fact that law will always be contextually 
sensitive.
901
 
 It must also be kept in mind that South Africa is potentially a lucrative destination for 
perpetrators of international crimes fleeing from prosecution, especially since at 
present most international crimes originate from conflicts in Africa.
902
  
 In order to make a prognostic assessment of the future of ICL in South Africa. This is 
done in the hope of identifying issues and providing some guidance to other national 
law systems tasked with the future advancement of international criminal justice.  
                                                          
899
 See Slaughter and Burke-White (The Future of International Law is Domestic) (supra) 328. 
900
 Wallace and Martin-Ortega (International Law) (supra) 37-38. 
901
 See Sanderson v Attorney General, Eastern Cape (1997) 12 BCLR 1675 (CC), para 26. 
902
 See Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others (North Gauteng High Court) Case No. 77150/09, 8 May 2012, para 12 (at 42). The applicants in 
this case contending that they brought the application for the review of the decision of the SAPS not to 
investigate Zimbabwean officials suspected of acts of torture committed as a crime against humanity in the 
public interest since, without prosecution of perpetrators of torture, “there is a risk of South Africa 
becoming a safe-haven for torturers who may travel here with impunity”. See also Katz A and Du Plessis 
M “In the Matter of: Lieutenant-General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa’s Presence in South Africa” 
Briefing Paper Prepared on Behalf of the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 
(CoRMSA) 2 July 2010, para 76. 
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 The distinctive eminence of transformative law in post-apartheid South African 
jurisprudence. 
 South Africa’s status as a leader on the African continent and African ‘success story’ 
makes its responsiveness to ICL important.
903
 All of the cases and situations currently 
before the ICC originate from the African continent. This has led to friction between 
the ICC and the African Union which may potentially alter the behaviour of African 
states towards the ICC and towards its international law obligations.
904
 Also, South 
Africa’s reception of ICL in its domestic legal system might serve as a template for 
other African states.
905
  
 
7.2 The History and Status of International Law in South Africa 
 
This section moves from the broader international setting to the domestic and briefly traces 
the history and status of international law in South African municipal law. The impact of 
apartheid, the advent of constitutional democracy and the monist/dualist debate will be 
considered. Comprehension of the relationship between South African municipal law and 
public international law is required before considering the current status, influence and the 
prospects of ICL in the country. 
 
Both courts and legal scholars have grappled with the relationship between 
international law and municipal law in the past. The importance of the relationship between 
international law and domestic law lies in the realisation that without adequate mechanisms 
of implementation and cooperation, international legal rules cannot be enforced by domestic 
courts.
906
 According to Wallace, each state’s reception of international law is uniquely 
regulated by that state’s municipal law: 
“There is no universal, uniform practice stipulating how States should incorporate 
international law into their domestic legal system and it is a State’s perception of international 
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 See Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 361. 
904
 See paras 7.6.2.2 and 7.7.1.1 infra. 
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 Du Plessis M “South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute” (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 460-479, 479. 
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law which determines the way in which international law becomes part of municipal law. In 
other words States differ in the way their national courts are either required or allowed to give 
effect to international obligations.”
907
  
 
To understand the relationship between international law and municipal law on a 
practical level, one must first turn to the theories of the monistic and dualistic schools. This 
necessitates a consideration of the theory on the relationship of international law vis-a-vis 
municipal law and monist-dualist debate in the South African context.
908
 The relationship 
between South African domestic law and international law is discussed under the pre- and 
post-apartheid eras to give the reader an understanding of the vast changes that have 
transpired in this relationship since the end of apartheid. The discussion also forms an 
introduction to Part III. 
 
7.2.1 The Pre-1994 Period
909
 
 
7.2.1.1 Apartheid and Isolation
910
 
 
South Africa was a founding member of the United Nations at the time of its establishment in 
1945. Under the leadership of General JC Smuts, South Africa played a prominent role in the 
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908
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relationship with international law since the end of the Second World War. 
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 For a legal definition of apartheid see UNGA Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) (1973) (Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid) (see footnote 917 infra). In contrast to other 
systematic crimes, and despite the fact that capital offenses were committed or authorised by members of 
the apartheid administration, apartheid was an ‘administrative denial of human rights’ characterised 
especially by discrimination based on race rather than an ‘administrative massacre’.  
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creation of the organisation and the drafting of the United Nations Charter. For a period 
following the creation of the United Nations, South Africa’s discriminatory racial policies 
were viewed with apprehension yet tolerated by most states.
911
 Apartheid achieved 
international notoriety after the Sharpeville massacre on the 21
st
 of March 1960 where South 
African policemen opened fire on peaceful protesters against apartheid pass laws for 
Africans, killing 69 people. After the Sharpeville massacre, the South African government 
received widespread condemnation from the international community. On the 1
st
 of April 
1960, the Security Council took its first action against South Africa by adopting resolution 
134 deploring the policies and actions of the South African government and calling upon that 
government to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination.
912
 
 
During apartheid, public international law had inferior status in the South African 
legal system.
913
 The Apartheid government’s lack of respect for international law resulted in 
multiple UN-backed sanctions against the state. Its racially discriminatory policies in 
particular violated the United Nations Charter as well as the international human rights norms 
of non-discrimination and self-determination.
914
 Relying on the principle of state sovereignty, 
the South African government believed that its apartheid policies were an exclusively 
domestic matter beyond the sphere of influence of the United Nations and international legal 
norms.
915
 As a result, South Africa became a pariah state among the post-world war 
international community with a developed culture of respect for human rights. This 
eventually culminated in its expulsion from the United Nations in 1974. 
 
                                                          
911
 As early as 1946 the Indian Government requested that the issue of the treatment of Indians in the 
Union of South Africa be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. 
912
 UNSC Resolution 134 (1960). 
913
 Scholtz W “A Few Thoughts on Section 231 of the South African Constitution” (2004) 29 South 
African Yearbook of International Law 202. 
914
 Dugard J “International Law and the South African Constitution” (1997) 1 European Journal of 
International Law 77. 
915
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 14: “State sovereignty (states exercising exclusive power 
over their territories) has been the organizing principle of the modern international political and legal 
system since at least the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 […]”. Over time the principle of state sovereignty 
has become less absolute and gradually more prone to exceptions under international law. Individual 
criminal liability for international crimes is a prime example of this development. 
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Ironically, South Africa inadvertently contributed greatly toward the development of 
substantive international law during the apartheid years.
916
 The racist social policy of 
successive South African governments single-handedly defined the international crime of 
apartheid.
917
 Due to the fact that no person has ever been tried, let alone convicted, for the 
crime of apartheid at national or international level, the existence of the crime under 
                                                          
916
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 19. 
917
 See UNGA Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) (1973) (Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid). Article II contains the definition of the crime of apartheid: 
“For the purpose of the present Convention, the term "the crime of apartheid", which shall include similar 
policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa, shall apply 
to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by 
one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them:  
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty of person: 
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;  
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily or mental 
harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;  
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or groups;  
(b)  Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause its or their 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from 
participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of 
conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying to members 
of a racial group or groups basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form 
recognized trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right to 
a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;  
(d) Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along racial lines by 
the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of 
mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging 
to a racial group or groups or to members thereof;  
(e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by submitting them 
to forced labour;  
(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
because they oppose apartheid”.  
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international law is placed in doubt.
918
 It is therefore “remarkable” that apartheid was 
recognised as a crime against humanity in article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute.
919
 Dugard 
distinguishes this negative contribution to international law of the South African state from 
the minimal positive contribution during this same period.
920
 During the era spanning the end 
of the Second World War to the end of Apartheid, South Africa consistently undermined 
international law by refusing to accept numerous fundamental norms of the international legal 
order.
921
 This resulted in political and legal isolation and the denial of benefits for individuals 
under international law. 
 
7.2.1.2 The Status of International Law under South African Domestic Law in the Pre-
1994 Period 
 
The status of international law under South African law during this period must be 
approached from the perspective of its Roman-Dutch law and English law heritage.
922
 Under 
Roman-Dutch law, customary international law formed part of national law as it was 
regarded as part of the same universal legal order with natural law as its foundation.
923
 
Grotius, who is widely regarded as the father of international law, expounded this approach in 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, his influential treatise on international law.
924
 Other Roman-Dutch 
law writers generally accepted Grotius’ view on the matter. English law, on which South 
Africa’s previous constitutional order was based, similarly regarded customary international 
law as part of municipal law.
925
 Thus South African common law with its Roman-Dutch and 
English common law roots adopted the monist approach by regarding customary international 
law as part of South African law. Prior to 1993 South African courts “showed strong support 
                                                          
918
 Zahar A “Apartheid as an International Crime” in Casesse A (ed.) The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (2009) 245-246. 
919
 Zahar (supra) in Casesse (Oxford Companion) (supra) 245-246. 
920
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 19.  
921
 Examples include the right to self-determination and the prohibition of discrimination. 
922
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 132. 
923
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 132; Dugard (International Law) (supra) 43. 
924
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 43. 
925
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 45. 
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for the monist approach in respect of customary international law”.926 In Nduli and Another v 
Minister of Justice the Appellate Division (now Supreme Court of Appeal) held that “it is 
obvious that international law is to be regarded as part of our law”.927 South Africa followed 
the dualist approach with regard to the applicability of treaties in municipal courts. South 
Africa followed the English approach in this regard. The executive was fully responsible for 
negotiating, signing, ratifying and acceding to treaties. So as to prevent the executive from 
usurping the legislature’s law-making function, treaties did not form part of South African 
municipal law unless it was incorporated into municipal law by a legislative act.
928
 The pre-
1996 dualist approach was captured by Steyn CJ in the case of Pan American World Airways 
Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Fire Insurance Company Ltd
929
: 
“…in this country the conclusion of a treaty, convention or agreement by the South African 
government with any other government is an executive and not a legislative act. As a general 
rule, the provisions of an international instrument so concluded, are not embodied in our 
municipal law, except by legislative process…In the absence of any enactment giving [its] 
relevant provisions the force of law, [it] cannot affect the right of the subject.”  
 
Dugard points out that, despite the formal recognition of international law as part of 
South African municipal law prior to the new constitutional dispensation, international law 
was viewed mostly with mistrust by the political and legal community of South Africa: 
“Although treaties were incorporated into municipal law, in accordance with the common law 
dualist approach, customary international law was treated as part of municipal law, unless 
inconsistent with legislation, the hostility of successive apartheid governments to the United 
Nations and international human rights conventions undoubtedly influenced the attitudes of 
legislators, judges and lawyers. International law received no constitutional recognition and 
was largely ignored by the courts and lawyers.”
930
   
                                                          
926
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 46; see also Stemmet (The Impact of Recent Constitutional 
Developments) (supra) 48: “International law was applied by South African courts in a series of cases 
dating to the previous century”. 
927
 1978 (1) SA 893 (A) at 906. 
928
 Stemmet (The Impact of Recent Constitutional Developments) (supra) 50. 
929
 Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Fire Insurance Company Ltd 1965 
(3) SA 150 (A) at 161 C – D. 
930
 Dugard (International Law and the South African Constitution) (supra) 77. 
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7.2.2 The Post-1994 Period
931
  
 
The advent of a constitutional legal order is the defining characteristic in the post-1994 period 
of South Africa’s international law history. The new (interim) Constitution enshrined human 
rights including the right to equality and a prohibition on discrimination based on various 
grounds including race.  
 
7.2.2.1 Transformative Constitutionalism 
 
The twofold (and limited) relevance of transformative constitutionalism was discussed under 
Chapter 3.
932
 In this chapter I turn to the potential impact of the transformative constitution 
on ICL in South Africa. The study of South African law in the post-1994 era is to a great 
extent the study of law in a transitional context and of a society and legal system in the midst 
of a deliberate process of transformation. In this context the following question arises: “[...] 
how are past injustices to be addressed so as to best transform the society into a just (and 
stable) society?”933 The transitional and transformative project in South Africa was pursued 
through the TRC and continues through the “transformative” Constitution. As described by 
Klare, the South African Constitution embraces the concept of transformation.
934
 
                                                          
931
 In this paragraph the discussion is limited to the effect of the Final Constitution (1996) on the status of 
international law in South Africa. The Interim Constitution (1993) and the Final Constitution have 
substantially differing provisions relating to international law. An analysis of these differences and the 
reasons for them is outside the scope of this thesis. For more information on the differences between the 
Interim Constitution and the Final Constitution’s provisions relating to international law, see Stemmet 
(The Impact of Recent Constitutional Developments) (supra) 47-74. 
932
 See also Chapter 3 para 3.4.1 supra. 
933
 Roederer (Living Well is the Best Revenge) (supra) 79. 
934
 Klare (Transformative Constitutionalism) (supra) 157. Klare describes transformative constitutionalism 
as “a long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed […] to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction”. See also Roederer (supra) in Roederer and Moellendorf 
(Jurisprudence) (supra) 623. 
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Transformative constitutionalism is a highly relevant and widely discussed topic in the 
modern South African constitutional law discourse.
935
  
 
Roederer suggests that the transformative project in South Africa is supported not 
only by the constitutional text and the constitutional jurisprudence of South African courts, 
but also by “the entire socio-political history and set of practices that brought about the end of 
Apartheid”.936 Also, it has been suggested that “each society’s transformation is in some 
sense a unique response to its unique past and present situation”. 937  Transformative 
constitutionalism and indeed the South African transition in general, places emphasis on 
forward-looking objectives that addresses the need to move away from the deeply ingrained 
social and systemic prejudices and inequalities. Amnesties were generally considered as a 
means to this end. Criminal accountability for gross human rights violations and criminal acts 
of the state and members of the state apparatus during apartheid has been an inferior 
objective of the South African transition and transformation.
938
 These characteristics of the 
South African transformation may cause one to question whether international criminal 
justice can play a transformative role in South Africa. I will argue that the incorporation and 
application of ICL via the constitutionalisation of international law in the “transformative” 
constitution may, and should have transformative value.
939
 
 
7.2.2.2 Re-emergence of South Africa as a Respected Member of the International 
Order and the Constitutionalisation of International Law 
 
According to Botha and Olivier, one of the most striking changes to the South African legal 
landscape in the new constitutional dispensation has occurred in the area of international 
                                                          
935
 See for example, Klare (Transformative Constitutionalism) (supra); Pieterse (What Do We Mean?) 
(supra); Langa (Transformative Constitutionalism) (supra). 
936
 Roederer (supra) in Roederer and Moellendorf (Jurisprudence) (supra) 623. 
937
 See Roederer (Living Well is the Best Revenge) (supra) 78. 
938
 This was clearly illustrated in the case of Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC), para 17. The Constitutional 
Court ruled that amnesties were warranted by the constitution and demanded by the transition to 
“objectives fundamental to the ethos of a new constitutional order”. 
939
 The main thrust of this argument is made under the concluding remarks of this chapter (see para 7.8 
infra). 
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law.
940
 South Africa moved from a cynical, defiant stance on international law to viewing 
international law as a pillar of constitutional democracy.
941
 Under the new constitutional 
order there has been a radical change in the relationship between international law and South 
African municipal law. Generally, the South African government became more amenable to 
international law in its domestic and foreign policy.
942
 During this period South Africa was 
readmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations from which it had been expelled in 
1974. This has been widely praised as a positive development. 
 
South Africa’s constitution now represents “the supreme law of the Republic” and any 
“law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid”. 943  Unlike South Africa’s previous 
constitutions which made no reference to international law, both the Interim (1993) and Final 
(1996) Constitutions made specific reference to the applicability of international agreements 
and customary international law. These provisions are contained in sections 231-233 of the 
Final Constitution. South Africa’s pre-1994 approach to international law treaties has not 
changed, but has been slightly altered by section 231 of the new constitution which 
introduced the concept of a self-executing treaty.
944
 Section 232 endorses the old common 
law approach to the applicability of customary international law in the South Africa by 
providing that: 
“Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 
                                                          
940
 Botha N and Olivier M “Ten Years of International Law in the South African Courts: Reviewing the 
Past and Assessing the Future” (2004) 29 (3) South African Yearbook of International Law 42-77, 43. 
941
 Dugard (International Law and the South African Constitution) (supra) 77. 
942
 Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 17-18. According to Bass, “[t]here is an increasing body of 
evidence by political scientists suggesting that domestic preferences are reflected in a state’s approach to 
international affairs”. Bass also argues that “liberal ideals make liberal states take up the cause of 
international justice”. 
943
 Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
944
 See section 231(3): “An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, 
binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces, but 
must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time”. 
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Furthermore, various provisions in Chapter 11 of the Constitution make the South African 
security forces subject to international law. Article 198 (c) provides that “[n]ational security 
must be pursued in compliance with […] international law”. Members of the South African 
security services and the South African defence force are required to act in accordance with 
international law in terms of article 199(5) and 200(2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, 
under article 200(2) the defence force is explicitly bound to act “in accordance with […] the 
principles of international law regulating the use of force”. 
 
An international agreement that has not been incorporated into South African 
municipal law may still have an effect in the domestic legal sphere.
945
 Section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution directs South African courts to consider international law when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Furthermore, South African courts must prefer an 
interpretation of domestic legislation that is consistent with international law over one that is 
inconsistent with international law.
946
  
 
The landmark Constitutional Court case of S v Makwanyane can be viewed as the 
locus classicus on the use of international law for interpreting the Bill of Rights.
947
 The case 
illustrated the new approach of South African courts to international law. The case concerned 
the constitutionality of the death penalty. According to Botha and Olivier, “[S v 
Makwanyane] was a case that lent itself to international influences and Chaskalson P seized 
the opportunity to make extensive and creative use of international law in his judgment”.948 
Chaskalson described the role of international law as follows: 
“International agreements and international customary law accordingly provide a framework 
within which Chapter 3 can be evaluated and understood and for that purpose decisions of 
tribunals dealing with comparable instruments such as the United Nations Committee on 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the 
                                                          
945
 Scholtz (A Few Thoughts on Section 231) (supra) 213. 
946
 Section 233. 
947
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); Botha and Olivier (Ten Years of International Law) (supra) 
44. 
948
 Botha and Olivier (Ten Years of International Law) (supra) 44. 
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international Labour Organisation may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of 
particular provisions of Chapter 3.”
949
 
Furthermore Chaskalson ruled that public international law, as referred to in section 35(1) of 
the Interim Constitution, referred to both binding and non-binding sources (soft law) of 
international law. 
 
Dugard observes that one of the consequences of the status of international law under 
the 1996 Constitution is the incidence of cases involving an appeal to international law as a 
‘higher law’.950 This was illustrated in for example, Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others and Kaunda and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.
951
 
 
All things considered, the position of international law in South Africa since 1994 
seems to be a positive one.
952
 On paper, South Africa is one of the most “international-law 
friendly” countries in the world.953 The preamble to the Implementation of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court Act declares: 
“The Republic of South Africa, with its own history of atrocities, has, since 1991, become an 
integral and accepted member of the community of nations.” 
In the new constitutional dispensation South African courts have increasingly referred to and 
made use of international law.
954
 According to Dugard the Constitution “seeks to ensure that 
                                                          
949
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC), para 35. 
950
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 22. 
951
 Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (this case is discussed at para 7.5.1 infra) and Kaunda and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC). 
952
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 23: “South Africa’s new constitutional order, which requires courts 
to interpret all legislation, and particularly the Bill of Rights, to accord with international law, and the 
nation’s commitment to the rule of law and human rights, sets the scene for a renaissance of international 
law both in South African foreign policy and in the jurisprudence of its courts”. 
953
 Botha and Olivier (Ten Years of International Law) (supra) 42. 
954
 See Botha and Olivier (Ten Years of International Law) (supra); Sachs A “War, Violence, Human 
Rights, and the Overlap between National and International Law: Four Cases Before the South African 
Constitutional Court” (2004) 28 (2) Fordham International Law Journal 432-476. 
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South African law will evolve in accordance with international law”.955 Up to this point, 
international law has been used most frequently in the context of section 39 of the 
Constitution (previously section 35 in the Interim Constitution) as an interpretive tool for 
developing South Africa’s human rights culture.956  Yet it appears that still more time is 
needed for the courts to build a well-developed jurisprudence on the import and effect of 
international law on South African law. 
 
Since the transition to democracy in 1994 the transformation of the South African 
criminal justice system has sought to place more emphasis on international co-operation and 
the fight against transnational crime.
957
 The first decade of democracy evinced considerably 
more commitment from the South African state to the ideals of international criminal 
justice.
958
 On executive, legislative and judicial level there has been increased awareness and 
activity relating to international criminal justice and international co-operation in criminal 
matters. South Africa faces many of the same menaces that represent a threat to the 
international community.
959
 Certain of these threats have been regarded as so serious that 
they have elicited calls for international co-operation from the UNSC.
960
 The phenomenon of 
                                                          
955
 Dugard (International Law and the South African Constitution) (supra ) 91. 
956
 Botha and Olivier (Ten Years of International Law) (supra) 74. 
957
 For a description of transnational crime one may turn to UNGA Resolution 55/383 (2000) (United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime). Although the Convention targets organised 
crime, article 3(2) possibly contains a general description of the elements of an offense of a transnational 
nature, namely (a) the offense is committed in more than one state; (b) the offense is committed in one 
state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; (c) 
the offense is committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal 
activities in more than one state; or (d) the offense is committed in one state but has substantial effects in 
another state. 
958
 Katz A “The Transformation of South Africa's Role in International Co-Operation in Criminal Matters” 
Paper delivered at Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Criminal Justice Conference, 7-8 
February 2005, available at http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/confpaps/katz.htm (accessed 2011/09/21). 
959
 See Report of the Secretary-Generals High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. 
A/59/565, 2 December 2004, Part 2, 25. 
960
 See UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) (Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist 
Acts) which calls for the suppression of the financing of terrorism and for international cooperation in this 
regard.  
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international crime and globalisation of crime has made international and regional 
cooperation in criminal matters an essential element in the fight against crime.
961
  
 
Since it became a republic in 1961, South Africa entered into only a small number of 
extradition agreements as a result of its political isolation.
962
 The Extradition Act 67 of 1962 
was enacted to facilitate extradition to and from foreign states and remains in force today, 
subject to the amendments in the Extradition Amendment Act 77 of 1996. The latter act 
amended the Extradition Act to allow for extradition to countries “designated” by the 
President of the Republic without having to conclude an extradition agreement.
963
 The advent 
of democratic governance, South Africa’s return to the community of nations and the 
abovementioned legislative developments have been positive developments from the 
perspective of cross-border criminal justice initiatives. As a result of these developments, 
various extradition treaties have been entered into up to date.
964
 South Africa acceded to the 
European Convention on Extradition in 2003, thereby entering into extradition agreements 
with multiple European countries.
965
 
 
The enactment of the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996, 
further illustrates South Africa's willingness to facilitate international cooperation in criminal 
matters. The International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act is the most important 
legislative instrument in the South African regime of co-operation in criminal justice.
966
 The 
Act is aimed at creating a “global network of crime prevention/prosecution” for South 
                                                          
961
 See Kemp G “Foreign Relations, International Co-operation in Criminal Matters and the Position of the 
Individual” (2003) 16 (3) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 368-392. 
962
 See Van Zyl Smit D “Re-entering the International Community: South Africa and Extradition” (1995) 6 
(2) Criminal Law Forum 367-377; see also Dugard (International Law) (supra) 215. 
963
 See Extradition Act, article 3(2). 
964
 For information of South Africa’s current extradition (and mutual legal assistance) agreements with 
foreign countries, see the website of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, available 
at http://www.justice.gov.za/docs/emlatreaties.htm (accessed 2011/09/22). 
965
 See Katz A “The Incorporation of Extradition Agreements” 16 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice (2003) 311-322, 314; see also Government Notice No. 666 in Government Gazette 24872 of 
2003/05/13. 
966
 Kemp (Foreign Relations, International Co-operation) (supra) 381. 
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Africa.
967
 Furthermore, the Act is intended “to facilitate the provision of evidence and the 
execution of sentences in criminal cases and the confiscation and transfer of the proceeds of 
crime between the Republic and foreign States; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith”.968  
 
Perhaps most significantly, South Africa became a party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. The provisions of the Rome Statute were transformed into 
domestic law through the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act (the “ICC Act” hereafter) which I will return to in detail later on in this chapter. 
 
7.2.2.3 Ubuntu 
 
The African concept of ubuntu is not easily definable. It has been described as an African 
world view and a philosophy of life based on solidarity and common humanity that is 
encapsulated by the phrase “a person can only be a person through others”.969  
 
The concept of ubuntu was recognised in the Interim Constitution, but omitted from 
the Final Constitution. Still, an ubuntu-based jurisprudence has emerged in the post-apartheid 
judiciary and particularly from the Constitutional Court. In Afri-Forum v Julius Sello Malema 
and Others, Lamont J lists 12 characteristics of ubuntu.
970
 According to the judgment, ubuntu 
“is to be contracted with vengeance”, “favours restorative rather than retributive justice” and 
“promotes mutual understanding rather than punishment”. 971  This leads one to pose the 
question, how does the judicial cognisance of the notion of ubuntu in South Africa affect 
South Africa’s constitutional obligations towards international criminal justice and its 
                                                          
967
 Botha N “The Post-Constitutional ‘Act of State’: The Need for Further Theoretical Refinement” (2002) 
27 South African Yearbook of International Law 295-305, 296. 
968
 Act 75 of 1996, preamble. 
969
 Mokgoro JY “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa” Paper delivered at the first Constitution                
and Law Colloquium held at Potchefstroom on 31 October 1997 available at 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/viewFile/43567/27090 (accessed 2012/02/16) 2. 
970
 Afri-Forum v Julius Sello Malema and Others [2011] ZAEQC 2, Case No. 20968/2010, para 18. This 
case is discussed in more detail at para 7.7.4 infra. 
971
 Para 18. 
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obligations towards the international community? International criminal justice pursues the 
ideal of accountability for perpetrators of international crimes. This retributive objective 
appears to be in direct conflict with the values of ubuntu. 
 
It is submitted that this tension is mostly theoretical in nature and that in practice there 
should not arise a mutually adverse relationship between ubuntu and international criminal 
law in South Africa. Ubuntu is a notion that influences our courts in interpretation only. It is 
not law and as such cannot overrule criminal prosecutions carried out legally and based on 
domestic or international law in South Africa. While the concept may help to promote 
fairness towards the accused and may make the application of international criminal law 
more “South African”, it will not and cannot create a bar to the prosecution of perpetrators of 
international crime under domestic or international law. 
 
7.3 Implementation and Application of International (Criminal) Law 
 
7.3.1 Incorporation and Transformation
972
  
 
International law is increasingly shifting its focus away from inter-state relations towards the 
domestic sphere.
973
 International criminal law has mirrored this development and is itself a 
consequence thereof. Domestic implementation of international law; the role of public 
international law in domestic legal systems and domestic international law obligations have 
become important aspects of the study of international law and constitutional law. In this 
regard, the debate between monists and dualists on the relationship between national and 
international law as well as the degree to which international law may be applied in national 
legal systems has become less relevant in practice.
974
 State practice in this regard is often 
more complicated and nuanced than what can be conceptualised and explained under the 
monist and dualist theories.
975
 As a result, the doctrinal approach has been abandoned in 
favour of a pragmatic approach. Therefore, to understand the contemporary relationship 
                                                          
972
 For a distinction between incorporation and transformation, see Chapter 3 para 3.2 supra. 
973
 Slaughter and Burke-White (The Future of International Law is Domestic) (supra) 328. 
974
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 129. For a discussion of the 
monists and dualist theories see Chapter 3 para 3.2 supra. 
975
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 130. 
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between international and domestic law, the “practical results” of implementation and 
application of international law must be investigated on a state-by-state basis. 
 
Arguably the most important example of a treaty pertaining to ICL which has been 
transformed into South African law is the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 0f 2002 (“ICC Act”). The ICC Act incorporated the 
Rome Statute into South African law and has been described as an “act of transformation”.976 
The ICC Act will be discussed further below.
977
 The Implementation of the Geneva 
Conventions Act which criminalises contraventions of the Geneva Conventions will also be 
discussed. Furthermore, draft legislation relating to the distinct crime of torture (the 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Bill) under South African law is currently 
under consideration. This Bill will also be scrutinised further below.
978
 
 
7.3.2 Direct and Indirect Application 
 
The general rule posits that states are free to implement international law as they wish and 
that they may also discharge their international law obligations in a manner of their own 
choice.
979
 Therefore, ICL is not directly applicable in domestic legal systems per se. 
Although the freedom of implementation rule is not controversial itself, the conditions and 
limits to the rule is subject to debate.
980
  
 
Direct application (or direct validity) of ICL occurs when a national court applies a 
rule of international law (incorporated into domestic law) as binding law.
981
 When 
international law has been transformed into domestic law by way of national legislation, 
indirect application takes place since strictly speaking the national law that mirrors (or has 
been modified from) an international rule is being applied. This is required for the so-called 
non self-executing treaty provisions, treaty provisions that do not become directly applicable 
                                                          
976
 See Katz (An Act of Transformation) (supra). 
977
 See para 7.6.1 infra. 
978
 See para 7.7.2 infra. 
979
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 132. 
980
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 133-134. 
981
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 8. 
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or enforceable in national courts upon ratification.
982
 The doctrine of self-executing treaties is 
a manifestation of the general rule that states have freedom of implementation of 
international law as it represents a limitation on the domestic validity of international law.
983
 
  
7 4 The Status of International (Criminal Law) in Democratic South Africa 
 
This section investigates the abovementioned constitutional provisions (sections 231-233) 
and illustrates the current position of international law in South African municipal law. Since 
ICL is a subspecies of international law, the status of international law in general in South 
Africa applies equally to ICL. The application of substantive ICL in South Africa depends 
firstly on the source from which the law is derived, either treaty or customary international 
law.
984
 
 
7.4.1 Bilateral- and Multilateral Treaties or International Agreements: The Role of 
National Legislation 
 
For the Republic to be bound to an international agreement, the Constitution requires 
approval of that agreement by way of resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces.
985
 This approval is required for all treaties except for ‘self-
executing agreements’ as provided for in section 231(3).986 This was a radical break from the 
                                                          
982
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 9, 136-137. 
983
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 136-137. Under the doctrine 
of self-executing treaties states “differentiate between treaty provisions that are directly applicable in 
national courts, or self-executing, and those that are not”. 
984
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 349. 
985
 Section 231(2). 
986
 Section 231(3) states that international agreements of a “technical, administrative or executive nature, 
or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national 
executive” are exempted from the requirement of ratification. According to Scholtz it is not certain what 
exactly is meant by agreement of a ‘technical, administrative or executive nature’. See Scholtz (A Few 
Thoughts on Section 231) (supra) 215. Stemmet however, believes that sections 231(2) and 231(3) 
“effectively eradicates uncertainties created by section 231(2) of the Interim Constitution regarding 
questions whether parliamentary agreement to ratification of or accession to international agreements is 
obligatory, and whether all agreements should be subjected to this procedure.” Stemmet also recognises 
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pre-1994 position where the executive had sole control over the incorporation of treaties. To 
improve transparency and accountability, the executive retained the power to negotiate and 
sign treaties while parliament had to agree to ratification of, and accession to treaties.
987
 A 
ratified agreement does not automatically lead to the incorporation of international law into 
domestic law, only that the Republic has an international law obligation and may incur 
liability under international law for failing to comply with the agreement or to meet its 
obligations under the agreement.  
 
South Africa subscribes to the dualist theory on the relationship between international 
obligations and municipal law. Accordingly: 
“…domestic courts may only apply international law, and specifically treaties if, and only if, 
those treaties have been transformed into municipal law by legislation.”
988
  
Sections 231(2) and (4) of the Constitution also reflects this position. Stating that:  
“An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution 
in both the National Assembly and the National Council of provinces [...]” 
And: 
“Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by 
Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament.” 
Section 231(4) coincides with the pre-constitutional dualist position in Pan American World 
Airlines above. A treaty becomes part of domestic law if enacted into law by national 
legislation. Section 239 of the Constitution states that ‘national legislation’ includes: 
(a) subordinate legislation made in terms of an Act of Parliament; and  
                                                          
that “it has not yet been established what characteristics identify a self-executing provision/agreement in 
South African law”. See Stemmet (The Impact of Recent Constitutional Developments) (supra) 59-60. 
987
 See Section 231(1): “The negotiation and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of 
the national executive”. See also Dugard (International Law and the South African Constitution) (supra) 
81. 
988
 Katz (An Act of Transformation) (supra) 26. For a distinction between the monist and the dualist 
approach refer to Wallace and Kalaitzidis (The Monistic Goal of Overcoming the Divide between 
Domestic and International Law) (supra) 2-3. See also Dugard (International Law) (supra) 53-56. 
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(b) legislation that was in force when the Constitution took effect and that is administered by 
the national government.  
 
Any international agreement which has been signed and ratified but not transformed 
into national law, will not give rise to individual rights and obligations under South African 
law. In respect of such treaties South Africa may still incur responsibility towards other states 
under international law. Thus, a treaty or international agreement and the obligations arising 
from it only becomes part of South African municipal law following an act of constitutional 
ratification. This is to be distinguished from the meaning of ratification found in treaty law or 
international ratification: 
“International ratification refers to the international process that brings the agreement into 
operation on the international plane through confirmation by the necessary state authority. 
Constitutional ratification refers to the procedure whereby the agreement receives approval of 
parliament and achieves municipal application. Constitutional ratification depends solely on 
the constitutional provisions of a state, while international ratification is an act in terms of 
international law where a deposit of the instrument of ratification takes place.”
989
  
There are three ways in which the legislature transforms treaties into domestic law: 
“In the first instance, the provisions of a treaty may be embodied in the text of an Act of 
Parliament; secondly, the treaty may be included as a schedule to a statute; and thirdly, an 
enabling Act of Parliament may give the executive the power to bring a treaty into effect in 
municipal law by means of proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette.”
990
 
 
7.4.2 Customary International (Criminal) Law  
 
Section 232 of the constitution contains the current position of customary international 
(criminal) law in South African law. It is a constitutional endorsement of South African 
common law in the pre-1993 period: 
“Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 
                                                          
989
 Scholtz (A Few Thoughts on Section 231) (supra) 206. 
990
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 55. 
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According to Dugard, the constitutionalisation of the rule on the applicability of customary 
international law has given customary international law more weight under the new 
constitutional dispensation.
991
 Accordingly, customary international law is superseded only 
by constitutional provisions and acts of parliament with which it is inconsistent.
992
 Customary 
international law is therefore superior to the law of precedent and subordinate legislation.  
 
Kemp points out the following regarding the application of customary international 
law in domestic legal systems: 
 “[...] the position of customary international law vis-a-vis domestic law is informed by 
national jurisprudential and constitutional developments.”
993
  
Also, in relation to the enforcement of crimes under customary international law in domestic 
courts, Kemp states: 
 “[...] a distinction between (general) customary international law and customary international 
(criminal) law provide[s] further nuances relevant to the application of international criminal 
law in domestic courts.”
994
 
 
Dugard observes that it is necessary to refer to judicial precedent to establish how 
customary international law rules are proven and which of these rules are to be applied.
995
 
This requires South African courts to turn to precedent from international (criminal) tribunals 
and foreign courts for guidance on the existence and application of a customary rule.
996
 Here 
the court will attempt to establish both usus (settled state practice) and opinio juris (practice 
backed by a sense of obligation that the rule is binding) to confirm the existence of the rule in 
question.
997
  
 
                                                          
991
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 50. 
992
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 50-51. 
993
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 133-134. 
994
 Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 134. 
995
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 51-53. 
996
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 51-53. 
997
 On the twin requirements for the existence of a customary international law rule, see Dugard 
(International Law) (supra) 26-30; Wallace and Martin-Ortega (International Law) (supra) 9 -20. 
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The constitutional recognition of customary international law and the fact that it is 
inferior in law only to the constitution and parliamentary legislation, has important 
repercussions for the conflict which potentially exists between the doctrine of stare decisis 
and newly developed rules of customary international law.
998
 In Trendex Trading 
Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria, it was famously stated that “international law knows 
no rule of stare decisis”.999 The Trendex–principle was applied by Eksteen J in the South 
African case of Kaffraria Property Co (Pty) v Government of the Republic of Zambia.
1000
 
Since customary international law is not subsidiary to judicial pronouncements by South 
African courts, the doctrine of stare decisis is no obstacle to the application of a new rule of 
customary international law in a South African courtroom.
1001
 This concurs with the approach 
in Trendex and can be viewed as an exception to the application of the doctrine of stare 
decisis.
1002
 
 
As Du Plessis explains, the prosecution of international crime based on customary 
international (criminal) law in a South African court prior to the enactment of the ICC Act, 
was highly unlikely: 
“Although customary international law forms part of South African law, a South African court 
confronted with the prosecution of a person accused of an international crime would have 
been hard pressed to convict, since the principle nullum crimen sine lege would probably have 
constituted a bar to any such prosecution.”
1003
 
 
                                                          
998
 Dugard (International Law and the South African Constitution) (supra) 80. 
999
 Trendex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria 1977 QB 529 (CA) at 544. In casu the 
question was “whether the rules of precedent applying to rules of English law incorporating customary 
international law meant that any change in international law could only be recognized by the English 
Courts (in the absence of legislation) within the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis”. See Wallace and 
Martin-Ortega (International Law) (supra) 43. 
1000
 Kaffraria Property Co (Pty) v Government of the Republic of Zambia 1980 (2) SA 709 (E) at 715. 
1001
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 50-51. 
1002
 Wallace and Martin-Ortega (International Law) (supra) 43. 
1003
 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 461 (footnote 2); see also 
Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 350. 
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In S v Basson the Constitutional Court appeared to accept that Wouter Basson could 
be prosecuted for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed extraterritorially.
1004
 In 
a separate opinion Sachs J specifically turned to the issue of South Africa’s customary 
international law obligation under the rules of humanitarian law.
1005
 Basson was alleged to 
have been involved in conduct amounting to war crimes committed outside South African 
territory during the Namibian border war. In his judgment Sachs J found that South Africa 
clearly has a customary international law obligation to prosecute war criminals and violators 
of humanitarian law: 
“The rules of humanitarian law constitute an important ingredient of customary international 
law. As the International Court of Justice (the ICJ) has stated [in the Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA)], they are 
fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’. 
The rules of humanitarian law in armed conflicts are to be observed by all States whether or 
not they have ratified the Conventions that contain them because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law. The ICJ has also stressed that the 
obligation on all governments to respect the Geneva Conventions in all circumstances does 
not derive from the Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian 
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.”
1006
  
Most crimes under customary international law are now contained in the Rome Statute or 
under treaties such as the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture. As 
acknowledged in article 232 of the Constitution, this does not mean that customary 
international law has become irrelevant. The recognition of South Africa’s customary 
international law obligations towards humanitarian law by Sachs J hinted at the possibility of 
using customary international law as a basis for the domestic prosecution of international 
crimes (not contained in a treaty or criminalised under domestic legislation) committed after 
section 232 came into force.
1007
 
 
                                                          
1004
 Dugard (International Law) (supra) 155 footnote 54. 
1005
 S v Basson 2004 (6) BCLR 620 (CC); see also para 7.5.2.3 infra for a detailed discussion of the Basson 
cases. 
1006
 S v Basson 2004 (6) BCLR 620 (CC) at para 124. 
1007
 See para 7.7.3 infra. 
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7.5 No Victory, No Justice? Amnesties and Accountability in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa 
 
This section addresses various questions relating to the use of alternatives to criminal justice 
during the South African transition. Considering the international community’s desire for 
accountability for perpetrators of international crime, what ante facto impact did the TRC and 
amnesties have on the South African legal system and on international criminal justice in 
South Africa? Also, what is the possible future impact of the recourse to amnesties over 
criminal prosecutions on South Africa’s post-apartheid society? This enquiry proceeds 
against the background of the peace versus justice debate.  
 
To a limited extent I attempt to isolate transformative value by using what might be 
deemed a reverse of my hypothesis, that is to say a “thinking-in” of transformative benefits of 
the prosecution of international crime as discussed in Chapter 5. Did the lack of criminal 
prosecutions create a deficit of justice or a denial of the purported transformative benefits of 
ICL in South Africa? Can a lack of individual criminal liability or the choice of amnesty over 
individual criminal liability for example, stigmatise a group for the crimes committed by its 
members or create a general lack of respect for the rule of law as some have suggested? The 
enquiry is largely theoretical in nature, since empirical proof in relation to the 
abovementioned questions are either absent or impossible to produce. 
 
7.5.1 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
It is widely believed that the transition to participatory democracy may not have been 
possible without the negotiated political compromise to grant amnesties to perpetrators of 
politically motivated human rights violations through the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (“TRC”). The idea of a truth commission in South Africa was produced as a 
pragmatic political compromise on the one hand, and as a product of the cultural values, 
religious beliefs and exceptional moral leadership prevalent in South Africa at the time on the 
other.
1008
 It is as a result of these “special ingredients” that commentators often use the term 
                                                          
1008
 Graybill (To Punish or Pardon) (supra) 3-18.  
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“the miracle of the new South Africa” when referring to the country’s relatively peaceful 
transition to democracy. 
 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 provided for the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (“TRC”). The TRC aspired towards 
truth-finding, victim empowerment and a measure of perpetrator accountability, but was also 
an important element of ensuring a peaceful political transition.  The Amnesty Committee, a 
sub-committee of the TRC, was tasked with granting amnesty for perpetrators who fully 
disclosed the details of their politically motivated crimes committed under apartheid if the 
damage from such crime was found to be proportional to the political objective. Amnesties 
granted by the TRC exempted perpetrators from subsequent criminal and civil liability. The 
granting of amnesties was not the sole task of the TRC however. It was also created to 
“deepen [South Africa’s] factual and interpretive grasp of its terrible past, going back to 
1960” and to act in the interest of victims.1009   
 
Much has been written about alternatives to criminal justice in relation to the duty to 
prosecute.
1010
 The legal issues surrounding post-conflict justice or the lack thereof, has 
received equal amounts of attention. A posterior determination of legality of amnesties in 
South Africa is beyond the scope of this paper. The unsuccessful challenge to the 
constitutionality of the TRC in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v The President of 
the Republic of South Africa can be regarded as sufficient for present purposes. From a 
contextual perspective, the case does however warrant a cursory amount of consideration. In 
the case the issue revolved around whether the amnesties granted to perpetrators of apartheid 
                                                          
1009
 See section 3 and section 11 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995; 
see also Asmal K “Truth, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience in Perspective” (2000) 
63 (1) Modern Law Review 1-24. 
1010
 See for example, Dugard J “Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime: Is Amnesty Still an Option?” 
(1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 1001-1015; Orentlicher (Settling Accounts) (supra); 
Edelenbos C “Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?” (1994) 7 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 5-15. 
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crimes were consistent with the interim constitution and with international law norms.
1011
 
Particularly relevant was the weight that should be attached to the duty to prosecute pursuant 
to customary international law. Dugard notes that despite the evidence in favour of an 
international law obligation to prosecute, the Constitutional Court in AZAPO “[expressed] the 
view that international law not only fails to prohibit amnesty but rather encourages it”.1012 
The court relied on article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II of 1977 as an exception to the duty 
to prosecute.
1013
 Article 6(5) states that authorities “shall endeavour to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict [...]”. 
 
From a criminal justice perspective the court had to consider the competing 
considerations of restorative justice (in the interest of nation-building and reconciliation) and 
retributive justice (in the interest of the victims). In the end the court aligned with the concept 
of restorative justice and found than even though it may be to the detriment of the victims, 
amnesty was constitutionally justified due to the fact that it was conditional as well as the fact 
that it had been designed for the specific purpose of facilitating the transition to democracy: 
“The amnesty contemplated is not a blanket amnesty against criminal prosecutions for all and 
sundry, granted automatically as a uniform act of compulsory statutory amnesia. It is 
specifically authorised for the purpose of effecting a constructive transition towards a 
democratic order. It is available only where there is a full disclosure of all facts to the 
Amnesty Committee and where it is clear that the particular transgression was perpetrated 
during the prescribed period and with a political objective committed in the course of the 
conflict of the past.”
1014
  
 
                                                          
1011
 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v The President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (8) 
BCLR 1015 (CC). For a case overview, see Sachs (War, Violence, Human Rights, and the Overlap 
between National and International Law) (supra). 
1012
 Dugard (Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime) (supra) 1003-1004. 
1013
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977) 1125 UNTS 609.  
1014
 Para 32. 
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The TRC released its Final Report on 21 March 2003. At the completion of its term, 
the TRC had filed 7127 amnesty applications.
1015
 Only about 16% of applicants (+/- 1100 
people) received amnesty.
1016
 This is a relatively small number considering that during 
apartheid the country had a population of roughly 40-45 million people, that apartheid crimes 
were committed over a period of more 30 years and that members of government, the police 
force and the defence force were entangled in the maintenance of the apartheid regime. 
 
7.5.2 Prosecution of Apartheid Crimes 
 
In South Africa, the liberators (most prominent of which is the African National Congress) 
never achieved an outright military victory over their oppressors. Rather, these liberation 
movements secured the democratic transition through leveraged negotiations with the 
apartheid government, gaining concessions in the process. Consequently, Nuremberg-style 
criminal trials conducted by the victorious over the vanquished (or “victors’ justice” as it is 
often referred to in studies on post-conflict justice) was not an option.
1017
 The establishment 
of an international criminal tribunal by the UNSC was also out of the question since South 
Africa did not represented a threat to international peace and security at the time.  
 
                                                          
1015
 Namgalies C “Apartheid on Trial: Book Review of Nerlich V Apartheidkriminalität vor Gericht” 
(2004) 15 Criminal Law Forum 349-352, 350. For more statistics on the TRC, see Mallinder L 
“Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa” (2009) Working Paper No. 2 
from Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Institute of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, Queen’s University (Belfast) 143-145. 
1016
 Graybill LS “Pardon, Punishment, and Amnesia: Three African Post-Conflict Methods” (2004) 25 (6) 
Third World Quarterly 1117-1130, 1119. 
1017
 Many prominent figures (including Desmond Tutu, Richard Goldstone and Senior Generals in the 
security forces) warned against the use of criminal trials during the democratic transition. These leaders 
feared that such trials would provoke violence from security forces and compromise political negotiations. 
See Allan K “Prosecution and Peace: The Role of Amnesty Before the ICC?” (2011) 39 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 239-301, 284. See also Akhavan (The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda) (supra) 504. The Rwandan government’s support for the ICTR was partly a result of “the 
military defeat of the party responsible for the genocide, so that the successor government (a coalition 
dominated by the victorious Rwandese Patriotic Front) stood to benefit from the punishment and political 
isolation of its predecessor”. 
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Other characteristics of the South African transition impacted on the choice against 
extensive criminal prosecutions. Firstly, it was widely believed that insistence on criminal 
prosecutions would compromise the delicate negotiation process and the ultimate goal of 
establishing a democracy.
1018
 Secondly, there were reservations about the capacity of the 
South African judiciary to cope with the magnitude of crimes committed in the course of an 
era spanning more than 40 years and often involving state complicity.
1019
 South African 
courts were entangled in the system of apartheid and helped to enforce apartheid law. The 
legitimacy of the legal system was therefore regarded as circumspect by many and it was 
difficult to imagine these same courts making an about turn to punish their former “masters”.  
 
This notwithstanding, criminal prosecutions were anticipated as an essential part of 
the amnesty process.
1020
 Amnesty and prosecution were envisioned to function as 
respectively the “carrot” and the “stick” in the amnesty process. It was the risk of criminal 
prosecution and often prosecution already in progress, which persuaded many perpetrators to 
apply for amnesty. If state criminals and political offenders failed to submit to the amnesty 
process or did not meet the requirements for amnesty, justice had to run its normal course. As 
will be illustrated below, the “stick” aspect of South Africa’s transitional justice model seems 
to have fallen by the wayside.  
 
The lack of significant criminal accountability in South Africa raises an important 
question. Can it really be said that the transitional justice model was successful if perpetrators 
who placed themselves outside the model are allowed impunity from their crimes? According 
to Mia Swart: 
“Many believe that the integrity of the TRC process will depend on how firm the ANC 
government remains in its commitment to prosecute those who did not apply for amnesty.”
1021
 
Kate Allan posed some interesting questions in relation to the long-term impact of amnesties 
in South Africa: 
                                                          
1018
 McGregor L “Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural Optimum or Political Facade?” 
(2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 32-45, 35. 
1019
 McGregor (Individual Accountability in South Africa) (supra) 36. 
1020
 Namgalies (Apartheid on Trial) (supra) 352. 
1021
 Swart M “The Wouter Basson Prosecution: The Closest South Africa Came to Nuremberg?” (2008) 68 
Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 209-226, 225. 
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“The success of amnesty must be considered in the current context of mass violent crime, not 
connected to conflict but to a range of political, social, and economic factors. Should some of 
the resources directed to the SATRC have been directed to building the NPA’s capacity to 
combat the conduct that has lead to one of the highest crime rates in the world? Did impunity 
breed impunity? Such conclusions must be acknowledged as crude and unsophisticated. The 
TRC can be credited with assisting to prevent lapse into civil war and some individuals’ 
moves from helplessness and persecution to relative hope and equality. However the 
crudeness of the conclusion serves the point: do we really know what the long-term outcome 
and impact of amnesty is in South Africa? Can we really say it hasn’t lead to impunity? Can 
we accept that those most responsible have walked free to live what may be comfortable lives 
without punishment?”1022 
 
Since the end of the TRC’s term, the NPA seems to have been reluctant to pursue the 
prosecution of apartheid crimes.
1023
 The South African government has not pressed the issue 
of impunity for apartheid crimes either. Former president Thabo Mbeki granted pardons to 33 
apartheid freedom-fighters in 2002.
1024
 Shortly after the TRC released its Final Report, Mbeki 
announced that remaining apartheid era crimes were to be dealt with by the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) according to “normal practice”.1025 Normal practice referring to 
the NPA’s ordinary prosecutorial discretion including the discretion to negotiate plea 
bargains with apartheid criminals.
1026
 The TRC recommended the NPA to consider 
prosecution of apartheid crimes and handed a list of more than 300 names over to the 
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 Allan (Prosecution and Peace) (supra) 286-287. 
1023
 Allan (Prosecution and Peace) (supra) 285. 
1024
 Allan (Prosecution and Peace) (supra) 285-286.  
1025
 Mbeki T “Statement to the National Houses of Parliament and the Nation at the Tabling of the        
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (15 April 2003), available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2003/tm0415.html (accessed 2011/06/04). 
1026
 “Prosecuting Apartheid-Era Crimes? A South African Dialogue on Justice” (2008) International 
Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School 40-41, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/ 
spotlight/links/prosecuting_apartheid_era_crimes1.pdf (accessed 2011/05/20). Section 105A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides that a legally represented accused may enter into a mutually 
acceptable plea and sentence agreement with the NPA. According to section 105A(3), the court shall not 
participate in the negotiation of such an agreement. 
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NPA.
1027
 These were the names of suspected perpetrators who did not apply for amnesty or 
were denied amnesty and cases where the commission felt there were grounds for possible 
criminal prosecution. 
 
7.5.2.1 Initial Prosecutions 
 
One of the remarkable characteristics of the South African transition is the absence of a 
dedicated body or institution, inside or outside the criminal justice system, to investigate and 
prosecute the crimes committed under apartheid.
1028
 Almost all of the country’s efforts 
towards a successful transition were focused on the TRC. Some trials did however take place 
in the first few years subsequent to the end of apartheid. As the TRC commenced its work, 
two separate inquiries in Pretoria and Durban respectively were created to investigate 
political crimes committed during apartheid. The Pretoria Inquiry conducted an investigation 
into the use of “Death Squads” by the South African Police. It led to successful prosecutions 
for Eugene de Kock as well as Ferdinand Barnard and three former police officers for their 
involvement in the “Motherwell Four Bombing”.1029 These prosecutions were all based on 
violations of domestic criminal laws. 
 
The most notorious of the abovementioned cases was that of Eugene de Kock, former 
commander of the infamous Vlakplaas “counter-insurgency” unit. De Kock was subsequently 
dubbed “Prime Evil” by the press. He faced capital offence charges as well as numerous other 
charges relating to fraud, theft and contraventions of arms regulations. De Kock was found 
guilty in respect of most of these charges, including six counts of murder and received a 
                                                          
1027
 “NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid Crimes: State’s Application for Leave to Appeal Dismissed” 
Legal Resource Centre (2009-05-04), available at http://www.lrc.org.za/ press-releases/943-2009-05-04-
npa-prosecution-policy-for-apartheid-crimes-states-application-for-leave-to-appeal-dismissed (accessed 
2012/08/12). 
1028
 Klaaren J and Varney H “A Second Bite at the Amnesty Cherry-Constitutional and Policy Issues 
Around Legislation for a Second Amnesty” (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 572-593, 575. 
1029
 S v Nieuwoudt en Vier Andere (South Eastern Cape Local Division) Case No. 1/96 (unreported). After 
a successful appeal to the Cape High Court, three of these officers were granted amnesty by an ad hoc 
panel of the Amnesty Committee in 2005; see Mallinder (Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution 
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sentence of life imprisonment.
1030
 Later, De Kock was granted amnesty in respect of all but 
one set of murders for which he had been convicted. It is widely believed that the successful 
prosecution of De Kock helped to persuade other members of the Apartheid security forces to 
apply for amnesty. The De Kock-trial is one of very few examples where “the stick” proved 
effective. 
 
The case of former Minister of Defence Magnus Malan and the 19 other accused, was 
also conducted purely on the basis of domestic law.
1031
 The accused were brought to trial on 
13 charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder allegedly committed by members of 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) during the 1987 massacre at the home of a United 
Democratic Front (UDF) activist in KwaMakhuta, in the former Natal. These IFP members 
were allegedly trained in the Caprivi Strip by the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF). In October 1996 the case ended in a full acquittal for all the accused and raised 
serious doubts about the South African judiciary’s ability to deal with crimes committed 
under apartheid.  Some commentators have argued that the outcome of the trial created a 
disincentive for perpetrators of apartheid crimes to apply for amnesty.
1032
 In contrast to the 
De Kock-trial, this unsuccessful prosecution was therefore an instance where the “stick” 
mechanism was detrimental to the truth and reconciliation process. 
 
7.5.2.2 The Amended Prosecuting Policy for Apartheid Crimes 
 
In 2005 the NPA produced amendments to its prosecuting policy. Among the amendments 
the NPA introduced guidelines and directives for prosecuting apartheid-era crimes. This was 
attached in Appendix A under the heading “Prosecution policy and directives relating to 
prosecution of criminal matters arising from conflicts of the past and which were committed 
                                                          
1030
 S v De Kock (Transvaal Provincial Division) Case No. 266/94, 9 September 1996. 
1031
 S v Peter Msane and Nineteen Others (Durban and Coast Local Division) Case No. 1/96, 10 October 
1996. This case is often referred to as the “Malan-trial” since Magnus Malan was the most high profile 
defendant in the case.  
1032
 Varney H and Sarkin J “Failing to Pierce the Hit Squad Fail: An Analysis of the Malan Trial” (1997) 
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on or before 11 May 1994”. 1033 These guidelines were intended to “reflect and attach due 
weight” to amongst other things human rights culture, the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court in the AZAPO case:  
“[...] justifying the constitutionality of the above process [of transformation to democracy 
including the practice of granting amnesties], inter alia, on the basis that it did not absolutely 
deprive victims of the right to prosecution in cases where amnesty had been refused”. 
And also, the judgment of the Constitutional Court in S v Wouter Basson: 
 “[...] to the effect that the NPA represents the community and is under an international 
obligation to prosecute crimes of apartheid”. 
 
The introduction to the new directives contained an interesting contradiction. Firstly, 
the guidelines recognise that a continuation of the TRC process would be unconstitutional. 
Secondly, it provided: 
“As part of the normal legal processes and in the national interest, the NPA, working with the 
Intelligence Agencies, will be accessible to those persons who are prepared to unearth the 
truth of the conflicts of the past and who wish to enter into agreements that are standard in the 
normal execution of justice and the prosecuting mandate, and are accommodated in our 
legislation.” 
In other words, the guidelines provided for normal prosecutorial discretion to be exercised in 
respect of apartheid crimes, including plea bargaining. If conditions specified in the act were 
met, the guidelines allow indemnities to be granted without publication and outside of court, 
even if a prima facie case has been established. 
 
The new guidelines have influenced only a small number of prosecutions related to 
apartheid crimes. The first case was that of the so-called APLA Four in 2006.
1034
 The case 
received surprisingly little coverage in the South African media. An Eastern Cape newspaper, 
the Daily Dispatch, published the sole article on the case.
1035
 
                                                          
1033
 Prosecutions Policy and Directives Relating to Prosecution of Offences Emanating from Conflicts of 
the Past and Which Were Committed on or Before 11 May 1994, promulgated 1 December 2005. 
1034
 In the Matter between the State and Khwezi Ngoma et al. (Transkei Division), Case No.125/04, Plea 
and Sentence Agreement, 2 May 2006. 
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 The case concerned four former members of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA), the military wing of an anti-apartheid political party, the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC), who entered into a plea agreement with the NPA pursuant to the amended prosecution 
policy for apartheid crimes.
1036
 The APLA Four pleaded guilty to murder and attempted 
murder charges arising from the attempted raid of a police station. The purpose of the raid 
was to obtain weapons to use in the furtherance of the political objectives of the accused as 
members of APLA. For these crimes, and in terms of a plea agreement under the amended 
prosecuting policy, the accused received 28 years imprisonment suspended for 5 years.
1037
 
 
 In 2007, a similar case from the opposing side of the conflict would receive much 
more local and international attention. In Van der Merwe et al., the five accused were drawn 
from the ranks of the state machinery of the apartheid government.
1038
 Most prominent 
among the accused was Adriaan Vlok, the Minister of Law and Order from 1986 to 1991. 
Vlok had previously applied for amnesty, which he was granted. The TRC however 
expressed the belief that Vlok had not made a full disclosure of his involvement in political 
offenses before the commission. 
 
The accused were charged with the attempted murder of Frank Chikane, the former 
head of the South African Council of Churches and an outspoken critic of the apartheid 
system. The accused pleaded guilty and conceded in terms of the plea agreement that they 
had “unlawfully and intentionally, in furtherance of a common purpose, attempted to murder 
the Reverend Frank Chikane”.1039  The accused received sentences of ten and five years 
imprisonment suspended for 5 years in each case. Lubbe and Feirreira take the view that in 
light of the NPA’s acknowledgement of insufficient evidence against Vlok and Van der 
Merwe, it would have been difficult to obtain convictions for all of the accused without the 
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use of a plea and sentence agreement as provided for in terms of section 105A.
1040
  
Considering the seriousness of the crimes involved however, the sentences may be viewed as 
too lenient. To date, Adriaan Vlok is the only member of the apartheid government to be 
convicted of a crime committed in the furtherance of the policies of the apartheid regime. 
 
In addition to these cases, the NPA’s guidelines have been subjected to judicial 
review. In Nkadimeng and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions, the applicants 
launched a constitutional challenge to the NPA’s policy amendments on the prosecution of 
apartheid crimes.
1041
 The applicants in Nkadimeng submitted that the guidelines allowed for 
prosecutorial indemnity (amnesties?) which violates the Constitution on various grounds 
including non-compliance with international law norms.
1042
 Their submission was that the 
new guidelines would have the effect of creating a re-run of the TRC.
1043
 Among the 
applicants in the case were the widows of victims of apartheid-era crimes (such as the 
Cradock Four) for which no amnesties had been granted and in relation to which no 
prosecutions had taken place. The other applicants were non-governmental organisations 
acting as interested parties in the protection of the Constitution. 
 
One of the most contentious issues with regard to the amended prosecution policy was 
the substantial overlap between: 
 “[...] the criteria that guide the NPA’s prosecutorial decision-making [in section C (a) – (h) of 
the new policy directives] and those contained in Section 20 of the TRC Act, which the 
Amnesty Committee used when assessing applications.”
1044
 
With regards to this overlap, the following issues were identified by the court in 
Nkadimeng.
1045
 Firstly, did the policy amendments allow for an amnesty, indemnity or a re-
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run of the TRC? Secondly, would the policy amendments in relation to a decision not to 
prosecute have the effect of allowing for an amnesty or indemnity equivalent to a re-run of 
the TRC? The applicants contended that the new prosecuting guidelines provided for a type 
of “backdoor amnesty”. Furthermore, the new policy received opposition on the grounds that 
it violated the duty to prosecute gross human rights violations and to uphold the rule of law. 
 
The court ruled that the policy amendments to the national prosecuting policy were 
“inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and unlawful and 
invalid”.1046 According to the court: 
“[…] paragraphs C 2 and C 3 [of the NPA’s new policy directives] state or suggest that the 
first respondent may still not prosecute, despite adequate evidence against a particular 
individual having committed an offence [on or before 11 May 1994]. Alternatively paragraphs 
C 2 and C 3 broadly interpreted confer such a power to the prosecution, contrary to its 
constitutional obligation. This is a real threat to the applicants' constitutional rights.”
1047
 
The international law aspects of the criticism against the new guidelines namely the 
customary international law duty to prosecute and the customary international law prohibition 
of amnesties, were not addressed by the court in Nkadimeng.
1048
 This was unfortunate. By 
avoiding to attach due weight to these international law norms, the court missed a vital 
opportunity to reaffirm South Africa’s commitment to international criminal justice and its 
customary international law obligations. Such a gesture by our courts may have gone a long 
way to towards highlighting the exceptional nature of amnesties for international crimes. It 
may also have contributed towards fighting impunity for apartheid crimes in South Africa or 
towards ensuring that there is no risk of the country sliding into impunity.
1049
 The TRC was 
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undeniably the only choice to facilitate a successful transition to democracy in South Africa. 
As a result of the “necessity” of foregoing large-scale criminal prosecutions in the aftermath 
of apartheid and in order to build on the successes of the TRC, the long-term impact of the 
lack of criminal accountability in South Africa needs to be anticipated and addressed as far as 
possible. Both amnesty and accountability are part of the bridge to societal reconciliation and 
transformation. 
 
7.5.2.3 The Prosecution of Wouter Basson 
 
The prosecution of Wouter Basson was both unique and significant. It was unique in being 
the only case relating to apartheid crimes to make it to the South African Constitutional 
Court. Furthermore, due to the fact that Basson’s prosecution was based partly on the alleged 
abuse of a state sponsored chemical and biological warfare program, the case was the first of 
its kind.
1050
 Similar to the Malan-trial above, prosecutorial efforts ended in a controversial 
acquittal of a former member of the SANDF for alleged crimes connected to the system of 
apartheid. Unlike the Malan-trial, the trial of Wouter Basson involved questions pursuant to 
international criminal law and provides some insight into the approach of the South African 
courts towards a criminal case involving international law and transnational elements.
1051
 
 
In 1999 Basson was charged in the High Court on sixty seven counts including 
charges of murder, various human rights violations, fraud, conspiracy to commit murder and 
a myriad of drug related offences. Particularly relevant were the charges relating to Basson’s 
participation in crimes alleged to have been committed against members of the South West 
African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), members of the ANC and individuals in the 
SANDF designated as security risks during the Namibian border war. The offenses were all 
allegedly committed outside the territorial borders of South Africa while Basson was 
employed as a medical scientist in the Special Forces of the SANDF. Mia Swart observed 
that the crimes of which Basson stood accused were “so grotesque, they almost seemed 
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imaginary”.1052 The innovative methods of murder in which Basson allegedly participated did 
indeed appear as something from a work of fiction. These included charges of murder by 
dropping political prisoners into the ocean from a helicopter after they had been administered 
an overdose of muscle relaxants, as well as the development of cigarettes contaminated with 
anthrax. 
 
Amongst the other charges, Basson was charged with six counts of conspiracy to 
commit murder in terms of section 18(2) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. Section 
18(2) criminalises the act of conspiring to commit “any offense”. The prosecution’s view was 
that the alleged offenses were conspiracies hatched in Pretoria and thus within the jurisdiction 
of the South African courts. In terms of the Act the conspirator may be held liable for the 
same punishment which would be prescribed for the target offense, irrespective of whether 
the planned offense eventually took place.
1053
 Since the murders in which Basson allegedly 
participated took place outside South African territory, Basson was charged with conspiracy 
to commit murder. 
 
In the court of first instance the judge dismissed the charges relating to conspiracy, 
ruling that South African courts could not adjudicate over crimes committed in foreign 
countries.
1054
 Section 18(2) was read restrictively and it was held that the Act did not apply to 
conspiracies with effects beyond South African borders. The judge also found that Basson 
was protected by the 1989 Namibian amnesty, which granted amnesty to all members of the 
South African security forces in Namibia. The state’s subsequent appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal against the dismissal of the charges was rejected on various procedural and 
substantive grounds.
1055
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The proceedings in the court of first instance started some years prior to the enactment 
of the ICC Act. Many of the offenses with which Basson was charged amounted to war 
crimes perpetrated during an armed conflict.
1056
 This would have been of little importance 
however since the South African ICC Act prohibits retroactive prosecution. Since South 
Africa follows the dualist approach, the only option at the time was to revert to customary 
international law on the subject. In the High Court the prosecution did not seek to rely on 
international law as a basis for Basson’s trial. At the time ICL was a novel concept in the 
South African judiciary and considered as “exotic” by South African lawyers. 1057  The 
prosecution could not have been certain that their case would have succeeded on the basis of 
customary international law.
1058
 The position of international law in the new constitutional 
dispensation was unsettled, as it continues to be to some extent.  Still, it is strange that so 
little attention was paid to the matter of international crime (war crimes) by the prosecution 
and judges of the High Court under South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation, which 
specifically made customary international law binding on the Republic by way of a 
constitutional provision.
1059
 It must however be mentioned that the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols had been ratified by South Africa in 1952 and 1995 respectively (this was pointed 
out by the court in Basson) but were not yet implemented as required by section 231(4) of the 
Constitution by the time the case reached the court.
1060
 
 
Only once the case had reached the Constitutional Court did the state rely on 
international law as a basis for prosecution. The state’s case was partly based on customary 
international law (as part of South African municipal law) as a base for a South African court 
to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction. The Basson case came before the 
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Constitutional Court in two hearings. The first case revolved around preliminary issues, the 
state applied for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and simultaneously for leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court against the 
judgment of the High Court.
1061
 In a separate opinion, Sachs J concurred with the majority 
judgment but ventured further than his colleagues by dealing with “the question of the 
constitutional significance of conduct amounting to a war crime” as a supplementary 
matter.
1062
 A specific reference to ICL such as this by a judge of the Constitutional Court can 
be regarded as significant. Regarding this issue, Sachs J abridged the problem in the context 
of post-apartheid South Africa rather well: 
“The questions before us have to be determined in the complex historical and jurisprudential 
situation in which the South African State has moved from perpetrating grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law to providing constitutional protections against them.”
1063
 
This brings us back to the complex interdisciplinary nature of ICL. It raises many questions 
as to South Africa’s international law obligations under the post-apartheid constitutional 
dispensation. Sachs considered firstly, whether Basson’s conduct could be characterised as 
war crimes and secondly, if this was the case, “whether and to what extent this could impose 
a special constitutional responsibility on the State to prosecute the respondent”.1064 Thirdly, 
Sachs considered: 
“…whether the quashing of the charges by the trial court followed by the refusal of the SCA 
to entertain an appeal against this decision, without reference to the fact that the prosecution of 
war crimes was involved, manifested a failure to give effect to South Africa’s international 
obligations as set out in the Constitution”.
1065
  
After considering these three questions, Sachs found that Basson’s conduct did indeed 
amount to war crimes, and referring to section 232 of the Constitution noted that: 
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“The rules of humanitarian law in armed conflicts are to be observed by all States whether or 
not they have ratified the Conventions that contain them because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law.”
1066
  
Furthermore, Sachs opined that “enquiries into whether the SCA failed to give sufficient or 
any weight to the State’s obligations under international law, raise constitutional questions, 
properly before this Court”.1067 
 
The second Constitutional Court case overturned the quashing of the charges relating 
to conspiracy.
1068
 The states’ submission was that the High Court’s ruling amounted to an 
error in law.
1069
 For this submission the prosecution relied on the extreme gravity of the 
charges and the “national and international need to have these issues properly adjudicated” 
(emphasis added).
1070
 The Constitutional Court was not asked to pronounce upon the guilt of 
Basson. The proceeding were undertaken to establish whether fresh prosecutions could be 
initiated. The court ruled in favour of renewed prosecution. The court’s ruling was not made 
on the basis of customary international law however, but on consideration of the Riotous 
Assemblies Act and the Defence Act. The court nevertheless considered the charges in 
relation to South Africa’s international law obligations.1071 The court ruled that the SCA had 
neglected to take into consideration South Africa’s customary international law obligations to 
uphold the principles of humanitarian law in relation to the quashed charges: 
“[183] … The quashed charges relate to the alleged use of poison and bacteria for offensive 
purposes to kill persons regarded as opponents of the then government. Although the most 
dramatic of the charges, and certainly the most heinous if true, are those that relate to the 
killing of hundreds of South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) captives and the 
threat to infect the water supply with cholera, the four other charges are far from trivial. They 
allege murder by poison and the existence of an active link between Dr Basson and a 
programme of assassination conducted by the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB). 
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[184] As was pointed out at Nuremburg, crimes against international law are committed by 
people, not by abstract entities, so that only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced. Given the nature of the charges, the SCA 
should have given appropriate weight and attention to these considerations, even in the 
absence of any argument on these issues by the State. Given the extreme gravity of the 
charges and the powerful national and international need to have these issues properly 
adjudicated, particularly in the light of the international consensus on the normative 
desirability of prosecuting war criminals, only the most compelling reasons would have 
justified the SCA in exercising its discretion to refuse to rule on the charges.”
1072
 
 
The Constitutional Court ruling in favour of the state meant that the case against 
Basson could be re-opened based on the previously quashed conspiracy charges. However, 
the NPA decided not to re-indict Basson. The NPA reasoned that their charges could have 
been opposed by the defence of autrefois acquit since the new charges would overlap with 
charges over which Basson had already been acquitted.
1073
  
 
 To some, the unsuccessful prosecution of Wouter Basson only served to reaffirm the 
superiority of the TRC model over a prosecution based transitional justice model. Desmond 
Tutu remarked that “the case has shown clearly how inadequate the criminal justice system 
can be in exposing the full truth of, and establishing clear accountability for what happened in 
our country”.1074 Proponents of criminal prosecution can only speculate on what the effects of 
more prosecutions for apartheid crimes might have been.  
 
No other case better illustrates a failure in the South African transitional justice 
project. Wouter Basson did not apply for amnesty. Neither was he successfully prosecuted. 
The end result was that neither the first prize of the truth about Project Coast and apartheid 
crimes in the SANDF, nor the second prize of accountability was achieved. From an 
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international law perspective, the trial represented a case of ‘too little too late’ on the part of 
the prosecution. It is seems plausible that the prosecution opted for the safer route by relying 
on “clear” domestic law instead of “vague” international law. On top of all this, Mia Swart 
notes the Constitutional Court’s failure to use the case as a platform for asserting the 
importance of international law in the new South Africa:        
“The Constitutional Court […] missed a perfect opportunity to acknowledge the proper status 
of international humanitarian law and customary international law in South Africa.”
1075
 
The Constitutional Court’s “awkward” approach to international law in the Basson case does 
not align with the status afforded to international law under the Final Constitution.
1076
  
 
7.6 South Africa and the International Criminal Court 
 
Unlike other treaties pertaining to ICL, the Rome Statute does not create a clear obligation on 
State Parties to incorporate new substantive criminal law provisions into domestic law 
through legislation that criminalises the offenses in article 5 of the Statute, neither to provide 
for universal- or extraterritorial jurisdiction over such crimes.
1077
 The relationship between 
international law and domestic law is generally regulated by a state’s domestic law. A state 
such as South Africa following the dualist approach to international law, needs to criminalise 
“broadly equivalent offenses” to enable it to prosecute the forms of conduct outlawed by the 
Rome Statute.
1078
 This has been the approach of most states party to the Rome Statute.  
 
Furthermore, it has been theorised that the principle of complementarity in the Rome 
Statute creates a strong incentive for national implementation legislation.
1079
 In the South 
African context this means the following: South Africa has signed a multilateral treaty and is 
bound by the principle pacta servanda sunt. The latter treaty obliges South Africa to 
prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (to be willing to prosecute such 
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crimes) and to take steps to actualise such obligation (enabling it to be able to prosecute the 
aforementioned crimes) or face the prospect of incurring state responsibility for non-
compliance with its obligations under treaty law.   
 
Whether as a result of the abovementioned dynamic or due to South Africa’s re-
emergence as a respected member of the international community of states, South Africa 
emerged as an early a champion for the ICC in Africa. At the Rome Conference, South Africa 
was among those states campaigning for a strong and independent ICC.
1080
 Thereafter, South 
Africa signed and ratified the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998 and in doing so became the 23
rd
 
State Party. Alignment between the South African legal system and the feature of 
complementarity under the Rome Statute is the first and foremost requirement for South 
Africa to competently discharge its obligations towards the ICC.  
 
7.6.1 The ICC Act 
 
To bring South Africa’s substantive criminal law in line with the substantive criminal law 
contained in the Rome Statute and with the scheme of complementarity contained therein, 
South Africa has enacted implementation legislation in the form of the Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courts Act (the “ICC Act”). The South African 
Parliament passed the ICC Act on 18 July 2002, shortly after the Rome Statute entered into 
force. The swift enactment of implementation legislation reaffirmed the South African 
government’s commitment to the ideals of international criminal justice. This commitment is 
expressed in the short title and preamble of the ICC Act. The preamble to the ICC Act 
describes South Africa as “an integral and accepted member of the community of nations” 
and requires the state to honour its international obligations by “bringing persons who 
commit such atrocities to justice”. Through the ICC Act, South Africa became the first 
African State Party to pass legislation implementing the law of the Rome Statute.
1081
 
 
The ICC Act creates a framework for implementing the Rome Statute and 
criminalises the most serious crimes of international concern as set out in the Rome Statute 
(genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) by creating substantive offences under 
                                                          
1080
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 345. 
1081
 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 461. 
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South African law with direct reference to the definitions of the crimes provided for in the 
Rome Statute.
1082
 Although there was initially some criticism against the ICC Act, most 
commentators are pleased with it since it integrates the Rome Statute’s definitions of the core 
crimes into South African domestic law and provides for a qualified form of universal 
jurisdiction with regard to those crimes.
1083
 
  
7.6.1.1 Objectives of the ICC Act: Prosecuting Core Crimes Through National 
Legislation and South Africa’s Complementarity Obligations 
 
The ICC Act aims to provide a structure for prosecuting core crimes nationally “in cases 
brought against any person accused of having committed a crime in the Republic and beyond 
the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances” and, “in the event of the national 
prosecuting authority declining or being unable to prosecute a person”, for cooperation with 
the ICC.
1084
 The ICC Act was clearly intended to bring South Africa in line with the 
complementarity regime of the Rome Statute and to prevent impunity through either direct or 
indirect enforcement of the Rome Statute. According to Du Plessis: 
“[…] the act takes seriously the ‘complementarity’ obligation of South African courts to 
domestically investigate and prosecute the ICC offences of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide.”
1085
 
This is reinforced by the preamble to the ICC Act under which South Africa commits to bring 
“persons who commit such atrocities to justice […] in a court of law of the Republic in terms 
of its domestic law where possible”. The wording of the preamble to the ICC Act indicates a 
strong commitment from South Africa’s parliament to the objectives of the Rome Statute. 
Through this the South African state has, even if only by way of implication, identified itself 
strongly with the values of the Rome Statute. The values of the Rome Statute have been 
described as the universal values of the international community, the ICC itself is an 
important consequence of the “move [in new and emerging international law] away from a 
                                                          
1082
 Section 3 (a) and (c). This method of implementation is a variant of so-called static implementation of 
international criminal law. See Rikhof J “Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes 
Prosecutions on International Impunity” (2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 1-51, 11-12. 
1083
 Katz was critical of certain aspects of the Act prior to its amendment (see para 7.6.1.5 infra). 
1084
 Section 3 (d) and (e). 
1085
 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 461. 
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state-centric model of traditional international law based on the preservation of sovereignty, 
to one more concerned with humanity”.1086  Through its adoption of the ICC Act, South 
Africa has formally demonstrated its support for this movement. 
 
7.6.1.2 Jurisdiction under the ICC Act 
 
The substantive jurisdiction under the ICC Act is derived entirely from the Rome Statute. The 
ICC Act incorporates the crimes in article 5 of the Rome Statute, namely genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Prior to the criminalisation of the international crimes 
contained in the Rome Statute, similar acts may have been prosecuted as ‘ordinary’ domestic 
crimes such as murder, rape or robbery. The definitions for the ‘new’ international crimes 
were transplanted directly from the Rome Statute, which is attached as an annexure to the 
ICC Act. According to Du Plessis, the drafters of the ICC Act were aware of the benefits of 
the Rome Statute as “a codified statement of the elements that make up the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity” and incorporated the Rome Statute’s 
definitions of those crimes for precisely that reason.
1087
 
 
The jurisdiction provided for in the ICC Act narrows the scope of universal 
jurisdiction on the one hand, and makes the system of complementarity more practical on the 
other.
1088
 The type of universal jurisdiction provided for under the ICC Act (often referred to 
as “conditional universal jurisdiction”) recognises the territorial limits of South Africa’s 
enforcement jurisdiction, namely the general rule that a state may not enforce its criminal 
laws in the territory of another state.
1089
  The latter form of universal jurisdiction has emerged 
                                                          
1086
 Tladi D “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of 
International Law” (2009) 34 South African Yearbook of International Law 57-69, 62. 
1087
 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 463. 
1088
 See Du Plessis (South Africa’s ICC Act) (supra) 4. 
1089
 France v Turkey (The case of the S.S. Lotus) Publications of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, Series A, No. 10, 7 September 1927 at 18: “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not 
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a convention”. See also Kemp et al. (Criminal Law in South 
Africa) (supra) 561. 
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as a more pragmatic alternative to the exercise of absolute universal jurisdiction by states.
1090
 
This fits in well with the complementarity regime envisioned by the ICC. Accordingly, any 
state may prosecute individuals for certain international crimes provided that the individual is 
present in the state at the time.
1091
 South Africa’s ICC Act is an example of such a limitation 
of classical universal jurisdiction.
1092
 The ICC Act does not however place any limitations on 
South Africa’s prescriptive jurisdiction in respect of the core crimes in the Rome Statute. 
                                                          
1090
 Conditional universal jurisdiction currently seems to have become the preferred way of invoking 
universal jurisdiction. Traditional, pure universal jurisdiction grants jurisdiction to any state “regardless of 
the situs of the offence and the nationalities of the offender and the offended” and such violations “can as 
such be prosecuted in any state on behalf of the international community” (see Randall (Universal 
Jurisdiction under International Law) (supra) 788); see also Van der Vyver (Universal Jurisdiction in 
International Criminal Law) (supra) 108; see also Swart M “Democratic Republic of the Congo versus 
Belgium: A Step Backward?” (2002) 17 Suid-Afrikaanse Publiekreg/South African Public Law 305–318, 
312: “According to the principle of universal jurisdiction states can exercise jurisdiction over non-nationals 
for crimes committed in a third state”). In rare cases where the principle was invoked in other jurisdictions 
however, courts have been tentative and cautious with the interpretation of the principle. The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Belgium case involved the prosecution of a non-national (Mr. Yerodia) by 
Belgium for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (“DRC”). Mr. Yerodia was not present in Belgian territory at the time that the warrant for his arrest 
was issued. Nor were there allegations of these crimes having been committed against Belgian nationals. 
The Belgian authorities thus sought to invoke universal jurisdiction in its widest form since its legislation 
(Belgian War Crimes Act of 1993) included the principle of universal jurisdiction and non-recognition of 
immunities [See Art(s) 5 and 7 of the Belgian War Crimes Act of 1993; See also Swart (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo versus Belgium) (supra) 312 (These articles “[gave] Belgian courts almost 
unlimited jurisdiction”)]. The Court found that the issue and circulation of an arrest warrant against an 
incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs in absentia was a violation of international law. The judgment in 
the case prompted a legislative change to curtail the jurisdictional reach of the Belgian War Crimes Act. 
This judgment has also been met with plenty criticism however. It was regarded by many as a hefty blow 
to ICL, undoing the progress made by the House of Lords in the Pinochet case. In this regard the minority 
judgment of Van den Wyngaert has received some support. 
1091
 Cassese A “Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction” (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 589-595, 592. 
1092
 See Du Plessis (South Africa’s ICC Act) (supra) 4. 
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Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe (to extend its national laws 
extraterritorially) which is a by-product of its sovereignty.
1093
 
 
Section 4(1) establishes jurisdiction for South African courts over ICC crimes 
committed in South African territory by providing that “despite anything to the contrary in 
any other law of the Republic, any person who commits a crime is guilty of an offence and is 
liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment”. Section 4(1) appears to reaffirm the principle 
of territorial jurisdiction under which a state may prosecute any criminal conduct occurring 
within its territorial borders. According to Du Plessis, it is difficult to comprehend why the 
drafters of the ICC Act chose to create such jurisdiction only by way of implication.
1094
 
Nevertheless, this type of jurisdiction does not generate any significant controversy since it is 
a well-established basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a state. 
 
Section 4(3) of the ICC Act provides four grounds of jurisdiction in order to try an 
individual for core crimes committed outside the territory of the Republic. A court in South 
Africa may try “any person who commits a crime contemplated in subsection (1) outside the 
territory of the Republic” if: 
(a) that person is a South African citizen; 
(b) that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the Republic; 
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the 
Republic; 
(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or against a 
person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic. 
A crime committed outside the territory of South Africa under any of these four 
circumstances is regarded as having been committed in the territory of South Africa. Section 
4(3) is of particular significance since it extends jurisdiction to persons who are not South 
African citizens but present in South African territory and non-South Africans who have 
committed core crimes against South African citizens. This is according to Du Plessis “a 
                                                          
1093
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 66 footnote 375; Kemp et al. (Criminal Law 
in South Africa) (supra) 554; see also the discussion of the SALC case at para 7.7.1.2 infra. 
1094
 Du Plessis M “Bringing the International Criminal Court Home” (2003) 16 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 1-16, 3. 
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progressive and potentially far-reaching aspect of South Africa's ICC Act”.1095 The ICC Act 
thus provides for a qualified extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of crimes supplanted from 
the Rome Statute. The hereto unsuccessful attempts by states to invoke pure universal 
jurisdiction, provides supports to the legislative curtailment of universal jurisdiction in South 
Africa’s ICC Act.1096  
 
With regard to jurisdiction ratione temporis, the ICC Act emulates the Rome Statute 
and does not allow for retrospective prosecution.
1097
 This is in line with section 35(3)(l) of the 
South African Constitution which guarantees that all persons have the right “not to be 
convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international 
law at the time it was committed or omitted”. 
 
In contemplating the jurisdictional reach of the ICC Act, diplomatic and head of state 
immunity as a bar to criminal prosecution must also be considered. Under article 27 of the 
Rome Statute, official capacity cannot exempt a person from criminal responsibility. The 
South African ICC Act contains a similar provision in section 4(2)(a): 
“Despite any other law to the contrary, including customary and conventional international 
law, the fact that a person - (a) is or was a head of State or government, a member of a 
government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official [...] is neither – 
(i) a defence to a crime; nor (ii) a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person 
has been convicted of a crime.” 
However, foreign and international case law illustrates the enduring controversy over 
diplomatic or head of state immunity under customary international law as a bar to criminal 
prosecution in domestic courts. These cases serve as authority for asserting that the immunity 
                                                          
1095
 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 463. 
1096
 See ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (The “Arrest Warrant” case), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2002, 3; see also Bianchi (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 21-22: “Recent 
attempts, such as the Belgian legislation of 1993-1999 to codify the purest version of the [universality] 
principle in domestic legislation have caused extensive opposition and eventually led to a reconsideration 
of its content and of its scope of application” (at 22). See also footnote 1090 supra. 
1097
 Rome Statute of the ICC, articles 11 and 24; ICC Act, section 5(2); see also Strydom H “South Africa 
and the International Criminal Court” (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 345-366, 
356. 
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of acting heads of state and foreign diplomats cannot be trumped by domestic legislation for 
the purposes of prosecuting international crime on behalf of the international community.
1098
 
Because the ICC Act specifically disqualifies “any law to the contrary, including customary 
and conventional international law” and makes specific reference to acting heads of state and 
members of government, section 4(2)(a) can be regarded as a considerably bolder 
proclamation of the irrelevance of immunities for the prosecution of core crimes in 
comparison to article 27 of the Rome Statute. Du Plessis notes however that despite this 
proactive improvement in the ICC Act, it is difficult to predict the approach that a South 
African court will adopt in this regard and that a South African court “might find that [section 
4(2)(a)] does not do away with personal head of state immunity”.1099 
 
Section 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act is however supported by the provisions of the 
Constitution. According the article 232 of the Constitution, the customary international rules 
on diplomatic and head of state immunity form part of South African law, but only to the 
extent that it is consistent with the Constitution and acts of parliament. Therefore, domestic 
prosecutions of diplomats and current and former heads of state in terms of the South African 
ICC Act cannot be opposed on the customary international law right to diplomatic or head of 
state immunity. These rights are inconsistent with section 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act and if 
invoked, would undermine the purpose and object of the Act, namely to prosecute 
perpetrators of core crimes under national law or to ensure cooperation with the ICC in 
respect of such prosecutions. 
 
7.6.1.3 Institution of Prosecution and Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) was established within the NPA as a specialised 
unit to investigate and prosecute crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC Act. This unit is 
headed by the Special Director of Public Prosecutions (currently Adv. Anton Ackerman SC) 
                                                          
1098
 Du Plessis M “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, available at http://www.csvr.org.za/ 
wits/confpaps/duplessis.htm (accessed 2011/08/03). In the Pinochet case, the House of Lords held that the 
immunities afforded to acting heads of state under international law constitute a bar to prosecution before 
national courts (See Pinochet I at 938 and Pinochet III at 905H). In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ came 
to a similar conclusion (para 58). 
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 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 474. 
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appointed by the President by way of a proclamation in terms of section 13(1)(c) of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act.
1100
 Under the proclamation the Special Director is 
instructed “to manage and direct the investigation and prosecution of crimes contemplated in 
the [ICC Act]”.1101  
 
In terms of the ICC Act, the consent of the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP) must be obtained before any person may be prosecuted for crimes under the Act.
1102
 
In deciding whether or not to prosecute, the NDPP must: 
“…give recognition to the obligation that the Republic, in the first instance and in line with 
the principle of complementarity as contemplated in Article 1 of the Statute, has jurisdiction 
and the responsibility to prosecute persons accused of having committed a crime.”
1103
  
In the event that the NDPP decides not to institute the prosecution, the he or she must in 
terms of section 5(5) provide full reasons to the Director-General of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, who in turn must relay such reasons to the ICC. According to 
Du Plessis: 
“It is clear, however, that any decision by the National Director to refuse to institute a 
prosecution before a South African court must be carefully considered, especially since an 
                                                          
1100
 Proclamation No. 46 of 2003 in Government Gazette 24876 of 2003-05-23. 
1101
 Upon submission of this dissertation the PCLU was investigating allegations of crimes against 
humanity brought against former Madagascan president Marc Ravalomanana for his alleged role in the 
killing of demonstrators by his presidential guard during the civil unrest in Madagascar in 2009. 
Ravalomanana was subsequently convicted in absentia and is currently in exile in South Africa. According 
to reports, the NPA believes that there is “reasonable evidence” that crimes against humanity were 
committed (see “NPA investigates Ravalomanana” News24 (2012/08/05), available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/NPA-investigates-Ravalomanana-20120805 (accessed 
2012/08/08). South Africa has jurisdiction over the case on the basis of section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act. 
1102
 ICC Act, section 5(1). Such consent is not however required to initiate an investigation into the alleged 
commission of crimes under the ICC Act (see Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (North Gauteng High Court) Case No. 77150/09, 8 May 2012, 
para 21).  
1103
 ICC Act, section 5(2). 
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unjustified refusal will lead to international responsibility of South Africa for its failure to 
comply with its obligations under the ICC Statute.”
1104
 
In light of the seriousness of the crimes under the ICC Act and the constitutional endorsement 
of international law and customary international law in section 231-232 of the Constitution, 
the NDPP will in all probability have to provide compelling reasons not to prosecute. 
 
Section 5(6) of the ICC Act reiterates article 17(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, by stating 
that any case which the NDPP refuses to prosecute is admissible before the ICC. Thus, the 
NDPP’s decision not to prosecute may represent “unwillingness” on the part of the South 
African state to prosecute for purposes of admissibility in the ICC.  
 
7.6.1.4 Cooperation with the ICC 
 
The modern system of international criminal justice requires efficient state cooperation for 
both direct and indirect enforcement of ICL. The role of domestic criminal law systems and 
the indirect enforcement of ICL have been pushed to the fore by the complementarity regime 
of the permanent ICC. However, domestic criminal law systems also have an essential role to 
play in the direct enforcement of ICL. On either front, domestic criminal justice systems are 
“vital to the functioning of the international system”. 1105  Close cooperation between 
international prosecuting and court officials as well as national criminal justice systems is 
needed to facilitate the collection of evidence, gathering of witnesses, the apprehension of 
alleged offenders, preparations for trial and incarceration of convicted persons.
1106
  
 
The ICC possesses no enforcement mechanisms and relies heavily on cooperation 
with the national law enforcement systems.
1107
 In principle, states party to the Rome Statute 
have an obligation to cooperate with the ICC.
1108
 This is especially important since trials in 
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 Du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 466. 
1105
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 347. 
1106
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 347. 
1107
 Du Plessis (Bringing the ICC Home) (supra) 7. 
1108
 Ambos K “Prosecuting International Crimes at the National and International Level” in Kaleck et al. 
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absentia are prohibited under article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, which states that “the 
accused shall be present during the trial”. Part 9 of the Rome Statute, entitled “International 
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance”, further elucidates the cooperative obligations of State 
Parties. Under article 86 of the Rome Statute: 
“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”  
Under article 93 of the Rome Statute the ICC can request various forms of assistance relating 
to investigations and prosecutions. This includes: 
 Finding persons and items.1109 
 Taking evidence (including testimony under oath).1110 
 The service and provision of documents.1111 
 The protection of witnesses and victims.1112 
 “Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested 
state”.1113 
 
Part 4 of South Africa’s ICC Act deals with “cooperation with and assistance to [the 
ICC] in or outside South Africa”. The ICC Act contains detailed provisions on matters 
relating to the arrest and surrender of suspects (sections 8-13), judicial assistance in ICC 
investigations and prosecutions (sections 14-30) and the enforcement of sentences imposed 
by the ICC (sections 31-32).  
 
7.6.1.5 Initial Deficiencies in the ICC Act and Subsequent Legislative Amendments 
 
The notion of complementarity necessitates transformative legislation which clearly outlines 
the content and scope of application of the Rome Statute. Adequate national legislation is 
needed for South Africa to effectively discharge its complementarity obligations under the 
                                                          
vertical in effect than that of the ad hoc tribunals yet also less meek than traditional horizontal cooperation 
based on mutual assistance.  
1109
 Article 93 (1)(a). 
1110
 Article 93 (1)(b). 
1111
 Article 93 (1)(c) and (i). 
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 Article 93 (1)(j). 
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Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 286 
 
Rome Statute. The initial deficiencies in South Africa’s ICC Act illustrate the practical and 
procedural problems that may arise from inadequately drafted legislation.  
 
According to section 9(1) the ICC Act, a request from the ICC for the provisional 
arrest of a suspect must be referred to the Director General of the Department of Justice who 
must immediately forward the request to the National Director of Public Prosecutions. Based 
on an affidavit attesting to factors such as the existence of the warrant and the presence or 
expected presence of the person concerned, the magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest of 
the person concerned. The matter is then brought before a magistrate “in whose area of 
jurisdiction he or she has been arrested or detained”.1114 The magistrate may only make an 
order of delivery after considering three issues. Firstly, that the person concerned is the 
suspect named in the ICC warrant.
1115
 Secondly, that the person has been arrested in 
accordance with the procedures provided for under domestic law. 
1116
And finally, whether the 
person’s rights under Chapter 2 of the Constitution (to the extent to which it may be 
applicable) have been respected.
1117
  
 
Anton Katz identified an initial deficiency in the ICC Act which may have resulted in 
South Africa being unable to discharge some of its obligations of cooperation and assistance 
under the Rome Statute.
1118
 The defect resulted from discrepancies between section 10(5) and 
section 11(1) of the ICC Act. The old section 10(5) provided that if the magistrate is satisfied 
that the three requirements above have been met, the magistrate “must issue an order 
committing that person to prison pending his or her surrender to the court” (own italics). 
Section 11(1) contains the provision on the removal of persons and “refers to any person in 
respect of whom an order to be surrendered has been given under section 10(5)” (author’s 
emphasis).
1119
 Under the old section 10(5) there was no mention of an order to be 
surrendered, only an order committing that person to prison. According to Katz, the problem 
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 Section 10(1). 
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 Section 10(1)(a). 
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 Section 10(1)(b). 
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 Katz (An Act of Transformation) (supra). 
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with the ICC Act’s scheme of arrest and surrender had resulted from the fact that “[t]here 
[was] no provision for any competent authority […] to issue an order of surrender”.1120 
 
 In addition to the three issues that the magistrate needs to consider before issuing an 
order of delivery, section 10(5) of the ICC Act requires that the magistrate be satisfied that 
the person concerned be surrendered to the court for: (a) prosecution for the alleged crime; 
(b) imposition of a sentence by the court for the crime in respect of which the person has been 
convicted, or (c) serving a sentence already imposed by the court. There is uncertainty as to 
the level of proof required from the prosecution to prove these requirements. Du Plessis is of 
the opinion that these additional requirements can be “regarded as satisfied on the strength of 
the ‘material supporting the request’”.1121 Section 89 of the Rome Statute provides that the 
“Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the 
material supporting the request” to a State Party. His argument is that this “onerous evidential 
burden” has, by the time the magistrate considers the warrant, already been discharged by the 
ICC Prosecutor before the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC and that the material supporting the 
request should be satisfactory proof for the South African magistrate considering the 
request.
1122
  
 
To rectify the shortcomings in the ICC Act as identified by Katz and others, section 
10(5) of the ICC Act was amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 22 of 2005. 
Section 10(5) now reads as follows: 
“[...] the magistrate must order that such person be surrendered to the Court and that he or she 
be committed to prison pending such surrender.” 
The new wording clearly gives magistrates the competence to issue an order of surrender or 
an order of incarceration pending the surrender of the person. 
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 Katz (An Act of Transformation) (supra) 29. 
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 Du Plessis (Bringing the ICC Home) (supra) 10. 
1122
 Du Plessis (Bringing the ICC Home) (supra) 10.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 288 
 
7.6.1.6 Article 98 Agreements 
 
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute provides that: 
“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to 
which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the 
Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of 
consent for the surrender.” 
In excess of 100 states have entered into such agreements with the USA.
1123
 An agreement in 
terms of article 98(2) is referred to as Bilateral Immunity agreement (“BIA”) or an article 98 
agreement. Signing such an agreement represents a commitment not to surrender any past or 
present US national, government official or military employee to the ICC. In turn, the United 
States makes a reciprocal commitment. Thus, it can be contended that BIA’s represent a 
political compromise in the Rome Statute which may adversely affect the Court’s mandate. 
 
South Africa is one of only a few African states not to have signed a BIA with the 
United States of America.
1124
 By choosing not to conclude such an agreement with the USA, 
the South African government sends out a clear signal of support for the ICC that gives 
normative goals primacy over a realist approach to international law, international relations 
and foreign policy.
1125
 One might argue that the refusal of the South African government to 
enter into a BIA with the USA emphasises its belief in the value ICC and its commitment to 
the rule of law.
1126
 South Africa’s refusal to enter into a BIA is certainly in line with the 
                                                          
1123
 See International Criminal Court: Article 98 Agreements Research Guide, Georgetown International 
Law Library, available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/article_98.cfm (accessed 2012/04/10); 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Factsheet of BIAs, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf  (accessed 2012/04/10). 
1124
 Cotton DH “The Magnificent Seven: Africa’s Response to US Article 98” African Human Rights Law 
Journal 1-34; see also International Criminal Court – Article 98 Agreements Research Guide, Georgetown 
International Law Library, available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/article_98.cfm (accessed 
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1125
 See Kelley J “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and 
Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements” (2007) 101 (3) American Political Science Review 573-589. 
1126
 See Kelley (Who Keeps International Commitments and Why?) (supra) 573-589. 
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values of the Constitution and existing international law obligations on the South African 
state.  
 
Article 98 agreements could arguably be opposed in view of article 53 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 53 states that treaties which conflict with 
a peremptory norm of international law are void. BIA’s have the potential to undermine the 
fundamental object and purpose of the Rome Statute to prosecute perpetrators of crimes 
which are widely accepted to represent ius cogens norms under international law. As a 
counterargument, the USA could rely on the principle pacta tertiis nec nosent nec prosunt 
which affirms that states are not bound by treaties to which they have not signed. Using this 
principle (also enshrined in the Vienna Convention) the USA can argue that the Rome Statute 
may not be enforced against their sovereignty and against USA nationals. 
 
7.6.2 The Politics of International Criminal Justice from the Domestic Perspective 
 
The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation commits itself to 
the promotion of “South Africa’s national interests and values, the African Renaissance and a 
better world for all”.1127 The department’s strategic objectives are inter alia to “contribute to 
the formulation of international law and enhance respect for the provisions thereof” and to 
“promote multilateralism to secure a rules based international system”.1128 Elsewhere it has 
been said that: 
“In international affairs South Africa is committed to the promotion of human rights, the 
application of international law, interaction with African countries as equal partners and the 
pursuit of friendly relations with peoples and nations of the world.”
1129
 
From the above it seems as if South African foreign policy is geared towards the 
advancement of national, regional and international well-being through inter alia 
endorsement of and contribution to the development of the international legal order. 
                                                          
1127
 See Department of International Relations and Cooperation website, available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/index.html (accessed 2011/09/29). 
1128
 See Department of International Relations and Cooperation website, available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/index.html (accessed 2011/09/29). 
1129
 Affidavit of Mr NJ Makhubele (Director: International Affairs, Department of Justice) as quoted in 
Thatcher v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2005 (4) SA 543 (C) para 27. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 290 
 
Domestic, regional and international objectives are not always perfectly aligned however. 
The South African government may find itself constrained in the exercise of its international 
obligations by domestic or regional political factors. What happens when obligations owed to 
the international community in this regard conflict with the policies of the regional political 
organisation, such as the AU? South Africa faces exactly this type of friction as a result of the 
controversy over the ICC’s arrest warrant for the Sudanese president, Omar Al-Bashir, and 
the prospect partly as a result of the latter conflict, of a regional court in Africa with 
international criminal jurisdiction. These considerations will be instrumental for the future of 
ICL in South Africa. 
 
7.6.2.1 The United Nations Security Council and the ICC 
 
The ICC is not an organ of the UN, but a court founded on mutual consensus through a 
multilateral treaty. The UN is however supportive of the work of the ICC. The ICC 
compliments the UN’s focus on human rights and international peace in many ways. An 
organ of the UN that does however have a direct influence over the functioning of the ICC is 
the UN’s executive body, the UNSC. The UNSC plays an important role in the functioning of 
the ICC in two respects, referrals in terms of article 13(b) and deferrals in terms of article 16 
of the Rome Statute. According to article 13(b) the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if: 
“A situation in which one or more of [the crimes in article 5] appears to have been committed 
is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations.” 
An important consequence of such a referral is that the ICC may assert jurisdiction over acts 
committed in a state not party to the Rome Statute. Also very significant is the fact that an 
article 13(b) referral made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain international 
peace represents a decision by the UNSC which is binding on all member states of the UN. 
On 31 March 2005 the UNSC used its article 13(b) power for the first time and referred the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC.
1130
  
 
                                                          
1130
 See UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005).  
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Article 16 is another provision in the Rome Statute which provides the UNSC with 
important powers towards the functioning of the ICC. According to article 16, “Deferral of 
investigation or prosecution”: 
“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for 
a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” 
The referral by the UNSC of the situation in Darfur has led to the issue of an indictment for 
the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, and others. This use of its power of referral along 
with the refusal to use its power of deferral in relation to the Darfur situation has provoked 
criticism from the African Union towards the UNSC and the ICC. 
 
7.6.2.2 The African Union and the ICC: A Stormy Relationship 
 
Regional political organisations are increasingly influential on state foreign policy regarding 
cooperation in matters of international criminal justice.
1131
 The African Union has of late 
become critical of the ICC. There is currently a perception among African states that the 
Court’s exclusive focus on Africa is politically engineered rather than based on the demands 
of justice.
1132
 A withdrawal of support from Africa, with its majority in the Assembly of State 
Parties, poses a serious threat to the overall legitimacy of the Court.  
 
On 3 July 2009 the African Union opposed the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest 
warrant for Sudan’s President Omar Hassan Al Bashir by adopting a decision directing 
                                                          
1131
 The African Union’s decision not to cooperate with the ICC’s arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir can be 
sighted as an example in this regard. See Harper P “Ignoring ICC warrant is unconstitutional” The Times 
(2009/07/12) http://www.lhr.org.za/news/2009/ignoring-icc-warrant%E2%80%98unconstitutional%E2% 
80%99-sunday-times (accessed 2012/08/22).  
1132
 Murithi T “Africa’s Relations with the ICC: A Need for Reorientation?” in Perspectives: Political 
Analysis and Commentary from Africa “A Fractured Relationship: Africa and the International Criminal 
Court” (2012) No. 1 published by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung 4-5. 
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African States not to assist the court in executing the indictment.
1133
 As early as July 2008, 
the AU Peace and Security Council made an appeal to the UNSC to invoke article 16 of the 
Rome Statute to defer the prosecution of Bashir that had been initiated at the ICC on the 
grounds that the prosecution could undermine on-going peace efforts and may not be in the 
best interests of justice and victims.
1134
 According to Tladi, there was also a secondary, 
underlying reason for the AU’s decision: 
“…an underlying reason is the notion that the ICC, as a western institution, should not 
exercise jurisdiction over African leaders – the idea that the arrest warrant smacks of 
imperialist arrogance. In the AU decision, there are hints of the attitude that African leaders 
ought not to be tried under non-African systems.”
1135
 
 
The AU’s request for deferral was not granted by the UNSC. The AU subsequently 
decided that “AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of article 98 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of 
President Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan”.1136 As a result of the AU’s decision, Bashir has 
been able to travel to Chad, Kenya, Malawi and Djibouti despite these countries being 
signatories of the Rome Statute, and therefore under an obligation to give effect to the ICC 
arrest warrant.  
 
Kenya in particular has experienced a “fall from grace” in its relationship with the 
ICC.
1137
 Kenya has gone from a model state party and one of only a few states in Africa to 
                                                          
1133
 See African Union, “Decisions and Declarations” Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, Assembly/AU/Dec 245(XIII) (Decision on the Meeting of African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) Sirte, Libya, 1-3 July 2009, para 10.   
1134
 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué PSC/Min/Comm(CXLII) 21 July 2008, para 11(i). 
1135
 Tladi (African Union and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 61. 
1136
 Tladi (African Union and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 61. This decision was reiterated by 
the AU early in 2012, see African Union “Decisions, Resolutions and Declarations of the Assembly of the 
Union” Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 397 (XVIII) (Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
29-30 January 2012, para 8. 
1137
 Gevers and Du Plessis (Another Stormy Year) (supra) 164. 
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promulgate implementation legislation, to a non-cooperative state.
 1138
 This is largely as a 
result of the ICC’s self-initiated investigation into the post-election violence in Kenya during 
2007/2008. The developments in the AU surrounding President Bashir’s arrest warrant and 
the deterioration of the relationship between the ICC and Kenya provides evidence of a 
growing “anti-ICC sentiment within Africa”.1139 
 
The situation surrounding Bashir’s ICC arrest warrant is illustrative of the political 
hurdles which the ICC faces in Africa, currently the sole continent in which it operates. It 
also illustrates the problems that states simultaneously party to the Rome Statute and a 
regional organisation may encounter. According to Tladi: 
“[...] the [AU] decision raises questions about [...] the relationship between international 
organisations and their African member states vis-à-vis AU decisions. From a more normative 
perspective, the decision raises questions about the reality of a new value-based international 
law, centred on the protection of humanity and human rights and whether such a new 
international law can escape accusations of neo-imperialism.”
1140
 
The AU’s defiant stance over the ICC’s arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, places the purported 
universal moral authority of the ICC in question. From a broader perspective, the AU’s 
defiance also raises questions over international criminal justice as an expression of the 
values of the international community.  
 
The conflict between the AU and the ICC via the UNSC raises important questions 
with regards to South Africa’s obligations towards the ICC and its international (criminal) 
law obligations in general. South African delegates at the AU meeting did not raise any 
objections to the decision not to cooperate with the ICC arrest warrant for Bashir. Although 
this is in line with South Africa’s foreign policy aimed at establishing the African 
Renaissance and unity within Africa, it represents a serious waver in South Africa’s 
                                                          
1138
 See ICC, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States 
Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya 
(Pre-Trial Chamber), ICC-02/05-01/09, 27 August 2010; see also Rome Statute of the ICC, article 87(7). 
1139
 Gevers and Du Plessis (Another Stormy Year) (supra) 165; Kegoro G “On the Brink: Kenya and the 
International Criminal Court” in Perspectives: Political Analysis and Commentary from Africa (supra) 22 
(noting that Kenya’s stance towards the ICC has further deepened the rift between the AU and the ICC). 
1140
 Tladi (African Union and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 58. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 294 
 
commitment towards the ICC.
1141
 It could be argued however that this represents a violation 
of South Africa’s obligations under international law, national legislation (the ICC Act) and 
the Constitution.
1142
 For South Africa, the situation represented a clash between their legal 
obligations toward the ICC and its membership of, and political objectives within, the AU.
1143
 
On other occasions, South Africa has reiterated its commitment to fulfil its ICC obligations. 
In May 2009 (thus before the AU decision not to cooperate with the ICC over the arrest of 
Al-Bashir) the South African government warned president Omer Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan 
that he would face apprehension and arrest if he were to attend the inauguration ceremony of 
South Africa’s newly elected president Jacob Zuma in Pretoria.1144 The decision to extend 
this warning to Al-Bashir appears to have been based on South Africa’s legal obligations 
under national legislation (the ICC Act).  
 
After the AU decision on 3 July 2009, the South Africa Foreign Affairs issued the 
following statement through a press conference held on 31 July 2009: 
“South Africa is the State Party of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and is 
therefore obliged to cooperate with the court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the court (Article 86) and hence also in the execution of arrest 
warrants. It is worth noting that Article 87(7) of the Statute provides that, when a state party 
fails to comply with a request to cooperate, the court may make a finding to that effect and 
refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties, or in the case of a United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) referral to the UNSC. 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that the official capacity as head of state or 
government of an accused provides no exemption from criminal responsibility. Furthermore, 
Section 4(1) of the South African implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act also ousts the applicability of other domestic laws in respect of an 
accused, with the result that the immunity from prosecution that President El Bashir would 
                                                          
1141
 See http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/index.html for an overview of the overarching objectives of the 
African Union and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (accessed 2011/09/29). 
1142
 Harper (Ignoring ICC warrant is unconstitutional) (supra). 
1143
 Tladi (African Union and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 57; see also Murithi (Africa’s 
Relations with the ICC) (supra) 6 (according to the author South Africa is “caught between a rock and a 
hard place when it comes to the AU-ICC relationship”). 
1144
 “Botswana says Sudan’s Bashir will be arrested if he visits” Sudan Tribune (2009/06/11). 
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normally have enjoyed in terms of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, 2001 (Act 
No. 37 of 2001), is not be (sic) applicable. 
An international arrest warrant for President El Bashir has been received and endorsed by a 
magistrate. This means that if President El Bashir arrives on South African territory, he will be 
liable for arrest.”
1145
 
In 2011, South Africa supported the UNSC’s referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, 
thereby displaying support for the Court.
1146
 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in 
August 2011, former president and current Deputy President of South Africa, Kgalema 
Motlanthe, called for ICC investigations into war crimes committed by NATO during the 
conflict between the rebels and pro-Gaddafi forces in Libya.
1147
 A request of this sort from 
such a high ranking members of executive government illustrates South Africa’s ambiguous 
approach to the ICC. On the one hand the call demonstrates, albeit indirectly, South African 
and African concerns over bias at the ICC or what could be deemed the AU or regional 
outlook. On the other hand it illustrated South Africa’s enduring belief in the ICC’s mandate 
to prosecute international crimes, the UN or international perspective.  
 
The changing attitude of the South African government towards the ICC gives rise to 
a peculiar situation. It may be compared to a kind of pendulum effect where the South 
African state swings back and forth between normative interests as well as moral values and 
other political interests. As part of the collective of African states, South Africa has on 
occasion agreed albeit perhaps reluctantly, not to cooperate with the ICC. Unilaterally, 
through its foreign policy and as an independent state, it endeavours to some extent to uphold 
its obligations or at least those obligations created by national legislation. South Africa’s 
refusal to sign a BIA, the warning to Al-Bashir not to attend President Zuma’s inauguration 
and the endorsement of the UNSC referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC, serves as 
evidence for South Africa’s enduring commitment to the ICC.  
                                                          
1145
 “Notes following the briefing of Department International Relations and Co-operation’s Director-
General, Ayanda Ntsaluba”, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?Pageid 
=461&sid=3378&tid=3523 (accessed 2012/04/04). 
1146
 South Africa was at that time a non-permanent member of the UNSC. 
1147
 “ICC must probe NATO violations – SA” SAPA (2011/08/25), available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ICC-must-probe-Nato-violations-SA-20110825 (accessed 
2012/04/11). 
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Although the abovementioned dichotomy is understandable in light of the nature of 
international law and politics in general, it is regrettable from an international criminal justice 
perspective. An ambiguous stance towards the ICC by South Africa, one of Africa’s 
democratic superpowers, could be a huge setback for the ICC’s work on the continent which 
arguably stands to gain the most from its effective functioning. Non-cooperation with the ICC 
may also tarnish South Africa’s newly gained and hard earned international reputation as a 
liberal democracy in the international order.   
 
7.7 Prognostic Assessments of Matters Related to International Criminal Justice in 
South Africa  
 
7.7.1 Prospects for the ICC in South Africa: Politics and Legal Commitments 
 
South African courts have not yet tried any persons for any of the acts criminalised in its ICC 
Act.
1148
 Nor has South Africa surrendered any suspects to the ICC to stand trial. This is not 
particularly surprising. The ICC has only been in existence for 10 years. The first court 
proceedings were initiated as recently as January 2009 against former Congolese warlord 
Thomas Lubanga.
1149
 The judgment was delivered in March 2012 and the sentencing 
judgment in July of the same year.
1150
 Up to date there have been very few prosecutions 
based on the complementarity principle in domestic courts around the world. This is 
preferable for the time being since domestic courts will look to the ICC for guidance in 
applying its domestic legislation which would have been most probably, and as in the South 
African case, borrowed or directly transplanted from the ICC Statute. According to article 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
must consider international law”. In the long run, ICC jurisprudence may enrich domestic 
criminal justice through providing interpretive guidance to domestic courts.  
 
                                                          
1148
 No. 27 of 2002. 
1149
 Simmons M “International Court Begins First Trial” The New York Times (2009/01/26), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/europe/27hague.html (accessed 2009/06/23). 
1150
 See ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Trial Chamber I: Judgment) Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, 14 March 2012; ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Trial Chamber I: Decision on Sentence 
Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute) Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 July 2012. 
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The international criminal justice system envisions a structure of international 
criminal law where domestic jurisdictions are primarily responsible for and capable of 
prosecuting international crime. The ICC cannot order state parties to investigate or prosecute 
international crimes under its jurisdiction, yet state parties have a duty to do so.
1151
 
Complementarity has emerged as one of the most important features of modern ICL. It is 
particularly important in relation to the transformative value of ICL because it has the 
potential to influence the lives of individuals at ‘ground level’ in domestic law systems.1152 It 
encourages domestic criminalisation so that referral to international courts should only be 
necessary where domestic courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute. The ICC in particular 
is only “designed to be a backstop” or ‘fall net’ for extreme cases which cannot be handled 
by local courts.
1153
 If the principle worked perfectly there would be little need for 
international or internationalised courts in the international criminal justice system.  
 
Despite the observations above, many states have either not yet ratified the ICC 
Statute or are yet to implement legislation empowering the law of the Rome Statute on the 
domestic level.
1154
 The ICC Statute in itself does not stipulate that a state party to it is under 
an obligation to enact legislation criminalising the core crimes.
1155
 Whether such obligation 
arises as an indirect consequence of complementarity or from customary international law is 
an academic matter. What is certain is that it is essential for states to enact such legislation for 
international criminal norms to be effective. 
                                                          
1151
 See ICC, Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, Judgement on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against 
the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II on 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case (Appeals 
Chamber) Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, 25 September 2009, paras 85-86.  
1152
 See also Chapter 8 para 8.3.3 infra. 
1153
 Du Plessis (South Africa’s ICC Act) (supra) 1. One may also content that the court is designed to be 
‘an institution of last resort’. 
1154
 Upon submission of this thesis “65 countries have enacted legislation containing either 
complementarity or cooperation provisions, or both, into their domestic law. Furthermore, 35 countries 
have some form of advanced draft implementing legislation”. See Coalition for the                       
International Criminal Court, Implementation of the Rome Statute, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (accessed 2012/08/22).  
1155
 “Importing Core International Crimes into National Criminal Law” Forum for International Criminal 
Justice and Conflict, Publications No. 1 (2007) 13, available at www.pcio.no/Research-and-
Publications/Publication/?oid=63310 (accessed 2009/07/30). 
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South Africa has shown good faith toward the ideal of an efficient international 
criminal justice system since the end of apartheid. Since the advent of democracy, South 
Africa has taken a number of positive steps evincing a desire to co-operate in various matters 
relating to international criminal justice.
1156
 According to Anton Katz, this can be ascribed to 
inter alia two important factors. Firstly, South Africa’s re-emergence as a respected nation-
state on the international level and secondly, the increasing threat of criminal activity with an 
international or transnational element.
1157
 
 
7.7.1.1 The Proposed ‘African Criminal Court’ 
 
The AU has been investigating the possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the proposed 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (hereafter “African Court”) to include jurisdiction 
over international crimes and have taken various steps towards this end.
1158
 As a result of 
proceedings initiated against African leaders in the lower courts of various European 
countries as well as the furore over the ICC’s arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, AU Member 
States have expressed concern over the possible abuse of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction.
1159
 The AU concern over the abuse of universal jurisdiction is arguably closely 
related to African concerns over the ICC as a biased, imperialist institution. In the latter 
respect, Murungu surmises the intended benefit of a regional court with international criminal 
jurisdiction in Africa: 
                                                          
1156
 Katz (Transformation of South Africa's Role in International Co-operation) (supra). Furthermore, in 
August 2012 the NPA announced that is investigating allegations of crimes against humanity against the 
former president of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana (see footnote 1101 supra). 
1157
 Katz (Transformation of South Africa’s Role in International Co-operation) (supra). 
1158
 The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted by the AU 
in June 2008. The Protocol envisions a merger between the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
with the African Court of Justice of the African Union. See Murungu CB “Towards a Criminal Chamber in 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights” (2011) 9 (5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
1067-1088, 1067; Du Plessis M “Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction 
Over International Crimes” (June 2012) Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 235, 1-3 (noting that the 
proposed African Court faces the prospect of “in utero adjustment”).  
1159
 Deya D “Worth the Wait: Pushing for the African Court to Exercise Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes” (2012) (2) Open Space 22-26, 22. 
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“The African states seem to contend that since the ICC is targeting African leaders, such as 
President Al-Bashir of Sudan, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, the three Kenyan state 
officials charged before the ICC and Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast, they would establish an 
African court as an alternative forum to try African individuals and thus prosecutions before 
the ICC. There is a perception that the prospective Criminal Chamber may work for Africa, at 
least hypothetically. It would serve as an African solution to African endemic problems of 
international crimes and gross violations of human rights.”
1160
  
There are however, additional reasons for the AU’s call for a regional criminal court with the 
ability to exercise international criminal jurisdiction, namely: 
“[…] the challenges with Senegal’s impending prosecution of the former President of Chad, 
Hissène Habré; and, the need to give effect to Article 25(5) of the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which requires the AU to formulate a novel 
international crime of ‘unconstitutional change of government’.”
1161
 
 
In May 2012 the draft protocol as previously amended to provide the Court with 
international criminal jurisdiction was approved and recommended to the AU Assembly for 
adoption.
1162
 Apart from individual criminal liability over the crimes contained in the Rome 
Statute, various transnational crimes and the new crime of “unconstitutional change of 
government”, it has been proposed that the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court should 
include corporate criminal liability for such crimes.
1163
 Currently the draft protocol provides 
for international criminal jurisdiction over 14 crimes.
1164
 At the AU Summit in July 2012, the 
AU commissioned a report on the financial and structural implications of expanding the 
jurisdiction of the African Court and requested the AU Commission to submit a definition for 
                                                          
1160
 Murungu (Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court) (supra) 1080. 
1161
 Deya (Worth the Wait) (supra) 22. 
1162
 See African Union, Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice and/or Attorneys General on Legal 
Matters, 14 and 15 May 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
1163
 Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7, 15 May 2012, article 46C. 
1164
 These are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of unconstitutional change of 
government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, 
trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources and the crime 
of aggression. See Draft Protocol (supra) article 28A. 
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the crime of unconstitutional change of government which will be considered at the next AU 
summit in January 2013.
1165
 In the event that the current draft Protocol and Statute is adopted 
at the next AU summit, it will enter into force 30 days subsequent to its ratification by 15 AU 
Members States.
1166
  
 
Deya appears (perhaps over-) optimistic about the broader range of crimes that could 
fall under the expanded jurisdiction of the proposed court: 
“If passed, these crimes would introduce to the world of international law several innovations 
that were either ‘shot down’ during the Rome Statute negotiations or were not envisaged at 
that time. Potentially, it would expand the scope and reach of international law, and possibly 
trigger similar efforts in other regions or even at the ICC.”
1167
 
Theoretically, the proposed court could enhance the current system of enforcement of 
international criminal law. According to Deya: 
“The draft legal instrument enables a complementary and harmonious relationship with the 
ICJ, the ICC and other courts, in the same manner that the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights co-exists harmoniously with the UN Human Rights Council, the UN 
Human Rights Committee and the Rapporteur System. This is also similar to how the AU 
Peace and Security Council co-exists with the UN Security Council.”
1168
 
Also in theory, jurisdiction over an expanded range of crimes for a regional criminal court in 
Africa, the continent most affected by international crime, may constitute a progressive 
development for international criminal justice.  
 
These purported benefits will only become a reality if the proposed court is able to 
discharge its mandate effectively. In a more pessimistic vein than Deya above, Murungu 
remarks that: 
                                                          
1165
 African Union, “Decisions, Declarations, Resolution and Special Vote of Thanks” Nineteenth Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Assembly/AU/Dec.427 (XIX) (Decision on 
the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15-16 July 2012, paras 2-3. 
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“[…] it remains to be seen whether the prospective Criminal Chamber will work efficiently. 
Indeed, if it is necessary that Africa punishes perpetrators of international crimes in house, 
institutional frameworks in a form of the Criminal Chamber (footnote omitted) must be set up 
to do so, and the relevant court or Criminal Chamber should be enhanced both in terms of 
capacity and legal support. Judicial independence should be a prerequisite for the dispensation 
of justice in Africa. Even where the Criminal Chamber might be established, the political 
commitment of the AU is vital to achieve the demands of justice for Africans. Furthermore, to 
enforce and provide cooperation with the Criminal Chamber, the African Union should ideally 
adopt a treaty to guarantee its commitment to cooperate with the proposed Criminal 
Chamber.”1169 
Du Plessis highlights various practical and legal issues regarding the expanded jurisdiction of 
the court as it is currently drafted. Firstly, Du Plessis argues that the court risks being 
overburdened by the long list of crimes currently provided for in the Draft Protocol: 
“The scope of the court’s jurisdictional reach is breathtaking. Even before the International 
Criminal Law (ICL) Section was introduced, the court would have had its hands full. With the 
ICL section added, there must be legitimate questions about the capacity of the court to fulfil 
not only its newfound ICL obligations, but also about the effect that such stretching will have 
on the court’s ability to deal with its general and human rights obligations.”
1170
 
And further: 
“[…] the court is expected not only to try the established international crimes, but also to 
tackle a raft of other social ills that plague the continent. While in principle this is laudable, it 
is sobering to recall that it took almost a decade for the ICC – a court dedicated to the 
prosecution of international crimes, with a far more limited jurisdictional focus on just three of 
the crimes that the African Court will be expected to tackle – to complete its first trial in the 
Lubanga matter.”
1171
 
                                                          
1169
 Murungu (Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court) (supra) 1080; Deya (Worth the Wait) 
(supra) 23-24. 
1170
 Du Plessis (Implications of the AU Decision) (supra) 6. 
1171
 Du Plessis (Implications of the AU Decision) (supra) 6. 
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Secondly, Du Plessis notes that beyond institutional capacity and political will, financial 
resources will be essential to the success of the court.
1172
 This can potentially be very 
problematic. Even if the AU can somehow muster the human and financial resources required 
for an efficient court, such expenses may be redundant considering that 33 member states of 
the AU are party to the Rome Statute which is already aimed at the prosecution of “the most 
serious crimes of international concern”. This could be viewed as wasteful expenditure when 
considering that the ICC is already intended only to be an institution of last resort. 
Additionally, allocation of resources to an African Court may be a risky investment in light of 
the legal and practical difficulties foreseen as a result of the Court’s ambitious mandate. The 
cost of a single international criminal trial is estimated at approximately $20 million, in the 
face of such exorbitant fiscal requirements it has been contended that “Africa does not need 
it, nor can afford it”.1173 
 
Furthermore, the fear has been expressed that an ‘African Criminal Court’ could 
create a regional “gap” of impunity in existing international criminal justice system 
(including presumably the work of the ICC as an integral part of that system): 
“Absent […] a prohibitively costly and fundamental re-design, an extension of the jurisdiction 
of the Court would create a regional African exceptionalism to international criminal law and 
international justice, ultimately damaging the credibility and effectiveness of Africa’s regional 
human rights system. In the space between an African exceptionalism and an ineffectual 
regional system, an African impunity gap could become institutionalised, rendering 
                                                          
1172
 Du Plessis (Implications of the AU Decision) (supra) 10-11. The AU has commissioned a report on the 
financial and structural implications of expanding the African Court’s jurisdiction (see footnote 1165 
supra). 
1173
 “Implications of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights Being Empowered to Try 
International Crimes such as Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes” An Opinion 
Submitted by Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CEAC Darfur 
Consortium; East African Law Society, EALS; International Criminal Law Centre, Open University of 
Tanzania; Open Society Justice Initiative; Pan-African Lawyers Union, PALU; Southern Africa Litigation 
Centre, SALC; and West African Bar Association, WABA, 17 December 2009, 16-17 and 22, available at 
www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/news/africa.../africa_20091217.pdf (accessed 2012/04/19). 
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international criminal law irrelevant to Africa. This outcome is both undesirable and 
avoidable.”
1174
 
It goes without saying that the realisation of a regional court with international criminal 
jurisdiction will have repercussions for South Africa’s international criminal justice 
obligations. Avoiding negative repercussions in this regard will require a large measure of 
congruence between the law of the proposed ‘African Criminal Court’ and the existing law of 
the ICC, as well as detailed provisions regulating the jurisdictional overlap between the two 
courts. Surprisingly, the draft protocol does not mention the ICC nor does it provide any 
guidance as to the relationship between the two courts. Considering the strained relationship 
between the ICC and the AU, this seems to be more than a negligent oversight on the part of 
the AU, one which may yet cause a legal and political conundrum as well as considerable 
confusion for AU member states that still have a positive bearing towards the ICC.
1175
 The 
problem is compounded further in those states that have enacted implementation legislation 
regarding the Rome Statute such as South Africa, which are not only under an international 
legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC, but also under a domestic legal obligation to do 
so.
1176
 Furthermore, if South Africa ratifies the proposed Statute, national legislation (similar 
to the ICC Act) will be required to ensure that the regional criminal court can discharge its 
mandate effectively as well as to provide for miscellaneous matters such as cooperation and 
surrender. This will make it exceedingly difficult for states that have hereto opted for the 
middle ground in the ICC-AU debacle to continue doing so. Ultimately, an ‘African Criminal 
Court’ might deal a serious blow to international criminal justice on the continent that has 
hereto evinced the greatest need for it. The proposed ‘African Criminal Court’ could facilitate 
this undesirable result by deepening the existing AU-ICC rift or by creating a regional gap of 
impunity as noted above.  
                                                          
1174
 (Implications of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights Being Empowered to Try 
International Crimes) (supra) 18.  
1175
 See Du Plessis (Implications of the AU Decision) (supra) 10-11: “[…] it is unfathomable that the draft 
protocol nowhere mentions the ICC, let alone attempts to set a path for African states that must navigate 
the relationship between these two institutions. Either this is a sign that the AU hopes its members will 
sidestep the ICC, or it is a case of irresponsible treaty making – forcing signatories to become party to an 
instrument that wilfully or negligently ignores the complicated relationship that will exist for states parties 
to the Rome Statute”. 
1176
 See Du Plessis (Implications of the AU Decision) (supra) 10. 
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7.7.1.2 Recent Litigation Relating to South Africa’s ICC Obligations  
 
In 2008, the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) submitted a dossier (the “torture 
docket”) to the PCLU containing “comprehensive evidence” of the involvement of 18 
Zimbabwean security officials in the perpetration of state-sanctioned torture.
1177
 The torture 
docket contained 23 signed affidavits from persons attesting to acts of torture perpetrated 
against them while in police custody subsequent to a police raid that took place at the 
headquarters of the main opposition party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) in March 2007. SALC argued that these acts of torture were committed in a 
widespread and systematic manner against the political opponents of the ruling Zimbabwe 
African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), therefore constituting crimes against 
humanity.
1178
 Crimes against humanity are prosecutable on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
under section 4 of the ICC Act. Furthermore, according to the applicants the alleged 
perpetrators have been visitors to South Africa “from time to time”.1179 This was accepted by 
the court.
1180
  
 
In lieu of these facts, the applicants submitted that the state has a duty under 
international and domestic law to apprehend and prosecute these alleged perpetrators and that 
the NPA (the National Director of Public Prosecutions acting as first respondent) owed a duty 
                                                          
1177
 See website of the Southern African Litigation Centre “Zimbabwe: Challenging the                        
NPA's Refusal to Act in Terms of the Rome Statute Act”, available at 
http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/cases/item/Zimbabwe_Challenging_the_NPA_refusal_to_act
_in_terms_of_the_Rome_Statue_Act (accessed 2012/08/23). 
1178
 See South African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others (North Gauteng High Court) Case No. 77150/09, 8 May 2012, para 1.13 (at 9); see also Coughlan 
G “Interview: South Africa - Zimbabwean prosecutions?” (2012/03/23), available at           
http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/interview-south-africa-zimbabwean-prosecutions (accessed 
2012/04/03). In this interview Nicole Fritz, Executive Director of SALC, stated that the applicants “made 
the case that torture was committed in a widespread and systematic way in Zimbabwe against political 
opponents of the ruling party ZANU PF – therefore, a crime against humanity”. 
1179
 See para 1.13 (at 9); see also Coughlan (Interview: South Africa - Zimbabwean prosecutions?) (supra).  
1180
 Para 11 (at 39). 
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to the state to take appropriate action in relation to the torture docket.
1181
 The SAPS however 
refused to investigate the matter on the basis that: 
 The docket contained insufficient evidence; 
 It would be difficult to obtain further evidence; 
 There was doubt as to whether section 4 of the ICC Act provided South African 
authorities with jurisdiction based on the “anticipated presence” of the 
perpetrators; and  
 For political reasons, namely that “any investigation will in addition to negatively 
impacting on South Africa’s diplomatic initiatives in Zimbabwe, compromise the 
position of the SAPS when is (sic) assumes the chair of the Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization (SARPCCO) [...]”.1182  
These reasons were endorsed by the NPA. Subsequently, SALC and the Zimbabwean Exiles 
Forum (“ZEF”, the second applicant) approached the North Gauteng High Court for an order 
setting aside the NPA’s decision not to investigate (“the impugned decision”) on the basis 
that the decision was unlawful under administrative law and in violation of the rule of law.  
 
The North Gauteng High Court’s ruling in South African Litigation Centre and 
Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others is momentous for 
international criminal justice in South Africa.
1183
 The case represents the first instance in 
which a South African court had been asked to interpret and delineate South Africa’s 
obligations under the Rome Statute, the ICC Act (in particular the scope of the jurisdiction 
provided for by the Act) and the Constitution in relation to the investigation and prosecution 
of international crime.
1184
 Below, I consider those parts of the judgment which are relevant to 
the focus of this thesis and the current chapter. It is submitted that the judgment has 
established a positive and potentially transformative precedent for the judicial interpretation 
of the ICC Act. It seems to be the “wide-ranging, precedent setting judgement fitting of the 
inaugural judicial pronouncement on South Africa’s ICC Act” that the likes of Christopher 
                                                          
1181
 Paras 1.13 (at 9). 
1182
 Para 4 (at 25-26); Kemp et al. (Criminal Law in South Africa) (supra) 562. 
1183
 (North Gauteng High Court) Case No. 77150/09, 8 May 2012. 
1184
 Para 1.6 (c) (at 3). 
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Gevers had hoped for.
1185
 The court did not shrink away from the difficult issues, as it may 
have been entitled to do in a review application of this nature where a single fault on the 
behalf of any of the respondents might have been enough for a successful challenge to the 
impugned decision.
1186
  
 
The applicants’ essential contention was that the respondents had a legal duty under 
international law (pursuant to South Africa’s constitutional obligations towards international 
law) as well as under domestic law (the ICC Act) to investigate the allegations in the torture 
docket. In opposing the review, the SAPS (the National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service, acting as the fourth respondent) contended inter alia that “investigation into 
allegations of torture by Zimbabwean officials in Zimbabwe […] could be initiated only once 
the perpetrator was in [South Africa]”.1187 On behalf of the fourth respondent it was argued 
that section 4 of the ICC Act does not provide for jurisdiction over the “anticipated presence” 
of a perpetrator in South African territory, that this could not be read into the ICC Act and 
that therefore, any investigation to this end would be futile.
1188
  
 
The court however agreed with the applicants’ submission that this line of thought 
(speculation on behalf of the respondents as to the success of investigatory efforts) would 
result in an absurdity where an investigation under the ICC Act could only occur whilst a 
suspect is physically present in South African territory, and that any investigatory powers are 
suspended whenever the suspect is not present.
1189
 The following passage from the judgment 
is illuminating in this regard:  
“First Applicant’s counsel pointed out that if Respondents’ contentions were correct, nl, that 
the NDPP and PCLU have no investigatory powers under South African law, and that the 
SAPS cannot investigate crimes outside of South Africa, then the ICC Act’s conferral of 
                                                          
1185
 Gevers C “The Application of Universal Jurisdiction in South African Law” European Journal of 
International Law Analysis, 24/04/2012, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/universal-jurisdiction-in-
south-africa/ (accessed 2012/05/08).  
1186
 Gevers (The Application of Universal Jurisdiction in South African Law) (supra). 
1187
 Mabuza E “‘Not SAPS duty’ to probe Zimbabwe torture claims” (2012/03/29), available at 
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=168497 (accessed 2012/04/05). 
1188
 Para 32 (at 90). 
1189
 Para 32 (at 91). 
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jurisdiction on South African courts to try perpetrators of international crimes who are not 
South African, and who commit their crimes outside of South African borders, would be 
rendered meaningless. It would mean that South Africa would never be able to hold 
international criminals accountable because, according to the Respondents, they were 
paralysed to act. This was clearly not consistent with the purpose and object of the ICC Act. It 
is my view that in deciding whether it was “possible” to bring the perpetrators of international 
crimes to justice, the Respondents were required to determine whether or not the information 
before them was sufficient to initiate an investigation [...].”
1190
 
To circumvent the absurdity raised by the applicants above, it appears that the court has 
confirmed that the ICC Act provides for a wide prescriptive jurisdiction which allows for 
investigations into crimes committed extraterritorially by non-nationals even when those 
persons are not in the country and South Africa is as a result unable to exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction under the ICC Act.
1191
  
 
The NPA and SAPS further contended that even though there is a reasonable 
suspicion that crimes against humanity were committed in Zimbabwe during March 2007, 
prosecuting these crimes would be harmful to South Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe.1192 
The court did not agree with this view, stating that: 
“First and Fourth Respondents’ view was […] affected by irrelevant political considerations 
having regard to their duties. Their attitude trivialised the evidence. Diplomatic considerations 
were also not the business of Fourth Respondent, to put it bluntly.”
1193
 
And further: 
“In the present context it was the duty of the First, Second and Fourth Respondents to 
investigate the docket. It contained sufficient information for purposes of such an 
investigation, in the context of the Rome Statute. At that stage, it was not their obligation to 
take political or policy considerations into account. These change in any event from time to 
time, whilst a proper jurisprudence remains a concrete basis for a stable society living under 
the twinkling but stern eyes of the Rule of Law. Any such considerations would affectively 
destroy the efficacy of the ICC Act. Respondents were required to act independently. In the 
                                                          
1190
 Para 31 (at 88-89). 
1191
 Kemp et al. (Criminal Law in South Africa) (supra) 562-563. 
1192
 Para 28. 
1193
 Para 28 (at 84). 
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present context, and in the light of the request for an investigation of the torture docket, they 
had to appreciate the nature and ambit of their duties, and act accordingly.”
1194
 (emphasis 
added) 
The court ultimately ruled in favour of the applicants and set aside the decision of the first, 
second and fourth respondents not to investigate allegations of torture committed as a crime 
against humanity in Zimbabwe by certain identified persons as “unlawful, inconsistent with 
the Constitution and therefore invalid”.1195 The court ordered the PCLU to “do the necessary 
expeditious and comprehensive investigation of the crimes alleged in the torture docket”.1196 
 
As mentioned, the court’s decision is a positive development from an international 
criminal justice perspective, especially from the perspective of anyone in support of a liberal 
interpretation of the ICC Act. The court ruled that political consideration were taken into 
account at the wrong “stage” (see emphasis above) and directed that the PCLU will, upon the 
mandatory completion of the investigation, decide whether or not to prosecute. According to 
the judgment, an investigation under the ICC Act must proceed if there is a “reasonable 
basis” to do so. Moreover, concerns over insufficient evidence and political considerations 
are irrelevant factors for purposes of the decision to investigate under the ICC Act.
1197
 It must 
however be kept in mind that the final discretion over prosecution lies with the NPA in terms 
of section 5(1) of the ICC Act.
1198
 Although the abovementioned considerations were rejected 
by the court in the SALC case, they may be taken into account in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion by the NPA.
1199
 Such decision will also however be subject to judicial review and, 
if the precedent in Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Others is anything to go by, the NPA will have to provide 
convincing reasons for a decision not to prosecute in the light of South Africa’s international 
and domestic law duties towards the prosecution of international crimes in the Rome Statute. 
In the event that the NPA declines to prosecute and if the judicial review of such a decision 
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 Para 29 (at 86). 
1195
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 See para 7.6.1.3 supra. 
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fails or does not take place, the feature of complementarity provides that the ICC may assert 
jurisdiction based on South Africa’s unwillingness to prosecute.1200 
 
Another positive aspect of the case is the judge’s approach to the locus standi of the 
applicants. In bringing the application, the applicants (both civil society organisations) relied 
on sections 38(a)-(d) of the Constitution to assert that they were acting in their own interests 
(section 38(a)); in the interests of the victims (section 38(b) and (c)); and in the public interest 
(section 38(d)).
1201
 Applicants relied on “[…] the degree of vulnerability of the people 
affected, the nature of the rights said to be infringed, the consequences of the infringement of 
those rights, and the egregiousness of the conduct complained of […]”.1202  
 
 The fourth respondent contended that the Bill of Rights cannot be applied 
extraterritorially since the real bearers of interests and rights (the alleged victims) were all 
foreigners, not in South African territory. For this submission respondents relied on the 
decision in Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others in 
which it was held that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights do not attach to nationals 
when they are outside South Africa.
1203
 
 
However, the court ruled that the applicants, the victims and the public have an 
interest in the challenge brought against the impugned decision.
1204
 The decision in favour of 
the applicants constitutes an empowering precedent to civil society organisations. In future it 
may provide encouragement for such civil society organisations which may seek to utilise the 
ICC Act in their own interests, in the interest of victims and in the interests of the public. In 
this way the judgment has broadened the potential scope of application of the ICC Act.  
 
                                                          
1200
 In the event of a decision not to prosecute, the ICC Act stipulates that the Registrar of the ICC must be 
informed of the decision as well as provided with the reasons for the decision (Rome Statute of the ICC, 
section 5(5)).  
1201
 Para 12.1 (at 41). 
1202
 Para 12.1 (at 43). 
1203
 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) para 32. 
1204
 The significance of this aspect of the SALC-case will be discussed more fully under Chapter 8 para 
8.4.2 infra. 
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7.7.1.3 A Final Word on Prospects for the ICC in South Africa 
 
In principle, South Africa is committed to its obligations under the Rome Statute and the ICC 
Act. In reality this commitment seems to be somewhat less than sincere. Although the 
judgment in Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others may be regarded as a highly positive development for ICL in South 
Africa, external political considerations have, and will continue to influence South Africa’s 
commitment to international criminal justice in general, especially in light of the looming 
prospect of an ‘African Criminal Court’. For better or worse, these political considerations 
will have a decisive impact on South Africa’s willingness to discharge its international 
criminal justice obligations.  
 
As illustrated by the situation surrounding the arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, the 
prosecution of international crimes involves complex legal and political issues. Although 
courts may decipher the legal issues, politics may yet have the final word. Gevers observes 
that “[a]lthough the obligations imposed by law on our institutions are clear and weighty, 
how those obligations are carried out inevitably involves policy choices”.1205 It is hoped that 
these matter will be addressed and settled in a manner compatible with constitutional- and 
internationally recognised obligations towards international criminal justice and human rights 
by South African decision makers and courts in the not too distant future.  
 
7.7.2 Other Relevant Legislative Developments 
 
7.7.2.1 The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 
 
Parliament enacted the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act (hereafter the 
“Geneva Conventions Act”) in July 2012. South Africa is party to the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols, which it ratified in 1952 and 1995 respectively. The delay in 
transforming the Law of Geneva into national law is surprising, even when taking the 
                                                          
1205
 Gevers C “Gaza docket: SA must tighten policies on international criminal justice” Business           
Day (2009/08/20), available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=79073 (accessed 
2012/04/04). 
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Apartheid government’s disregard for international law into consideration. Nonetheless, the 
act represents a significant development for international criminal justice in South Africa.
1206
  
 
The object of the act is “to enact the Conventions into law as is required by section 
231(4) of the Constitution; to ensure that the Republic complies with the Conventions; and to 
ensure prevention of, and punishment for, breaches of the Conventions”.1207 Section 5 of the 
Act provides: 
“(1) Any person who, whether within or outside the Republic, commits a grave breach of the 
Conventions, is guilty of an offence. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), "a grave breach" means- 
(a) a grave breach referred to in Article 50 of the First Convention; 
(b) a grave breach referred to in Article 51 of the Second Convention; 
(c) a grave breach referred to in Article 130 of the Third Convention;  
(d) a grave breach referred to in Article 147 of the Fourth Convention; or 
(e) a grave breach referred to in Article II or 85 of Protocol I. 
(3) Any person who within the Republic contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of the 
Conventions not covered by subsection (2), is guilty of an offence. 
(4) Any citizen of the Republic who outside the Republic contravenes or fails to comply with 
a provision of the Conventions not covered by subsection (2), is guilty of an offence.  
(5) A person convicted of an offence contemplated in subsection (1 ), (3) or ( 4) is liable to a 
fine or to imprisonment, including imprisonment for life, or to such imprisonment without the 
option of a fine or to both a fine and such imprisonment.” 
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply only to 
international armed conflicts. In contrast to the ICC Act which provides for a qualified form 
of universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed during any ‘armed conflict’, the Geneva 
Conventions Act criminalises only grave breaches and therefore only provides for universal 
jurisdiction if it can be shown that the accused is guilty of serious war crimes committed 
                                                          
1206
 The significance thereof lies in the fact that the transformation of international crimes into domestic 
law makes the prosecution of such crimes by national courts more viable, see para 7.8 and Chapter 8 para 
8.3.4.3 infra. 
1207
 Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act, section 2 (a)-(c). 
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during an international armed conflict.
1208
 Section 5(3) and section 5(4) endorses jurisdiction 
based on the principles territoriality and (active) nationality respectively, providing for such 
jurisdiction over ‘other breaches’ of the Conventions and Additional Protocols.  
 
Similar to the method of incorporation of the substantive crimes of the Rome Statute 
used in the ICC Act, the Geneva Conventions Act contains a number of schedules which 
incorporate the substantive law of the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols “as 
is”. Jurisdiction under the act is further regulated by section 7 and provides that: 
“Any court in the Republic may try a person for any offence under this Act in the same 
manner as if the offence had been committed in the area of jurisdiction of that court, 
notwithstanding that the act or omission to which the charge relates was committed outside the 
Republic.”
1209
 
And: 
“Whenever this Act is enforced outside the Republic, any finding, sentence, penalty, fine or 
order made, pronounced or imposed in terms of its provisions is as valid and effectual, and 
must be carried into effect, as if it had been made, pronounced or imposed in the 
Republic.”
1210
 
The act thus provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction and extraterritorial enforcement of 
punishment in respect of the offences mentioned above.  
  
Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions Act leaves the ICC Act unaltered in its scope 
and function by providing that: 
                                                          
1208
 An international armed conflict can be defined as a clash between the armed forces (or parts thereof) of 
two or more states, even if one of the states party to the conflict refuses to acknowledge the existence of a 
state of war. See common article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, according to which the Geneva 
Conventions “apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”. 
See also ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeals Chamber: Jurisdiction) Case No. IT-94-1-AR, 2 October 
1995, para 70: “[…] an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such 
groups within a state”. 
1209
 Section 7 (1). 
1210
 Section 7 (3). 
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“The provisions of this Act must not be construed as limiting, amending, repealing or 
otherwise altering any provision of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act, 2002 (Act No. 27 of 2002), or as exempting any person 
from any duty or obligation imposed by that Act or prohibiting any person from complying 
with any provision of that Act.”
1211
 
Thus the Geneva Conventions Act is intended as a supplementary measure to ensure 
constitutional compliance with regard to South Africa’s obligations towards international 
criminal justice, particularly breaches of humanitarian law.   
 
7.7.2.2 Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Bill, 2012   
 
The South African parliament was, at the time of writing, considering a bill which will 
provide for the distinct crime of torture (as opposed to torture as a crime against humanity 
which is already criminalised under the ICC Act) under South African law. The proposed 
Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Bill (the “Torture Bill”) is intended to give 
effect to the right to freedom and security of persons in section 12(1)(d) of the Constitution 
and South Africa’s obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Torture.1212 
Furthermore, the purposes of the Torture Bill are to make the distinct crime of torture a 
prosecutable offense and to promote universal respect for human rights and human dignity in 
doing so.
1213
 Under section 3 of the Bill, torture is defined as: 
“any act or omission, by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted by a public official on a person—  
(a) in order to—  
(i) obtain information or a confession from him or her or a third person;  
(ii) punish him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed, is suspected of 
having committed or is planning to commit; or  
(iii) intimidate or coerce him or her or a third person to do, or to refrain from doing, anything; 
or  
(b) for any reason based on unfair discrimination,  
                                                          
1211
 Section 20. 
1212
 See Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Bill, B21-2012, preamble. 
1213
 Section 2. 
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but 'torture' does not include pain or suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.” 
Unlike the ICC Act and the Geneva Conventions Bill, the Torture Bill does not incorporate 
the definition of a crime mutatis mutandis from a corresponding international instrument. 
Nonetheless, the wording of the definition of torture in the Torture Bill agrees strongly with 
wording in article 1 of the Convention Against Torture.
1214
 
 
The Bill provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of torture on grounds of 
jurisdiction similar to those provided for in the ICC Act. According to section 6(1): 
“A court of the Republic has jurisdiction in respect of an act committed outside the Republic 
which would have constituted an offence under section 4(1) or (2) had it been committed in 
the Republic, regardless of whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the place of its 
commission, if the person to be charged—  
(a) is a citizen of the Republic;  
(b) is ordinarily resident in the Republic;  
(c) is, after the commission of the offence, lawfully present in the territory of the Republic, or 
in its territorial waters or on board a ship, vessel, off-shore installation, a fixed platform or 
aircraft registered or required to be registered in the Republic and that person is not extradited 
pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention; or  
(d) has committed the offence against a South African citizen or against a person who is 
ordinarily resident in the Republic.” 
The Bill therefore also provides for a qualified form of universal jurisdiction.
1215
 For the 
prosecution of acts of torture committed outside South African territory, section 6(2) requires 
the written authority of the NDPP. In this respect, the Torture Bill differs from the ICC Act. 
Under section 5(1) of the ICC Act the NDPP must consent before any prosecution under the 
Act may take place. Under the Torture Bill such consent is only required for the prosecution 
                                                          
1214
 Under the Convention Against Torture, torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”.  
1215
 See para 7.6.1.2 supra. 
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of acts of torture committed outside the territory of South Africa. It would seem that the 
legislature has intended for more freedom in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding 
acts of torture committed within South Africa than in respect of crimes under the ICC Act.  
 
Under section 4(3)(a) and 4(3)(b) of the Bill, defences based on the immunity of 
current and former heads of state and government officials  and obedience to superior orders 
are excluded for purposes of determining criminal liability and the determination of an 
appropriate sentence in relation to acts of torture. Under section 4(4) the prohibition of torture 
is entrenched as non-derogable law, even in the event of “a state of war, threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency”.  Therefore, by the express intent 
of the legislature, it would seem that a justifiable limitation of the prohibition of torture in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution is virtually impossible. 
 
Section 8 is a noteworthy aspect of the Bill. Section 8(1) places a duty on the State “to 
promote awareness of the prohibition against torture aimed at the prevention and combating 
of torture”. Furthermore, section 8(2) enjoins the President to designate members of Cabinet 
to facilitate the development of programmes to educate and inform the general public as well 
as public officials on the prohibition of torture, also to provide assistance to victims of 
torture. Section 8 may be viewed as a purposively prevention-orientated provision in the Bill. 
It is submitted that such a pro-active approach to international crime is a welcome 
development which supports the values and forward-looking purposes of ICL in general.  
 
7.7.3 The Prosecution of Crimes under Customary International Law under Section 232 
of the Constitution and the Duty of Third States to Prosecute 
 
It goes without saying that since the implementation of the ICC Act and the Geneva 
Conventions Act, and if the requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction are met, South 
Africa need not turn to customary international law under section 232 of the Constitution to 
prosecute any of the crimes under customary international law provided for in the Rome 
Statute and the Geneva Conventions respectively. Since customary international (criminal) 
law is now only subject to constitutional and legislative constraints, the degree to which 
customary international criminal law obligations can be observed by South African courts 
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must be determined. In this section, I address the question of the possible role of customary 
international law as a basis for national prosecutions in South Africa.
1216
  
 
Strydom’s dictum below serves to illustrate the possible future relevance of these 
considerations to the South African legal system:   
“What should be noted is that the national prosecution of persons for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity with reference to customary international law has relevance beyond the 
question of apartheid crimes. War time atrocities on the African continent did not begin or 
end with the apartheid regime or the Rwanda genocide, and it seems valid to consider the 
future role of customary international law in this regard, especially in view of the low rate of 
ratifications of the ICC Statute by African countries and the tendency among certain 
governing elites on the continent to see political solidarity as a greater virtue than justice.”
1217
  
It is well established that the crimes contained in the Rome Statute are crimes under 
customary international law.
1218
 The substantive jurisdiction of Rome Statute was purposely 
restricted to only the most serious crimes of international concern under customary 
international law.
1219
As Kleffner has observed, the rules of customary international law 
remain intact despite the near codification of certain customary international crimes in the 
Rome Statute: 
“It has to be acknowledged at the outset that numerous crimes that are embodied in the Rome 
Statute, as much as some of the general principles and jurisdictional regimes applicable to 
them, had been recognised under international law prior to the adoption and entry into force of 
the Statute. For some of them, a clear obligation to adopt the necessary legislation derives 
from treaties, and customary law may impose such an obligation for others. The Statute leaves 
such existing rules of international law intact.”
1220
 
  
                                                          
1216
 For example, could the NPA rely on common law (via section 232 of the Constitution) to prosecute 
customary international law crimes which have not been transformed into national law or customary 
international law crimes committed before the enactment of such legislation?   
1217
 Strydom (South Africa and the International Criminal Court) (supra) 357.  
1218
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 59; Jessberger and Powell 
(Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 350. 
1219
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 350. 
1220
 Kleffner (The Impact of Complementarity) (supra) 90. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 317 
 
Historically, national courts have been wary of the direct application of customary 
international criminal law.
1221
 In this regard, South African courts are no exception. The 
principle of legality, particularly the principle nullum crimen sine lege, poses the biggest 
legal obstacle to the domestic prosecution of crimes under customary international law. In 
relation to this friction, the most important provisions of the Constitution are section 232 and 
section 35(3)(l). Under section 232 of the South African Constitution, customary 
international law applies directly in South Africa. According to section 35(3)(l): 
“Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right not to be convicted 
for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the 
time it was committed or omitted.” (emphasis added) 
Read together, these two provisions constitute a ground for prosecuting customary 
international law crimes under common law provided that the existence of such an offence 
under international law at the time of the commission can be proved.
1222
 The emphasised 
section in section 35(3)(l) above seems to provide specifically for this possibility.
1223
 Despite 
a natural “hesitance” in terms of the principle of legality to prosecute international crime 
solely on the basis of section 232, Kemp et al. note that: 
“The advantage of prosecutions through the direct application of customary international law 
is that it is not subject to the same temporal limitations as […] statutory regimes […]. This is 
because the presumption against retroactivity is applicable only in instances in which a new 
offence is created. Its observance is therefore subject to the qualification that offences that 
                                                          
1221
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 350. 
1222
 Kemp et al. (Criminal Law in South Africa) (supra) 564-565. Those seeking prosecution will therefore 
have to discharge the burden of proving that the relevant offenses were crimes under customary 
international law at the relevant time. 
1223
 According to the separate opinion of Chaskalson J in S v Basson [2004 (6) BCLR 620 (CC)], the 
Constitution cannot serve as a means for the retrospective criminalisation of conduct committed prior to its 
enactment: “If the conduct with which the accused was charged did not constitute an offence under South 
African law at the time it was committed, then in the light of [Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and 
Another] the State cannot contend that it has become an offence because of the provisions of the 
Constitution” (at para 97). However, the wording of section 35(3)(l) makes it clear that if it can be shown 
that conduct was already criminalised under customary international law by the time that the Constitution 
was adopted, there is no infringement of the right under section 35(3)(l).  
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were, at the time of their commission, unlawful under international law and criminalised at a 
later date will not offend section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.”
1224
 
This is confirmed by section 6(4) of the Geneva Conventions Act, which provides that 
“[nothing] in this act must be construed as precluding the prosecution of any person accused 
of having committed a breach under customary international law before this Act took effect”. 
 
Common law prosecutions based on section 232 of the Constitution may at best be 
considered as a hypothetical possibility.
1225
 The controversy over Lieutenant-General Faustin 
Kayumba Nyamwasa’s presence in South Africa offers a concrete illustration of some of the 
difficulties that may arise in this regard however. A Rwandan national and former senior 
military official in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Nyamwasa fled Rwanda in February 
2010 following allegations of corruption, embezzlement and terrorism against him. In 
addition to being sought by the Rwandan government, Nyamwasa is the subject of two 
indictments issued by Spanish and French judges respectively. The Spanish indictment 
contains charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and the murder of Spanish nationals 
attributed to Nyamwasa personally and through his subordinates under the doctrine of 
command responsibility. The French indictment arose from Nyamwasa’s alleged involvement 
in shooting down of the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana as well as a 
number of French nationals in 1994. Furthermore, Nyamwasa is allegedly connected with 
grave human rights violations committed in north-west Rwanda and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) between 1994 and 1998.
1226
  
 
 While in South Africa, Nyamwasa survived after being shot in the stomach in what 
seemed to have been an assassination attempt. The suspicious circumstances surrounding the 
attempt on his life and the current political climate in Rwanda suggested that Nyamwasa’s 
extradition to Rwanda would expose him to political persecution and that such extradition 
would violate South Africa’s domestic and international legal obligations. On 24 June 2010, 
                                                          
1224
 Kemp et al. (Criminal Law in South Africa) (supra) 564. 
1225
 Kemp et al. (Criminal Law in South Africa) (supra) 564. 
1226
 Katz and Du Plessis (Briefing Paper) (supra) paras 4 and 5. 
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the South African Department of Home Affairs confirmed that Nyamwasa had been granted 
asylum (refugee status) in South Africa.
1227
 
 
 The international crimes (war crimes and crimes against humanity) for which 
Nyamwasa stands accused were committed before the Rome Statute came into effect. Both 
these crimes are widely recognised as crimes under customary international law and subject 
to universal jurisdiction. Thus, South Africa has the authority to prosecute Nyamwasa for the 
crimes of which he stands accused.
1228
 Furthermore, no form of immunity attaches to 
Nyamwasa to potentially complicate his prosecution in a South African court.  
 
Although South Africa has the authority to prosecute crimes subject to universal 
jurisdiction, it is less clear whether international law places a duty on third states to prosecute 
such crimes. According to Werle the duty to prosecute persons for crimes committed 
extraterritorially and by foreign-nationals has hereto been universally recognised only in 
respect of perpetrators of war crimes committed during an international armed conflict.
1229
 It 
is not however universally accepted that third states have a duty under customary 
international law to prosecute persons for the crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.
1230
 Although international law seems to be moving towards recognition of a 
general obligation on states to prosecute perpetrators of core crimes present within their 
                                                          
1227
 According to Katz and Du Plessis, Nyamwasa’s refugee status was granted in terms of a legal error: 
“There is reason to believe that Nyamwasa was involved in crimes against humanity and war crimes and 
thus Nyamwasa is an excluded person for purposes of section 4 of the Refugees Act [130 of 1998] and is 
not eligible for refugee status” and furthermore, “in light of the political climate in Rwanda, and in 
compliance with the principle of non-refoulment, South Africa should not extradite Nyamwasa to Rwanda 
if Nyamwasa is able to demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear that he faces a reasonable possibility of 
persecution or ill-treatment in Rwanda”. See Katz and Du Plessis (Briefing Paper) (supra) para 106.   
1228
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 70; Katz and Du Plessis (Briefing Paper) 
(supra) para 77. 
1229
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 70. 
1230
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 71; see also Ferdinandusse (Direct 
Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 193; Karavias M “Duty to Punish” in Cassese (Oxford 
Companion) (supra) 306 (citing Werle with approval and noting that the question over the existence of 
such a general obligation “remains unresolved”.  
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territory, there is not yet sufficient state practice to serve as conclusive evidence of the 
existence of a rule of customary international law.
1231
  
 
Nyamwasa’s refugee status, the indictments against him and his alleged involvement 
in gross human rights violations gave rise to a number of practical and legal questions which 
may shed some light on South Africa’s ability to stay abreast of the development of the 
international criminal justice system. Nyamwasa’s presence in South Africa raises pertinent 
questions as to the ambit of South Africa’s customary international law obligations towards 
combating impunity and towards a foreign-national allegedly implicated in international 
crimes committed extraterritorially.
1232
 For their part Katz and Du Plessis have argued that, in 
the face of credible evidence of an individual’s involvement in war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, South Africa has a legal obligation to either prosecute such an individual 
(Nyamwasa in particular) or to cooperate with foreign state(s) through the surrender or 
extradition of the accused to such foreign state for prosecution.
1233
 Thus, with the exception 
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I (committed during an 
international armed conflict), the prosecution of a perpetrator of core crimes committed 
before the enactment of the Rome Statute who is present in South African territory presents 
the NPA with the arduous task of proving the crystallisation of a general duty to prosecute 
such crimes under international law at the time that the crime was committed.  
 
Upon submission of this thesis, Nyamwasa still had refugee status in South Africa. 
Although it is complicated by the refugee status which he has been afforded, the Nyamwasa 
                                                          
1231
 Ferdinandusse (Direct Application of International Criminal Law) (supra) 193. This question was 
avoided by the ICJ in Belgium v Senegal (Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite) 
(Judgment) 12 July 2012, para 54: “[…] the issue whether there exists an obligation for a State to 
prosecute crimes under customary international law that were allegedly committed by a foreign national 
abroad is clearly distinct from any question of compliance with that State’s obligations under the 
Convention against Torture and raises quite different legal problems”. 
1232
 Katz and Du Plessis (Briefing Paper) (supra) para 7. 
1233
 Katz and Du Plessis (Briefing Paper) (supra) paras 73-97. The authors cite the preamble of the Rome 
Statute according to which “it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes” (at para 88). According to Werle however, this provision in the Rome 
Statute “only reinforces the duty to punish crimes committed on a state’s own territory”, see Werle 
(Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 71.  
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situation casts a shadow of doubt over the NPA’s future reliance on customary international 
law as a basis for prosecution. The prospect seems to be an unlikely one. It is unclear how, if 
at all, the international law duty to prosecute will influence the NPA’s prosecutorial 
discretion over international crimes.
1234
 The questions over universal jurisdiction, the duty to 
prosecute and customary international law as a basis for prosecuting international crime 
under common law was left open by the Constitutional Court in S v Basson.
1235
 These 
uncertainties underscore the importance of national legislation to incorporate international 
crimes into South African criminal law.  Through the ICC Act, the Geneva Conventions Act 
and the Torture Bill, South Africa has taken significant legislative steps to reduce the gap of 
impunity for perpetrators of international crime who may venture here in the future.   
 
7.7.4 Prognosis on Reconciliation and Lasting Peace in South Africa  
 
The positive aspects of the TRC process have been widely publicised. Although not without 
criticism, the TRC was praised as a great success story and as a model worthy of being 
emulated in other post-conflict societies. It must be submitted that much of the praise for the 
TRC is well deserved. Even those who point out the TRC’s imperfections admit that it was 
the only viable option at the time.
1236
 Still, no mechanism of transitional justice, regardless of 
its measure of success, can be viewed as perfect. The peace versus justice debate rages on 
whilst the fight against impunity, arguments in favour of accountability, the international rule 
of law and the rights of victims of gross human rights violations cannot be easily ignored. 
 
Can it be said that a deficit of justice was created by a lack of accountability for 
apartheid crimes in South Africa? If so, will it lead to some sort of revenge on the 
“perpetrator” group? Or, will it undermine the rule of law in the long run? No one knows for 
certain. Preventing private vengeance and enhancing respect for the rule of law are after all 
two of the most widely acknowledged purposes behind retributive punishment. Wilson cites 
evidence to suggest that a lack of accountability for human rights violations in South Africa 
                                                          
1234
 Swart (The Wouter Basson Prosecution) (supra) 223. 
1235
 2005 (12) BCLR 1192 (CC) at footnote 147; see also the discussion of the Basson-cases at para 7.5.2.3 
supra. 
1236
 See Rakate PK “Reconciling Amnesties with Universal Jurisdiction in South Africa: A Response to 
Garth Meintjies and Juan Mendez” (2001) 3 International Law Forum du Droit International 42-46, 42. 
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is the cause of the high crime statistics and “wild justice” in some places.1237  According to 
Kiss: 
“Just as wounds fester when they are not exposed to open air, so unacknowledged injustice 
can poison societies and produce the cycles of distrust, hatred, and violence that we have 
witnessed in many parts of the world.”
1238
 
 
Kate Allan observes that it is yet to be seen whether the South African transitional 
justice model will make “a real and lasting contribution in combating impunity in South 
Africa”.1239  Continuing in this vein, the potential long-term negative impact of TRC and 
Amnesties deserves some attention. Roht-Arriaze has speculated of the possible long-term 
impact of a lack of criminal prosecution in a post-conflict society: 
 “…a blanket amnesty and silence from the new government perpetuate the existence of a 
separate class to whom the rule of law does not apply.”
1240
 
It is widely believed that a lack of criminal accountability for individual perpetrators within a 
group may cause the victims to impute the criminality to the larger group over time.
1241
 This 
would be a particularly dangerous situation in South Africa since the previous white 
oppressor class constitute a small minority of the South African population. It might be 
argued that the vulnerability of this group is enhanced by the fact that the white minority have 
retained a large degree of economic power and are still the predominant landowners in South 
Africa. Although it takes a stretch of the imagination and a more than average helping of 
paranoia, some suggest similarities between modern day South Africa and Rwanda before the 
                                                          
1237
 Wilson RA The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-apartheid 
State (2001) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 310.  
1238
 Kiss E “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints” in Rothberg RI and Thompson D 
(eds.) Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (2000) Princeton University Press, Princeton 
68-98. 
1239
 Allan (Prosecution and Peace) (supra) 285. 
1240
 Roht-Arriaza N (ed.) Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (1995) Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 4. 
1241
 Farer TJ “Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal Law Help?” (2000) 22 (1) Human 
Rights Quarterly 90-117, 92. 
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genocide.
1242
 The continental setting is also slightly foreboding. Africa remains the continent 
most prone to strive, civil war and compromised democracy. 
 
Moreover, it has been suggested that prosecutions may serve as a symbolic act which 
may lessen the imposition of collective guilt on the perpetrator group.
1243
 Through the trial, 
the individualisation of guilt and through punishment, the perpetrators become symbols of the 
prior evil or injustice. This serves to separate the individual perpetrators from the perpetrator 
group, thereby diverting guilt towards the actual leaders and architects of mass violence. 
Such symbolic trials may become a historical point of reference for the identity of a 
transforming society.
1244
 If we assume that these benefits are more than theoretical in nature, 
they have largely not been obtained in South Africa. 
 
The arguments in opposition to the use of truth-telling and conditional amnesties 
above should however be scrutinised relative to the specific context against which one 
purports to test it. First of all, the South African amnesty was a conditional amnesty. 
Conditional amnesties have generally garnered more support from the international 
community than blanket amnesties. Secondly, criminal prosecutions for apartheid crimes 
could proceed in the event of a denial of amnesty or for perpetrators who did not come 
forward to the TRC.   
 
There are those who would argue that the imputation of accountability to the group 
has been counteracted by the effect of reconciliation through the TRC. This also remains to 
be seen. There have been many voices speaking out against the reconciliatory approach as a 
superficial quick fix. Others bemoan the TRC as a mechanism in which real reconciliation 
was compromised in favour of the demands to realpolitik. The fact that the TRC was created 
through political compromise does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it was 
                                                          
1242
 There has been an increasing use of the term “genocide” by Afrikaners since 1994, especially in 
relation to farm murders and the signing of struggle anthems by members of the ANC. See for example 
http://afrikaner-genocide-achives.blogspot.com/. See also however, footnote 1245 infra. 
1243
 See Goldstone R “Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Tribunals” in Heyns C and Stefiszyn K (eds.) Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A 
Reader (2006) Pretoria University Law Press, Pretoria 370. 
1244
 See Chapter 4 paras 4.3.2 and 4.3.4 supra. 
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politically compromised as a whole. The TRC itself was established as an independently 
functioning body. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no magic crystal ball for predicting the final outcome of the 
use of the TRC in South Africa. The high crime rate and remaining social, economic, and 
racial divisions serve as preliminary warning signs of what might transpire. Despite its 
sociological complexity, international crime is not entirely unpredictable. There were early 
warnings of the Rwandan genocide for example. Rather, international crime is hard to 
prevent and to halt once it escalates, especially in the case of state complicity or an internal 
conflict. According to Genocide Watch, Afrikaans-speaking white South African farmers (or 
“boers”) are currently a vulnerable group in respect of the crime of genocide:  
“This Genocide Watch is to raise an alert concerning the number of Boer farmers slain since 
the end of apartheid in South Africa. The threat of destruction of a group must not be ignored 
because its numbers are small or its members disfavoured because they have acted in 
discriminatory ways in the past. A critical factor in this analysis is the total remaining number 
of Boer farmers. The total number of ethno-European farmers in South Africa has been 
estimated at approximately 40,000 to 45,000. The majority of ethno-European farmers are 
Boers. In world context, this may seem to be a small number of people. But such absolute 
numbers are biased against recognition of threats to the survival of minorities. The smaller the 
minority the more severe this bias.”
1245
 
In September 2011, South Africa was moved to stage 6 “Preparation” on Genocide Watch’s 
“Countries at Risk Chart”, because of “evidence of organized incitement to violence against 
white people”. In February 2012, South Africa was moved back to stage 5 “Polarisation”. 
The main reason for this was steps taken to curtail the political power of the radical leader of 
the ANC Youth league, Julius Malema.   
 
                                                          
1245
 “Over 1000 Boer Farmers have been murdered in South Africa since 1991” Genocide                   
Watch Report (2002), available at http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/SAfrica2002Over1000Boer 
FarmersInSouthAfricaHaveBeenMurderedSince1991.pdf (accessed 2012/02/06). As indicated by the 
emphasised words in the quoted text, Genocide Watch’s statement must be viewed as a statement by a 
‘watchdog’ organisation with the specific aim of raising awareness of conditions potentially conducive to 
genocide. Thus, there is at present no conclusive legal proof of a ‘Boer genocide’ in South Africa.  
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Despite the foreboding picture which emerges from the preceding paragraph, it is 
important to draw attention to the specific form of intent (dolus specialis) required for the 
crime of genocide, namely the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial 
or religious group, as such” (emphasis added).1246  Thus, when members of a group are 
targeted due to their membership of that group, even if the offender’s intent is discriminatory 
in nature, it is not sufficient to warrant a conviction for genocide as the offender did not 
intend for his or her actus reus to contribute to the destruction of a protected group.
1247
  
 
In general, caution should be applied to the determination of the existence of 
genocidal intent. The crime of genocide has developed as one of the few crimes which are 
viewed as so egregious that is offends humanity as a whole. As was noted by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in Krstić, “[the] gravity [of the crime of genocide] is reflected in the 
stringent requirements of specific intent. Convictions for genocide can be entered only where 
that intent has been unequivocally established”. 1248  A failure to uphold the distinction 
between criminal acts intentionally perpetrated against members of a group and criminal acts 
perpetrated with the intent to contribute to the destruction of a protected group (or, the strict 
threshold of genocidal intent), may lead to the exploitation of the label of genocide and will 
ultimately detract from the moral resonance reflected in the definition of the crime of 
genocide.      
 
Aside from the cautious approach mentioned above, it is submitted that in general a 
preventative approach to genocide is warranted. Incitement to commit genocide must be 
                                                          
1246
 See Rome Statue of the ICC, article 6. 
1247
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, para 187; see also Kemp et 
al. (Criminal Law in South Africa) (supra) 531-533; Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) 
(supra) 276. 
1248
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstić (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para 
134; see also ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstić (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-98-33, 2 August 2001, 
para 700: “It can […] be argued […] that genocide is the most serious crime because of its requirement of 
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. In this sense, 
even though the criminal acts themselves involved in a genocide may not vary from those in a crime 
against humanity or a crime against the laws and customs of war, the convicted person is, because of his 
specific intent, deemed to be more blameworthy”. 
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smothered since, in the way that small sparks may cause a runaway fire under the right 
conditions, the momentum of genocide may become overwhelming and cause great 
devastation in a relatively short time. This applies to the other core crimes as well. The nature 
of these crimes and the extraordinary context in which they often occur, merits a pro-active 
approach from states and their legal systems. Giving too little attention to these matters has 
led to mass atrocity in the past and pleads for an acknowledgement of the failures of history. 
When it comes to international crimes, particularly those crimes contained in the Rome 
Statute and in relation to the words or actions of authority figures or populists, any 
governmental or judicial emphasis on the rights of minorities and crimes that protect (at least 
partially) minority or collective rights are to be applauded. For this reason it is essential that 
states formally acknowledge the seriousness of international crime as well as empower their 
lawyers and legal systems with effective incorporation of international criminal laws. 
 
A heartening approach in this regard comes from the judgment of the South African 
equality court in Afri-Forum and Another v Julius Sello Malema and Others.
1249
 At issue was 
whether utterances chanted, sung or recited in public by the respondent (Malema) and 
translated to mean “shoot the Boer/farmer”, “shoot the Boers/farmers they are 
rapists/robbers” constitutes hate speech under South African law. These utterances raise 
concern especially over the use of the memory of apartheid as a weapon of radical politics in 
South Africa. In his judgment, Lamont J referred specifically to the court’s international law 
obligations under the Constitution and a number of treaties applicable to the issue.
1250
 He lists 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) “which 
should be read with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and section 20 of the 
ICCPR.
1251
 Furthermore, the judge underlined the vulnerability of minority groups stating 
that “[t]he Court has a clear duty to come to the assistance of such affected people”.1252 The 
judge found that hate speech is prohibited so as to “prevent both visible exclusion of minority 
groups that would deny them equal opportunities and benefits of […] society and invisibly 
                                                          
1249
 [2011] ZAEQC 2, Case No. 20968/2010. 
1250
 Paras 16 and 27. 
1251
 Para 27. 
1252
 Paras 27 and 35. 
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exclude their acceptance as equals”.1253 The judge ordered that the song and words at issue 
constituted hate speech and that the respondents are restrained from singing the song Dubula 
Ibhunu at any public or private meeting. The judgment illustrates the value of the recourse to 
the norms and values of international law to attempt to resolve a domestic social conflict.  
 
Lastly, it must be noted that just as the legacy of transformative criminal trials has 
changed over time, the legacy of the TRC may become a powerful point of reference for the 
values of the new South Africa.
1254
 Douglas notes of the Nuremberg IMT: 
“At the time of its staging, the Nuremberg trial aroused indifference in the majority of 
Germans. In the 1950s, Germans viewed the trial with contempt, as an exercise in victor’s 
justice.12 In particular; they vilified Nuremberg for treating ‘aggressive war’ as an 
international crime. Now, however, the trial is generally viewed in Germany with respect – 
both as an event that prodded Germans to a collective reckoning with their troubled past, and 
as a vital contribution to the developing body of international law.”
1255
 
Thus, there is every chance that the TRC as a response to apartheid and means to facilitate 
transition and transformation will be vindicated in future years. It may prove to be a positive 
contribution to the South African collective memory. Such a development would negate any 
real (current or future) negative effects which may be directly attributable to a lack of 
criminal accountability for apartheid era (international) crimes. 
 
South Africa remains a deeply divided society. Although many initiatives have been 
launched to attempt to reverse apartheid, its main legacy of socio-economic inequality 
between black and white South Africans is still a reality of everyday South African life. 
Crime levels have skyrocketed since the early 1990’s.1256 Furthermore, according to the 2010 
Reconciliation Barometer Survey Report, 22% of South Africans feel that government should 
have done more to prosecute perpetrators of apartheid crimes, while 39% feel that 
                                                          
1253
 Para 29. 
1254
 See Chapter 4 supra on the legacies of the Nuremberg IMT and the Eichmann trial respectively. 
1255
 Douglas (supra) 520. 
1256
 See Snyman (Criminal Law) (supra) 21-23. In light of the exponential increase in crime since the 
1990’s, Snyman describes the South African criminal justice system as “dysfunctional”. 
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government has not done enough to support the victims of apartheid crimes.
1257
 These 
realities coupled with the potential negative after-effects which might transpire from the lack 
of criminal accountability in the immediate aftermath of apartheid, paints what seems to be 
an ominous picture for the future. Is it possible that due to a general lack of retribution and 
symbolic criminal trials, collective memory can be turned into a political weapon in South 
Africa? When focusing on these objective factors alone, one might predict some sort of 
violent backlash or cyclical revenge attributable to the “failures” of the South African 
transition. Yet, the miracle of the South African transition endures. The lasting value of the 
TRC process is in many respects undeniable. In spite of South Africa’s ailing democracy, the 
rainbow nations’ rainbow remains mostly intact. 
 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
The increased production of international criminal justice norms by the international 
community is one of the most significant developments in modern international law. These 
norms place legal obligations on the inter- and intra-State conduct of governments and on 
individuals. The modes through which the international community produces these norms 
(treaties or the rules of customary international law) are designed to permeate domestic legal 
systems through implementation legislation and/or application in domestic courts. Anne-
Marie Slaughter describes the importance of the role of domestic courts in this regard: 
“National courts are the vehicles through which international treaties and customary law that 
have not been independently incorporated into domestic statutes enter domestic systems.”1258 
In addition to voluntarily incorporated international law norms, some international norms 
have developed to achieve a status of higher law from which no derogation is allowed. These 
                                                          
1257
 Since it is not mentioned in the survey report, it is assumed that the 22% figure relates to perpetrators 
of apartheid crimes which had not participated in the TRC process. See Lefko-Everett K, Lekalake R, 
Penfold E and Rais S “2010 SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey Report”, Published by the Institute for 
Justice and Reconciliation 32. It must be mentioned that this report is in many respects also positive 
towards reconciliation in South Africa. 
1258
 Slaughter A “Judicial Globalization” (1999-2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103.  
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peremptory norms of international law also have a persuasive or de-legitimising effect on 
inter-State conduct and the conduct of states towards their citizens.
1259
 
 
Since the end of apartheid, the South African legal system is open to the influence of 
diverse legal sources including international law.
1260
 The constitutionalisation of international 
law specifically gives international law more weight and influence in the post-apartheid 
South African legal system. Furthermore, is has become evident that the South African 
Constitution embraces the concept of transformation. The Constitution is intended to “heal 
the divisions of the past and [establish] a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights”.1261 This constitutional commitment is intended to address 
real problems which, although largely the result of South Africa’s history of oppression and 
the high levels of poverty and inequality still rampant in the country, might also be a 
consequence of failures during South Africa’s transition, namely a lack of true reconciliation 
between ethnic groups and a lack of respect for the rule of law. 
 
The constitutional entrenchment of international law may be viewed as an important 
element of the post-apartheid “legal revolution” and the broader project of transformation in 
South Africa.
1262
 The Constitutional Court’s approach in S v Makwanyane illustrates the 
significance of international law in the new South Africa.
1263
 In February 2012, the South 
African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development published a document on the 
transformation of the judicial system and the role of the judiciary in the developmental South 
African state. According to this document, transformation should be aligned with 
international imperatives since South Africa, as “an important member of the global 
                                                          
1259
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-95-17/1-T10, 10 December 
1998, para 155. 
1260
 Roederer (supra) in Roederer and Moellendorf (Jurisprudence) (supra) 623: “South Africa is [...] 
unique in being anti-exceptionalist, anti-isolationist, in its openness or permeability when it comes to 
multiple legal traditions and the models that accompany them. This is illustrated not only by the 
intermingling of customary law, English and Roman Dutch law, and their various underlying principles 
and approaches to legal problems, but also through the recognized influences of international law, 
comparative law, and the thinking of scholars from other traditions”. 
1261
 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1262
 Roederer (supra) in Roederer and Moellendorf (Jurisprudence) (supra) 623. 
1263
 See para 7.2.2.2 supra. 
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community and an active campaigner for human rights”, has a responsibility to go “beyond 
the minimum expectations of complying with international norms, standards, and state 
obligations, and to be a driver of social change within the South African Development 
Community (SADC) and the continent”.1264 
 
From this perspective it is clear that South African courts must as far as possible 
endeavour to interpret and apply international law in a transformative manner to the same 
degree as other “transformative” provisions in the Constitution. Considering the latter 
statement, the influence of past injustices on South Africa’s constitutional values and 
commitments as well as the importance of national courts in the realisation of the objectives 
of international criminal justice, it is submitted that the transformation of ICL into national 
law through incorporation legislation and the application and interpretation of ICL in 
domestic courts must be viewed as a part of the larger, forward-looking project of 
constitutional transformation and the institutionalisation of international human rights in post-
apartheid South Africa. A serious commitment to international human rights cannot be 
regarded as genuine without a concomitant commitment to the cause of international criminal 
justice. Denying South Africans of the mutual benefit of ICL must be viewed as contrary to 
constitutional values. Such a denial disconnects individuals from value-driven norms related 
to their well-being which are not only domestically endorsed via the Constitution, but also 
universal in nature. 
 
In a dualist state such as South Africa, the application of ICL in domestic courts 
requires above all ratification (or accession) and incorporation of treaties related to 
international criminal justice. Apart from political will, the incorporation of ICL does not 
require anything beyond the existing framework for the voluntary incorporation of 
international law. It is hoped that South African courts will be placed in a position not only to 
take full benefit of the transformative value of ICL, but also to interpret international 
(criminal) law obligations in a manner that promotes a transformative social influence. Up to 
this point South African courts have had limited opportunities to do this. The judgments in 
the Afri-Forum and Another v Julius Sello Malema and Others and Southern African 
                                                          
1264
 “Discussion Document on the Transformation of the Judicial System and the Role of the Judiciary in 
the Developmental South African State” Published by the South African Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, February 2012, 3. 
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Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, 
constitute positive developments in this regard. Even though the Malema-case did not involve 
the application of ICL, the reference made by the Equality court to the Genocide Convention 
and the Rome Statute shows a penetration of ICL values into the domestic sphere. In contrast, 
the Basson and Nkadimeng cases and the situation surrounding Faustin Nyamwasa represent 
missed opportunities for bringing South Africa in line with the values of the international 
community and the objective to end impunity for serious international crime. 
 
It may be submitted that due to its acceptance of liberal democracy and as a 
consequence of the constitutionalisation of international law, South Africa can generally be 
expected to support ICL as a matter of internal- and foreign policy.
1265
 This expectation is 
underscored by evidence of cosmopolitanism and idealism in the international order, the 
influence of which creates a brand of international law that functions in a way that contradicts 
the traditional regulatory function of international law where it is viewed as inferior to state 
interests and exclusively reliant on state consent. Yet, it appears that the anticipated 
permeation of international legal norms into the South African legal system has not been 
entirely forthcoming. South Africa’s general hesitancy of relying on international law in 
criminal matters may be ascribed to two factors.
1266
 Firstly, due to South Africa’s isolation in 
the apartheid-era, the South Africa judiciary has only relatively recently started to engage 
with international law. Time is needed for the acquisition and development of legal 
knowledge, awareness and experience. Secondly, South African lawyers are not well-
schooled in the application of international law (especially customary international law) and 
may until recently have found international law too exotic to be used in legal proceedings.
1267
 
Beyond this general reluctance to rely on international criminal law, there is also the 
difficulty of proving the existence and applicability of customary international law rules in a 
country following the dualist approach. This difficulty is not confined to South Africa and 
has been illustrated in a number of cases worldwide, notably the Pinochet case in the United 
Kingdom.
1268
  
 
                                                          
1265
 See Chapter 6 para 6.3.2.2 supra; see Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra). 
1266
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 361. 
1267
 Swart (The Wouter Basson Prosecution) (supra) 213. 
1268
 See footnote 1098 supra. 
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It must however be recognised that international legal norms do not operate in a 
vacuum. Political pressures are exuded on South Africa and its legal system from 
international- and regional organisations such as the United Nations and the African Union. 
The international order and the international criminal justice system are based on 
dependencies and interdependencies of various sorts, which add further nuances to the 
politics of ICL. The ICC for example is highly dependent on state cooperation, while states 
are politically, economically and diplomatically interdependent among each other.
1269
 In this 
chapter, it was illustrated how for example the decision of a political body, the UNSC referral 
of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, has resulted in an impact via the AU on South Africa’s 
stance towards the ICC. These types of problems are endemic to the “marriage” between ICL 
and politics.
1270
 It is furthermore a consequence of the difficulties of the enforcement of 
international law in general. The reality is that the greater part of international law is still 
based on voluntary compliance by states. In the absence of such voluntary compliance, very 
limited enforcement measures are available for use against states in breach of international 
law.  
 
In conclusion to this chapter, it appears that the political and legal characteristics of a 
state may have a crucial impact on its ability to dynamically reflect modern international 
criminal justice and consequently also the transformative potential of ICL within states. From 
the analysis of the impact of ICL in South Africa, it is submitted that the following aspects 
are crucial to the transformative value of ICL in any domestic legal system: 
 Constitutional- or some other form of legal entrenchment of international law in 
general.  
                                                          
1269
 See “Sudan: Malawi President Asks to Ban Bashir from Summit” (2012/05/06), available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201205070110.html (accessed 2012/05/08). In this articled it is reported that 
President Banda of Malawi had requested the AU not to allow President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan to attend 
the AU summit in Malawi during July 2012 since she believed this would have negative “economic 
repercussions”. See also the argument of the respondents in Southern African Litigation Centre and 
Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (North Gauteng High Court) Case No. 
77150/09, 8 May 2012, para 4 (at 25-26) (the respondents argued that an investigation into allegations of 
crimes against humanity would impact negatively on South Africa’s diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe). 
1270
 See Chapter 4 para 4.2.3.3 supra. 
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 The incorporation of treaties pertaining to ICL into national law through legislation, 
most important of which is legislation incorporating the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
 The measure to which ICL can be applied and adjudicated on in domestic courts. In 
this regard the following may be beneficial: awareness and knowledge among 
domestic lawyers and civil society of the nature and value of ICL domestically as well 
as impartiality and independence in the judiciary and the prosecuting authority. 
 The international and regional political affiliations of the state and the positive or 
negative influence of these affiliations on domestic legal obligations towards 
international criminal justice. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUBMISSIONS 
 
 
 
8.1 Foreword 
 
A multitude of studies have dealt with the contribution and limitations of the use of ICL in 
transitions to democracy, in the wake of mass atrocity and in post-conflict situations.
1271
 In 
this thesis I have followed a somewhat different approach. Although parts of the thesis has to 
some extent overlapped with the aforementioned studies, the thesis as a whole provides a 
broader perspective that goes beyond these traditional areas of investigation in order to 
examine specifically the transformative contribution as well as the potential for such a 
contribution by the international criminal justice system in a more holistic manner. The 
concept of transformation remains fluid and elusive, owing to the different meanings which 
may be afforded to it in law, politics and in situations (such as during political transitions) 
were law often becomes politicised. Consequently, I have sought to conceptualise 
transformative value broadly, but also in line with its ordinary grammatical meaning to 
convey it as change that may be beneficial to the civitas maxima.
1272
 The question I have 
sought to address is whether or not ICL can achieve or help to achieve this type of change 
generally, and in South Africa specifically.  
 
8.2 General Conclusion 
 
In light of the facts and issues considered in the preceding chapters, it is my conclusion that 
ICL has some ability and potential to advance transformation. This ability is however partly a 
                                                          
1271
 See for example Teitel (Transitional Justice) (supra); De Lange (supra) in Villa-Vicencio and 
Verwoerd (Looking Back Reaching Forward) (supra). On the limits of ICL and the institutions of ICL as a 
response to mass atrocity see Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law) (supra). See also 
Osiel (Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory) (supra). 
1272
 See Chapter 3 para 3.5 supra. In this chapter many of the criteria of “transformative value” formulated 
under Chapter 3 are applied to ICL (see paras 8.3.1, 8.3.2, 8.3.4.1 and 8.3.4.2 infra).  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 336 
 
result of broader global trends of transformation of which ICL is an element. That is to say 
that ICL’s transformative value is to an extent reliant on what I refer to below as 
‘transformative synergies’. Furthermore, ICL’s transformative ability is subjected to a 
number of practical limitations and often susceptible to disruptive political influences.  
 
While punishment under ICL is for the most part a backward-looking exercise in the 
tradition of domestic criminal law retributivism, ICL is to an extent removed from this 
paradigm as a body of law that is historically and ontologically purpose- and value-driven. In 
other words, ICL is also normative and forward-looking in various respects. Furthermore, the 
research provides some scope for asserting that ICL could have transformative value and 
potential that goes beyond its application in international criminal trials and beyond the 
context of mass atrocity. ICL’s transformative impact is not confined to the “hard” impact of 
the application of substantive ICL in international and domestic courts on perpetrators, 
victims, societies, states and the international community directly or indirectly involved with 
international criminal justice processes. The international criminal justice system as a whole 
also creates a more elusive “soft” impact.1273 This is the gradual normative impact that ICL 
creates through its continued existence, the upward trajectory of its development, its moral 
resonance and through a purpose-driven association with certain international values and 
structures of political power.  
 
ICL reflects an idealistic version of how the world should be, even though it is itself 
constantly under the influence of how the world is. A place in which power often trumps 
justice and where massive crimes are often met with impunity. Neither transformation, nor 
international criminal justice operates in a vacuum. For better or worse, ICL’s transformative 
value and potential is affected by the political will of states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1273
 See Chapter 1 para 1.5 (assumption 2) supra. 
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8.3 Main Arguments 
 
The following arguments are presented in support of the general conclusion above:  
 
8.3.1 International Criminal Law as Purpose- and Value-Driven  
 
ICL is formally restricted to the narrow function of holding individual perpetrators of 
international crime accountable through the determination of guilt and punishment. Yet 
beyond this formal function, ICL serves a much larger normative purpose. The history, 
rationale, and the underlying assumptions for the use of ICL indicate that it pursues many 
objectives which are forward-looking and utilitarian in character. From a broad perspective, 
ICL may therefore be viewed as a body of law intended to have a transformative social 
function. ICL exists on the assumption that a supranational framework of criminal law can 
address the problems of state and mass violence, as well as play a role in the future deterrence 
of these phenomena. Furthermore, international crimes exist to protect the interest of the 
international community and project shared universal values in situations where national 
criminal justice systems have been historically unwilling or unable to fulfil this function.  
 
Punishment for international crimes is based on more or less the same rationale as 
punishment of domestic crime. It is a regulated sanction with a broader expressive 
significance. International criminal norms may be viewed as an authoritative expression of 
the international community’s outrage over certain acts as harmful and contrary to their 
collective values. The legal threat of international criminalisation is partly intended to 
function as an instrument of social change which aims to re-orientate the values of 
perpetrators of international crime and also to project these values into the future in the hope 
of deterring similar acts.
1274
 Viewed collectively, the assumptions that underlie the 
international criminal justice regime are tantamount to a belief in legalism and to a more 
limited extent, utilitarianism.
1275
 Legalism is the belief that all human conduct, including state 
criminality and individual conduct during collective violence, is within reach of legal 
                                                          
1274
 Zimring F and Hawkins G “The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social Change” in Tapp JL and 
Levine FJ (eds.) Law, Justice and the Individual in Society: Psychological and Legal Issues (1977) Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, New York 60-61. 
1275
 See Chapter 5 para 5.3 supra. 
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rules.
1276
 The utilitarian belief suggests that the application of these rules may secure some 
social benefit.
1277
 International crimes are collectively a legalistic expression of the values of 
the international community. As such, the existence and enforcement of international 
criminal norms may be viewed as an effort to protect the values of the international 
community as well as to project these values onto groups of individuals (perpetrators of 
international crime) which have not yet embraced such values, as it is believed that this 
would be to the benefit of all.  
 
International crimes, especially the core crimes, find significant moral resonance 
within the international community.
1278
 The normative value of ICL is largely derived from 
this moral significance. These crimes are an expression of what humanity deems to be 
universally offensive. The moral resonance of international crime gives punishment at the 
international level an enhanced expressive potency. The defendants put on trial are often 
high-profile state and military leaders viewed by the public as symbols of the past conflict. 
Furthermore, whether the offender featured in the events as an architect of mass violence or 
as a foot soldier acting under ‘manifestly unlawful’ orders, these defendants are viewed by 
the international community as hostis humani generis because of the nature of their crimes. 
                                                          
1276
 Shklar defines the legalist outlook as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of 
rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules” (see Shklar 
(Legalism) (supra) 1); Shklar (In Defense of Legalism) (supra) where legalism is similarly defined as “the 
belief that morality consists of following rules and that moral relationships are a matter of duties and rights 
assigned by rules”; see also West (Reconsidering Legalism) (supra). 
1277
 In general, and if it does not amount to disproportionate punishment for the perpetrator, the forward-
looking punishment theories are morally justified because they contain a long-term utilitarian benefit (See 
Metz T “Legal Punishment” in Roederer and Moellendorf (eds.) Jurisprudence (2004) 556). 
1278
 The moral resonance of serious international crime, and its universal illegality, must be distinguished 
from the realpolitik of its enforcement. Most of the criticism against international criminal justice proceeds 
not from the moral justifiability of prosecuting serious international crimes but from the 
institutionalisation, manner or timing of prosecution. There is less agreement in the international 
community on the ‘who, where and how’ of international criminal justice than there is over the ‘why’. 
Thus, while the AU members may dispute the arrest warrant issued by the ICC in Sudan, they do not do so 
on the ground that the warrant is immoral, but primarily on the ground that the warrant conflicts with or 
undermines another legitimate extra-legal interest of the AU, namely regional strategies for a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict in Sudan (see Chapter 7 para 7.6.2.2 supra). See also Tladi (The African Union 
and the International Criminal Court) (supra); Deya (Worth the Wait) (supra). 
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All these defendants must answer for their crimes in a court of law in the same manner that 
an ‘ordinary’ criminal would. It is extraordinary justice meted out in a conventional way. 
Beyond its function to provide a mechanism for applying the law, the trial itself is a symbol 
of unflinching justice and of the supremacy of the rule of law.  
 
Not only substantive ICL is morally significant. Another aspect of ICL that resonates 
morally is the manner in which the law is enforced. International criminal justice is confined 
in its enforcement to ‘ordinary’ modes of punishment found in domestic criminal justice 
systems and restrained by human rights law as well as certain established legal principles.  
ICL recognises that the accused are to be afforded the same fair trial rights under 
international human rights law as those which would offer protection to accused persons in 
national courts.
1279
 Without exception, the statutes of various international criminal courts 
guarantee the accused the right to a fair trial.
1280
 This acts as a counterweight to the 
retributive impulses engendered by serious international crimes. By constraining its 
application to the parameters of internationally accepted due process rights and procedural 
fairness, ICL gains a measure of moral superiority in the fight against the scourge of 
international crime. This creates a lasting legacy of fairness and justice beyond the trial and 
the impact created by the act of punishment itself. For all its faults, the Nuremberg IMT has 
left behind a legacy that is the primary example of this.
1281
 
 
8.3.2 ICL as Historically Self-Conscious: The Back to the Future-metaphor  
 
The primary justification for punishment under any species of criminal law is backward-
looking retribution. This is endorsed through the sentencing jurisprudence of international 
criminal tribunals. ICL is largely a retributive and repressive response to egregious criminal 
acts. As outlined under the previous heading however, ICL is also normative and forward-
looking through the fact of its being driven by its ontological purposes and underlying values. 
International criminal justice, as part of a transitional justice response in particular, also 
                                                          
1279
 See the ICCPR, articles 9 and article 14. 
1280
 See the Rome Statute of the ICC, article 67 (rights of the accused) and article 85 (right to 
compensation for unjust arrest or conviction). 
1281
 See Chapter 4 para 4.2 supra. 
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aspires in part towards “forward looking goals of social transformation”.1282 Deterrence is a 
prominent example of a forward-looking utilitarian goal of punishment which has been 
endorsed by international criminal tribunals. Many of the lesser ‘judicially-recognised’ and 
subsidiary objectives of ICL such as creating a historical record, reconciliation, the interests 
of victims and ending the culture of impunity are forward-looking utilitarian objectives which 
unlike deterrence, are mostly alien to domestic criminal law punishment theory.
1283
 These 
objectives originate from past events that still haunt humanity’s collective consciousness, 
events for which many initiatives exist to ensure that they are not repeated. ICL is one such 
initiative. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, a major characteristic of transformation is that it is a 
forward and backward-looking exercise.
1284
 In Chapter 3, transformation was described as a 
goal-orientated, yet historically self-conscious process of change. The injustice, mass 
atrocities and universally offensive behaviour that ICL is self-conscious of are well known 
and well documented. International crimes have developed out of a shared historical 
awareness in the international community, specifically to address and prevent the phenomena 
of gross human rights violations, collective violence and transgressions related to armed 
conflict which has victimised millions and shocked the universal consciousness of mankind. 
Furthermore, ICL aims to end the historical impunity for architects and perpetuators of the 
abovementioned phenomena. These phenomena are not confined to the past. There is at 
present still plenty of it to go around. In the years since the Second World War the nature of 
conflict has changed and may change again. Neither has the tide been turned in respect of 
impunity. One needs only to turn to the ICC’s list of outstanding arrest warrants to note that 
accountability for international crimes is still far from guaranteed. The likes of Joseph Kony 
and Omar Al-Bashir continue to thwart the administration of international criminal justice. 
Quite simply, the wrongs that ICL is constantly and historically mindful of are also the 
wrongs which it seeks to remedy and eliminate from this world.
1285
 The project of ICL is 
                                                          
1282
 See Goldbraith (The Pace of International Criminal Justice) (supra) 90-94.  
1283
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 8. 
1284
 See Chapter 3 para 3.4.3 supra. 
1285
 The South African Torture Bill serves as a good example in this regard. In the preamble of the Bill 
reference is made to the fact that South Africa “has a shameful history of gross human rights abuses, 
including the torture of persons and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of many of 
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founded on the belief that criminalisation of certain acts may help to bring justice and peace 
to the world. This goal represents the alternative to the present, or the ideal towards which 
ICL is geared through its purposes and values, even though it is almost certainly unattainable. 
 
The historical self-consciousness of ICL explains the fact that international criminal 
trials have tended to be somewhat flexible in respect of their objectives. They are flexible in 
the sense that they are to some degree tailored (or, some may contend, manipulated) to 
address sui generis needs in a specific context in an effort to prevent a repeat of past 
events.
1286
 At the Nuremberg IMT the focus was mostly on retribution. Much effort was 
however made to establish the tribunal as a historical and symbolic break from the past.
1287
 
For the prosecutors in Eichmann, the trial represented an opportunity to shape the identity of 
the young state of Israel and of the many Jewish victims of Nazi atrocities.
1288
 In the 1990’s, 
with the changing nature of conflict and the rise of international human rights, the ad hoc 
tribunals shifted the focus of international criminal justice towards the new objectives of 
truth-finding and reconciliation, which are more specific to the needs of post-conflict 
societies.
1289
 More recently, the ICC seeks to combat crime which threatens the peace, 
security and well-being of the world and also emphasises the interests of victims of 
international crime.
1290
 
 
The simultaneously forward- and backward-looking nature of the objectives of ICL 
presents further justification for the argument that ICL has transformative value. ICL 
represents a means of holding perpetrators to account and of dealing with past injustices. This 
is not done exclusively to rectify the past, but is also forward-looking in that it aims to create 
                                                          
its citizens and inhabitants”. Having taken cognisance of this fact, the Bill provides for measures both to 
combat and prevent acts of torture. See Chapter 7 para 7.7.2.2 supra. 
1286
 In Chapter 3 it was submitted that “transformative change is determined by, and contingent upon, the 
nature of prior injustices”. See Chapter 3 para 3.4.3 supra. 
1287
 See Chapter 4 para 4.2.3.3 supra. 
1288
 See Chapter 4 paras 4.3.2 and 4.3.4 supra. 
1289
 See Chapter 5 paras 5.6.5.1 and 5.6.5.2 supra. 
1290
 Beyond those objectives which receive express and tacit recognition in the Rome Statute, it is yet to be 
seen whether the Court will interpret its purpose narrowly or broadly in future. In the ICC’s first 
sentencing judgment, the court confined itself to the purposes expressly provided for in the preamble of the 
Rome Statute (see Chapter 5 para 5.5.3 supra). 
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new social and legal expectations. ICL punishes crime in an effort to prevent its future 
occurrence. Theoretically, there is a positive association between the repressive, backward-
looking functions of criminal punishment and the previously outlined normative function of 
international criminal justice. There is a belief that punishment will effect social change in 
the long term through establishing and solidifying new social values as well as through 
expressive condemnation and general deterrence. Some international criminal trials may 
serve to imprint a history lesson onto the collective consciousness, creating a pedagogical 
effect through retrospective judgment which may enhance the social solidarity of the 
international community with regard to certain egregious forms of conduct.
1291
 At the heart of 
ICL lies the international community’s value-based desire for the long-term maintenance of 
international peace and security through the suppression of conduct that poses a serious threat 
to peaceful human co-existence.
1292
 The golden thread running through ICL’s many 
backward- and forward-looking objectives is the ideal of injecting new values into societies 
and projecting such values onto those members of the international community who have not 
yet accepted the values of international peace and security as universal and mutually 
beneficial. It is hard to imagine a means of suppressing the types of conduct which threatens 
world peace and security in a manner that is universally intelligible, yet also within the 
parameters of basic human rights (also important values of the international community) 
other than through the ex post facto punishment of such conduct based on both global 
authority and a firm commitment to respect individual rights as well as legal principles of 
fairness.  
 
The saying, ‘there can be no peace without justice’, has become the near unbridled 
mantra of international criminal justice. There can however be no peace through the 
subsidiary goals of peace (reconciliation, general deterrence and respect for the rule of law 
are prominent examples) unless the fundamental values that underlie the punishment 
representative of justice in the abovementioned mantra, are successfully communicated to 
and accepted by the individuals and population groups which represent the target of 
expressive punishment. If anything, this thesis has highlighted the fact that although ICL may 
                                                          
1291
 See Chapter 5 para 5.6.2 supra. 
1292
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 31-32. Threats to world peace are interpreted 
broadly to include serious human rights violations which occur within a state. See also Chapter 8 para 
8.3.4.1 (footnote 1303) infra. 
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serve to project shared human values, the process of ensuring real and lasting acceptance of, 
and compliance with, these values represents the main challenge to the project of 
international criminal justice moving forward. 
 
8.3.3 ICL as a Mediator between the Interests of Power and Justice 
 
International law is caught between state values and human values, between the interests of 
almost 200 states and the needs of more than seven billion individual human beings.
1293
 ICL 
is at the centre of this tension between the state and the individual, between Westphalian 
sovereignty and an emerging cosmopolitanism, where it acts as an autonomous body of 
substantive international law, but also as a mediator of sorts between the aforementioned 
extremes. Currently there is a belief that international criminal justice evolved and exists as 
“a phenomenon anchored in power yet simultaneously capable of transcending it”.1294 ICL 
must balance divergent interests - accountability against fairness, international crime control 
against due process and punishment that reflects the new international moral consciousness 
against the established rules of the principle of legality – in order to project human values (or 
the interests of individuals) in an international legal system which traditionally reflects only 
state values and interests. In the words of Luban, “[international] criminal law stands for the 
proposition that crime is crime regardless of its political trappings”.1295 
 
The institutions of ICL are illustrative of its ability to mediate between divergent 
interests. Although dependent on political support, these institutions also receive the clout 
that is necessary for wielding an independent influence which promotes human interests 
through the political support that they are able to induce by way of their moral resonance, as a 
                                                          
1293
 Henkin (International Law) (supra) 279. 
1294
 Megret (Politics of International Criminal Justice) (supra) 1264; see also Teitel (Transitional Justice) 
(supra) 213. This resonates with Krisch’s assertion that “international law is both an instrument of power 
and an obstacle to its exercise”. See Krisch (International Law in Times of Hegemony) (supra) 371. 
1295
 Luban (Fairness to Rightness) (supra) 9-10. Luban also contends that: “The decision not to stage 
criminal trials is no less an expressive act than the creation of tribunals; and the expressive contents 
associated with impunity or summary punishment are unacceptable: both are assertions that political crime 
lies outside the law. The point of trials backed by punishment is to assert the realm of law against the 
claims of politics” (emphasis added). 
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matter of international policy and through other means such as the political cost of non-
cooperation. Through objective application of the law (based on a deep devotion to the value 
of legalism) subsequent to its political creation, these institutions obtain the ability to 
discharge a mandate based on internationally accepted norms which promote human values. 
By facilitating this fragile balance between politics and law, ICL has been able to appease 
states and the international community and to promote overlapping political (state) and legal 
(human) values. 
 
In the ICC-era of international criminal justice, the Rome Statute’s feature of 
complementarity is arguably the most important mechanisms attempting to mediate between 
state and human interests in the prosecution of serious international crimes. Accordingly, 
states retain their sovereign right to punish perpetrators of serious international crimes with 
jurisdictional links to their territory via the locus of the crime, the victim or the offender. The 
prosecution of serious international crime is also in the interest of the international 
community however, regardless of where the prosecution takes place and provided the 
proceedings are not undertaken for the purpose of shielding the perpetrator from criminal 
responsibility, the proceedings are not unjustifiably delayed, proceedings are conducted 
independently and impartially, and that the national justice system is not unable to carry out 
proceedings against the accused due to total or partial collapse.
1296
 Complementarity 
therefore represents a mechanism which consists of a hybrid of human and state values. 
States are presented with the option of being party to the Rome Statute, but not at the expense 
of their sovereign right to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction within their territory. In this 
regard member states are offered a choice to exercise such jurisdiction and also provided with 
a double incentive to do so. Firstly, states are incentivised to protect their sovereign right to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed and over persons present in their 
territory. Secondly, they are incentivised to take measures to avoid any unwillingness or 
inability that would cast the state in an unfavourable light in the eyes of the international 
community. Non-cooperation with the ICC and non-compliance with ICC obligations sends 
out a damaging foreign policy message. Whether state parties are unwilling or unable to 
prosecute international crimes under the Rome Statute, “any intervention by the ICC will 
                                                          
1296
 See Rome Statute of the ICC, articles 17(2) and 17(3). 
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communicate that the quality of domestic law and the willingness to fight human rights 
abuses in the states concerned is questionable”.1297 
 
This thesis has shown that ICL is a branch of law which, although it may be disrupted 
in its transformative ability, is to some extent able to achieve the transformative goals 
associated with the larger project of international law generally and with dominant political 
goals of the international order such as democratisation. ICL is both politicised and in the 
sense that it is applied impartially and objectively, mechanically legalistic once 
institutionalised and sustained through the will of states.
1298
 Liberalism creates a 
transformative drive through legal means which builds on political momentum, while 
legalism provides both real and perceived legitimacy to the project and offers some restraint 
to the imposition of western values on non-western societies. The ability of ICL to function 
contrary to the expectations of those who seek to abuse it, is also the very characteristic that 
enables it to cultivate the kind of change that is transformative.  
 
8.3.4 Transformative Synergies – The Interdependencies of Transformation 
 
In theory, a body of laws may provide a vehicle of change towards new values by instilling 
nascent social norms as legal rules. To achieve these goals in practice, such law requires the 
ability to authoritatively communicate values. It is submitted that a moral- and political 
authority, represented by the international community and the liberal states respectively, not 
only drives the body of law that is ICL but is also constitutive of the qualities (discussed 
above) and dynamics (discussed in this section) that make ICL transformative.  
 
In addition, as social transformation is not the exclusive prerogative of criminal law, 
other legal and extra-legal movements or mechanisms of transformation may have a positive 
impact on (or a positive interaction with) ICL’s ability to achieve beneficial change as it has 
                                                          
1297
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 360. 
1298
 It has been suggested that legalism is “the operative outlook of the legal profession, both bench and 
bar”. See Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 8. This explains why lawyers tend to go about the business of 
international criminal justice in a very principled and “rule-obsessed” way which may be insensitive to 
political realities and which is not based on empirical proof of the utility (in the traditional or ‘domestic’ 
sense) of the prosecution of international crimes. See Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 6. 
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been formulated above.
1299
 ICL is an interdependent part of these movements to the extent 
that it constitutes a movement within or alongside other supranational movements of 
transformation. ICL’s ability to advance a transformative agenda is to a large extent based on 
its positive association or -interaction with other legal developments (human rights); 
dominant politics (liberalism); domestic legal systems (through incorporation and 
application) and its use in conjunction with alternatives to criminal justice. I refer to these 
interactions and associations as ‘transformative synergies’. 
 
8.3.4.1 International Criminal Law and International Human Rights 
 
ICL and international human rights exist together in a close, deep-rooted relationship. These 
legal disciplines have emerged alongside each other and share the Second World War as 
catalyst for their prominence in the modern international legal system. They are often referred 
to as “two sides of the same coin” and also as the ‘sword’ and the ‘shield’ of international 
justice respectively.
1300
 ICL is a powerful expression of the importance which the 
international community attaches to universal respect for basic human dignity.
1301
 Much of 
what falls under ICL is a deliberative effort to protect against serious- and wide scale 
violations of fundamental human rights.
1302
 On the other side of the aforementioned ‘coin’, 
                                                          
1299
 Socio-economic rights discourse and transformative constitutionalism (in the South African context) 
represent arguably the areas of legal research most prominently concerned with the use of law to advance 
social transformation. See, for example, Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) Juta, Cape Town; Klare (Transformative Constitutionalism) (supra); 
see also Lutz E and Reiger C (eds.) Prosecuting Heads of State (2009) Cambridge University Press, New 
York 291 (noting that the surge in prosecutions of heads of state and -government since the 1980’s 
(frequently on the basis of transgressions of ICL) has occurred alongside a broader “normatively 
grounded” global transformation towards the values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights).  
1300
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 45. 
1301
 Arnold (supra) in Kaleck et al. (International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes) (supra) 9-10. 
1302
 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 45-46. Werle highlights crimes against 
humanity as particularly illustrative of ICL’s function to protect fundamental human rights. Furthermore, 
according to Werle, “[t]he development of international criminal law […] has an impact on the substance 
and the status of human rights guarantees. International criminal law thus contributes significantly to 
strengthening and further developing the protection of human rights” (at 47).  
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“[h]uman rights are at the core of international criminal justice proceedings”.1303 ICL is also 
confined in its enforcement and application to the rules and boundaries of human rights 
jurisprudence.
1304
  
 
ICL and international human rights are at the heart of the movement to achieve 
greater recognition for individual rights in international law. ICL and international human 
rights represent interdependent justice-based movements (cosmopolitan movements) that 
have developed out of the atrocities committed during the Second World War.
1305
 ICL is 
aimed at individual perpetrators and increasingly on the interests of the victims. Viewed from 
the perspective of its partnership with international human rights however, ICL not only 
targets these categories of individuals but also through its expressive function, all individuals. 
In the traditional narrative originating from the Nuremberg IMT, the international 
community’s desire for accountability for human rights abuses lies at the centre of an 
emerging regime which prioritises human values over state values. From this perspective ICL 
is a mechanism for a natural progression towards global governance by the people. 
Consequently, ICL’s transformative value is closely affiliated with a broader revolution of 
individual rights that is driven by cosmopolitan developments in international law and by the 
international human rights movement especially. The international human rights movement is 
at the forefront of international legal developments which are increasingly looking to pierce 
the veil of state sovereignty. It may be argued that the creation of a strong human rights 
culture is a critical part of any transformative process. ICL benefits in this regard through its 
close historical and ontological relationship with the international human rights 
                                                          
1303
 Zappala S “Respect for Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings” in Cassese (Oxford 
Companion) (supra) 489; Knoops (Theory and Practice of International and Internationalized Criminal 
Proceedings) (supra) 15-19. 
1304
 See for example the recurring references to the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial in ICTY, 
Prosecutor v Furundžija (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, 21 July 2000, para 177; 
see also art 36(3)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute: “Every candidate for election to the Court shall: (ii) Have 
established competence in relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and 
the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to 
the judicial work of the Court”. For a general overview of the human rights protection in international 
criminal proceedings, see Zappala (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 489-490; see also 
Werle (International Law) (supra) 47-48. 
1305
 See Chapter 2 para 2.1 supra. 
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movement.
1306
 As a result of this relationship, ICL achieves a level of legitimacy which 
empowers it to be more transformative and less regulative.
1307
 ICL’s potential to transform is 
a repercussion of the progress that has been made towards the vertical application of those 
international laws which are primarily in the interests of the individual.
1308
 
 
Moreover, international law incentivises states towards achieving a good reputation 
within the international community, or at least incentivises states to act in a way in which 
they may avoid disapproval from the international community.
1309
 With the possible 
exception of the permanent member states on the UNSC, states which aspire to a favourable 
standing in the international community, are increasingly required to show a serious 
commitment in domestic and foreign policy to the cause of human rights. The close, deep-
rooted relationship between human rights and international criminal law reinforces the notion 
that states can hardly show a serious commitment to human rights without an accompanying 
                                                          
1306
 Consider for example, the following remarks by Ferdinandusse: “Criminal prosecutions of 
international crimes, in whatever court they take place, interact with various other legal proceedings, as 
well as with quasi-legal institutions like truth commissions. Perhaps one of the most direct interactions 
takes place with human rights courts. These not only inform criminal courts on all levels of due process 
standards and contribute to the clarification of shared concepts like torture and rape, but also regulate with 
increasing precision the extent to which serious human rights violations require criminal prosecution. This 
can lead to a direct dialogue between human rights courts and criminal courts, as can be seen in the 
Barrios Altos case, where a judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights prompted the 
Peruvian courts to prosecute army personnel for the killing of civilians, despite national amnesty laws”. 
See Ferdinandusse W “The Interaction of National and International Approaches in the Repression of 
International Crime” (2004) 15 (5) European Journal of International Law 1041-1053, 1046-1047. 
1307
 Stolle and Singelnstein (supra) in Kaleck et al. (International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes) 
(supra) 49. 
1308
 Up to this point ICL has most commonly been evoked during political transitions or as a response to 
gross human rights violations in times of armed conflict, as well as during instances of mass atrocity. Starr 
argues that this “might amount to a transitional stage in this young and evolving field” and that, since war 
and mass atrocity are the historical catalysts for transformative legal responses, ICL might eventually play 
an important role in regulating the relationship between the state, individuals, and the international 
community in times of peace similar to how international human rights have now gained global acclaim. 
The establishment of the ICC (and especially the feature of complementarity) represents a purposive step 
in this direction. See Starr (Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times) (supra) 1259, 1307-1311. 
1309
 Slaughter and Burke-White (The Future of International Law is Domestic) (supra) 334. 
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commitment to the cause of international criminal justice
 1310
 Compliance with international 
human rights and cooperation with regards to international criminal justice are among the 
most important determinants of the international image of any state. As a consequence of this 
‘package deal’, ICL has some leverage to ensure compliance over the incorporation and 
enforcement of ICL norms as well as matters requiring interstate cooperation in the fight 
against crime with an international or transnational element. Significantly and partly as a 
result of this leverage, a majority of states in the international community are now party to 
the Rome Statute.
1311
 The bearing of most states towards the ICC and international criminal 
justice in general is no longer a simple ‘use it or don’t use it’ choice.  
 
8.3.4.2 International Criminal Law and Liberal Politics 
 
As a branch of international law, ICL not only reflects the politics and values dominant in the 
international order, but is to an extent also a manifestation of these dominant politics and 
values. As evinced during the Cold War, international criminal justice is unfeasible without 
the support of states, especially the permanent members of the UNSC. The creation and 
functioning of the ad hoc tribunals serves as an example of the political will required for the 
operationalisation of international criminal justice.
1312
 The political realist perspective based 
on power and control, locates ICL as a central element in a forced progression by states 
towards an emerging regime of global governance.
 
Such a regime would presumably be 
based on core unifying values, notably human rights, supported by democracy and the rule of 
                                                          
1310
 As the South African situation illustrates, the transitional justice context and the option of recourse to 
truth commissions may be a possible exception to this. In transitional periods the demands of international 
criminal justice may be disrupted by pragmatic and political factors. Beyond the transitional context 
however, no democratic state will succeed in an effort to undermine the project of international criminal 
justice without a backlash from the international community. 
1311
 By becoming a state party to the Rome Statute, states are not only signalling their commitment to the 
values espoused in the Statute, but arguably also their unwillingness to stand outside the faction of liberal 
states who endorse the ICC. There is also an increased emphasis on bringing domestic politics in line with 
international laws. Mostly only powerful states can afford to be outside the ICC “club”. 
1312
 See Peskin (International Justice) (supra); Clark (Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court) 
(supra) 527-529; see also Chapter 6 para 6.3.4 supra. 
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law.
1313
 From this perspective, the emphasis falls on the role of states in the development of 
the international criminal law regime, in order to advance goals that are based on internal and 
external policy considerations.  
 
From a realist perspective, ICL has emerged and continues to develop due to the 
political support of states that are ‘like-minded’ in their ideological worldview. The concepts 
underlying to ICL such as legalism and utilitarianism, also often find expression as a political 
ideology (or “political preference”).1314 If there is a transformative value to ICL, as I argue 
that there is, then such transformative value is by and large a by-product of international 
(criminal) law’s affiliation with the politics and values of liberalism and liberalism’s 
confidence in the value of legalism. Liberalism prescribes to ICL not only its procedures but 
also its objectives, driving it through the backing of a coalition of liberal states towards 
achieving goals of social change. Whether in its classical or anti-pluralist manifestation, 
liberalism is concerned with the condition of the individual.
1315
 The focus of ICL on 
individuals as not only targets of punishment but also benefactors of the objectives of 
punishment is largely due to the dominance of liberal legalism in ICL. Because the individual 
is of central importance to both liberalism and legalism, liberal-legalist dominance in ICL 
ensures more effective filtering of utilitarian benefits of punishment to individuals directly or 
indirectly affected by international crime.  
 
Due to growing neo-liberal tendencies in the international order, powerful liberal 
states project their values onto the international legal and political order, notably democratic 
beliefs.
1316
 Because of these influences, the interactions between international law and 
domestic law give rise to legal mimicry which allow for “visions of liberal legalism [to] seep 
into national jurisdictions” and reshape societies on legal and social levels.1317 While it is a 
                                                          
1313
 See Lamb H “Our Global Neighbourhood: A Summary Analysis of Report of the Commission on 
Global Governance” (January/February 1996) Eco-logic, available at http://sovereignty.net/p/gov/ 
gganalysis.htm (accessed 2011/08/18).  
1314
 “Legalism is a concept that seems only to spring from a particular kind of liberal domestic polity”. See 
Bass (Stay the Hand of Vengeance) (supra) 7; see also Shklar (Legalism) (supra) 3-4 and 111-220. 
1315
 See Chapter 6 para 6.3.2.1 supra. 
1316
 See Chapter 6 para 6.3.2 supra. 
1317
 See Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law) (supra) Chapter 5. 
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bone of contention to non-western states and pro-pluralist factions, the ascendency of liberal 
legalism in ICL is an important medium for transformation around the globe. For law to be 
transformative and work towards the objective of social change, it must be politicised without 
becoming usurped by politics. A delicate balance must be found. Political usurpation of the 
law leads to problems of legitimacy such as selectivity of justice and hegemonic dominance 
which cannot be truly transformative in a culturally diverse international community. 
Effective transformation occurs where human values overlap with dominant political values. 
This is the space in which ICL, through its associations (transformative synergies) with 
human rights and liberal-legalist modalities of justice, may achieve transformation.  
 
8.3.4.3 International Criminal Law via Domestic Legal Systems 
 
The ability of a state to apply ICL directly through domestic courts is vital to the 
transformative value of ICL for states. It is also crucial to the transformative value of ICL in 
general. The most effective way in which the values of the international community may find 
expression is through the domestic incorporation of international criminal norms and the 
subsequent application thereof in domestic courts. This is what brings the objectives, values 
and benefits of ICL “home” to individuals.1318 Domestic courts can be viewed as the “engine 
rooms” of transformative change which ICL may be able to mediate. Effectively incorporated 
ICL transforms into domestic criminal law and benefits from the existing intrastate 
mechanisms for the enforcement of criminal justice. Domestic criminalisation also removes 
some of the legal obstacles such as the rule against retroactive punishment, which may arise 
when ICL is applied as new law after the fact. Much depends on the status of international 
law in the domestic legal systems of states. The contemporary South African legal order 
serves as a good example, especially when compared to the status of international law during 
the apartheid era. Although many international laws were crimes under South African law 
since the adoption of the Interim Constitution (which incorporated customary international 
criminal law), prosecution of such crimes on the basis purely of its illegality under customary 
international law was unlikely.
1319
 Since the transformation of the law of the Rome Statute 
                                                          
1318
 See Du Plessis (Bringing the ICC Home) (supra) 1-16. 
1319
 See Stemmet (Influence of Recent Constitutional Developments in South Africa) (supra) 52-54. The 
Interim Constitutions provided in section 231(4) that “rules of customary international law” form part of 
the law of the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of parliament. In the Final 
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into domestic law, domestic prosecution (or cooperation with the ICC with regards to the 
prosecution) of many of the same customary international law crimes is not only more 
probable (the SALC-case may referred to as a good omen in this regard) but it is also foreseen 
that fewer legal obstacles may hinder such prosecution.  
 
In Chapter 7 it was highlighted however that a number of ‘characteristics’ are crucial 
to the ability of domestic legal systems to reflect the benefits of international criminal justice 
for individuals.
1320
 Instead of playing a passive role, states can regard international criminal 
justice as a means of acquiring the benefits of justice for its own citizens as part of the greater 
civitas maxima and as an indispensable aspect of the institutionalisation of human rights. 
Domestic implementation legislation is not necessarily a part of the international criminal 
justice system. If ICL can be effectively implemented, it is an important part of domestic 
legal systems. For example, the ICC must be viewed not as a substitute for but a supplement 
to domestic criminal law systems faced with certain categories of crime.
1321
  
 
8.3.4.4 International Criminal Law and Alternatives to Criminal Justice 
 
The context in which ICL is invoked is crucial to its viability and transformative value. The 
prosecution of prominent political and military figures may disturb fragile diplomatic and 
political efforts at keeping the peace. Others have highlighted how international tribunals 
may exasperate the domestic crisis and decrease political stability.
1322
 It is trite to say that 
realistically speaking, and also in order to optimise its value within a specific situation, ICL 
must always be invoked in a way that is sensitive to the specific realities of the context of its 
                                                          
Constitution, section 232 provides that “customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act or Parliament”. According to Stemmet the omission of the 
word “rules” in section 232 of the Final Constitution brought “no change in the meaning or scope of 
application” of section 231(4) of the Interim Constitution. See also Chapter 7 paras 7.4.1-7.4.2 supra. 
1320
 See Chapter 7 para 7.8 supra. 
1321
 Jessberger and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochets) (supra) 348; Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law 
and Procedure) (supra) 127. 
1322
 See Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 9. In reference to the ICTY, Peskin observes that 
“indictments of top-level Serbian and Croatian military and political leaders have bitterly split government 
coalitions, and during certain periods undermined the democratic transitions in Belgrade and Zagreb”. 
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use. In sensitive contexts, ICL must be applied in conjunction with other legal and extra-legal 
mechanisms to promote transformative change in the most holistic manner possible.  
 
It must also be remembered throughout that the rationales for the use of alternatives to 
criminal justice in the transitional context or as a response to mass atrocity casts a critical 
light on the justifications for the use of criminal prosecutions in these situations.
1323
 
Alternatives to criminal justice such as the South African TRC’s use of the truth and public 
apology, may be a valuable means of facilitating the process of authoritative communication 
and acceptance of values to society which is crucial to the transformative project.
1324
 
Equating ‘accountability’ and ‘justice’ with criminal prosecutions is unrealistic and not the 
true vision of international criminal justice left by the Nuremberg IMT.
1325
 Nevertheless, 
even with the renewed emphasis on alternative justice mechanisms and pluralistic and 
reconciliatory modes of justice, the international community and in particular victims and 
directly affected communities, instinctively require retribution for serious international 
crimes.
1326
 There is always this tension between the hereto unattainable ideals of peace and 
justice. Focusing the international criminal justice debate on a choice between the opposing 
goals of reconciliation and accountability or peace and justice is an oversimplification of the 
matter since these ideals are not mutually exclusive in the long-run. They may in fact 
complement each other. If correctly invoked in a balanced and contextually sensitive manner 
alongside alternative justice mechanisms, ICL can contribute to the pursuit of all the ideals 
mentioned above. Finding this balance will significantly enhance ICL’s transformative 
synergy and must be viewed as the vital challenge to any society in transition. 
 
8.3.5 The Double-Edged Sword of Politics  
 
Above it has been shown that liberal politics impels ICL towards transformative objectives. 
Yet, it must be recognised that judging by history, a clash of political interests might also 
produce hindrances to the development and solidification of the emerging regime of 
                                                          
1323
 Alvarez (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 37.  
1324
 For example, the South African TRC helped to popularise the notion of ubuntu in South African social, 
political and legal culture. 
1325
 Alvarez (supra) in Cassese (Oxford Companion) (supra) 38.  
1326
 De Lange (supra) in Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd (Looking Back Reaching Forward) (supra) 28. 
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international criminal justice.
1327
 Although it has been submitted that ICL derives 
transformative value from liberal politics, politics is a double-edged sword in that the 
transformative potential of ICL might also be disrupted by a lack of political will or the abuse 
thereof.
1328
 This is a repercussion of an endemic political influence in international criminal 
justice. 
 
Broadly, politics may disrupt the project of international criminal justice in two ways. 
Firstly, politics may bring efforts to deliver international criminal justice to a halt or severely 
limit such efforts through the hegemonic strategy of withdrawal. This typically occurs when 
sovereign interests come into conflict with the interests of the international community. The 
USA’s signing and subsequent ‘un-signing’ of the Rome Statute due to national security 
concerns post-911, is a manifestation of this form of political disruption. 
 
Secondly, although political support is a major driving force behind ICL’s 
transformative efforts, it may push ICL over the threshold between politicised law that 
promotes mutual interests and politicised law that is, or may be perceived as, an instrument of 
hegemonic abuse. This creates legitimacy concerns which hinder ICL’s functioning and 
consequently also its transformative mandate. The non-cooperation of various African states 
over the arrest of President Al-Bashir due to concerns over ideological bias is illustrative of 
this kind of disruptive influence.
1329
 Concerns over political influence have plagued 
international criminal justice from the first moments of it gaining prominence in the 
international order. This critique has its origins in the denouncement of the Nuremberg IMT 
as “victors’ justice”. Although ICL and later international criminal trials have undoubtedly 
been successful in addressing many of shortcomings of the Nuremberg precedent, there 
remain to be concerns over the political nature of international criminal courts and selective 
prosecution. At the ICTY for example, former head of state Slobodan Milošević’s defence 
was based upon the tribunal being “simply political”.1330 
 
                                                          
1327
 The lack of sufficient political will to apply the law of Nuremberg during the Cold War years can be 
sighted as an historical example. See Chapter 2 para 2.1 supra. 
1328
 On criticism regarding the hegemonic abuse of law, see Chapter 6 para 6.3.3 supra. 
1329
 See Chapter 7 para 7.6.2.2 supra. 
1330
 Hagan, Levi and Ferrales (Swaying the Hand of Justice) (supra) 589. 
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In spite of the progress that has been made by individual-centred and justice based 
movements (much of which was itself made possible through the support of liberal states), 
realpolitik and state sovereignty still wield a powerful and unpredictable influence in the 
international order which may at times adversely affect ICL. Even though ICL is in many 
ways a contradiction to the classical model of international law, it cannot entirely escape 
from the endemic (political) confines of the international legal system. The politicisation of 
international criminal law is inevitable and might have a negative effect on its ability to 
transform by adversely affecting its integrity or moral authority. Without a measure of 
politicisation and value-infusion however, the transformative value of ICL is significantly 
diminished. An over-idealistic system of international criminal justice will most probably 
lack the political support and level of state cooperation required for efficacy.
1331
 
 
8.4 Application of the Central Thesis 
 
The following section aims to test the practical application of the central thesis using two 
particular circumstances in which it has been suggested that ICL may have transformative 
value as examples for how the thesis may be applied. These are the use of ICL in the wake of 
mass atrocity and ICL as interpreted and applied in domestic legal systems. 
 
8.4.1 ICL as a Response to Mass Atrocity: Comments on the Work of Mark Drumbl 
 
Among international criminal tribunals there is a certain amount of faith in the transformative 
ability of international law and international criminal law.
1332
 International courts have been 
                                                          
1331
 See Damaska (What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?) (supra) 36: “[…] overly ambitious 
attempts by courts to impose monocracy on the volatile world of international politics may induce 
powerful actors in the political arena to withdraw their support from the fledgling institutions of 
international criminal justice”; see also Ambos (supra) in Kaleck et al. (International Prosecution of 
Human Rights Crimes) (supra) 68. 
1332
 Keeping in mind the various criticism which have been raised throughout this thesis, there is evidence 
of, and an enduring believe in, the transformative value of international criminal tribunals in the following 
areas: 
a. Creating a ‘voice’ for the international community through which it can express its indignation and 
condemnation of gross human rights violations (this may be referred to as expressive retribution). 
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portrayed “not only as instruments of justice and morality, but indispensable tools for conflict 
resolution and prevention as well as nation building”.1333 Outside the international criminal 
tribunals this faith is not so widely shared. One of the assumptions underlying international 
criminal justice (that macro crime can be addressed through substantive criminal law and 
international criminal tribunals) remains disputed.  
 
In his critically acclaimed book Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Mark 
Drumbl provides a convincing argument against the transformative potential of international 
criminal law in the wake of mass atrocity.
1334
 Amid his contentions, Drumbl suggests that the 
complexity and contextual sensitivity of atrocity and international crime necessitates an 
equally diverse international criminal justice system. Drumbl advocates the implementation 
of additional horizontal mechanisms to deal with mass atrocity alongside the adversarial trial 
as, in his view, “international punishing institutions […] are insufficiently attuned to the 
national and local”.1335 He highlights for example the value of restorative justice mechanisms 
in Rwanda (the gacaca courts) for addressing the retributive shortfall of the ICTR in the 
wake of the Rwandan genocide.  
 
                                                          
b. Putting an end to the global and historical ‘culture of impunity’. In this regard the complementarity-
based ICC may be highlighted for its role of incentivising states to empower their domestic courts with 
regards to the prosecution of core crimes (see Chapter 5 para 5.6.3 and para 8.3.3 supra). 
c. Enriching international law and national criminal justice systems on the material, institutional and 
procedural level by setting standards for impartiality, judicial independence, legitimacy, fair trial rights and 
human rights of both victims and offenders (see Mugwanya GW “Criminal Justice through International 
Criminal Tribunals: Reflections on some Lessons for National Criminal Justice Systems” (2006) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 28). 
d. Advancing the rule of law globally. 
1333
 Peskin (International Justice) (supra) 9. 
1334
 See Henham R “Book Review: Drumbl MA Atrocity, Punishment and International Law” (2007) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 477-489; Parmentier S “Book Review: Drumbl MA Atrocity, 
Punishment and International Law” (2007) 5 (5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1215-1218; 
Heller (Deconstructing International Criminal Law) (supra) 975.  
1335
 Drumbl (Atrocity, Punishment and International Law) (supra) 125. 
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According to Heller, “it is hard to imagine that anyone who reads the book will still 
be able to believe that liberal-legalist criminal trials, however well-intentioned, are capable 
with dealing with the collective nature of mass atrocity”.1336 Permantier contends that:  
“Drumbl raises very serious questions about the fact that international criminal justice has 
been strongly imbued with a western conception of justice, which is liberal and legalistic, and 
may not be the only model to deal with these ‘extraordinary’ crimes that involve many 
victims, many perpetrators, a large group of bystanders – and all of these within a political 
context.”
1337
 
Drumbl’s work centres on the institutions of ICL (international and internationalised criminal 
courts) created in the wake of mass atrocity and the punishment dispensed by such 
institutions. It is necessary to examine and respond to certain aspects of Drumbl’s critique of 
the transformative potential of ICL as a response to mass atrocity as well as the manner in 
which ICL is enforced and institutionalised in such situations.
1338
   
 
According to Drumbl, one of the ICL’s shortcomings as a response to mass atrocity is 
its inability to hold bystanders and indirect beneficiaries of mass atrocity criminally liable.
1339
 
These bystanders, who may well constitute the largest “perpetrator” group in the wake of 
mass atrocity, are indeed beyond the immediate reach of not only ICL but also criminal law 
in general.
1340
 As a general rule, no criminal liability results from a person’s failure to act 
without the existence of a legal duty to the contrary. Thus, from a domestic criminal law 
perspective, the bystanders, onlookers and non-objectors during episodes of mass atrocity are 
beyond the reach of criminal law. In the wake of mass atrocity it is the collective mind-set of 
this often numerically dominant group which becomes essential in the quest for successful 
general deterrence, social reconciliation and the process of transformation in general. In 
Chapter 3 it was noted that transformation entails a process of changing the values of 
individuals and groups.
1341
 Because of this, the manner in which the ideological beliefs and 
prejudices which are shared between the actual perpetrators and the bystander group and 
                                                          
1336
 Heller (Deconstructing International Criminal Law) (supra) 998. 
1337
 Parmentier (Review of Drumbl) (supra) 1216. 
1338
 Drumbl’s work has featured throughout the thesis, especially in Chapter 5. 
1339
 See also Fletcher and Weinstein (Violence and Social Repair) (supra) 580. 
1340
 See Chapter 5 para 5.2.5 (5) supra. 
1341
 See Chapter 3 para 3.4.6 supra. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 358 
 
which gave rise to or perpetuated the widespread incidence of violence, are affected is crucial 
to a successful transformation.  
 
Historically, ICL sets its sights on the “big fish” or the top level perpetrators of 
international crime. If international criminal laws are unable to hold bystanders and indirect 
beneficiaries liable for their inaction, does this mean that ICL is of little value to the 
transformative project (particularly toward reconciliation) in the wake of mass atrocity? In 
my opinion, this is not the case. Firstly, although members of the bystander group cannot be 
held liable under ICL, this group (in particular those who are blameworthy in the moral but 
not the criminal sense) is the target of the expressive function of international criminal trials, 
of punishment in the wake of mass atrocity, but also of the developed and developing 
international criminal justice system in its entirety. The entire system, trials and the 
punishment dispensed for those who are found to be criminally liable, seeks to protect the 
interests of the international community and to project their values on the authority of the 
mutually beneficial nature of such values. Through supranational institutions, through 
symbolic trials of the “big fish” and through regulated punishment (an authoritative message 
of right and wrong), internationally accepted values are communicated to the affected civilian 
population at large (including the bystander group). The defendants, often the leaders and 
architects of the policies that lead to violence, are discredited along with the policies and 
propaganda under which their leadership had come to represent the domestic ‘right’ and 
which had come into conflict with the more morally authoritative international ‘right’. 
Although bystanders are not held criminally liable and cannot appear on the stand in person, 
the values which the bystanders may have shared with the actual perpetrators, values which 
were tacitly condoned by the bystander group, are put on trial. Through the criminal trial 
process and the public, binary conflict which it entails, these values are dissected, condemned 
and discredited along with the individual perpetrator. 
 
Secondly, since the bystander group may constitute a large section of the post-conflict 
population, it is important for purposes of reconciliation to avoid the group being labelled as 
collectively guilty. There is a risk that the group as a whole may be stigmatised by former 
victims. This in turn, could renew the cycle of mass violence. Criminal law may play a 
positive role in this regard. By publicly punishing those “most guilty” of atrocities, the 
victims’ desire for retribution is publicly expressed and focused on those who bear the brunt 
of the responsibility for the past injustices. Importantly, if they can achieve the necessary 
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balance of political support and independence, these trials are not mere show trials. They are 
trials under the laws of the international community, the latter which communicates as much 
about international standards of fairness and the supremacy of the rule of law as it does about 
the international community’s moral outrage over acts which are deemed to be universally 
offensive. A limited amount of retributive punishment may not placate those victims most 
directly affected by mass violence. Yet, as we have seen in Germany, Rwanda and elsewhere 
- the greater the scale of violence, the less practical it becomes to prosecute all those involved 
in the perpetration of crime. With this practical limitation in mind (not to mention the 
shortages of resources which have been experienced by international criminal tribunals), a 
public, formal, and historic trial addressing the core issues of the conflict and the culpability 
of high profile personae in that conflict may have effects that go beyond the directly affected 
parties to appease the victim group in general and also to prevent the social stigmatisation of 
the bystander group.  
 
International criminal trials have repercussions for justice that go beyond the 
application of positive law, the trial and the immediately affected parties. The gravity and 
symbolism that attaches to international criminal trials provides them with a dimension of 
influence which is supplementary to the traditionally accepted goals of punishment. ICL’s 
transformative value therefore is not confined to the courtroom.
1342
 Some trials, especially 
transitional trials and political trials may provide an enduring transformative legacy or 
become symbolic of transformative values. Through punishment, the public debate they 
engender and through their expressive and symbolic effect, these trials serve as vehicles to 
transform the consciousness of individuals and communities.
1343
 Famous international 
criminal trials such as the Nuremberg IMT and the Eichmann trial have shown that the 
greater symbolic value and the messaging value of trials of historical importance can be 
equally significant and endure even long after the close of the proceedings.  
 
                                                          
1342
 Stahn C “The Future of International Criminal Justice” (October 2009) 2, available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Stahn_The_Future_of_IJ.pdf (accessed 2012/06/15): “[…] the 
effects of justice cannot be measured only by what is actually going on in the Court room, but by their 
impact internationally and domestically”. 
1343
 Bilsky (Transformative Justice) (supra) 3; See Chapter 4 para 4.3.4 supra. 
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Punishment and trial, sentence and fairness, the impact sought by international 
criminal justice appears to address past and present wrongs and also, in a more intrinsic 
manner, the underlying causes of such wrongs. ICL as a whole thus speaks to the future and 
to the international community, and promotes the notion of the law’s global transcendence. 
Therefore, even if ICL is less able of attaining any of the punishment objectives associated 
with domestic criminal sanctions as Drumbl suggests, it still holds value for the civitas 
maxima, both of the present and future.
1344
  
 
8.4.2 ICL in Domestic Legal Systems: Comments on Southern African Litigation Centre 
and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 
 
The recent South African case Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Others provides an opportunity for testing the central 
thesis, especially aspects of the thesis which relate to the transformative synergy between ICL 
and domestic legal systems.
1345
 The case is a good example of how the interpretation of 
domestic obligations towards international criminal justice can serve to promote international 
values and in so doing, go beyond that which could be achieved through domestic criminal 
laws.  
 
In this case, the court directed the SAPS to conduct an investigation into the 
perpetration of torture as a crime against humanity committed by non-nationals in foreign 
territory (although these non-nationals visit South Africa “from time to time”).1346 Torture as 
a crime against humanity is criminalised through the South African ICC Act which 
incorporates the substantive crimes in the Rome Statute. Whether as a distinct crime or (as in 
                                                          
1344
 See Chapter 5 para 5.6 supra on the sui generis objectives of ICL. See also Tallgren (Sensibility and 
Sense) (supra) 561-595. Tallgren develops the thesis that the “rational and utilitarian purpose of 
international criminal law could partly lie elsewhere than in the prevention and suppression of criminality”. 
Also, at 591-592: “Were the international criminal justice system stripped of its utility and rationality, what 
would be left? One option would be to think that its main function would be to serve as a symbol and as a 
model, showing the way for the national jurisdictions”. And further: “This could mean special roles for 
international criminal law: as the loudspeaker echoing the values of the international community, as a tool 
in negotiations, as the message preceding or following military intervention”. 
1345
 For a detailed discussion of the case, see Chapter 7 para 7.7.1.2 supra. 
1346
 Para 1.13 (at 9). 
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the SALC-case) as a crime against humanity, torture is subject to “a clear and absolute 
prohibition […] in international law” and outlawed through a multitude of international legal 
instruments.
1347
 As such, it is a clear manifestation of what the civitas maxima deems to be 
morally offensive behaviour which transgresses their values.
1348
 The international prohibition 
of torture is a value-driven norm that exists for the purpose of punishing torturers as hostis 
humani generis wherever they may have committed the act of torture and through such 
punishment, to entrench the values for which the prohibition exists. Furthermore, like other 
international crimes, the crime of torture is part of a supranational framework of criminal law 
that represents an effort to address those crimes which domestic criminal justice systems are 
often incapable of dealing with. 
 
In the SALC-case the applicants seemed to assert the fact that because its jurisdiction 
is not limited to crimes committed in South Africa or by South African citizens, the ICC Act 
is part of this supranational framework and that it was aimed at insuring accountability over 
international crimes (the commission of which was based on substantial evidence) in any 
country where the prospect of accountability is low due to the collapse of the rule of law or 
due to state complicity in the commission of the crimes.
1349
  In this regard, the judgment in 
the SALC-case has some messaging value which speaks not only to South African citizens but 
also to the international community. The judgment reiterates South Africa’s position as a 
cooperative and principle-bound member in the international community of states. 
Simultaneously, South Africa is publicly and symbolically distinguished from its more 
lawless and uncooperative neighbour to the north. 
 
As a consequence of its post-apartheid openness towards international law and its own 
history of systematic oppression, South Africa has acceded to the purpose- and value-driven 
                                                          
1347
 Cryer et al. (International Criminal Law and Procedure) (supra) 294. Torture is prohibited as a distinct 
crime in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture and as a 
crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 1(f). 
1348
 See para 27 (at 81-82). The court, having been referred to the Basson-cases by the applicants, 
highlights “an international consensus on the normative desirability of prosecuting [perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity] and [that], by necessary implication, a proper investigation had to be done in all such 
instances” (emphasis added). 
1349
 Para 1.9 (at 7). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 362 
 
project of international criminal justice, criminalising torture and other international crimes 
indirectly by way of section 232 of the Constitution and also more directly through national 
legislation such as the ICC Act and the Geneva Conventions Act.
1350
 As is illustrated by the 
interpretation of the duty to investigate under the ICC Act in the judgment, South Africa has 
broadened the scope of application of its domestic criminal justice system for the purpose of 
benefitting both its own citizens and the international community. The court’s assertion that 
not only the victims of international crime and those representing the victims have an interest 
in the prosecution of suspected perpetrators, but that such prosecution is also in the public 
interest is highly significant. The locus standi of the applicants to force a review of a state 
decision not to proceed with what is essentially a criminal investigation is a development for 
criminal justice in South Africa without precedent. It resonates well with the notion of 
international crime (especially the core crimes in the Rome Statute) as an expression of the 
will of all persons in the international community.  
 
Furthermore, the decision aligns well with the view of the majority of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of the ICC in Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya.
1351
 The latter 
case and the SALC case are similar in some respects. Both cases concern the regulation of 
investigations related to crimes against humanity. In both cases a court was asked to 
determine whether such investigations could (or should have) proceed(ed). In relation to the 
post-election violence in Kenya in 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber authorised the prosecutor to 
proceed with an investigation under the proprio motu powers afforded to him under article 15 
of the Rome Statute by taking a generous approach to the definitional requirement of crimes 
against humanity in article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute that the actus reus must be committed 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”. The 
OTP was allowed to investigate notwithstanding the view held by the majority that “there 
was no evidence of a policy on the part of the Government of Kenya to attack a civilian 
                                                          
1350
 See also Chapter 7 para 7.7.2.2 supra on the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Person Bill. 
1351
 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Pre-Trial Chamber) Case 
No. ICC-01/09-19, 31 March 2010. 
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population”.1352 The Pre-Trial Chamber held that “organizations not linked to a State may, for 
the purposes of the Statute, elaborate and carry out a policy to commit an attack against a 
civilian population” but that this must be judged on a case by case basis.1353 In casu, the 
majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber found that: 
“[...] the violence was not a mere accumulation of spontaneous or isolated acts. Rather, a 
number of the attacks were planned, directed or organized by various groups including local 
leaders, businessmen and politicians associated with the two leading political parties, as well 
as by members of the police force.”
1354
 
 According to Du Plessis, the majority’s approach may be viewed as a positive development: 
“The majority view, which flows from a generous interpretation of the Rome Statute’s 
provisions, is one which enlarges the scope for justice mechanisms like the ICC. Such a 
generous approach to the evidence of organizational capacity – as opposed to the minority’s 
re(strict)ive interpretation – does not appear inappropriate at the preliminary phase where the 
Prosecutor of the ICC is asking the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the very first phase of an 
investigation into ICC crimes.”
1355
 
The decision in the SALC case has similarly enlarged the scope for international criminal 
justice in South Africa and potentially also the reach of the ICC via indirect application of the 
law of the Rome Statute in South African courtrooms.  
 
In light of the abovementioned aspects of the SALC case, the case appears to illustrate 
the type of change to the benefit of individuals or the civitas maxima (the transformative 
value) which may be achieved by international criminal norms via domestic legal systems. 
The transformation of international crimes into domestic law presents a practical means of 
channelling international values to individuals via the domestic legal systems of states. Thus, 
ICL represents a means of bringing international values “home” to individuals where legal 
avenues for the protection of such values are more accessible, for example, via civil society 
                                                          
1352
 Du Plessis M “International Criminal Law (Recent Cases)” (2010) 2 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 317-325, 321. 
1353
 Paras 92-93. At para 93, the Pre-Trial Chamber mentions considerations which may be borne in mind 
for purposes of determining whether a group constitutes an ‘organization’ under the Statute. 
1354
 Para 117. 
1355
 Du Plessis (International Criminal Law, Recent Cases) (supra) 321. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 364 
 
organisations such as SALC and ZEF acting on behalf of the victims of international 
crime.
1356
  
8.5 Submissions 
 
Based on the general conclusion, the main arguments and the application of the central thesis 
above, I provide the following two submissions: 
 
8.5.1 Broadening of the Conceptualisation of the Purposes of International Criminal 
Justice 
 
There appears to be a discrepancy between ICL’s  historical self-consciousness, its 
fundamental purpose- and value driven nature and the justifications of punishment that have 
been expressed through the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. These tribunals 
have rightly highlighted retribution and deterrence as the main objectives of punishment for 
perpetrators of international crime. However, in spite of the undeniable forward-looking 
values and purposes underlying to ICL in general, utilitarian objectives have been recognised 
as subsidiary goals to a very limited extent only. Based on the unique foundational and 
historical mandate of ICL as well as the unique types of criminality and social evil for which 
it exists, I propose that greater recognition of what I have hereto referred to as the sui generis 
objectives of ICL in conjunction with the objectives of retribution and deterrence: 
1. Is justified because it decreases the abovementioned discrepancy; and 
2. Counteracts some of the rationales for the argument that ICL is an unsuitable response to 
mass criminality (thereby defending ICL as a response to mass atrocity). 
With respect to the second submission, I believe that recognition of the larger purpose of ICL 
and sui generis punishment objectives provides a more convincing answer to the why-
question (‘why turn to ICL as a response to mass atrocity?’) which in turn justifies the ‘how’ 
                                                          
1356
 Since the victim of crime is not traditionally a central participant in the South African criminal justice 
system, this is a positive development in that it brings South Africa’s criminal justice system (especially in 
relation to international crime) nearer to the law of the Rome Statute which provides for victim 
participation. See Burchell (Principles of Criminal Law) (supra) 11-12; Rome Statute of the ICC, article 
68. For an overview of the rights of victims under the Rome Statute, see Chapter 5 para 5.6.5.3 supra. 
With regards to the “home”-metaphor, see Du Plessis (Bringing the ICC Home) (supra). 
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(the use of a sui generis and supranational species of criminal law) and placates some of the 
criticism against the use of ICL in the wake of mass atrocity. 
 
When it comes to punishment, ICL faces the conundrum of ordinary punishment for 
extraordinary crime. In Arendt’s view for example, although punishment was “essential” in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the crimes committed by the Nazi Germans were so 
heinous that they could not be adequately punished whatsoever by any existing legal 
systems.
1357
 As a further restraint to ‘punishment that fits the crime’, sentences in 
international courts cannot disregard international human right standards. The harshest form 
of punishment, long-term incarceration, does not match the severity of many of the offenses 
committed during mass violence. Thus it would seem that punishment will rarely fit the crime 
in international criminal justice. This must be accepted. It is submitted however that 
broadening the understanding of the justifications and purposes of international criminal 
justice beyond the traditional penological purposes of criminal law will counteract the 
imbalance of justice created by ordinary punishment for extraordinary crime. Although 
seemingly “ordinary”, punishment of international crime recognised for its role in the effort 
to attain broader forward-looking social purposes related to punishment as the expression of 
values, is generally more amenable than punishment aimed at producing effects which are 
purposely limited to those purposes which can be achieved through criminal sanctions in the 
domestic criminal law analogy.   
 
The proposed broader approach also speaks to a fundamental paradox found in many 
situations where international crime has been committed, namely that extraordinary crimes 
are often committed not by hostis humani generis (enemies of mankind), but by ordinary 
citizens that have in a sense themselves become “victims” of ideology, propaganda and 
extraordinary circumstance. Most international crimes are as much a consequence of social 
evil as individual evil. In fact, many mid- and low level perpetrators during collective 
violence believe that their acts are right or justified. It is not always clear whether these 
                                                          
1357
 Arendt H/Jaspers K Correspondence 1926-1969 (Cited in Osiel (Why Prosecute?) (supra) 128) 54: 
“The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what constitutes their 
monstrousness. For these crimes no punishment is severe enough. It may well be essential to hang Göring, 
but it is totally inadequate. That is, his guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and 
all legal systems”. 
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perpetrators committed crimes following a cost-benefit analysis which made them believe 
that they would get away with it. More likely, they either believed that what they were doing 
was right or that they would not get away with refusing to do what was expected of them, 
what many others were doing or what they were ordered to do. This phenomenon is beyond 
the criminology for which domestic criminal law punishment exists. As a consequence the 
domestic criminal law paradigm is of limited value for addressing this problem. For this 
reason, a forward-looking approach which attempts to address the broader social evils which 
perpetuate mass violence may be justified. A conceptualisation of ICL which fosters greater 
cognisance of the sui generis trial and punishment objectives of ICL may offer a certain 
degree of succour to the current ontology of international criminal justice which takes a more 
narrow view of the transformative role that criminal justice may play. Acknowledging these 
objectives will also address those problems associated with the disparities between crime, 
accountability and punishment which typically follow the perpetration of international 
crimes. Taken collectively, the conventional and sui generis objectives of ICL address not 
only independent criminality, but through a sustained normative influence also the roots of 
criminal conduct which is universally offensive and the social evils which produce mass 
violence and egregious crime. 
 
To suggest that a species of criminal law should be conceptualised in a manner that 
allows for the recognition of more ambitious objectives will indubitably prompt opposition.  
In her work on the Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt put forward that the sole purpose of the 
criminal trial is to make a finding on the guilt or innocence of the accused and to impose a 
sentence in the case of a guilty verdict.
1358
 It has been almost 50 years since the publication of 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. Yet Arendt’s view has been reiterated or positively endorsed by 
many over subsequent years.
1359
 It remains an enduring and powerful point of critique. By 
putting criminal justice’s ability to effect social change into question, it strikes close to what I 
believe constitutes the beating heart of the project of international criminal justice.  
 
 
                                                          
1358
 Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem) (supra) 253. 
1359
 See, for example, Douglas (The Didactic Trial) (supra); Galbraith (The Pace of International Criminal 
Justice) (supra). 
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8.5.2 Alternative Outlook on the Role of International Criminal Justice in 
Transformation 
 
Can ICL achieve broader social purposes? Based on the arguments above, and subject to 
constraints which must be duly considered, it is submitted that this is a realistic possibility in 
the long term. The foundational rationales of ICL guide it beyond the objective of 
determining and punishing individual guilt toward ideals and objectives that have a socially 
transformative impact. ICL is driven by values and purposes which exempts it from the 
traditional paradigm of criminal law objectives which leans heavily towards retribution. 
Although the establishment of individual guilt is the primary focus under both domestic 
criminal law and ICL, punishment under ICL and by international tribunals reaches beyond 
the individual perpetrator and further than the retributive function of punishment to goals that 
have a broader social utility. ICL’s value and influence is furthermore not confined to 
expression by way of judgments and punishment. The international criminal justice system as 
a whole produces forward-looking effects that may influence the decisions and actions of 
various actors.
1360
 The question should not be whether ICL is justified to pursue such 
objectives, but how these objectives can be reached by ICL in conjunction with the many 
other movements which aim to transform the world into a better place.  
 
This thesis has not purported to bestow some type of supernatural value on ICL. Nor 
have I tried to prove what might be deemed ‘the radical assertion’ that ICL’s fledgling 
exterior belies great transformative potential. The thesis presents a more realistic evaluation 
of ICL’s transformative value and potential from a broad perspective by taking cognisance of 
the abovementioned possibilities and also to offer an alternative outlook on ICL’s role in 
transformation as well as the value it may hold in the long run. Much of this thesis has 
indicated that there are challenges to ICL as a socially transformative device as well as 
dependencies and interdependencies which are crucial to its ability to fulfil its existential 
mandate. Perhaps it may be argued that the proponents of international criminal justice have 
been both overly protective of the legal sanctity of the project and under-appreciative of the 
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 See Chapter 1 para 1.5 (assumption 2) supra. It is submitted that the influence of ICL on the decision-
making may present a fertile ground for further study. 
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impact of power on international criminal justice.
1361
 Rather than taking the view (as legal 
purist may do) of politics as an insurmountable obstacle to international criminal justice, 
politics must be acknowledged as an asset to the broader transformative purpose of ICL. The 
negative influences of politics on international criminal justice must be regarded as areas of 
awareness and concern deserving the attention of anyone with a genuine interest in a fair and 
balanced system of international criminal justice.  
 
It is prudent to say that the general picture of international criminal justice is much 
less blurry today than it was in the aftermath of the Second World War. The core crimes and 
their elements have achieved a measure of permanence in the Rome Statute while the 
substance of ICL has been developed by various international, hybrid and domestic courts 
which have applied it to a more or less uniform degree. Modern ICL has reached the point in 
its development where it exists as an independent species of international law. Yet, as in the 
past, the dual characteristics and unique nature of ICL (the fact that it is backward- and 
forward-looking, repressive and normative and politicised) creates conflict within the field 
and clashes with the classical rubric on the accepted principles, functioning and role of 
criminal law. This conflict has been the point of focus for ICL’s objective critics and 
ideological opponents alike. However, as ICL continues to gain legitimacy and enters what 
can arguably be referred to as its post-ontological era, it may become possible to approach 
ICL not from the viewpoint of internal conflicts, but from the viewpoint of the possible 
benefits of these dual characteristics in light of its sui generis nature.  
 
8.6 Final Remarks 
 
In spite of the diverging arguments which I have forwarded hereto, it must be acknowledged 
that as a species of criminal law, ICL remains largely retributive in character. The primary 
purposes of international criminal trials and the domestic prosecution of international crime is 
to hold perpetrators accountable for having transgressed the norms of the international 
community. ICL’s ambitious mandate of transformation is mostly precipitated by the 
application of substantive criminal law in a formal criminal trial. Moreover, the act of 
punishment remains the primary effect-producing mechanism of criminal law. These general 
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 For an analysis of various works regarding the politics of international criminal justice, see Megret 
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boundaries of criminal law are perhaps the most fundamental practical restrictions on ICL as 
an instrument of social change.  
 
However, I am only partially in agreement with those supporters of Hannah Arendt 
who assert that a trial’s exclusive purpose is to render justice to the offender. There are 
grounds for asserting that ICL is somewhat exempt from this narrow social function. The 
formal application of sui generis criminal law in sui generis situations may have effects that 
go well beyond the courtroom walls and beyond the immediately affected parties. Ultimately, 
law exists in response to social problems and, to reiterate Snyman’s opening observation, “a 
tree is known by its fruit”.1362 International criminal justice is by exception a collection of 
laws which is intended to apply in and over situations where the very limits of the law’s 
ability to create a better world (to ‘bear fruit’) is put to the sword and pushed to the extreme. 
When the international community is watching, international criminal law norms and the 
trials through which they are interpreted and applied, tap into larger issues and questions 
affecting humanity in general. Whether by design or through coincidence (or both), this gives 
unique educative, normative and symbolic dimensions to international criminal justice and 
allows international criminal justice to enter into the moral dimension of values, of right and 
wrong and of human interconnectedness. This is the territory of the likes of Aristotle, Kant, 
Bentham and Mill, where international criminal justice becomes a projection of what the 
world is, what it might be and what it ought to be as part of an on-going process to progress 
from an imperfect reality to an imagined alternative. This is a long-term, perhaps never 
ending project, in which the role of criminal trials are historically unequalled and in which 
the international criminal justice system as a whole might yet play a transformative role. 
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